

The Year Book of College Debating

INTERCOLLEGIATE
DEBATES

Affirmative and Negative

Volume XIX

Edited by
EGBERT RAY NICHOLS

808.5 I61 v. 9

Kansas City Public Library



This Volume is for
REFERENCE USE ONLY

5-37-6M-P

YEAR BOOK OF COLLEGE DEBATING

INTERCOLLEGIATE DEBATES

Edited by
EGBERT RAY NICHOLS
Professor of Speech
University of Redlands, California



VOLUME XIX

NOBLE & NOBLE PUBLISHERS, INC.
100 Fifth Avenue, New York City

Copyright, 1938

By NOBLE AND NOBLE, *Publishers, Inc.*

REFERENCE

EDITOR'S FOREWORD

Two main interests marked intercollegiate debating in the season of 1937-1938: Foreign policy of the United States and the Difficulties of Capital and Labor in Industry. A few other domestic problems and affairs were discussed, such as the Ever-Normal Granary Plan, Reorganization of the Federal Executive, and Referendum on Declaration of War or the Ludlow Amendment to the Constitution, which, in reality, is rather closely connected to Foreign Policy.

Under the general heading of "Foreign Policy of the United States," such debate subjects are included as: An Alliance with Great Britain, which will be the National High School subject for 1938-1939; The Policy of Neutrality; Anglo-American Action against Japan; Armed Protection of Foreign Investments; The Big Navy Policy; Abandonment of Isolation and the Present Neutrality Law; Collective Security Plans for Democracy; and Limitation of Aggression by Dictatorships.

Included in the Industrial or Labor and Capital issues were: Giving the National Labor Relations Board Power to Enforce Arbitration of all Industrial Disputes, which was the National Pi Kappa Delta subject; Collective Bargaining in the Mass Production Industries; Craft Unionism *vs.* Industrial Unionism; The

Union Closed Shop; and Incorporation of Labor Unions.

Not all of the above mentioned subjects could be included in this volume. Several of them are, however. Some of them have been included in previous volumes in this series; for example, several discussions of Taxation of various kinds, The Japanese or Oriental Situation, Neutrality, and Control of the Arms and Munitions Trade.

Debates on the National High School Subject of 1937-38, the Unicameral Legislature, and on the Pi Kappa Delta subject, Arbitration of Industrial Disputes by the NLRB were purposely left out of this volume because they can easily be found elsewhere, and because the Unicameral Legislature has been included previously in this series. The Editor felt that space should be given as far as possible to other subjects of interest not so widely debated which will be of interest next debate season, and to the subject that the High Schools will use next year.

The Pi Kappa Delta subject for the next debate season will not be chosen until September, 1938, which is too late for this volume to carry a debate on it, unless by chance the same subject is chosen as has been dealt with in one of the debates included in this book. Indications point now to a subject chosen in the field of foreign relations or one dealing with the New Deal and the political situation in the United States. Either discussion would be profitable, pertinent, and informative, and these two subjects are likely to occasion consider-

able discussion in the academic debate world in the next two years.

The prevalence of many tournaments throughout the country, and the three national tournaments to prepare for each debate season, have a tendency to cut down the number of subjects debated and to concentrate attention on a few subjects.

Many colleges debate but one subject during the season, and few of them debate more than three subjects. This is not so true, however, of the colleges that do not engage in tournament debating, but who specialize on Radio, Service Club and public forum debating. In this field one college may engage in as many as ten or fifteen different debates on different subjects. This requires a large debate squad and the concentration of the work of certain teams on the squad upon one subject a semester, or not more than two or three during the season. It is, of course, impossible to do good debating if one changes subjects too often. Good debating requires considerable study and research and considerable practice debating before the team is ready for the platform or a radio appearance. The value of many of the tournaments lies in their opportunities for practice and development upon any given debate subject.

It would seem in many cases, however, that a year on one subject is perhaps too much time. The subject can be pretty well learned and its interest exhausted by the average debater in a single semester—that is, the average debate subject can. Occasionally a subject is bigger and merits a year's work, but that is seldom

true. The attempt, however, to get the National Convention of Pi Kappa Delta to use two subjects a year failed, largely because of the fact that many of the colleges do not debate throughout the two semesters of the college year, and felt that for strenuous competition they could not prepare on more than one. In a way, this is greatly to be regretted as the debater needs the study and outlook on more of the great public questions than he will get in four college debate seasons, concentrating on one question each season.

There is nothing, perhaps, which broadens and enlightens the debater on public questions more than engaging in debate on those questions, so the more subjects debated, inside the limitations of proper preparation, the better, and the more education for citizenship obtained. This really is a very important matter as college debaters are likely to take leadership in the future in legislatures and in Congress where these questions must be finally settled.

After all it is more important that the Speech training of the colleges and the programs of such organizations as Pi Kappa Delta, Phi Rho Pi, and the National Forensic League should be aimed at practical education for citizenship and leadership in affairs rather than at victory in contests. The zest for contests and for victories is good when it is utilized to further the education of the individual, but not so important if all the emphasis is placed upon the forensic victory.

Today in education we have a controversy over contest debating because educational aims are not fully realized. One group concentrates on contests, not for

education, but for victories. Another group revolts at having any contests because they resent over-emphasis on victories. They, in turn, neglect a valuable educational asset in the contest, and abandon debating altogether, or attempt to get its educational values out of such substitutes as group discussion, panel discussion, symposium, and legislative assemblies. All of these educational methods have value, but they cannot give the same values that debate of the good old traditional type furnishes. There is room for all of these methods, and if the debater engages in all of them, and uses different subjects in different types of speaking activities, he will gain something of the value involved in debating many subjects.

Intercollegiate Debates opens its pages to all types of debating. Throughout the series many different kinds of debating have been presented. In addition to traditional debating, the cross-question types, open forum types, symposiums, and various types of discussions have been included. For instance, the present volume includes the regular varsity type of debate, direct clash debate (not before included), radio debate, open forum debate, and symposium. Many of the debates included in this volume were electrically transcribed in whole or in part, taken off the record later, and in some cases edited and improved for publication.

The electrical transcription debate is becoming quite popular and enables cross-country debates to take place without the expense of travel. Often, if good transcriptions are obtained, the debates are later given by electrical transcription over the radio. One of the distinct

advantages of this type of debating for the speakers involved is the opportunity offered to hear themselves speak. The incentive to personal improvement inherent in this experience is self-evident. The advantage to the teacher is that he can require the students to write out their speeches to meet the time limit possible on the record, and can thus find out ahead of time what the debaters propose to say, and can seize the opportunity to criticize and demand improvement. This has obvious educational advantages over the extemporaneous tournament debating where the instructor does not know what his debaters are doing and saying. Electrical transcription, then, is likely to have considerable effect in improving the standard of extemporaneous speaking and debating.

The Editor herewith presents as much of a record of the past debate season as the limits of this work make possible, with the hope that it will prove of value and of service to the debating world. Contributions from next season's debates will be welcomed. If you are contemplating sending in a debate next year, write to the undersigned to make arrangements. It is to be hoped that the next debate season will unfold as many new and interesting discussions and revive as many unsettled and important issues as the present season has presented.

EGBERT RAY NICHOLS,
University of Redlands,
Redlands, California.

CONTENTS

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| FOREWORD | iii |
| AN ALLIANCE WITH GREAT BRITAIN | 1 |
| University of Redlands <i>vs.</i> Pasadena College | |
| NEUTRALITY, FREEDOM OF ACTION, AND ALLIANCES | 49 |
| Symposium by George Washington University, Cornell University, University of Puerto Rico, and University of Virginia | |
| NEUTRALITY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES | 111 |
| University of Arizona <i>vs.</i> Arizona State Teachers College | |
| ANGLO-AMERICAN BOYCOTT ON JAPANESE GOODS | 151 |
| Montana State University <i>vs.</i> Gonzaga University | |
| LARGER NAVY IN THE PACIFIC | 187 |
| North Carolina State College <i>vs.</i> University of Pennsylvania | |
| REFERENDUM ON DECLARATION OF WAR | 205 |
| University of Wisconsin <i>vs.</i> University of Iowa | |
| REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE | 247 |
| Winthrop College Affirmative and Negative | |
| COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN MASS-PRODUCTION INDUS- TRIES | 287 |
| University of Pittsburgh <i>vs.</i> University of Missouri | |

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| THE UNION CLOSED SHOP | 347 |
| Denison University Affirmative and Negative | |
| THE EVER-NORMAL GRANARY PLAN | 403 |
| Iowa State College <i>vs.</i> Kansas State College | |
| APPENDIX | 425 |
| List of Subjects covered in Intercollegiate Debates, <i>Volumes I—XIX</i> | |

AN ALLIANCE WITH GREAT BRITAIN

*University-type Debate on the High
School Subject*

UNIVERSITY OF REDLANDS AFFIRMATIVE *vs.* PASADENA
COLLEGE NEGATIVE

At the end of the college year the two college squads mentioned above made a brief study of the National Subject for high schools for the following season. Several reasons led to this procedure: the regular season was ended and the national college subject dropped, but some time remained for the squad or debate class to fill so a look into the future was in order. A second reason was the likelihood of drawing a national subject for colleges on the same problem or an allied one. Third, there was the general interest of the debaters personally in pursuing information on this particular proposal in order to be competent judges for high school debates, as well as well-informed citizens. Fourth, the national high school tournament is to be held in Southern California during the next season, a fact which stimulates college debaters' interest in the subject to be used.

This particular debate was partly written out and partly electrically transcribed, the speeches being later revised by the debaters after a round table conference on the proposition. The debate is not exactly presented as originally given, as both sides wished to improve their work as much as possible in the time available. The regular statement of the high school subject was used, and care was taken to avoid any difficulties over the meaning of the term "alliance."

The statement of the 1938-39 high school subject is: Resolved, that the United States should form an alliance with Great Britain.

The debate was held in the recording room at the University of Redlands, May 28, 1938, before the coaches and some of the members of both debate squads. The Director of Debate at Pasadena College is Robert D. Clark. The speeches were collected by the Editor of this volume, Director of Debate at the University of Redlands.

AN ALLIANCE WITH GREAT BRITAIN

First Affirmative, Eugene Sill
University of Redlands

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: We of the Affirmative deem it a pleasure to have the opportunity of debating our good friends from Pasadena College here in Redlands this afternoon. We hope that this debate may be of mutual interest and value to us.

We of the Affirmative are chiefly concerned in one thing: to obtain the best possible world relations and security for America in the best possible way, as free from war as is feasible for our national well-being. Let us be practical, throw away all of our romantic viewpoints and look at the problem of peace and war in a realistic way. We affirm that if there is a question to be settled, and two methods, one of war and one of peace, arise as a means of settling that dispute, the peaceful method is the more desirable. Peace may not be possible, but we propose that it should be the basis of our policy if there is a logical method for employing it.

Since it is desirable, economically and politically, that we have peace, we of the Affirmative wish to propose the best method by which that peace can be obtained. That method is outlined in the question for debate: Resolved, that the United States should establish an alliance with Great Britain.

In clarifying our stand, we of the Affirmative wish to

present the definition of alliance given by Pitman B. Potter, "The simplest form of international political union is the alliance, which may be defined as an association of two or more otherwise independent states for a common purpose." With such a definition in mind, let us proceed to see how such a proposed association and cooperation between Great Britain and the United States may lead to an improved international relationship. We wish to show that neutrality has not brought peace in the past and does not really afford the best possible method of protecting us from war at the present time. With the failure of neutrality there are but two methods left to bring us peace. One of these is international cooperation through the League of Nations and the World Court, and the other method is to cooperate with our neighbor democracy and mother country, Great Britain, through a process by which our combined good-wills and strength of armament may insure the peace, give adequate defense for America, and help to insure the great democratic ideal for the world, as opposed to the more illiberal and dangerous Fascism of central Europe. We shall prove that the League and the World Court are no longer the logical bodies with which to cooperate, and that we have but one remaining path to peace and security: to join Great Britain in an alliance.

We emphasize, friends, that the world appears to be headed toward war, and that we as a nation are in serious danger of being drawn into it under our present neutrality policy. For more than five years—since Japan invaded China in 1931—we have been trying to

"kid" ourselves that peace is still possible under our traditional policy, and we have hastened to patch up that old policy. Neutrality, under the recent Neutrality Act or any other similar machinery, is still neutrality, and as such cannot succeed. With internal conflict in Spain between Communism and Fascism, with the invasion of China by Japan and the resulting atrocities, with strained relations in Austria and Czechoslovakia, with militant nationalism in Italy and Germany, and with the unprecedented increases in armaments in the democracies, how can anyone say neutrality can insure us from war or prevent war?

At one time we had an opportune moment to join the other nations of the world in cooperation—immediately after the World War. But now it is too late. The recent trends toward international chaos and disorder have convinced us that war is inevitable in the future, unless we radically alter our foreign policy.

According to Major K. A. Bratt, "The developments of the nineteenth century did not lead . . . to the World War alone. The same policy is still in the main pursued by European statecraft. One may perhaps assert that this development could not be avoided. One thing is certain, and that should be writ in large letters: if it continues, the next Great War cannot be prevented."

What do we have to protect us from such war? Only our traditional policy of neutrality; yet that policy has got us into war in the past. Neutrality did not protect us from the War of 1812. History indicates that we have not in the past escaped war when it came to

Europe, and we cannot do so in the future. In the two decades preceding the War of 1812, the Presidents of the United States were determined that we should stay neutral in the conflict raging between Great Britain and France. Two embargoes were set up at different times, declarations of our neutrality were made, Jefferson came in as a pacifist President, and public opinion was determined to maintain isolation. How strangely like our own time this sounds! Perhaps the results of our action today will be the same as were those in 1812. At that time, after the Embargo of December, 1807, our exports were cut from \$108,000,000 to \$22,000,000; and such intense economic disturbance arose in New England that there was talk of secession. In spite of or because of these measures, we went to war with England in 1812 and isolation definitely failed.

How similar the conditions were in 1918, we all know. From the time of the First Hague Conference in 1899 to the actual declaration of war by President Wilson, we had hoped to keep ourselves free from the pending war. No man was ever more sincere than was Wilson that we must not go to war against Germany. He tried to be neutral. According to Charles Seymore, Wilson may have had a definite leaning toward the Allies from the outset; yet he leaned so far the other way to prevent his personal opinion from entering in, that both sides accused him of being too friendly with the other side. Yet, in spite of this neutrality on the part of the President, we failed. Let me quote from the book by Dulles and Armstrong, *Can We Be Neutral?*: "The American people have an overwhelming

desire to remain at peace with the rest of the world. They say that it is worth almost any sacrifice to keep free of other people's wars. But did they not have the very same feeling in the days preceding the War of 1812 and the opening phases of the World War? On neither occasion, as it turned out, were they willing to pay the price of peace, either in loss of trade or diminished national prestige. The wars of Europe became our wars."

Not only has neutrality failed in the past, but it is only logical that it will fail now if adequately put to the test. Dulles and Armstrong say: "We cannot rely for the maintenance of neutrality on the calm and measured judgment of our press and people. Any serious incident which seemed to involve our national honor would find us again ready to fight, despite our devotion to peace in the abstract, and despite the activities of peace societies and our churches." Further, Walter Hines Page has said, "A government can be neutral, but no man can be." It is extremely doubtful if our present act for neutrality could keep us out of war if the pressure of public opinion and economic interests were opposed to it. It was an act passed in an emergency for one particular situation. Who knows that it would meet the test of a different situation and different forces from those which it was intended to meet? We of the Affirmative seek something more substantial as the basis for our peace.

Two methods are then open to us. Obviously, the League of Nations is not the logical agency now. At one time it may have been. In the Peace Conference

at Paris after the World War, visionaries such as Wilson and Lloyd George were determined to establish a new world order. Although France was adamant and caused such strict measures to be placed against Germany that constant friction has existed since that time, conditions during the middle twenties were greatly improved and world cooperation seemed possible. The Dawes Plan of 1924 eased the stress over Germany's reparation payments; and the Pact of Locarno in 1925, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 seemed to insure peace to the world. Still it was not too late for the United States to join the League. But now it definitely is too late. Germany, Italy, and Japan are no longer members. The League is losing favor in the eyes of the British. In fact, the French and some of the second-rate powers are the only nations which are now in favor of its policies. Obviously, it is foolish for us to join this League.

The only direction in which we may turn is to join England in an alliance in order to maintain the security and safety of the form of government which we of America and England consider superior to all of the other governmental forms in the world—democracy. These nations working together can definitely display enough defense, collectively, to protect themselves from aggressors and can be a powerful influence for peace throughout the world. They can help to enforce peace among nations. In fact, it is only by force that a Hitler or a Mussolini can be stopped. We mean resistance on the part of a combined England and America that would command Hitler's respect and make him exceed-

ingly cautious about moving any further into central Europe. G. F. Eliot has said in an article entitled "Hitler's Balance Sheet," appearing in the *New Republic* for May 25, 1938, that Hitler "can now be stopped only by force, at the risk of war." Mr. Eliot admits that war might be the result of such force, but he does not feel that war would be inevitable. Force, used in the position of the famous "passive policeman" might thus be sufficient to maintain the peace. Thus might the world be prevented from plunging again into war, with the possibility of the utter extinction of democratic forms of government.

My colleague, Mr. Roskam, will show you a great number of benefits which would accrue from such an alliance, but let me show you why England is the logical country with which to ally. Since unaggressive force has become the only possible method for our maintenance of peace, we need the combined force of England and the United States to insure such peace. Neither one of us alone, sometimes cooperating and sometimes not, is great enough to maintain the peace. But combined, our chances of acting in the role of passive policeman are much greater. Further, the dangers of invasion of our mainland are becoming more acute than they once were. Modern science has made such invasion possible. Some experts feel that such invasion is entirely possible and might come about with a great victory of the Fascist powers in Europe. Add to this the fact that the largest percentage of our munitions factories are concentrated in the vulnerable coastal areas, the fact that our population is becoming concentrated

on our seaboard regions, and the fact that other nations are arming rapidly, we see that dangers of attack are considerable. Alliance is necessary, and only Great Britain offers a logical ally.

Our interests, our ideals, our background are identical with those of Great Britain. We are the two great democracies. We already have a virtual alliance with Great Britain through our present Neutrality Act. England is closely connected with Canada, and our close relations with her also make our North American interests common with those of Great Britain. Great Britain and the United States are interlocked economically, and have complementary purposes.

Therefore, since we have proved that the present methods of securing peace have failed and are not promising in the future, and that of the other methods, none are adequate except alliance with Great Britain, we feel that such an alliance should be formed.

First Negative, Charles M. Guss
Pasadena College

WORTHY OPPONENTS, FRIENDS: It is always fitting that the attention of the world should be directly focused upon international relationships. Because the intensity of this focus has by recent developments been greatly magnified, the high schools are to be commended for their choice of this question.

We have just been informed that the purpose of the Affirmative proposal that the United States establish an alliance with Great Britain is that America "might

have the best possible world relations and security," and that world peace might be more probable. The first Affirmative speaker cited to us the failure of neutrality, the World Court, and the League of Nations; and then, surprisingly, he came to the conclusion that we should ally ourselves with Great Britain—blandly assuming that peace would follow. Certainly the gentlemen have not seen the danger of using such logic, for it is to be remembered that peace is not a static element but entirely relative.

In the presentation of the proposal we do not feel that the situation involved in world unrest has been accurately analyzed. We contend that the United States should not establish an alliance with Great Britain because:

1. The alliance would fail to accomplish its purpose.
2. The policy would engender the hostility of other nations toward us.
3. An alliance would crumble in the face of economic and political interests.

It is our desire to consider first the purpose of the resolution. Will it, as has been suggested by the first speaker: (1) guarantee defense to America, and (2) make world peace more probable?

One needs only to peruse this first purpose of such an Anglo-American alliance to identify a basic false assumption. Is it to us that the alliance would guarantee defense? What precarious position are we in that it seems necessary to ally ourselves with Great Britain? It is not necessary even to scrutinize this assumption to see that the alliance would be wholly for

the protection of England and not for us. We see that Great Britain has colonies, colonies to protect, if you please, that are scattered throughout the world. This is not true of the United States. Great Britain is separated from Continental Europe by the short distance across the English Channel. England always has been and today must be concerned in every controversy on the Continent. Thus, the supremacy of England is based on the fact that she does not allow any nation to gain too much power in Europe. It is England, then, that is vitally interested in protection from seething powers in Europe. An alliance with Great Britain would not serve to protect us, as oceans separate us from the concerns of England and Europe. It would only make us "Big Brother" for a badly spoiled "John Bull."

In considering the second purpose of an alliance of the United States with England, namely, to make world peace more probable, we present a fact that is fundamental in the consideration of peace. It is this: It is absurd for us to expect peace as a result of a coalition of the United States with England unless that coalition will solve the problem that is making for unrest. We were just informed of the "internal conflict in Spain," of the "invasion of China and Austria," and "militant nationalism in Italy and Germany." But, friends, there is a reason why Japan casts envious eyes upon a weak and undeveloped Asia, rich in world resources. There is a reason why Adolph Hitler today has the most powerful army in the world and is attempting once again to unite a scattered, defeated German people.

There is a reason why Benito Mussolini stood before a tumultuous Italian people and amid cheers shouted, "The order of the day for Italians, for Fascist Italians, can only be this! We must be strong. We must be always stronger. We must be so strong that we can face any eventualities and look directly in the eye whatever may befall." The reason is that each of these factions has a grievance to settle that it feels can be settled only by war.

The Treaty of Versailles has made and will continue to make more history than it was ever intended to. Although it surely cannot be claimed guilty of engendering all of the unrest in Europe, it has provoked a sentiment, an attitude, that as long as it exists will endanger the peace of the world. It is an attitude that an alliance cannot solve. You will recall that the treaty, whether it was intended to or not, (and the Germans think it was) reduced Germany to the destiny of a second power nation. Herbert Gibbons in his book, *Europe Since 1918*, says this of the treaty: "The greatest blow to Germany in the Treaty of Versailles was the ban it placed upon her contacts with the outside world. She was compelled to give up her colonies, to renounce her commercial treaties, and to surrender everything that she had built up in the way of import and export markets. The aim of the treaty was to eliminate Germany as a competitor in world markets, and to make it impossible for German capital to accomplish anything in the future in Africa and Asia."

But doubtless one of the greatest contributory causes

of ill feeling is that England, America, and France have helped Germany only enough to keep her from going bankrupt, and in all diplomatic relations German statesmen have been utterly ignored. This has produced a feeling that constitutes a problem—and it is a problem that an alliance instead of helping to solve will only make more complex. For if we ally ourselves with Great Britain, we will force other nations into similar action against us. This will mean that the Western World will be divided into two hostile camps.

In 1916 when Italy entered the war, it was the promise of the Allied powers that she would receive, in recompense, valuable islands and colonies in the Mediterranean and North Africa. But in the formation of the treaty we find that the United States, France, and Great Britain were unmoved by the rightful demands of Italy, and consequently the weaker Italian statesmen left in disgust while the treaty was being formed. Time may change many things, but time is only changing Anglo-Italian grievances today, in that added English diplomacy has increased this unpleasant tenseness between Italy and England. England's miserable attempts to halt the Italian advances in Ethiopia by sanctions has produced an arrogant Italian attitude toward the British. Thus it is certain that our alliance would only increase already strained diplomatic relations. An alliance will make Germany and Italy believe that we are cooperating in a deliberate attempt to keep them from getting colonies, an attempt that corresponds in every way with the manner pursued by England in her time of acquisition.

The result of these actions is evident in world events today, for Hitler has inoculated the German people with an unconquerable fervor to be respected once again as a world power; and following the Ethiopian conquest Mussolini enthusiastically declares, "We must be strong." Whether or not Germany and Italy are justified in this attitude toward past Anglo-American relations, or whether or not they are justified in their quest of colonies and supremacy is irrelevant. Be it merely psychological or a fundamental inevitable necessity, the fact remains that this attitude greatly constitutes the problem disturbing peace in the world today. Thus it is the obligation of the gentlemen of the Affirmative to demonstrate that the policy they advocate of an alliance of England and the United States will in any way solve the problem.

Our second basic objection to the plan of the Affirmative is that such an alliance would not only fail in its purpose, but that it would engender the hostility of other nations toward us. As I have just stated, Germany and Italy will feel that the alliance is formed in a deliberate attempt to keep them from getting colonies, thus increasing the hostility. Furthermore, one must be aware of the fact that Great Britain is an expansive Empire. Her problems in one colony are not her problems in other colonies. Her relationships with nations in one part of the world are not her relationships with nations in another. Consequently, any alliance with that country would draw us into controversies and interests with nations which we really should be disinterested in. Such a policy would, of course, then put us in

an unfavorable light with other countries; and instead of promoting friendliness, the alliance would only serve to engulf us in an avalanche of hostilities. Any nation as powerful as is the United States would be a central figure in every controversy. I submit to you that the United States is not prepared now, nor are we willing, to occupy a "big tent" in two hostile Western World camps.

But just as significant as this is the fact that such alliances have acted in the past to cause war. Harry Elmer Barnes in his book, *The Genesis of the World War*, says this regarding causes of the World War: "Unquestionably one of the chief diplomatic causes of the World War was the existence of the great counter-alliances that had come into being between 1871 and 1914. Ostensibly planned in the interest of peace, they actually operated to produce suspicion and fear." And yet, friends, the Affirmative policy would inevitably produce other counter-alliances with that same "suspicion and fear." The history of Europe reveals that it has been the determination of Great Powers that strength shall not be uneven but that there shall be a balance of power. To accomplish this fact, we see the pages of European history loudly proclaim that war has been the principal method. As Mr. Barnes stated, between 1871 and 1914 great counter-alliances were formed. In one system of alliances were Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy—until Italy later formed an alliance with France. In the other system were Great Britain, France, and Russia. Thus as a consequence these powers formed the combatants in the

World War. Since England and France are today closely allied, England is involved in all the problems of Europe. It is then not difficult to realize the complexity of the situation if the United States would ally itself with Great Britain, unbalance European strength, increase that feeling of reproach of Germany and Italy, and then force them into coalition, forming again the situation existing in pre-war days. We submit to you that the Affirmative policy is in direct contrast to any sound plan of peace.

Now at this opportune moment I would be pleased to summarize briefly the Negative issues as they have been presented. We oppose the plan that we ally ourselves with England because:

1. Such an alliance would not fulfill its purpose. It cannot guarantee peace unless it solves existing causes of unrest which we have cited to you. Such an alliance would only increase these problems.

2. Our second objection is that the alliance would engender the hostility of other nations toward us. For these reasons we declare that this policy should be rejected and the United States should not enter into an alliance with Great Britain.

Second Affirmative, William Roskam
University of Redlands

FRIENDS: The accumulation of data seems to point to the existence of a turning point in our American foreign policy. Going back a little we see that in attempting to formulate a more or less definite foreign policy, a bill

with positive tendencies is introduced in Congress; after it has been passed it seems to have been modified considerably in the other direction. After its passage, a situation arises which to many invites its application, yet it is allowed to go unused. Following along the important events in relation to our foreign attitude, we find that our President gives a speech in Chicago which seems to call for positive action against aggressor nations, and about a month later the same President's delegate to Brussels is the leader in a do-nothing policy. Where, then, lies the answer to this seemingly contradictory mass of events?

The fact that this indefinite situation is not limited to the United States is probably realized by all. In this debate we are, of course, concerning ourselves principally with the foreign policies of the United States and Great Britain, referring to others in whatever way they might affect or have bearing on these two.

My colleague, Mr. Sill, has given to you the need and reasons for the adoption of the policy of the Affirmative. Before we proceed with a discussion of the benefits that would follow, let us consider the objections the Negative have raised.

The first speaker for the Negative contended that an alliance would fail in purpose as it would be primarily for England's benefit and that it would not make world peace more probable. He also contended that it would engender the hostility of other nations and that it would result in the formation of counter-alliances.

Before the Negative make the assumption that such an alliance would result primarily in England's benefit,

they should briefly review their history with particular regard to the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. At no time could the United States have enforced that Doctrine as successfully, had it not been for the active or potent threat of help from the British Navy. In the discussion of the benefits, the absurdity of this Negative assumption will again be shown when the help that the United States would be guaranteed in the manipulation of her own navy is outlined.

The Negative, in the assertion that it would not make world peace more probable, have more or less demanded that we remove the entire cause for war. Hardly is this a fair demand to make of any Affirmative, but we will definitely show that an alliance will make peace more probable. The Negative have failed to realize that we pointed out the failure of the World Court and the League of Nations, not in principle but in effect. So the thing that would be most desirable in the light of this fact, is an Anglo-American alliance. As Mr. G. F. Eliot has said, "Hitler can be stopped only by force." Other militant aggressors are of the same standing. Thus an alliance would make world peace more probable by offering a potent force, not to remove the cause of war, as that is for far more comprehensive organizations, but to insure that militant actions would be stopped.

In contending that an alliance would engender the hostility of other nations, the Negative assume that we would stop other nations in some actions; this is quite true. Naturally this suppression would take place only in case of undesirable or militant action on the part

of these other nations. If engendering hostility under these conditions is to be criticized, then the Negative must show that we should let these militant and undesirable actions continue.

As to the assertion that it would cause counter-alliances, certainly the Negative are not going to be so naive as to refuse to recognize the present actual if not written alliances between Rome and Berlin, between Tokio and Berlin, and between other such capitals. By what reasoning can the Negative contend that a proposed alliance, in the future, could be the direct cause for alliances which exist, in the present?

After thus having answered the assertions the Negative have so far made, let us proceed with a survey of the actual benefits that would follow the adoption of such a plan.

The first benefit that would result from the establishment of an Anglo-American alliance is the guaranteeing of our national sovereignty. Perhaps this sounds startling to some of you, but actually our sovereignty should be protected from the aggressiveness of some European powers. Great Britain is our first line of defense in Europe. If Great Britain, one of the world's two outstanding democracies, goes down, then what is to be the future of America, the other leading democracy? Definitely, such an alliance would have as one of its benefits a far reaching guarantee of our national sovereignty. Allow me to quote from *Interpretations of American Foreign Policy*, by Quincy Wright: "We on our side, then, are making a planned and persistent effort to convert the Anglo-American relationship in re-

spect of sea power from a menace of conflict into a movement of cooperation. And why? Because competition in sea power contains the only menace of war between us, and because cooperation in sea power is the best means both of us have for banishing war from the world."

Along this same vein allow me to quote Livingston Hartley in *Is America Afraid?*: "The United States and the British Empire outclass all other nations in every form of national power except permanent military establishments. In financial strength, trade, resources, and sea power they have no other peers and are comparable only to each other."

Between the United States and Great Britain there now exists some cooperation in the manipulation of our navies. To quote again from Livingston Hartley, "We have seen how the British Navy by its control of the North Sea and the Western Mediterranean makes American Atlantic security absolute and allows us to concentrate our battle fleet in the Pacific." Under the policy of an alliance this cooperation would be guaranteed and the benefit not only of the cooperation but the advance knowledge and approval of this action would be mutually desirable. First, it would allow us to concentrate our navy in the Pacific and Great Britain to concentrate her fleet in the Atlantic. This concentration coupled with complete understanding and knowledge of each other's actions would assure both of us of adequate and increased protection. Second, such coordination of activity would result in the lessening of de-

mands for large navy expenditures both for us and for Great Britain.

The establishment of an alliance with Great Britain would guarantee the preservation of many intangible and also tangible ties and connections, to the mutual benefit of the United States and Great Britain. Many of the conditions mentioned exist today, but the guarantee of their preservation and continuation and even their possible expansion would definitely be beneficial.

First, an alliance would preserve the intangible ties of our relations with Canada and other members of the empire in uniting us with the British Commonwealth. It would thus assure the continuation of the peace of the famous three thousand miles of unarmed boundary.

An alliance would assure the preservation of our tangible trade relations with England and parts of the British Empire. In 1934 over 40 per cent of our total exports were sold to the British Empire. More than a third of Canada's exports are shipped to this country. We buy 34 per cent of our total foreign imports from the British Empire, and we are India's third best customer.

Third, it would guarantee the protection of the American investments made in enterprises in British countries. According to Professor Charles A. Beard in his recent book, *The Idea of National Interest*, the percentage of American investments of this type in the British Empire is very important; these investments amount to more than \$2,700,000,000 or more than 36 per cent of the world total.

Fourth, as was mentioned when refuting the Negative

objections, the Monroe Doctrine has been helped and supported by the British Navy, as was exemplified in the Venezuelan incident. This policy has also helped Great Britain. The preservation and guaranteed continuation would be but another of the benefits that would follow the establishment of an Anglo-American alliance.

Fifth, the United States would have the advantage of being consulted before acts likely to result in war were entered into. Great Britain could not drag us into war as she can now most inevitably without consulting us beforehand and giving us a voice in shaping policy. We had no voice in shaping the events that precipitated the last war. We shall have none in the events that will bring the next war, under present conditions. Allied with Great Britain we shall be the first to be consulted before important and far reaching decisions are made.

The last and most important benefit under the policy of the Affirmative is the maintenance of democracy and the preservation of socially progressive civilization. The United States and Great Britain are both interested in the maintenance of international democracy, both are supporters of peace; their methods may vary, but their goal is the same. These two nations are committed to peace in accordance with the obligations accepted in October, 1929, when President Hoover and Prime Minister MacDonald issued the following joint announcement in relation to this pact.

" . . . both our governments resolve to accept the peace pact not only as a declaration of our good intentions but as a positive obligation to direct our national

policy in accordance with its pledges," as quoted by Henry L. Stimson in *The Far Eastern Crisis*.

Even this brief outline leaves no doubt that the United States and Great Britain are complementary in their own and in world interests. The strength of one adds to the safety of the other. Paralleling this thought are the words of Livingston Hartley: "There is no question in such circumstances that the United States and the British Empire can protect their common interests far more effectively in concert than either can alone. The case for Anglo-American cooperation appears unassailable whenever international democracy or any mutual interest is at stake."

Allow me to close with the words of Prime Minister Baldwin on the eve of his taking office, in June, 1935: "I have always believed that the greatest security against war, in any part of the world whatever, in Europe, in the East, anywhere, would be the close collaboration of the British Empire with the United States. The combined power of the navies, the potential manpower, the immediate economic power of refusal to trade or lend moneys, would be a sanction that no power on earth, however strong, would dare to face. . . . I look forward to the future and see that union of forces for peace and justice in the world and cannot but think that, even if we cannot openly advocate it yet, some day those who follow us may see it and know that the peace of the world is guaranteed by those who speak our tongue." *

* Young, Eugene J., *Powerful America*, Frederick A. Stokes Co., New York, 1936.

Second Negative, Byron H. Chilson
Pasadena College

FRIENDS: I wish to express my appreciation for the privilege of meeting the gentlemen from Redlands this afternoon. I feel that we have a very appropriate subject for discussion. I have listened with much attention to the Affirmative case which is now before us. It is interesting. But I am afraid the gentlemen have overlooked some very important angles to this question. The first speaker spent considerable time demonstrating first, that the League of Nations had failed to maintain peace; second, that our policy of neutrality had failed to maintain peace. Then on the basis of these two premises, he proceeded to draw the entirely unrelated conclusion that we should have an alliance with Great Britain. What would Socrates say to such a syllogism as this?

Let us consider it a moment. We will grant that the League of Nations has been a bitter disappointment to pacifists. We will further grant that our policy of neutrality has not kept us out of war. But that does not mean it has been of no value. Following this policy, the United States has been involved in fewer serious international problems and wars than any contemporary power. The gentlemen said that neutrality did not keep us out of the World War. It kept us out two years longer than an alliance with England would have. The Affirmative stated that neutrality failed to avert the War of 1812. Would an alliance with any power have prevented this conflict? Because it has not achieved per-

fection and kept us out of all wars, the Affirmative would condemn our policy of neutrality. They overlook what it has accomplished. Last year some 10,000 people were murdered in the United States. Should we destroy the murder laws? According to the logic of the Affirmative, since these laws have not worked perfectly, we should allow the gangster to declare open season on their victims without restraint.

The Affirmative are in favor of peace, but it seems that they wish to bring peace by removing our policy of staying out of international problems in Europe as far as possible. Instead, they would thrust us into each and every quarrel and dispute of Great Britain.

The Affirmative have said that an alliance is desirable due to our common interests. In the past the United States and Great Britain have cooperated splendidly without an alliance. Every benefit which the Affirmative have attributed in advance to their proposed policy has already been accomplished without an alliance through a policy of cooperation. Our border relations with Canada have been maintained peacefully without such an alliance. Trade relations with the English colonies has advanced steadily without such an alliance. If cooperation has achieved benefits, the desirability of the proposed alliance, as well as the logic, disappear.

Mr. Guss has already told you that an alliance with Great Britain would fail to accomplish its purpose. It would not preserve peace. It would not help us defensively. Secondly, he told you that such an alliance would arouse the animosity of other countries against us. I propose to show you that such an alliance would not be

able to stand the strain of varying economic and diplomatic interests which the two countries possess. The third position of the Negative is then: that an alliance between Great Britain and the United States would crumble due to different spheres of influence and interests.

It has long been an accepted principle of British diplomacy that the mission of England is to maintain the balance of power in Europe. For nearly two centuries England has played the weaker countries of Europe against the most powerful nation of the time. Her procedure is simple. By diplomatic intrigue, she allies two or three weaker countries against the stronger. She keeps out of the struggle, herself, until one side becomes weaker, in order to maintain a proper balance. She feels that such a policy is necessary in order to preserve her national existence. England is only a small country. She lies only a few hours travel from several powerful countries, many times her size. To allow these countries to become too powerful would be disastrous to England. Consequently, she is always in the midst of European intrigue. Do we of the United States wish to become involved in the constant threat of European war? An alliance with England would make this necessary, if it were to be maintained. The United States has always avoided European questions as much as possible. If England became involved in a serious European dispute, the United States would not support her. The treaty would thus be broken, and hard feelings would be the result.

The Open Door policy in China as we know it has

been in operation since 1842. It did not receive its name until 1899, when Secretary of State Hay circulated a pamphlet stating this policy among the nations. It has been said that this was circulated due to the influence of the British foreign office. This may be true but the policy itself is a definite policy of American diplomacy. Although England has many more commercial interests in China, it is the United States who maintains the Open Door. England was first opposed and then in favor of this policy. But the United States has been constant in throwing her influence against any nation which threatens the existence of Chinese nationalism. She has in turn opposed Germany, France, England, Russia, and Japan. Since the conquest of Korea by the "Land of the Rising Sun" in 1895, Japan has been a constant threat to the policy of the United States in the Orient. Consequently, America has opposed every move of Japan since that time. She has constantly thrown her influence in favor of Russia, the most logical enemy of Japan in the East. When Japan was thoroughly whipping Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, the United States intervened and offered a peaceable settlement. President Roosevelt negotiated the Treaty of Portsmouth between the two powers. Japan failed to gain many of the privileges she would have undoubtedly received had the war not been cut short.

It is thus apparent that England and the United States are both interested in the balance of power, but not in the same sphere. An alliance between the two countries would force both nations into spheres in which they are not vitally interested. If we were allied with

England we would become involved in maintaining the balance of power in Europe. Although it is no longer possible to stay out of Europe entirely, we do keep out of European quarrels as much as possible. Our interest is more vital in the Orient. The policy of neutrality helps us to stay out of European entanglements. An alliance with England would thrust us directly into every controversy which would arise. Do we wish this to happen? On the other hand, such an alliance would force England to help the United States maintain the Open Door policy in the Orient. She has never been willing to do this. In the Japanese campaign of 1931-32 in China and in the present campaign, the United States has opposed Japan in every possible way except by arms. Our government has many times appealed to England for help. England is willing for the United States to attempt to halt Japan. She will not aid us, though she has more extensive commercial interest than we do. Her paramount interest lies in Europe. Once again the alliance would fail. If the United States became involved in serious troubles with Japan, England would not support us.

There is yet another divergence of interests. England is even more interested in the sea route through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal than she is in European politics. This route has been called the "Pathway of the Empire," "the life-line of England." Over it comes more than half of England's raw materials and food products. Its maintenance is indispensable to England. This is illustrated in the recent Italian-Ethiopian conflict. When Italy went into

Africa, England moved three-fourths of her fleet into the Mediterranean. She appealed to the United States to aid her to curb Italy through economic sanctions. We were disinterested. The United States is, however, vitally interested in the Panama Canal and the Hawaii-Guam route of the Pacific. England is indifferent to this interest. It is of no consequence to her who owns the Panama Canal. Should trouble arise over either of these different interests, England and the United States would fail to support each other. The alliance would crumble. Hard feelings would develop because one country had failed to keep its word.

In the past there has been mutual understanding between England and the United States. These two great world powers have worked together harmoniously. They were instrumental in promoting better world understanding. That this did not last is no fault of England or the United States. The Washington Conference of 1922 and the Four Power Pact are monuments of Anglo-American cooperation. Why should we destroy that cooperation by instituting a policy which could never succeed? Why should we destroy a beautiful international friendship by an ineffective, animosity-producing alliance which is, by its very nature, predestined for failure?

No, let us rather continue to cooperate with our Anglo-Saxon brothers whenever possible. When it is impossible, let us not embitter our relationships by entangling agreements which can never be kept.

First Negative Rebuttal, Charles M. Guss
Pasadena College

FRIENDS: The government of the United States has always cooperated in the best interests of peace. But our statesmen have refrained from alliance with any country because they were possessed with the insight to see that alliances have not in the past increased the peace of the world, nor are they sound policies for the future. The gentlemen of the Affirmative have thought only of the menace to the world and of forcing peace upon "militant countries." Because the League, the World Court, and neutrality have failed, the gentlemen would "insure peace" by our "combined good wills and strength of armament." They have made this their basic issue but have failed to demonstrate how a powerful alliance would "insure the peace." We have demonstrated that the Affirmative policy does not solve the problem existing in Europe today. The Versailles Treaty has caused resentment in Europe, resentment that would be increased to the point of two powerful Western World alliances if the Affirmative policy were adopted. It is our position that the alliance would not "force peace" on the world. It would bind us to protect England and her colonies, make other nations hostile toward us, entangle us in all European controversies, and, instead of uniting the world, entangle us in a system of alliances that would disturb the peace of all the world.

Again, we are informed that "neutrality got us into war before." Then we were told that neutrality failed

us in the War of 1812 and the World War. Now, I would like to ask the gentlemen of the Affirmative these questions: If we had had an alliance with France, would we have been saved from the War of 1812? Or, if we had been allied with England, could we have remained out of the World War? The gentlemen would scoff at our neutral position during the World War, but, nevertheless, neutrality kept us out until 1917, and England entered in 1914.

It is absurd to think of stopping Hitler and the German people by fear. Yet, the members of the Affirmative are vaguely hoping that we can force them into peace by fear of our powerful alliance. Again we reiterate our position: peace will not be insured, it will not be substantial until the world meets and solves the problem causing unrest. Stopping Hitler by force is no solution.

Now, let us examine the principal benefits that are supposed to accrue from such an alliance as they were presented by the second Affirmative speaker. The first benefit is the "preservation of intangible ties with Canada." But we must remember that the ties with Canada were not founded by England, they have not existed because of England, so we see no need in relying upon England for this preservation.

The second benefit would preserve our trade with England. Here again the gentlemen are in error. The second Affirmative speaker mentioned that 40 per cent of our exports and 34 per cent of our imports involved the British Empire. But this trade has been built up without an alliance and will continue without one for

this reason—foreign trade is a matter of business, of profits and cannot be contingent upon alliances.

The third benefit for our consideration is the co-operation in manipulating our navies. It sounds ideal for England to protect our Atlantic coast. But, now I ask you, does it even sound reasonable for our government to take any such risk or responsibility? It may be a matter of conjecture for some, but it certainly is not for us, to understand fully what would have been the plight of Germany had she put such reliance in Italy during the period of their alliance. We would certainly find ourselves in an embarrassing position if England would do as did Italy during a crisis.

The fourth benefit of the proposal was the maintenance and preservation of democracy. The gentlemen have merely waved a red flag before us but have failed to demonstrate adequately that American democracy is endangered to the point that we must entangle ourselves in alliances. Instead of democracy being preserved because it is right, the Affirmative policy would create battlegrounds of another uncivilized, barbarous war.

We feel that if we were to establish an alliance with Great Britain that such an alliance would fail in its purpose. It would not protect America nor would it make world peace more probable. What few advantages we might gain would certainly be outweighed by the position in which we would place ourselves and the destiny of the whole world. We submit to you that it would be unwise to entangle ourselves in European affairs, engender the hostility of other nations, and dis-

turb the peace of all the world by dividing the Western Hemisphere into two hostile camps. Therefore, we contend that the Affirmative proposal should be rejected and the United States should not establish an alliance with Great Britain.

First Affirmative Rebuttal, Eugene Sill
University of Redlands

FRIENDS: The main issue that has been presented to us in this debate has been whether the alliance which we of the Affirmative propose is aimed at an actual solution of the problem which exists in Europe. We of the Affirmative have shown to you that England and the United States are to act as "passive policemen" to help maintain peace. Now we will agree that at the peace conference in 1918 the seeds for a future war were sown. But we do not think that there was any conceivable way of settling the issues which arose any better than was done. It is not the treaty which caused the problem. It was the facts which rested beneath that treaty which caused the trouble. If the treaty had been so made that French security had been jeopardized, or that Germany's colonies had been returned, or that England had forfeited her colonies to Germany for her security, there would now be just as much trouble over the treaty as there has been under the present arrangement. No matter how the peace had been made, no adequate settlement would have been forthcoming; for under present methods there seems to be no real way of settling those disputes.

Therefore, in intimating that we of the Affirmative must show some means of actually settling the dispute, they have not only put upon the Affirmative a position which is impossible, but have apparently assumed the burden of proof, that by changing the Treaty of Versailles they can help the situation. We maintain that France would protest as much under the new arrangement as Germany is now doing under the old. Further, we have shown a method by which peace can be insured as nearly as possible. Thus their point cannot stand.

Further, the first Negative speaker has said that the alliance would guarantee defense not to America, but to England. Friends, we have called your attention to the fact that we are in definite need of protection ourselves by showing that we are not as secluded from the rest of the world as we once were. With dictatorship creeping into South America, with Fascist agitation permeating great sections of our society, with modern science making actual invasion possible, we cannot say that we are not in need of protection. Perhaps we shall be protecting some of the British colonies, but what if we are? They are good customers of ours. Their safety is just as interlocked with the safety of the democratic powers as is the safety of England, for England is as definitely dependent upon the colonies as are the colonies upon her. Therefore, if England, as distinct from the empire, falls, the empire will disintegrate and we will be left alone among the democracies to maintain our integrity. Therefore, there is nothing as dangerous in our being forced to protect the colonies of

the empire as our friends of the Negative would like us to believe. The alliance does not mean merely defense for England.

The main contention of the second Negative speaker has been that, since the United States and Great Britain have different spheres of influence and different interests, the alliance would soon break down. First, let me remind you that we have shown how, in many ways, Great Britain and we have common interests. But our friends have shown that in the Orient, in Europe, in the Suez Canal region, and in the Panama Canal region, our interests are different. Perhaps they are, to a certain extent. But it is also just as true that their interests are not as divergent as the Negative would have us believe. Remember that Canada is still a part of the British Empire and that Great Britain has considerable interest in South America. Is it not exaggeration to say that England has no interest in who owns the Panama Canal or who controls it? Is it not also just as foolish to say that England has no interest in the Orient and doesn't care if America opposes Japan or not? Remember that India is still in the Orient. So are the Malay Archipelago and the British cities in China. The recent stress in the Orient is coming to emphasize the importance which Great Britain places in these colonies, and it is foolish to assume that Great Britain is not interested there even more than the United States. Therefore, although our predominant interests may be somewhat different from those of Great Britain, still our interests do coincide.

The Negative have stressed the fact that alliances

have plunged us into war in the past. May we emphasize that we have never had a full-fledged alliance, and that it is impossible to assert what might happen under such an alliance. However, there seems to be little indication that such an alliance would be a direct cause for war. In proof of their belief that alliance would bring war, our friends of the Negative have said that our neutrality kept us out of the World War for three years, and they asked us to show how our alliance would have done likewise. We would have been plunged in immediately, in their estimation. May we remind you that Germany acted during the war on the constant assumption that the United States would never enter it. She hoped that the war would be another like that in 1871, and would last only a few weeks. America could never come to the aid of the allies in that time, and some hope was held that if we did come into the war, we would come in on the side of Germany. Even in the days when the submarine campaign was threatening the relationship between Germany and the United States, Germany still thought that she could end the war before we would ever get a soldier to France. Is it not logical to assume, therefore, that if we had been definitely allied with England from the outset that German troops would never have moved against France, or that if they had, American forces could have come immediately into the scene and have ended the war quickly? Thus, it might be logical to say in contradiction to the statement of the Negative that, instead of causing war, the alliance actually might have maintained the peace.

Thus we of the Affirmative have definitely proved that there is no other way of settling the problem of war confronting the world than by alliance with England, and although we have shown that it is not perfect and might sometimes lead to war, it is the best possible system for the present time.

**Second Negative Rebuttal, Byron H. Chilson
Pasadena College**

FRIENDS: This is the last opportunity that we of the Negative will have to express ourselves. It is necessary, then, to analyze the debate and consider only the most vital factors. Basically, the debate has resolved itself into a controversy as to whether we should have an alliance with England or merely continue our present policy of cooperation with that country. In other words, we of the Negative believe that England and the United States should continue to cooperate whenever possible. When their interests differ, however, we feel that the countries should be free to pursue their individual courses. The Affirmative also believe in cooperation, but they believe in enforced cooperation. They believe that when the interests of the two countries are widely divergent and they do not wish to cooperate, that they should be forced to cooperate by an alliance. I have spent considerable time showing how an alliance would not be able to enforce this cooperation. It would fail in the face of the widely divergent interests of the two countries. I cited four distinct instances in which an alliance with England would fail. History has shown

repeatedly that nations keep alliances intact only as long as they best serve the interests of the nation. An example has already been cited in this debate: The example of Italy breaking the Triple Alliance. Other cases could be cited if time permitted. Japan, Germany, Russia,—yes, even England, have all evaded or broken outright treaties and alliances at one time or another. England has stated emphatically that she will not pay her debts to the United States. She will not pay back money which she borrowed! If England were a citizen of any nation she would be termed a crook of the first class. It seems, however, that it is perfectly natural and the right thing for a nation to do, to break her trust with another nation when it is profitable or expedient to do so.

If England has broken faith with the United States already, what right do the gentlemen have to assume that she would keep the terms of an alliance? Would the British not break it if it served their interests? The Affirmative have dared to suggest that we sign this alliance in order that we might rely upon England to defend the Atlantic seaboard for us. This might easily be comparable to hiring a Pretty-Boy Floyd or a Dillinger to guard a bank. The Affirmative have stated that we already have concentrated our fleet in the Pacific, and are relying on England now to aid in case of an attack. We do, however, keep a healthy portion of our fleet in the Atlantic, somewhat over a third of our naval strength, to be exact. Our military experts would never consent to the moving of more of our fleet strength to the Pacific. They realize that we could

never trust Great Britain. The bland faith of the Affirmative in the binding powers of such an alliance is not shown by our national leaders. In other words, the ultimate benefit of defense has already been reached by a policy of cooperation. An alliance would not further benefit us defensively because we would never move more of our fleet to the Pacific.

Mr. Guss and I have both demonstrated how all the specific benefits advocated by the Affirmative are not future benefits depending upon an alliance, but that they already exist as the result of our present policy of cooperation. The only remaining reason, then, for the adoption of this policy is a general one and not specific in its nature. The Affirmative hope that some good will result if England and the United States can be forced to work together where they fail to do so now. In other words, they want the United States to help England maintain the balance of power in Europe and maintain the Mediterranean-Suez route. They want England to help the United States maintain the Open Door policy in China and defend the Panama Canal. They want us to help England maintain her empire. They believe that such a policy would be beneficial to both countries, especially the United States. If the proposed alliance could stand these various strains, and the two countries would cooperate (we have already shown that it will not), we believe it would be disadvantageous to the United States. The British Foreign Office has many times dominated the State Department of the United States. It has been said that England expects every American to do his

duty. With an alliance between the two countries, that domination would increase. We would undoubtedly wind up helping England most of the time, while they would help us only when it was convenient.

The Negative have demonstrated so far in this debate that the policy of neutrality has not failed entirely, but has kept us from being involved in many international problems. We believe that it should not be abandoned, as it must be, if an alliance is made with England. We have demonstrated that all the benefits advocated by the Affirmative have already been achieved. We have shown you that an alliance would fail to accomplish its purpose of maintaining peace, but would only cause the development of two hostile armed camps. We have demonstrated that an alliance would fail because of divergent interests. Due to hard feelings which would develop, this would destroy our policy of cooperation and would result in damage rather than benefit.

Therefore, the Negative believe with Walter Lippmann when he says in *Foreign Affairs* for April, 1935, "Whatever else happens in Anglo-American relations, they should not be poisoned by deceptive promises that cannot be made good in a crisis which is vital to one nation and not to the other."

**Second Affirmative Rebuttal, William Roskam
University of Redlands**

FRIENDS: As the concluding speaker in this debate, it becomes my duty to weigh the evidence and to present the final rebuttal for the Affirmative.

When the Negative summarized their case, they said that the following points stood: first, cooperation is sufficient and that the benefits of alliance already exist; second, that England would break her promise and that we could not trust her to guard our Atlantic seaboard; third, that our spheres of interest are too divergent for successful alliance.

First, cooperation. If cooperation as it now exists were sufficient, would Japan be closing the door in China, would Great Britain be temporizing with Italy and Germany in Ethiopia and Spain and Austria? Would these things be happening if the two countries spoke unitedly and powerfully against them? By stating that they wish to cooperate with Great Britain at all possible times, the Negative grant the desirability of an alliance, for an alliance is guaranteed cooperation. The chief difference between the Negative and the Affirmative is merely the act of guarantee. They are for cooperation with Britain, and we are for making it certain rather than haphazard. They wish to withdraw from obligation when the going is hard, in fact, when cooperation is most desirable. We see no advantages in such a vacillating policy. See what our failure to cooperate voluntarily, without a definite agreement, is doing today in the Orient!

Next, granted that some of the benefits of alliance do exist today, the guaranteeing of them assures their continuation. This continuation is not secure enough without some form of agreement. They say that trade is based on profit and so would exist without an alliance. However, if the customer goes . . . so is the trade

gone, profit or no profit. And if they say there is no danger of this, they refute their main contention, that it would engender hostility when we suppress certain undesirable or militant actions.

Second, they impeach the honor of England under the contention that the English would be prone to break the treaty or alliance. Why didn't they cite some example of England breaking an alliance, instead of using Italy? Why didn't they? Because that example does not exist. When has England broken any alliance? The only proof they have for this is an outside and unconnected reference to Italy's non-dependability or England's default on war debts, a purely economic consideration. Might we say that the calibre of proof indicates the validity of an argument.

When the Negative say that we could not dare to trust England to guard our Atlantic seaboard, they fail to recognize that we are doing that very thing right now and that an alliance would not only guarantee that, but give us a voice in England's actions and thus prove doubly beneficial. Allow me to repeat the quotation from Livingston Hartley, that I gave in my constructive speech, "We have seen how the British Navy by its control of the North Sea and the Western Mediterranean makes American Atlantic security absolute and allows us to concentrate our battle fleet in the Pacific."

As a last contention the Negative point out the divergence in our spheres of interest. Granted that we are interested in the Panama Canal and they are interested in the Suez Canal—by assuming responsibility for a zone or sphere we release each other's power so

more can be amassed for protecting one canal; thus they can be better protected. This added protection is certainly a mutual benefit. An understanding for each to protect one canal and one ocean would hardly break under the pressure of different interests. Our merchant marine uses the Suez Canal and England's merchant marine uses the Panama Canal. Even though the two nations have different spheres of interests, their goals are the same and can be achieved by coordinated action.

A columnist, despite his renown, can hardly be considered an authority on world conditions and trends, so even his fear of the result of a crisis cannot challenge the integrity of two nations when facts do not support that fear.

The Negative have cited certain examples where we have not supported Great Britain and they have not supported the United States. The Negative made no attempt to show that this cooperation would not have been desirable, and certainly we of the Affirmative give it our complete support. If this is true, then under the Affirmative proposal not only would the United States and Great Britain back each other in certain actions, but each would have a voice in determining what actions they would be called upon to support.

Reviewing the Affirmative case, we see that out of three possible policies for the United States to follow, two are either undesirable or eliminated by their nature and consequences, and the third has definite advantages and benefits. Even Socrates would not call the elimination of two out of three possibilities a syllogism, and so it is hardly fair to say this is an unrelated syllogism,

when in all actuality it is argument by a process of elimination, this process not having been challenged by the Negative except in their claim of partial achievement for one of the two rejected policies.

Basing our arguments upon facts of history and the testimony of experts in their own field, we have proceeded with this one possibility, an alliance, and have further shown that England is the only logical power with which to ally. This point has not been attacked by the Negative.

Following this, we of the Affirmative presented to you certain benefits that would accrue, and certain existing benefits, the continuation of which would be guaranteed.

Thus in this debate, by showing the need, the reasons, and the benefits of the Affirmative proposal, having either refuted the objections of the Negative or shown their lack of pertinence or inconsistency, we of the Affirmative can conclude only one thing, that the United States and Great Britain should establish an alliance.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: AN ALLIANCE WITH GREAT BRITAIN

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

- Allen, G.—*Collective Security*. 1936. World Peace Foundation.
 Beard, C. A. and Smith, G. H. E.—*The Idea of National Interest*.
 1934. Macmillan, New York and London.
 Buehler, E. C.—*British-American Alliance*. 1938. Noble & Noble.
 Dulles, A. W. and Armstrong, H. F.—*Can We Be Neutral?* 1936.
 Harper.
 Hartley, Livingston—*Is America Afraid?* 1937. Prentice-Hall. \$2.00.

- Hagood, J.—*We Can Defend America*. 1937. Doubleday, Doran. \$2.50.
- Howe, Q.—*England Expects Every American to Do His Duty*. 1937. Simon and Schuster. \$2.00.
- Lytton, V. A. and R. B.—*Role of the English Speaking Peoples*. 1935. League for Political Education, 123 W. 43rd St., New York City.
- Selsam, J. P.—*Attempts to form an Anglo-French Alliance. 1919-1924*. 1936. Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. \$1.00.
- Simonds, Frank H.—*America Faces the Next War*. 1933. Harper. \$1.00.
- Simonds, Frank H.—*Can America Stay at Home?* 1932. Harper. \$3.00.
- Stimson, Henry L.—*The Far Eastern Crisis*. 1936. Harper.
- Wilbert, H.—*Atlantic: Bond or Barrier*. 1937. Oxford. 75¢.
- Wilson, A.—*United States and the League*. 1933. G. Allen. London. 1s 6d.
- Wilson, B.—*Friendly Relations*. 1934. Little, Brown. Boston. \$4.00.
- Wright, P. Q.—*Neutrality and Collective Security*. 1936. University of Chicago Press.
- Wright, Quincy.—*Interpretations of American Foreign Policy*. Lecture on the Harris Foundation. 1930. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1930.
- Young, Eugene J.—*Powerful America*. F. A. Stokes Co. 1936.

MAGAZINES AND PERIODICALS

- American Historical Review.—42:491, Apr., 1937. *Anglo-American Relations 1853-1857*. R. W. Van Alstyne.
- American Mercury.—38:433, Aug., 1936. *Military Alliance with England*. Beaverbrook. Discussion in 39: sup. 22. Nov. 1936. 43:425, Apr., 1938. *England Liquidates Liberalism*. L. Dennis. 43:306, Mar., 1938. *To Hell with America!* By an Englishman. Discussion in 44:94, May, 1938.
- Atlantic Monthly.—159:618, May, 1937. *What England Will Fight For*. E. Percy.
- Canadian Forum.—16:12, Dec., 1936. *British Foreign Policy*. S. Cripps.

- Christian Century.—55:38, Jan. 12, 1938. *Where Is Mr. Roosevelt Heading?* 55:116, Jan. 26, 404, Mar. 30, 1938. Discussion.
- Christian Science Monitor.—p. 1-2, Aug. 14, 1935. *Wanted: a Foreign Policy*, J. P. Pope. p. 1-2, Nov. 10, 1937. *Anglo-American Front*, D. G. Hutton, R. L. Buell. p. 5, Feb. 19, 1936. *Washington Never Meant That*, G. Greenbie. p. 1-2, Jan. 12, 1938. *Why America and Britain Should Cooperate*, R. Muir.
- Contemporary Review.—152:513, Nov., 1937. *America, Britain, and the Far East*. A. F. Whyte.
- Current History.—48:23, Apr., 1938. *Mr. Eden and Mr. Chamberlain*.
- Foreign Affairs.—13:574, July, 1935. *Paramount Interests of Great Britain and America*. W. Lewis. 14:549, July, 1936. *Has Great Britain a Foreign Policy?* H. Nicolson. 14:584, July, 1936. *British Vacillations*. 16:388, Apr., 1938. *Alternative American Policies in the Far East*. E. T. Dennett. 16:430, Apr., 1938. *America Re-arms*. H. W. Baldwin.
- Fortnightly Review.—147:(n.s.141):641, June, 1937. *Lion and the Unicorn Today! American View*. W. Y. Elliott. 149:(n.s.145):272, Mar., 1938. *Britain and the European Balance*. L. M. Gelber.
- Fortune.—149:(n.s.143):362, Mar., 1938. *I'm Alone Still the Watchword of the U.S.A.* S. Gwynn.
- Harper's M.—176:652, May, 1938. *Where Are You Going, Mr. President? Trend of Our Foreign Policy*. H. Herring.
- International Affairs.—17:51, Jan., 1938. *U.S. and British Policy; with Discussion*. W. H. Stead.
- International Conciliation.—312:371, Sept., 1935. *Statement of British Foreign Policy;—with Comment*. S. Hoare. 337:72, Feb., 1938. *Parallel Roads to Peace*. Editorial from the *New York Times*.
- Living Age.—353:482, Feb., 1938. *German View of Britain*. G. Wirsing.
- Nation.—141:63, June 17, 1935. *England and the United States*. O. G. Villard. 145:253, Sept. 11, 1937. *Anti-British Hysteria*. 146:259, Mar. 5, 1938. *Europe and America: European Balance Sheet*. 146:505, Apr. 30, 1938. *Problem in Ethics: British-Italian Agreement*. O. G. Villard.
- New Republic.—85:121, Dec. 11, 1935. *British Foreign Policy*. G. Barry. 90:63, Feb. 24, 1937. *Future of Foreign Policy*. B.

- Bliven. 93:93, Dec. 1, 1937. *Collective Insecurity*. B. Bliven.
93:328, Jan. 26, 1938. *Memoranda on National Policy*. B. Bliven.
94:60, Feb. 23, 1938. *Mr. Hull's Foreign Policy*. 94:128, Mar.
9, 1938. *England's Foreign Policy and Ours*. 94:167, Mar. 16,
1938. *Collective Security: a Debate*. E. Browder, C. A. Beard.
News Week.—9:5, May 1, 1937. *Roosevelt Aligns U. S. and Britain
for Preservation of Peace*.
Nineteenth Century and After.—120:569, Nov., 1936. *What is British
Defensive Policy?* N. Angell.
North American Review.—245: No. 1:95, Mar., 1938. *Our Bonds
with the British*. L. Hartley.
Queen's Quarterly.—44: No. 2:247, 1937. *Canada and the Anglo-
American Entente*. D. K. Sandwell.
Saturday Evening Post.—210:33, Feb. 5, 1938. *We Love a Crusade*.
G. F. Eliot.
Saturday Review of Literature.—17:6, Jan. 15, 1938. *Nibbling at
the Lion's Tail: review of Defense of the Empire*, by N. Angell,
J. F. Green. 17:3, Mar. 12, 1938. *Defense of Democracy*. G.
Slocombe. 17:9, Mar. 26, 1938. *Defense of Democracy*. Reply
with Rejoinder. B. E. Schmitt.
Time.—31:22, Feb. 28, 1938. *Expulsion of Eden*.
Vital Speeches.—1:174, Dec. 17, 1934. *Joint Responsibility of Eng-
land and America to Insure peace*. N. M. Butler. 2:36, Oct.
21, 1935. *Our Foreign Policy*. W. E. Borah. 4:267, Feb. 15,
1938. *Hatred on the Rampage: Making the World Safe for
Democracy*. H. F. Bone. 4:335, Mar. 15, 1938. *Restore the
Family of Nations; Trade Treaties, Neutrality, Arbitration*. R.
L. Buell. 4:368, Apr. 1, 1938. *America's Contribution to World
Peace*. C. Hull. 4:354, Apr. 1, 1938. *Would We Fight in Eu-
rope? A dangerous Sort of Misunderstanding*. J. P. Kennedy.
4:386, Apr. 15, 1938. *Our Imperative Task: to Mind Our Own
Business*. W. E. Borah. 4:403, Apr. 15, 1938. *Whither America?*
L. Johnson.
Woman's Home Companion.—65:22, Apr., 1938. *America's Defenses*.
M. A. Hallgren.
Yale Review (n.s.)—25:221, Dec., 1935. *Clarifying Foreign Policy*.
S. F. Bemis.

NEUTRALITY, FREEDOM OF ACTION,
AND ALLIANCES

*A Symposium Debate on American
Foreign Policy*

SYMPOSIUM: GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, CORNELL
UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO, AND
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

In order to present more phases of the American foreign policy than could be developed in a straight debate on Neutrality, Freedom of Action, or an Alliance with Great Britain, Professor Harold F. Harding, of the Department of Public Speaking of George Washington University, arranged a "double-header" Symposium in which four different educational institutions instead of the usual number of two participated. Instead of speaking on one side of a debatable proposition, the subject of the foreign policy of the United States was divided into various angles and individual speakers were asked to present certain views. Each institution was represented by two speakers, making eight in all to take part in the discussion.

The Symposium was held on the evening of March 25, 1938, at George Washington University, Washington, D. C., on the general subject of "American Foreign Policy with Respect to Neutrality and War." The speakers from George Washington University presented and discussed the present Neutrality Act; Cornell urged modification or repeal, suggesting international cooperation of some kind. Puerto Rico spoke outright for an alliance with Great Britain, and the University of Virginia urged freedom of action such as we had in 1914. The discussion was followed by an open forum and question period.

The speeches were taken in shorthand, the notes corrected and the speeches assembled under the direction of Professor Harold F. Harding, Director of Forensics at George Washington University, and later contributed to *Intercollegiate Debates*.

NEUTRALITY, FREEDOM OF ACTION, AND ALLIANCES

Introduction

Professor W. H. Yeager

I regret very much that we have kept you waiting for a few minutes longer than we had expected tonight, but this is just one of the evidences of the difficulty of getting four great universities to cooperate at the same time on the same particular project. But we are ready now to go ahead with this discussion, and in opening the meeting tonight I want first to extend to these gentlemen from Puerto Rico, from Virginia and Cornell Universities very cordial welcomes. We are very happy to have them with us to discuss with our own representatives this very important question in this very novel manner.

I would like next to state that this Symposium was arranged, rather, was conceived and arranged, by Professor Harold F. Harding, of the Department of Public Speaking; and I want to commend him for his originality in thinking up this new method of intercollegiate debate which is a departure from traditional forms of debate, and to thank him for the effort he has expended on this project.

Our Chairman tonight is a member of the United States Senate. He is also a member of the Committee

on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate and as a member of that Committee is charged directly with the function of formulating American foreign policy with respect to neutrality and war. Formerly he was an instructor in Latin and Greek and a Professor of Political Science at the University of Utah. Senator, I suppose you have been introduced many times as the Honorable Elbert D. Thomas, of Utah. Tonight I think I will not do that. I will just take that for granted, and in these academic halls introduce you as Dr. Elbert D. Thomas, of Utah. Dr. Thomas! (Applause.)

Senator Elbert D. Thomas

VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THIS SYMPOSIUM, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: The speaking "fest" which you are about to enjoy is arranged as the ancient symposiums, if I may make that kind of plural with a Greek word, were arranged. But tonight we will be without the wherewithal that made the talking fluid and kept it going in ancient times.

This is in reality a talk-fest arranged in an orderly manner. The topic which will be discussed tonight will be "American Foreign Policy With Respect to Neutrality and War"; and it will be discussed by the teams from the four colleges that have been mentioned, in the following order: George Washington, then Cornell, then Puerto Rico, and then Virginia.

The speakers on the George Washington team are Mr. Southmayd and Mr. Corker; Cornell, Mr. Maxcy and Mr. Westmore; for Puerto Rico, Mr. Rodríguez

and Mr. Berrios; and for Virginia, Mr. Michael and Mr. Kopper.

In order that you will be sure to know exactly what these speakers are talking about (and I mean that in all kindness to them because I have at some time or other made a speech), I will call your attention to what probably you have already read, but we will review it together, that "George Washington will explain and defend the present Neutrality Act. Cornell will urge modification or repeal in the direction of international cooperation of a temporary kind. Puerto Rico will speak for international cooperation of a more permanent kind, and, in particular, by means of an Anglo-American alliance. Virginia will urge a repeal of the Neutrality Act with a view to restoring the freedom and independence of action we enjoyed in 1914."

That is almost a universal approach to this great subject and, if you all are not thoroughly mixed up when we get through, I assure you that your Chairman will be.

Each speaker will have ten minutes and each will follow in his proper place without further introduction. Mr. Southmayd!

John P. Southmayd
George Washington University

SENATOR THOMAS, MR. YEAGER, GENTLEMEN FROM CORNELL, GENTLEMEN FROM PUERTO RICO, GENTLEMEN FROM VIRGINIA, AND LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: At this time I should like to express our appreciation for having the gentlemen from these three universities

here tonight to debate with us on this subject, "The American Foreign Policy in Regard to Neutrality and War," and so forth. I should particularly like to express my appreciation at this time to the gentlemen from Puerto Rico, Mr. Rodríguez and Mr. Berríos, and Martínez Alvarez, who is not speaking, and Arturo Mórales. Those gentlemen entertained us last year very hospitably on the Island of Puerto Rico. Two other George Washington men and I spent a week on the Island of Puerto Rico and I believe I can safely say that that is probably the highlight of my college career, probably the most enjoyable week I will ever spend in my life. If any of you people ever have a few spare weeks in which you would like a vacation—(Applause) if by any chance, that is—I would suggest that you go to the Island of Puerto Rico, and there you will find beyond all doubt the most hospitable people in the world and the most beautiful island in the world.

Tonight, in debating this subject, I feel rather at a disadvantage to start with. I am going to begin by trying to defend and explain to you the present Neutrality Act. But I have following me—let's see—six men before my partner speaks again; and in the meanwhile I will not only have two men, as is usual in a debate, attacking me, but I will have probably six men tearing me limb from limb; so if my speech, by the time these other gentlemen are through, sounds rather unsubstantial, I would like you to bear with me and remember I have a partner coming last who will attempt, again, to put me together.

We of the first speakers (we can hardly say the

Affirmative) believe that the present Neutrality Act, that is, the Neutrality Act of 1937, is the cornerstone of American foreign policy. We believe that to be the very basis of our present policy in regard to foreign affairs. Now, as you all realize, the world today is in a very highly unsettled condition. Just a couple of weeks ago Herr Hitler went into Austria, conquering that nation and generally upsetting things. Poland just recently issued an ultimatum directed toward Lithuania, which considerably disturbed things, as you all know. A civil war has been going on in Spain for months now, and in the Far East we have the Japanese and the Chinese continually at odds—continual slaughter, so that you see, if there is one thing the United States must prepare itself for, must gird itself for, that is peace, to stay out of war.

There are certain nations of the world which seem bent on having war at any price. The United States, on the other hand, the people in this country, are bent on having peace—peace above all. In the words of President Roosevelt, "We hate war." Therefore, we actively engage in a search for peace.

I should like to explain to you just how the present Neutrality Act enables us to have this peace, safeguards the peace and security of the American people. First of all, the most important section of the Act is Section 1, which provides an absolute embargo on all arms and munitions to belligerent nations. That is, when a state of war is declared between two belligerent nations, the President must declare this arms embargo in effect. We

can't ship any more guns, any more shells, to those belligerent nations.

How will that help the peace of the United States? Investigations of a couple of years ago before the Nye Munitions Investigation Committee of the Senate revealed one of the primary causes of our entrance into the World War was that American munitions makers were shipping and selling to belligerent nations arms and munitions. Those belligerent nations tried to curry the favor of the United States, tried to get as many of those arms and munitions as they could, tried to promote the industry in the United States; and that gradually, experience has shown, involved us, step by step. That is, that was one of the steps which later got us into the war.

If we absolutely prohibit the sale and export of these arms and munitions to belligerent nations, that is one major step in the direction of the peace and security of the American people.

Well now, how else, you may ask, does this Act affect the security of our people? Well, in the second place, in Section 2 of the Act, there is a so-called "cash and carry" clause. This Act provides that, in addition to the arms and munitions which are embargoed by the President, certain other goods which the President feels should not be shipped to belligerent nations can be put on a restricted list, so that if those nations wish to do business with the United States they must come to the United States in foreign ships, pay us spot cash, have title to those goods removed to the foreign countries

before they leave our port; and, once they leave our port, we have nothing to do with them.

That is a very substantial advantage to our people by reason of the fact that during the World War our merchant ships would go out on the high seas loaded with supplies for belligerent nations, and what would happen? They would be attacked; they would be sunk. Our people would get up in arms about the situation. It would arouse the emotions, the passions of our people.

Well, now, if we provide that we cannot trade with those belligerent nations in these certain articles, that they must pay cash, they must come over to our shores in their own ships and get them, they can't build up commercial credits in the United States, and that is going to be another very substantial advantage to keep us out of the throes of war.

In addition to that there is provided, under the terms of the Act, that we cannot make loans or credits to belligerent nations. Of course, it is elementary that during the World War one of the primary factors which involved us in that war was that our big banking houses floated loans to these other nations; consequently their emotions, their feelings, their sympathies went where their pocketbooks went. We supported certain nations prior to our entrance into the World War, certain Allied nations, because those were the nations to which we made the greatest loans, and it was to our advantage to see that those nations would win so we could get our money paid back. But we were fooled. They are still owing us that money!

Well, now, if in the event of future wars, we absolutely restrict and prohibit loans or credits to belligerent nations, there is no danger of our making loans which will not be repaid, as were the World War debts. That is another very constructive step toward the peace and security of this nation in time of war. So that you see there are provisions in this Act which deal very definitely with our problem and get at the root of it.

What is the philosophy of the present Neutrality Act? The gentlemen in the Senate got together; they probed into the causes of the World War; they saw precisely what these causes were. They were loans and credits to belligerents, travel on merchant ships, and so forth. They restricted those causes, prohibited them so that those events can never take place again. That being the case, the likelihood of our being drawn into another war is substantially reduced.

We wouldn't be so naive for a moment as to say that this Act is any absolute guarantee against the United States going to war. Ladies and gentlemen, I submit to you that there is no legislative enactment which is a positive guarantee against the United States going to war. But what we of George Washington do submit to you is that this Act takes very constructive steps forward toward correcting those abuses which draw us into war, that it is a step which has come forward gradually out of the knowledge of the Senators and the men in the Congress of the United States and the President of the United States so that, in the event of a future war (although it isn't any guarantee, and I challenge any of these gentlemen to give us any abso-

lute guarantee against the United States going to war), it is a logical step forward; it is a progressive step forward.

Of course there are things wrong with the Act. We don't think it is perfect. We favor some amendments to the present Act. But we say, of all the proposals advanced, this is the best so far and let us keep it, because it will insure that the United States will not be dragged into war because of the things which formerly dragged us into wars.

George E. Maxcy
Cornell University

SENATOR THOMAS, MR. YEAGER, FELLOW DEBATORS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I think we of Cornell join with the first speaker in saying that we hate war.

Before I start I should like to thank George Washington University for inviting us down here tonight. Both Mr. Westmore and I are enjoying the trip tremendously.

Before we can suggest a foreign policy for the United States, I think we ought to consider the facts, particularly the economic facts concerning our relationships with foreign nations. Let's take a look at a few of these facts. During the five years before 1929, the United States sold annually \$5,000,000,000 worth of goods abroad. In 1935, despite a world-wide depression, numerous tariff restrictions, quotas, and so forth, we still managed to sell \$2,000,000,000 worth of goods.

It is commonly known that we export 10 per cent of

our production. At first glance this doesn't seem very much. But I doubt if any of you business men in the audience today are in a concern which is so prosperous, so embarrassed by orders, that you can dismiss a 10 per cent decrease in your business as too trivial for comment.

It wouldn't be so bad if these exports were evenly distributed amongst our industries, but they are not. Fifty-six per cent of our cotton was exported in 1937; refined copper, 33 per cent; automobiles, 10 per cent; radio appliances, 14 per cent; office appliances, 27 per cent. Many of those industries would be bankrupt without foreign markets and the men in those industries would be added to our already swollen relief rolls. Normally in the United States there are 49,000,000 men, women, and, unfortunately, children, employed. Ten per cent of that is 5,000,000 men—5,000,000 more unemployed. I am sure that would add to our budget balancing difficulties, Senator.

Turning to the import side of the situation, we find that the United States is not self-sufficient, as we like to think. We have to import 100 per cent of our rubber, silk, tin, manganese, nickel, and a host of other minor products.

Turning to the investment side of the picture, we see this country as a powerful creditor nation, with investments all over the world—long-term investments amounting to \$10,000,000,000. Then, as we look at the future of this country, the nation as a whole, we see that we have gone from an agricultural nation to a vast industrial nation. We have built up a tre-

mendous industrial machine capable of turning out goods far more rapidly than they can be consumed domestically. Certainly our future prosperity is dependent upon finding outlets for these goods.

In short, when we look at the facts we see that America can't stand alone, that we cannot hope to live in isolation, that we are so economically, inextricably bound up with the rest of the world that we must act as a world power.

That doesn't mean that we have to enter into military agreements with other nations. It doesn't mean we have to make entangling alliances. All that is required is a day-to-day willingness upon the part of the United States to cooperate with other nations to insure peace. We can't crawl into the shell of neutrality. We are too big, too important, too economically concerned with the rest of the world for that. If we try to do so we shall blunder into the same situation that happened in 1917.

I don't think the industrial interests of this country can resist a war boom. I don't think any administration can resist these economic interests. Certainly an administration which has so far failed to curb the so-called vested interests, failed to make any real social reforms—I don't see how any administration can control these business interests. And so we are forced into the world, whether we like it or not. We must act as a world power.

As I stated before, it does not mean entangling alliances, and particularly it does not mean an agreement to act in accord with Great Britain to defend British

interests scattered all over the world. As an example of what this type of collective action might be, let us cite the Italian-Ethiopian campaign. I think one of the fundamental causes why oil sanctions failed to be put into effect in time was the uncertainty that lay in the hands of the United States. The League powers did not know what the United States was going to do, consequently they were afraid to enact oil sanctions. They would be futile if the United States continued to sell oil to Italy, so they failed.

In failing to cooperate with the League powers in this case, we aided an aggressor nation and we dealt a blow to world peace. Collective action can be successful and it can be successful without League action. Take the Nyon Conference, for instance. Prior to that conference so-called pirate submarines were sinking British and French ships. There was no doubt they were Italian submarines. The powers concerned got together. They sent warships to the troubled area and by the threat of united force they quickly put an end to that sort of activity.

It is this type of collective action which we favor for the United States. We must act in the world and we must be prepared to join with other powers, not always the same powers, but to join in accordance with our interests.

So far I have mentioned political cooperation. But we need more than that. We need economic cooperation with the other nations. One of the fundamental causes for trouble in the world today is that the so-called "have-not" nations cannot get peacefully the

necessary raw materials that they need. Because foreign trade has become so choked they cannot get the necessary dollar exchange, franc or sterling exchange, to buy the raw materials, the very raw materials that we are willing to sell, dying to sell in fact. There is no one to buy them.

In order to give them this necessary purchasing power we must trade with them. We have to buy goods which they produce economically. And in doing this I think one of the greatest forward steps for peace has been the Hull Reciprocal Trade Agreements policy. That policy provides for a gradual lowering of tariff barriers, a lowering of tariff barriers in the interest of this nation as a whole.

In carrying out this policy some concerns will be harmed. There is no doubt about that. But the nation as a whole will benefit, and that is the attitude that we must take.

So, then, we favor political and economic cooperation of an opportunistic sort. It seems to me that the present Neutrality Act interferes with that policy. It ties the hands of the President. It forces us to act alone, and we can't act alone.

Not only that, it is based upon the false assumption that it can keep this country out of war. But can it? The Neutrality Act seems to me to be one mass of contradictions. On the one side, we have the Act declaring that when a state of war exists, the President shall declare enforcement of the Act. But in China the President didn't see fit to declare a state of war existing. As a result, the Act wasn't applied. In Ethiopia a war

was declared. Certainly that is a contradictory bit of action.

Secondly, as the first speaker pointed out, the measure prevents all loans to belligerents. But again we have the contradiction: the President, at his discretion, can permit short-term loans to belligerents if, in his eyes (and this is a beautiful phrase), they benefit the economic interests of the United States or the citizens concerned.

And so, ladies and gentlemen, the Neutrality Act cannot keep us out of war because we are in the world and we must act in the world.

Mr. Juan Rodríguez
University of Puerto Rico

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, AND FRIENDS: In the name of our debating team I take great pleasure in thanking the first gentleman from George Washington for the very kind words he had to say of Puerto Rico; also the authorities of this university for having made possible our visit to this institution for the discussion of a very important question which deals with the present international situation and has become a headline, a living issue.

A great deal has been said as to the desirability of the creation of an Anglo-American alliance. Of course the first question that will naturally come to our minds is one concerning the necessity for the creation of such an Anglo-American understanding.

If I were to ask this audience what is the first line

of defense for the United States in the Atlantic Ocean, I am quite sure most of us will agree that England is the first line of defense for the United States in the East, because with England as the European mistress of the seas we are quite sure that the power will be exercised by a nation which we all know believes in government by consent of the governed, so when American citizens speak of being indifferent as to the outcome of European wars it is because they have already taken for granted that there is a nation strong enough to keep the balance of power favorable to the United States, because disruption of such a balance of power would totally upset the international system on which we have worked—our economic and political institutions.

A clear example of this reality is based on the fact that the Neutrality Act is based on the idea that England is the leading power in the Eastern Hemisphere. Let's examine for a moment this Neutrality Act, passed in 1937. We all know that the Neutrality Act was passed by men who believed that the United States was forced to enter the World War by becoming spiritually, politically, and economically entangled with Great Britain, because they thought that President Wilson had permitted war trade with England and did not effectively protect war trade with Germany.

Of course the idea behind the Act was to avoid the repetition of such a condition of affairs which would lead us into another great conflict. But now let's examine the result of such an Act for a moment. The Act provides that the United States shall not sell any goods to belligerents unless they pay cash for the goods and

carry them in their own ships. In other words, this cash and carry provision means only this, that in the event of a great European war, England and its allies are the only ones that have the cash and the ability to carry those goods, because in the first place they control most of the gold that is not already in the United States. They control the foreign investments, which are convertible into gold or its equivalent; and besides, they have the merchant marine to carry those goods, and their fleet controls the Atlantic Ocean, through which those very same goods will be transported to Europe.

Under these circumstances, we can clearly see that Germany would be as effectively excluded from the American market as it was in 1917. It would be as effectively excluded from the American market as if the United States Navy were supporting once again the Allied blockade.

I think that we can see from this that there must be some inevitable, deeply rooted and beneficial connection between the interests of England on the one side, and the United States on the other. At this point in the discussion, of course, we could ask ourselves the reason for this alliance. Of course, it is my belief that the reason for this cooperation is none other than the realization of the fact that if England is ever undermined and falls, American security and institutions will be shaken to their very foundations. The destruction of England would be the downfall of the international system on which we have developed our ideas, our

democratic philosophy, and on which we have operated our best institutions and economic structure.

As the noted journalist, Mr. Walter Lippmann says very effectively and graphically: "We have only to imagine our positions if Britain were to collapse first on attack by Germany, then by Italy, and then by Japan in the western Pacific. Could we conceivably be indifferent to such a world-shaking catastrophe as that? With whom would we be able to discuss very amiably the idea of naval parity? Could we be indifferent as to how the different fragments of this great political institution were disposed of?"

He goes on to say: "We could by no means be indifferent to such a world-shaking catastrophe because everything that is already taken for granted by us, like the air we breathe, would be suddenly and drastically altered."

I think this is enough evidence to show that an Anglo-American understanding, more than beneficial, is a practical, living necessity in the modern world.

Now we could ask ourselves, granting that such a connection is necessary, what kind of understanding would best serve that necessity. Of course I shall not bore you by going into a detailed description of the kind of Anglo-American understanding I am advocating tonight. I take it that that is not my task this evening. Nevertheless, I shall give you what I consider some of the main points that must be present in such an understanding.

In the first place, the alliance should be of a political as well as an economic character. It should provide,

first, for the military defense of Great Britain from foreign attack when it is considered that the British Government is unable to protect itself from aggression and that such an aggression can operate in a disruption of the British political integrity as a nation, the spirit of such a proposition being to safeguard the balance of power exercised by democracy in the maintenance of a peaceful international system, whenever the war involves a clear-cut moral issue in addition to consideration of American interests.

Second, that England and the United States will in no case attack or invade each other, or resort to war against each other; and that includes not only *de jure* wars but also *de facto* hostilities.

Third, intensification of economic ties through trade agreements and fair competition in the world markets. Great Britain and the United States shall not work at cross purposes in the international economic field, nor drift back into pre-war competitive alliances.

The next and final test for such an alliance is whether this understanding is to be practical in the modern world. Now, without putting forth the sentimentality of hands across the seas, common language and religion and traditions, we have our economic interests very closely intertwined. The United States buys more goods from England and Canada than from Japan, Italy, Germany, France, Soviet Russia, Spain, and Mexico combined. The two countries together control two-thirds of the war materials of the world and their two navies can dominate the seven seas. During the past few years the United States and Great Britain

have been even closer in the realm of social ideals. We of today know that the present trend in America is toward controlled capitalism and social security, both supported by public opinion. Great Britain and the United States also uphold the democratic ideal, and in maintaining and re-adopting the liberal tradition and in not joining this crusade against Bolshevism, Great Britain and the United States exercise a very strong stabilizing force in a world which we all know can be very easily marred by wars of ideology.

Both countries are also united in the desire to maintain the sanctity of treaties and world peace. In all these things we have Great Britain and the United States closely related. They have close interests.

Because it is a necessity, ladies and gentlemen, because it is practicable and beneficial, I rely on this analysis just made to conclude that an Anglo-American alliance is the best preservative of world peace and a fulfillment of our destiny as a leading nation.

Mr. J. H. Michael
University of Virginia

I wish to thank the gentlemen of George Washington for allowing us this opportunity of presenting our views before you tonight. If we seem to venture into the territory and work of the previous speakers, I assure you that it is not a sporadical expedition but what we believe a safe combination of some of the facts they have presented.

The foreign policy of the United States before the

World War was that of freedom of action, not isolation. It is this freedom and independence of action which we wish to defend tonight.

In the light of such a position, let us consider the courses presented tonight and see where they lead us, what their results are. Isolation, to be effective, must be economic as well as political. Economic isolation means the withdrawal of our interests in every foreign country and the practical abandonment of a merchant marine under the United States flag. It means that our foreign missions must be brought home; it means that Standard Oil, the Ford Motor Company, and similar branches of our industry must be withdrawn from those countries in which they have gained a productive foothold. It means a material lessening of our share of world trade. It means a lowered scale of living for our people.

Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of State, said that our foreign trade in the Far East alone could mean the difference between depression and prosperity for the United States. If 10 per cent of our trade is with foreign nations, then what effect could the entire 10 per cent have, should it be cut off?

Cutting down the foreign distribution of our products dumps the remainder on the home market, a far greater mass than can be absorbed. On another front, withdrawal from the world means the lowering of our standard of culture through lack of contact with other nations, and different ways of thinking and acting. Less tangible than the other course, perhaps, this may well

be the impoverishment that may strike us hardest in the end.

But an isolationist policy is more than an economic failure. It has its political costs as well. Political isolation means the refusal of this government to take any positive action in the maintenance of world peace or preventing the annihilation of an innocent but beleaguered state. Such a course makes for the breakdown of international morale. The irresponsibility and lack of concern of the world's greatest democracy for the peace of that world gives those powers wishing to break that peace a golden opportunity. It is an opportunity quickly seized and thoroughly capitalized. Bloody China is the proof of such a pudding!

Thus, by sticking our heads in the sand at the expense of parts farther away, we have encouraged and are indirectly responsible for international anarchy. With all due respect to Senator Thomas and his colleagues of the Foreign Relations Committee, we cannot support the Neutrality Act.

Our argument against isolation is not confined to theory. Unfortunately, that Neutrality Act gives us bitter facts. Has this Act insulated us from war, as was its intention? It is our contention that, in both of the conflicts now raging, it has placed us viciously on the side of the aggressors. In the Spanish conflict, mandatory application of the Act because of a declaration of a state of civil war shut off supplies from the legal government while the rebels were illicitly aided by their Fascist friends. In China, the failure to invoke the Act

mandatorily, since international war had not been declared, made us an unwilling ally of Japan.

Having examined the boomerang of isolation, let us turn next to its opposite, collective action. As a platonic ideal, we may approve. As the Greek city states long ago pointed out, however, as a workable plan it is not infallible. Impractical today, it will, we fear, be so for generations to come. Our best example is provided by the late failure and death of the League of Nations. Factors causing its demise are today unchecked and even intensified. Dictatorships aligned against democracies, exaggerated nationalism, and hatred among nations, you all know, are insurmountable objects to collective action today. Is it possible, in the face of these objects, to find a policy to which we can safely adhere?

We believe that between these two extremes of complete isolation and binding cooperation there is a middle path which suggests itself as a safest and wisest course for this country to follow. Such a policy would return to us that freedom of choice which we had in 1914, and such a policy escapes the glaring weakness of the other plan.

But what is the problem we must meet and what are the aims which help guide us? The problem, in brief, is that of helping world intercourse to proceed with as little friction and interruption as possible. Our aims, therefore, must be two-fold: first, to preserve world peace, or at least to mitigate the possibility of world war; secondly, to protect our interests at home and abroad.

Let us test by these standards the middle-of-the-road policy which we maintain as a solution. Freedom of action will tend to avoid war because it is flexible and permits rapid adaptation to changing world conditions. The most effective way to preserve peace is through a policy which is not so rigid as to apply a single predetermined act to a wide variety of unknown world situations. Controlled opportunism has definite value in an unpredictable world. The Chaco war, the Spanish war, the Japanese conflict and the Ethiopian conquest all demanded different methods of treatment.

In addition, freedom of action is far superior to either isolation or predetermined cooperation. In addition, we have the gain of avoiding the peace-at-any-price attitude, which is the inescapable result of both these extremes. Clearly, the only way to preserve peace in isolation is to give up our freedom of the seas and our rights abroad. Cooperation commits us to the preservation of a *status quo*, which may be like the Versailles Treaty and the Polish Corridor, an unjust and dangerous situation.

Not only will the freedom-of-action course help preserve our peace, but it will allow us to help in the stimulation of a sound world trade and international exchange of culture and good will. Travel, interchange of students, and importation of artistic products will all build up understanding and like thinking, the real enemies of war.

Mr. Chairman, we are in favor of the reciprocal trade treaties because we believe that they do stimulate and help waken the sleeping Goliath of world trade.

In peace time or when war is brewing, the power of the President to act as he sees fit in an emergency, with his hands not tied by law, will lend prestige to our words and moral pressure against wrongdoing. Even the fact that we are taking a manly and forthright stand on international affairs will not only lend influence and prestige to us as a nation, but will at the same time give new hope and new courage to peace lovers throughout the world.

Senator Thomas

We now start on the second series, and Mr. Westmore, for Cornell, will be our first speaker.

John A. Westmore
Cornell University

MR. YEAGER, SENATOR THOMAS, FELLOW DEBATERS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Up until about two or three years ago, all of us in this country sat back with rather pleased smiles on our faces and we patted little children on the heads and we said, "Well, sonny, you will never have to go to war." I think all of us believed that—that possibly the world had learned its lesson, that possibly the millions of lives lost in the last world conflagration had not been lost in vain, that the millions of homes ruined had not all gone in vain.

Today all of us fortunate enough to know how to read realize the world is headed toward a major catastrophe. We merely have to substitute the term Czechoslovakia for Sarajevo, and once again the world is

seemingly headed toward a world conflagration. All of us here are very much interested in this problem because many of us are the cannon fodder of the next world war, and it is our problem to find that salvation for the United States of America which will keep us at peace.

Idealism is fine, but you and I tonight are going to be realists. We are going to find out what is best for us. Many solutions have been offered you, some practical, some impractical, none of them perfect.

Let's see what we have been offered. George Washington offered us the present Neutrality Act, and they gave some very fine examples of what this Act said. I read the Act myself and it is a magnificent piece of verbiage, with all due apology.

What does it say? It says the President can state that American citizens can't travel on foreign ships, or he can state that we won't make loans abroad. But one thing that most of us don't realize is that it says, "When the President finds a state of war exists." Let's make that word "when," "if." "If the President of the United States finds a state of war exists."

In Spain the President of the United States found a state of war exists and he declared a state of war to be in existence and so we stopped our shipments abroad. The Loyalists no longer received our munitions, but the Rebels did. But at least there the President lived up to his obligation.

Now we have this little fracas in China. That is not a war, it is a hunting expedition. The President did not see fit to declare a state of war in existence there. He

may have had his reasons. He probably did. But he was not living up to the spirit of the legislation. He was living up to its words: "When the President finds that a state of war exists."

All these petty examples and these petty ideas that are in this piece of legislation are fine—when the President declares a state of war exists. I admit it has a lot there, but it certainly will not keep us out of war.

We were told about cash and carry, and that was supported. If we had cash and carry in this country today, those self-same pressure groups that drove us to war in 1917 would drive us to war once again. When you have \$10,000,000,000 of investments abroad and you are continually adding to these investments, can you talk of neutrality? Can you talk of peace? I think all of us know only too well that the investors in this country largely control the newspapers. With this situation, what are you going to have? Shall it be very long before we hear the cry, "Make the world safe for democracy" again? Can we talk of neutrality? Can we talk of cash and carry when we are going to have these pressure groups at work at us again?

Loans and credits were mentioned. Again that unfortunate figure of \$10,000,000,000 comes to mind. We will stop loaning abroad tomorrow. What are we going to do about the \$10,000,000,000 already over there? Also, the fact that the President can allow credits if he thinks it is to the economic interest of the United States.

They stated that no legislation would keep us out of war, and I think probably all of us here feel that.

No piece of legislation made by anybody can take in all situations. We may think it is right today, but tomorrow it will probably prove false. We don't want legislation. We want freedom for the United States.

Puerto Rico suggested an Anglo-American understanding. All of us, I guess, in our hearts want that. But one point there I don't think was brought to light. The English have a vast empire, unfortunately much vaster than that of the United States. It might be all right in certain times but at other times we will be dragged in with England into foreign conferences which are none of our business.

The Virginian likes freedom of action, and on the surface that is right along the Cornell line. We want freedom of action but there is a difference. They want freedom of action similar to 1914, where the President tried to do his best to keep us out of war. If I remember correctly, or my books tell me, Woodrow Wilson was reelected on the platform, "He Kept Us Out of War." It wasn't but shortly after his election that we were right in the war.

All right. We want to head this nation of ours today toward cooperation. We don't want to head it in a haphazard sort of way, saying to the President, "You can do what you want." We believe that in all fairness to this country we have to be a world power, consequently we must look toward cooperation for our salvation. We can't just look first to the North and then to the South. We must look along one line, the line which seems most practical to us, and that is cooperation.

Our policy is opportunist. That is rather selfish, rather cruel, probably; but we have to be interested in ourselves. All the other nations are. None of us here tonight is hopeful enough to think that some sort of major conflagration will not break out in the near future. We have only to think of Herr Hitler abroad, who, in his *Mein Kampf*, said he wanted to wipe out France. That man still wants to do that today. Can we sit back and believe that, with a gentleman in control with as much power as Herr Hitler, no world war is imminent?

No, gentlemen, many solutions have been offered. It just so happens that tonight isolation was not one of them, thank God. But Virginia spent quite a considerable time on that and I don't think Cornell must reëcho. Isolation is another ideal, an ideal that would probably answer our problems if it could be made workable; but as we have shown you, it will not work.

William Allen White suggested that we have no foreign shipments of goods at all, that we have no investments. Carrie Chapman Catt says, "We just won't have foreign shipments of goods; we will have no foreign shipments of any articles." In other words, people from all walks of life have presented solutions to you, and each one of us here probably has his own solution.

Tonight we have covered all of them. We have grouped them together. We have shown the present Neutrality Act is not the answer to our problem, that it won't keep us out of war. President Roosevelt can say he hates war; Neville Chamberlain can come out

with a magnificent statement that war has no winnings. We all agree with that, but the present Neutrality Act cannot keep us at peace.

We also feel the Anglo-American accord is not practical, that it would involve us in far too much. We feel the freedom of action of 1914 led us to war then, and as sure as fate will lead us to war again.

So we have offered our solution, which is both practical and selfish. We have said this: we must be practical. Consequently, we must look toward cooperation. That is the line, possibly, of least resistance, but that line which will lead us to our own salvation. On top of that, we must be selfish, we must be greedy. Consequently, we must be opportunistic. I think very sincerely that in that policy of opportunistic cooperation we will find the salvation of the United States of America and possibly the peace of the entire world.

Mr. Luis Berríos
University of Puerto Rico

MR. CHAIRMAN, SENATOR THOMAS, FRIENDS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: It seems to me that the gentlemen who have spoken tonight had pretty well-prepared speeches, and when I came here I had no idea of what I was going to say. But certain fundamental ideas have popped up in my mind as I have been listening to the speeches from the gentlemen of George Washington, Cornell, and Virginia.

It seems to me that there has been one general mistake in the discussion of the foreign policy of the

United States with regard to neutrality and war, and that general mistake has been that the gentlemen have gone on to show the theoretical merits of mere theoretical plans, without paying any attention to the practicability of those plans.

Take, for example, the gentlemen from Cornell. They have stated, in one of their last sentences, that they must be practical, and yet they have been urging more cooperation with the world of an opportunistic kind. But they have not stated for a single moment what kind of opportunistic cooperation, how they are going to get to that end, by what means—specifically, by what means.

After all, you could go on discussing the possibilities, the theoretical values of opportunistic cooperation in the world for ages, but it would be as futile as coming here and discussing such useless propositions as, I will say, "Resolved, That Uncle Sam shave his beard," or something like that.

It seems to me that the gentlemen from Cornell have gone off the track. They have assumed that it is possible, in the modern world, to have opportunistic cooperation; but they don't care just what kind of opportunistic cooperation. We hold that, in view of the modern international situation, that kind of opportunistic international cooperation would be by means of alliances or treaties of a temporary character with other nations. Specifically, with what nations? I think it very reasonable to think—and I suggest to you—that the United States would be very foolish to enter upon any kind of alliance with, say, Germany, Italy, and

Japan. Those are the traditional rivals of the United States. That leaves, then, the possibility of making temporary alliances with the friends of the United States.

Let us see what friends. In the first place we have Russia. But Russian tradition is so different from our tradition, their ideals, their economic interests are so far apart from ours, and even their geographical location, that the idea is limited to a certain extent to an impossibility.

Then we have nations like those in South America with which, already, we have some sort of understanding or alliance. That leaves, then, the possibility of France and England. Of course we could engage in an alliance with France, but the greatest possibility would be a temporary alliance with England, because, as my colleague has pointed out, we find our economic relations and our ideologies are very closely connected. Then the whole alternative of the gentlemen from Cornell is limited to the upholding of a temporary alliance with England. They view it in the light of probability, and not in the light of mere theory.

The position of the gentlemen from Cornell as contrasted with ours is that they want a temporary alliance with England, and we propose a permanent one. I think it reasonable to state that in these temporary alliances there are great disadvantages: in the first place, and principally, because you have to act in the midst of turmoil, because you have to decide things in a hurry, while by means of permanent alliances you foresee all the possibilities and you are prepared to

meet all those possibilities. Therein we hold that the alternative presented by the gentlemen from Cornell comes down to, or limits itself to, the upholding of a temporary alliance which, as compared with a permanent alliance with England, is not very favorable.

The gentlemen from George Washington have been upholding the Neutrality Act of today. It seems to me the failure in that stand is that the present neutrality of the United States is unneutral neutrality. It is a tacit alliance with England, which once more comes down to our proposition of a permanent alliance with England.

Let us analyze the Neutrality Act of today. As has already been pointed out, one of its main provisions is the cash and carry provision. That cash and carry provision means exactly this, that if nations at war want to buy goods or stuffs from the United States they must get to our ports, pay cash for our goods, and carry them back to their ports in their own boats.

Now we ask, what nation in Europe has a navy strong enough, is economically resourceful enough, to come to our ports, pay cash for our goods, and take them back to Europe, if not England? The gentlemen cannot deny that fact. Then neutrality, as applied to Europe, means only one thing—a tacit alliance with England, and therein it is being inconsistent with itself and is being unneutral neutrality.

That Neutrality Act, if applied to the case of the Far East, means only one thing—that the gentlemen cannot deny—that the application of that neutrality legislation to the Far Eastern question would help Japan as

against China. What advantage are we going to expect from a policy, from legislation, from an Act that, when applied in the Far Eastern situation, would help our greatest rival and potential enemy in the Pacific, namely Japan, and would go against the public sentiment of the United States? Therein we see how, in the case of the Far Eastern situation, the Neutrality Act of today is detrimental to the interests of the United States, and in the Western Hemisphere would mean a tacit alliance with England.

What would be the result of such a position? Are the gentleman so naive as to believe that the enemies of England would stand and tolerate this situation across the ocean? We believe that such a belief would be rather innocent. We know that Germany would not stand for such a position. That would naturally mean one of two things, either that Germany would directly attack England and hinder the English Navy from getting to the United States. That would mean the complete collapse of our economic relations and connections with England. I suggest that that would not be very good for the United States.

Or, in the second place, the second possibility is that the United States be directly attacked, and therein neutrality, instead of keeping us away from war, is plunging us into a war. So we see the whole fallacy behind the practicability of the idea which inspires the present neutrality legislation, the idea that we can stay away from war.

We all want to stay away from war. Humanity has always wanted to stay away from war. But has human-

ity been able to stay away from war? That is a very different problem. We hold that the United States, with its present neutrality legislation, can go anywhere but to peace.

The gentlemen from Virginia have been advocating a return to the freedom and independence of action that we had in 1914. If in 1914 we had freedom and independence of action, I don't know what the two words mean, because if freedom and independence of action lead one into a general world war—that is not freedom and independence of action. The gentlemen have been assuming that we could be free and independent in our action today, but that is a fallacy, because the practicability of the idea of freedom and independence of action is something quite different from the mere advocacy of the idea. Could we be free and independent of action in a world which is characterized by close political and economic interdependence among nations? Of course, political and economic interdependence is a term which is incompatible with freedom and independence of action, and the gentlemen cannot deny that in the modern international situation the fundamental reality is a close interdependence among nations, politically as well as economically.

How are the gentlemen going to advocate freedom and independence of action in the light of that fundamental reality?

We say, then, that the gentlemen from Virginia have been doing one thing. They want to keep away from war by means of freedom and independence of action, by relying upon a policy which is in flat contradiction

to the modern international situation, and we ask of the gentlemen from Virginia if it is logical to state that we can rely upon such a policy to keep us out of a war, a policy which is in flat contradiction with reality and which is destined to solve the problems which arise out of that reality with which it is incompatible. That is rather simple logic and out of proportion with the complex entanglements of modern situations.

So we have shown, of all the alternatives presented, two come down to a tacit alliance with England. The one presented by the gentlemen from Cornell means a temporary alliance with England as compared with our alternative of a permanent one; and the neutrality legislation of today resolves itself into a tacit alliance with England, which upholds our position; and the gentlemen from Virginia have been trying to discuss the theoretical merits of a proposition which would not work in the light of present fundamental realities.

Samuel K. C. Kopper
University of Virginia

SENATOR THOMAS, MR. YEAGER, FELLOW DEBATORS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: We of the University of Virginia have listened with great interest to the discussions on neutrality, the blind handmaiden of isolation, and permanent alliance with Great Britain. These are suggested as possible courses for the United States to follow in its foreign policy.

As you have seen, however, we think that none of these positions is wise, because each of them binds us

hand and foot. Under any of them we are in danger of having our foreign policy determined in Tokio, London, Berlin, or any other capital you would want to choose.

By contrast, it is our firm belief that the United States should base her foreign policy on complete freedom and independence of action. This does not mean that we engage in every petty argument, no matter where it is or what it may be about, nor that we will continue to permit ourselves to be trampled under foot by any pseudo Caesar.

Such a policy of freedom of action is desirable for several very important reasons. First, it is clear that a war-like nation will be far more careful in its actions should it seem quite possible that the United States would immediately clamp down on any imperialistic, aggressive designs, designs harmful directly or indirectly to the interests of the United States or to the peace of the world.

If, on the other hand, a nation knows in advance what we are going to do, it can make its plans accordingly while we are left in a sort of Stygian darkness. Precisely thus Japan took advantage of our Neutrality Act by not declaring war and thus kept us, against our will, as an open source for munitions and supplies.

A policy of freedom of action would keep us from being victimized in such fashion. The cards are not stacked against us. When the other nations know what our cards are, how can they fail to win?

It is commonly acknowledged today that the United States is the most powerful nation in the world. There

seems to be no reason why we should relinquish this position to some other nation whose aggressive tendencies will prove detrimental to us in the long run. Therefore, we can and should maintain a balance of power. To show that we mean what we say it may be necessary to apply force once or twice, but only once or twice, far less often than under the system of collective security and more effectively than under any system of isolation.

Instead of such a "foolish virgin" policy, we advocate a strong and effective stand among the assembly of nations. Great Britain is an outstanding example of a nation which has taken historically a determined course for the freedom of action and peace. In general, the results have been highly successful. She has not only kept a balance in Europe throughout four centuries, but has suffered less from war than any other major nation. In fact, she was embroiled in fewer struggles than any of her major neighbors during the nineteenth century. Her freedom of action was powerful and effective. It brought about the downfall of Napoleon, it shortened the Crimean War, stopped the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, halted Bismarck's war scare of 1884, prevented Germany's war-provoking occupation of the Philippines in 1898, and blocked Russia's nefarious bargain with Austria-Hungary when the latter took Bosnia and Herzegovina. Great Britain kept free of the Polish-Russian War of 1828, the Russian-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, and various Italian-Austrian wars. In each case the action served the welfare of the nation and the peace of the world. En-

lightened self-interest may have had a part, but its benefits went to the ends of Europe.

Supposing, now, that Great Britain had instead remained in isolation. Her ship of state would have been swamped and sunk in the Napoleonic tide. By positive action promptly applied, she made herself the governor and not the victim of the forces of evil. Let the United States take notice! Isolation is no more possible today for us than it was for Great Britain at the time of Napoleon.

We may wonder what specific steps America can take to carry out such a positive view of world affairs. Well, first, for example, we must seriously consider cooperation with Great Britain. The gentlemen from Puerto Rico have suggested that we make a permanent alliance with Great Britain. We are not suggesting this. We are suggesting a temporary agreement, not a temporary alliance between these two great democracies which have ideals and interests in common.

Isolationists often object at this point that George Washington feared cooperation. Washington may not be an authority on today's affairs, but for the isolationists' benefit let's see what he had to say. We quote from the "Farewell Address." He said, "Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishment on a reasonably defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." I fail to see anything in that about entangling alliances. Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler said, in a speech on Washington's Birthday in 1932, that Washington was "defi-

nately not the father of neutrality, although he was the father of the country."

Great Britain and the United States are very close together, as we have seen. They have their cultural interests, their common law and common language. Their trade with the United States amounts to 37 per cent of our total trade. We must remember that if the British Empire falls before some Fascist march the United States will find itself alone, an isle of olive branches on a sea of cannons. Do we wish to be like the rich boy in the slums who has left his friends behind him and goes along the street trusting in his bag of money to protect him? At the same time we cooperate, however, we must keep our hands free. We are not advocating any commitments or long-term alliances. Great Britain does not want a long-term alliance any more than we do. Her history has very few, if any, long-term alliances in it.

In reality, we wish freedom of action. Freeing the hands of the President, who is incidentally the highest officer in this country and should have some freedom of action in foreign policy according to the Constitution, will make it far more possible to steer a wise and profitable course. Hand in hand with this freedom of action, we urge the extension of world-wide intercourse and good will through the Hull Reciprocal Trade Treaties. These pacts aim ultimately to correct a chaotic world economic condition.

Also, we advocate adherence of the United States to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The United States' policy in 1914 had some cooperation to

it and was not an isolated stand. I think the gentleman from Puerto Rico has reached some confusion as to what led us into the World War. It was not freedom and independence of action that led us into the World War, but the fact that we dropped the freedom and independence of action.

Thus, in a political sense, we urge that the United States free itself to follow the way of the golden mean, neither abandoning our brothers nor dictating to them, yet able to move in a direction which seems to us wise in the defense of our own peace and that of the world.

In a cultural sense we can go even farther, extending world-wide intercourse, good will and understanding as a firm basis for future political organization. We cannot have that union, as the League of Nations demonstrated, until a firm foundation of cultural agreement has been laid. Today international affairs are so explosive and so intricate that it is impossible to lay down a foreign policy in 1, 2, 3, A, B, C, fashion. Independence of action will serve our needs and the world's needs best. Let us not commit ourselves to any permanent alliances or to any policy of strict neutrality.

Senator Thomas

Mr. Corker will close the discussion by speaking for George Washington.

Charles E. Corker
George Washington University

SENATOR THOMAS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: My partner, Mr. Southmayd, was under the impression earlier this evening that I was going to put him together after this discussion was over, and I would very much like to gather up, again, the pieces of Mr. Southmayd and reassemble them. But the speakers have been making rather back-handed licks at Senator Thomas here, who can't say very much in his own behalf, so I think perhaps Senator Thomas needs more putting together than does my partner, Mr. Southmayd. I think Senator Thomas has been sitting here and behaving himself better than any United States Senator I ever heard of before! (Laughter)

Before we start this process of reassembling, however, I want to do a little "unassembling" on the part of the gentlemen from Puerto Rico. They have told us that we should seek this so-called collective security through an alliance with Great Britain. They stated their case very ably. However, Mr. Hilaire Belloc, a former member of Parliament, a British editor and statesman, stated that case I believe a little more effectively in a magazine article in the British *G. K. C's Weekly*, in January of this year. Mr. Belloc dealt with the precarious and almost pathetic position of British finance in the Far East and he dealt with the lack of any powerful foreign allies on the part of Great Britain today.

Then Mr. Belloc said: "There remains the United

States. It is commonly said up and down Europe that we can make the United States do what we like. . . . We got the United States into the Great War and, what was more extraordinary, we managed, in the debt business, to make France the villain of the piece. The mass of the American public has no experience as we have of modern war. Its enthusiasm is easily aroused. We have already got them to feel a sort of instinctive opposition to the Italians and . . . have got them to oppose the Third Reich. . . . Shall we rope in America against Japan? As things now stand our chances are, to put it in American, about fifty-fifty." (Applause)

Mr. Belloc lacked the fire and the eloquence of the gentleman from Puerto Rico, but he did come to the point a great deal more directly and that, so far as Great Britain is concerned, is the only point. Oh, yes, Great Britain will stand behind us, if Great Britain is our ally. Great Britain will stand behind us until they cave our ribs in, and then Great Britain will run like . . . —Great Britain will depart very rapidly.

The foremost advocate in the world of the League of Nations and of collective security has been Great Britain, since the World War. And under Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Great Britain assured the small and helpless nations that they could rely on the League of Nations and not on their armaments for security. Last month British policy changed abruptly. Anthony Eden resigned. In place of the assurances that Britain had given the small nations, Prime Minister Chamberlain said on the floor of the House of Commons: "We must not try to delude small, weak nations into thinking they

will be protected by the League against aggression and acting accordingly when we know that nothing of the kind can be expected. *We must not try to delude small, weak nations.*" So Great Britain's support of the League, her assurances to those small, weak nations, had been deluding those nations!

Today, one month after Britain withdrew her support, almost treacherously I should say, one of those nations, Austria, is no more, and others doubt their ability to exist. I wonder if the gentleman from Puerto Rico, if Puerto Rico ever becomes an independent nation, would like to rest the security of Puerto Rico upon Great Britain, upon British assurances and British alliances, as Austria did.

Now we come to the position taken by the gentlemen from Cornell. They have advocated that we rely not upon permanent alliances but that we rely upon temporary alliances. Unfortunately this splendid discovery they have made to keep the United States out of war is not new. It has been tried and it has been tried again. They told you of the attempt that was made on the part of the nations in the League against Italy, when Italy was engaged in the Ethiopian conquest, and it failed. It did draw Mussolini and Hitler closer together, permitting the conquest of Austria a few weeks ago, and that was the only result.

When our State Department had less wisdom than it has since acquired, Secretary Stimson tried this, when Japan was engaged in the conquest of Manchuria, but Great Britain refused to back our note of protest. They said quite frankly that their permanent alliances with

Japan were more important than our purely temporary offers of assistance, and our State Department was left the unpleasant task of backing down rather hastily from the proverbial limb. I don't believe that if the gentlemen mentioned that plan to those officials they would be very popular. In fact, I am rather inclined to believe that the Secretary of State would become rather bilious upon hearing of such a plan.

Then we come to the Virginia position. The gentlemen from Virginia have told us that they want to take the middle of the road. They don't want alliances and they don't want isolation. They don't want neutrality. I was looking all over the floor this evening for the road down which they were traveling, but I couldn't even find the road. It is, however, a position that we might expect the gentlemen from Virginia to take, because it is a position that might square very adequately with the Virginia temperament and be pursued very energetically by Southern statesmen who would pursue their duty on a shady lawn, sipping nice, tall mint juleps. However, it doesn't propose to do a thing. It proposes to wipe off our statute books the neutrality laws we have at the present time and it does not substitute any attempt at all to keep the United States out of war.

The weakness of the position of 1914, to which they have said we should return, is the weakness which got us into the World War. It is a policy of drifting. In 1914, when Great Britain destroyed our trade with Germany, naturally, by drifting, under this flexible policy, we allowed our interests to become inextricably bound up with Great Britain and we went to war on the

side of the Allies. That is again the danger which we are confronting at the present time.

Today, however, the United States has a foreign policy which does not rely upon foreign nations. It does not rely upon the intrigue and swift-changing international scene, but it relies upon action of our own, upon which we can depend. It is an attempt to keep us out of war. It provides that the President, when he finds that we are seriously in danger of becoming embroiled in a European war, may recall our ships from danger zones. He may recall our citizens traveling on belligerent ships; he may prevent foreign governments from financing their wars in the United States. It is an attempt, in so far as possible, to withdraw our ships, our citizens and our interests, from danger zones. That is the only way that has been developed to attempt seriously to keep the United States out of war. Maybe today we still have the spirit that would die for dear old Rutgers, but we will no longer die for dear old Standard Oil!

We have said that this is not a guarantee against war. It is merely the framework of a policy around which the common sense intelligence of the American people, of our statesmen, of our press can keep us out of war. That is the policy we have today, and more necessary than ever are those qualities of tolerance, wisdom, and moderation in our foreign affairs. We must continue to follow a policy of what our distinguished Chairman, Senator Thomas, called "the principle of living and letting live" in international affairs, and by so doing our common sense can keep us out of war. That is the

prime interest of the American people, of the American nation today.

Forum Discussion
Senator Thomas

For your sake, for the speakers' sake, and especially for my sake, I am very happy that this has been a discussion and not a formal debate, and that no decision is required. Had there been a decision, I am sure that I echo the ideas of everyone present that, if the voting were taken after any one of the speakers, that would be the speaker who would win the debate.

I am glad, too, to see that the Neutrality Act and the neutrality idea have had an effect upon debating in the United States, because we came together, all of us neutrals, listening to four sides of an argument. That, I am pretty sure, reflects the definition which the last speaker made of our present Neutrality Act, an Act which makes it possible for us to live and makes it incumbent upon us, too, to see that others may continue to live.

According to the scheme of tonight's program, we now throw the question open to questions and answers. We should have only simple questions—by that I mean not complex questions—questions that can be answered directly. If the person who has such a question will call upon any one of the eight speakers by name and then put the question to him, we will have the answer.

QUESTION: I wish to ask any one of the two gentlemen from George Washington a question with respect to the effect of the Neutrality Act on aggressions which

we witness today in the world. We know that such a distinguished individual as Secretary Hull and others in the Administration——

SENATOR THOMAS (Interposing): Please don't answer the question for them. You asked a question. Don't explain what you want and don't make a speech. Just ask a question, please.

QUESTION: I was merely preparing an introduction to my question.

SENATOR THOMAS: I have asked that we ask questions and not prepare introductions or give answers. If you have a question, please give it.

QUESTION: Does the Neutrality Act have any provision, whatever, to stop aggression going on in the world today which eventually may affect America vitally?

MR. SOUTHMAYD: So far as I know, the present Neutrality Act—that is the Neutrality Act of 1937—contains no specific provision to stop aggression in other parts of the world. That is not the purpose of the Neutrality Act. There is but one purpose for the Neutrality Act of 1937, and that is to keep America at peace with the world and not to stop aggression in Germany and Italy and elsewhere. It is all very well to talk about stopping that aggression. That is what we tried to do in the World War. We went over there to make the world safe for democracy, and look what happened! The world is now safe for Fascism, evidently. All we are interested in under the Neutrality Act of 1937 is in keeping these United States at home

and at peace and keeping our children in school and our men at work.

QUESTION: I should like to ask one of the gentlemen from Puerto Rico, who claim that Italy, Japan and Germany are our principal competitors, if they will name two geographic spheres of activity in which England is not our chief competitor.

SENATOR THOMAS: The authority on world trade, please!

MR. RODRÍGUEZ: I grant you, England may be our chief competitor, and it is because of that that we want to stabilize unfair competition in the world today.

QUESTION: Is it a fact than an Anglo-American alliance constitutes a breach of the principles as established by the Constitution and destroys the great ideal of no entangling alliances on the part of foreign countries?

MR. RODRÍGUEZ: Really, I can't follow you very well. Will you put it in words of one syllable?

. . . The question was repeated . . .

MR. RODRÍGUEZ: If I get you right, you really ask whether such permanent alliances with England would be opposed to the principles set by our forefathers. Is that it?

Well, maybe it would. So what?

QUESTION: I should like to ask a question of either of the two gentlemen from Cornell. I think conservative estimates of the cost of the World War placed it at about \$65,000,000,000, and several times during the discussion tonight Cornell harped——

SENATOR THOMAS (Interposing): Please get to the question!

QUESTION: The question is this: Is it worth \$65,000,000,000 to protect \$10,000,000,000 of investments?

MR. MAXCY: Of course it isn't worth it, but people don't think in those terms. They think in terms of present-day business conditions. They look at Europe today and think, "Well, war is a good thing." It certainly will give us a temporary boom, and most business men aren't very farsighted. Perhaps that is why the country is in such a state as it is in now. People are taking the short-term viewpoint and they don't look as far ahead as you are looking.

QUESTION: I should like to ask a question of the gentlemen from Puerto Rico. Since the primary purpose is to prevent this nation from getting into war——

SENATOR THOMAS (Interposing): Question, please!

QUESTION: Has it occurred to the gentlemen from Puerto Rico that the possibilities of England getting into war in the Mediterranean, in the Chinese situation, and in other parts of the world are mentioned frequently, and that no one yet has mentioned the United States with any such direct relation to war? Does he think such an alliance would help keep us out of war, or drag us into war to protect the British Empire?

MR. RODRÍGUEZ: I thought I said, in my private Anglo-American alliance, that we would be against aggressive wars. If England were attacked—of course I have no statement to give you a detailed description of how such an Anglo-American alliance should be, and I hope you realize that. Of course England has, you

may call it, different interests, very widespread in the world today. You may say that the United States may be foreign to some of those interests. But the real problem to be solved is whether or not, in the face of the present international situation, an Anglo-American alliance wouldn't be the best alternative, the most stabilizing force, the first and best step to be taken toward international security and peace.

QUESTION: May I ask one question in answer to that? If that were true, wouldn't the United States be giving about 60 per cent and 70 per cent in order to get 10 per cent security out of it?

MR. RODRÍGUEZ: Of course I don't know the proportions. In fact, I am not interested in that.

QUESTION: Then wouldn't we be getting much the smaller proportion of security?

MR. RODRÍGUEZ: No. Haven't you heard of the British Navy, for instance?

QUESTION: Mr. Kopper, of Virginia, considering the speed with which the totalitarian governments can act today to usurp another government, can we hope to effect a temporary alliance with England speedily enough to cope with any situation that might arise today?

MR. KOPPER: You notice I advocated that we make some agreement with Great Britain at the present moment, before there are any more of these dictatorial moves either from Berlin or Bagdad or Tokio or Shanghai, or wherever they are going. We should make a definite step toward Great Britain right now and get

some understanding in the way of naval protection of the two countries. If we waited until the time the dictators strike, I don't think there would be any chance of forming any alliance—not under the democratic system.

QUESTION: May I ask one brief question of Mr. Corker? I would like to know if the gentleman feels there is any justification for some of our naval officers to refer to the United States Department of State as the B. A. F. O., the British-American Foreign Office.

MR. CORKER: No!

MR. MICHAEL: I should like to ask the last speaker from George Washington whether the opinion of Mr. Belloc alters the fact that an alliance with Great Britain will in some cases help us. We can also run like

MR. CORKER: I think the opinion of Mr. Belloc is merely typical of the opinion which Great Britain has. I think Great Britain feels that with an alliance she would have a powerful ally. She would make her wars our wars. We won't have any wars, if we have sense enough to recognize that there are 3,000 miles of deep water between us and the nearest potential enemy.

MR. MICHAEL: But cannot an alliance with Great Britain, in spite of her opinion, aid us in some cases?

MR. CORKER: I don't believe it ever has yet. I don't believe it could. I don't believe that we have any danger of war so long as we will stay out of those alliances. Great Britain has far-flung interests, colonies at every corner of the earth. We don't have any of

those interests. Why should we make British interests our interests?

MR. MICHAEL: Would my so-called defense of British interests not help stabilize a country which is practically our only bulwark between complete isolation from aggressive nations of the world?

MR. CORKER: Our only protection from aggressive nations of the world, when those aggressive nations are aiming their policy at Great Britain and not at the United States, is to stay out of that conflict.

MR. MICHAEL: Are we strong enough to stay out of that conflict?

MR. CORKER: It doesn't take any strength to sit down. It takes a great deal of strength to get up and fight.

MR. MICHAEL: What happens if the fellow comes and slugs you while you are sitting down?

MR. CORKER: During 150 years of our history we fought a number of wars and every one of those wars has been a war of aggression. We never yet have fought a war of defense, nor have we ever been on the point of fighting a war of defense.

MR. MICHAEL: It is not impossible in the future, though.

MR. CORKER: I heard a little poem the other day which reminds me of the position that has been taken here this evening:

"I saw a man upon the stair,
A man who was not there.
He was not there again today;
I hope to God he'll go away."

That is the position of the enemies which have been conjured up here out of the mists of the Atlantic for us to fight.

MR. KOPPER: If it is possible for Germany to make intrusions in Brazil, is it not possible for them to make them in Canada or Mexico?

MR. CORKER: I don't believe Germany has made any intrusions in Brazil. I read that they had burned some 200 swastika flags.

MR. KOPPER: They are still making intrusions.

MR. CORKER: I haven't been to Brazil lately, so I wouldn't know about that.

SENATOR THOMAS: I think the arrangement was that we should entertain questions from the floor put to the debaters. While we all enjoy this, there was a time limit for the debaters. Are there any other questions from the floor?

QUESTION: Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the gentleman from Puerto Rico, Mr. Berríos, how he reconciles his attack on the opportunism as advocated in part by both Cornell and Virginia, in which he implied there were alliances and agreements, with his own support of a permanent Anglo-American alliance.

MR. BERRÍOS: Because they are two quite different things.

QUESTION: Just how are they different?

MR. BERRÍOS: One is an opportunistic alliance of a temporary character (don't forget that), and the other is a permanent alliance with England, two quite different things.

QUESTION: Mr. Maxcy, of Cornell: Who, under your plan, would determine the countries with whom we should temporarily ally ourselves? Would it be the President, Congress, business, any particular interests, or just who?

MR. MAXCY: I imagine it would be plainly the State Department. It would probably be in the hands of experts like Senator Thomas. The opinions of these men would be determined by a recognition of what is going on. These men would be able to know far better than the members of Congress, I imagine—the average member of Congress with the exception of Senator Thomas—and Congress and the State Department, of course, will be subject to these pressure groups that we have mentioned. But, primarily, it will rest in the hands of the State Department and the President.

QUESTION: May I ask Mr. Michael, of Virginia, a question? He said that dictatorships and nationalism today are insurmountable facts, and I take it to mean by insurmountable that they are very real and they are spreading, as it were. I wonder, then, how does he reconcile that fact with the policy of practical isolation, namely freedom of action, aside from any collective security.

MR. MICHAEL: The gentleman has perhaps missed my opening sentence, which was that the policy of 1914 was not isolation, practical or otherwise. It was independence of action. I say that the spread of aggressive action, of aggressiveness and a rise of a spirit of nationalism hinder the greatest means which we have toward world-wide thinking, world-intercourse, in short. I be-

lieve that world-intercourse could overcome that nationalistic spirit.

QUESTION: I should like to ask one question of the debaters from George Washington. What is your answer to the charge that the terms of the present Neutrality Act make it possible for a foreign nation to circumvent the spirit of the Act?

MR. SOUTHMAYD: I don't recall just what the charge was about the circumvention of the spirit of the Act. This much I do say. The charge has been leveled that the Act favors one belligerent nation as against the other. That is, the proposition was brought out tonight that the nation that has the ships and the gold is favored as against those nations which don't.

Well now, to that all we can say is this: I talked the other day with an international lawyer of some repute and he told me that there is a cardinal principle of international law which is this, that to be neutral you must act the same way toward both nations. In any given neutrality act, one nation may be geographically situated so it will be favored as against the other. But now all that can be asked of any neutral nation is that it apply the same terms to one nation as to another nation, and that is precisely what is done under the present Act. We lay down the same terms to England, the same terms to France and the same terms to Germany. If England has more ships and more money, that is their lookout, not ours. We are fulfilling our obligations as a neutral nation, and that is all that can be asked of any neutral nation.

SENATOR THOMAS: It is now half past ten and I

think it would be well to leave some questions to be solved at some future time, and not destroy all debating. I therefore turn the meeting over to Professor Yeager.

PROFESSOR YEAGER: In closing the meeting I merely want to thank Senator Thomas for coming to us tonight and acting as Chairman. I think that there is nothing more to be said, and I declare the meeting adjourned.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

- Academy of Political Science.—*Foreign Policy of the United States*. Pa. \$2.50. The Academy.
- Alexander, R. C. and Stone, W. T.—*America Contradicts Herself*. bds. 35¢. Foreign Policy Association.
- Angell, Norman—*The Great Illusion*. 1933.
- Angell, Norman—*Peace and the Plain Man*. 1935.
- Angell, Norman—*The Unseen Assassins*. 1932.
- Bisson, T. A. and Alexander, R. C.—*Clash in the Pacific*. 35¢. Foreign Policy Association.
- Bratt, Major K. A.—*The Next War*. 1931.
- Buell, Raymond Leslie and Alexander, R. C.—*War Drums and Peace Plans*. 35¢. Foreign Policy Association.
- Butler, Nicholas Murray—*Between Two Worlds*. 1934.
- Cooper, Russell M.—*American Consultation in World Affairs*. 1934.
- Curti, M. E.—*Peace or War*. 1936. Norton. \$3.50.
- Farley, M. S.—*America's Stake in the Far East*. 1936. Inst. of Pacific Relations. 25¢.
- Godshall, W. L. (comp.)—*American Foreign Policies—Formulation and Practice*. 1937. Edwards Bros. \$5.
- Grattan, C. H.—*Preface to Chaos*. 1936. Dodge. \$3.
- Hallgren, M. A.—*Tragic Fallacy*. 1937. Knopf. \$4.
- Hartley, Livingston—*Is America Afraid?* 1937.
- Harrabin, J. F.—*An Atlas of Empire*. 1937.

- Hinton, H. B.—*America Gropes for Peace*. 1937. Johnson Publishing Co. \$2.
- Lockwood, W. W.—*Foreign Trade Policy of the United States*. 1936. Inst. of Pacific Relations. 50¢.
- Ludlow, L.—*Hell or Heaven*. 1937. Stratford. \$2.
- Patterson, Ernest Minor.—*America: World Leader or World Led?* 1933.
- Perkins, D.—*Monroe Doctrine 1867-1907*. 1937. Johns Hopkins Univ. \$3.50.
- Sayre, F. B.—*America Must Act*. 1936. World Peace Foundation. 75¢. pa. 35¢.
- Sears, L. W.—*History of American Foreign Relations*. 1936. Third edition. T. Y. Crowell. \$3.50.
- Shepardson, W. H. and Scroggs, W. O.—*United States in World Affairs*. An Account of American Foreign Relations. 1934-1935. 1936. Harper. \$3.00.
- Stratton, George Malcolm—*International Delusion*. 1936.
- Ware, E. E. editor.—*Study of International Relations in the United States*. 1938. Columbia University Press. Buck. \$3.50.
- Wilbert, A.—*Atlantic: Bond or Barrier?* 1937. Oxford. pa. 75¢ 2s 6d.
- Williams, W.—*Dusk of Empire*. 1937. Scribner. \$3.
- Wright, Quincy—*The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace*. 1935.
- Young, E. J.—*Powerful America: Our Place in a Rearming World*. 1936. Stokes. \$3.

MAGAZINES AND PERIODICALS

- Academy of Political Science. Proceedings.—17:273, May, 1937. *Foreign Policy of the United States*. Ed. by J. A. Krout.
- American Journal of International Law.—31:665, Oct., 1937. *Far Eastern Policy of the United States*; with text of the State Department statement regarding the situation in the Far East. C. Eagleton. 31:688, Oct., 1937. *Secretary of State Hull's Pillars of Enduring Peace*. G. A. Finch. 32:101, Jan., 1938. *Observations of Foreign Governments upon Sec. Hull's Principles of Enduring Peace*. Bibliography.
- Annals of the American Academy.—192:1-155, July, 1937. *United States and world war*. Edited by E. M. Patterson.
- Asia.—38:230, April, 1938. *America Plays a Risky Game*.
- Business Week.—p. 62, Oct. 16, 1937. *Turning Point in Foreign Policy*.

- Catholic World.—146:257, Dec., 1937. *Foreign Policy? Who Knows?* J. M. Gillis.
- Christian Century.—55:271, Mar. 2, 1938. *Is Youth to Be Betrayed Again?* J. B. Abernathy. 55:397, Mar. 30, 1938. *We Did It once.* H. Herring.
- Christian Science Monitor.—p. 4, July 21, 1937. *Where Policy Falters: Washington Handicapped by Division of Authority in Government.* L. Stoddard. p. 1, Jan. 12, 1938. *This Interdependent World: Why America and Britain Should Cooperate.* R. Muir.
- Commonweal.—27:449, Feb. 18, 1938. *Mobilization for Chaos.* 27:617, Apr. 1, 1938. *International Anarchy.*
- Congressional Digest.—17:92, Mar., 1938. *Memorandum on National Policy.* B. Bliven.
- Digest.—1:12, Oct. 30, 1937. *Was the President's Chicago Speech a Move toward Peace?* Pro and con.
- Fortnightly Review.—149 (n.s. 143):362, Mar., 1938. *I'm Alone still the Watchword of the U. S. A.*
- Harper's.—176:652, May, 1938. *Where Are You Going, Mr. President? Trend of our Foreign Policy.* H. Herring.
- International Conciliation.—331:549, July, 1937. *United States and World Organization during 1936.* 337:69, Feb., 1938. *American Aloofness; editorial from the New York Times.* 337:72, Feb., 1938. *Parallel Roads to Peace; editorial from the New York Times.* 334:711, Nov., 1937. *Roosevelt's Address on Quarantining War Aggressors.* Chicago, Ill. Oct. 5, 1937. 334:733, Nov., 1937. *American Foreign Policy statement of July 16, 1937; with Comments of Foreign Governments.*
- Nation.—145:391, Oct. 16, 1937. *Quarantine: Gesture or Policy?* 145:707, Dec. 25, 1937. *How Can We Escape War?* N. Thomas, R. L. Buell. 146:202, Feb. 19, 1938. *War Is in The Air.* P. Y. Anderson. 146:238, Feb. 26, 1938. *Road to Peace: Free International Collaboration.* L. Fisher. 146:262, Mar. 5, 1938. *America Must Act.* 146:271, Mar. 5, 1938. *Fundamental Weakness of the Hull-Davis-Roosevelt policy.* O. G. Villard. 146:356, Mar. 26, 1938. *A World War Will Destroy Democracy.* O. G. Villard. 146:376, 403, 435, 460, Apr. 2-23, 1938. *Foreign policy for America; Peace Poll Returns.*
- New Republic.—91:209, 224, Je. 30, 1937. *Will America Stop Another War?* With Editorial Comment. J. A. Hobson. 93:93. Dec. 1,

1937. *Collective Insecurity*. B. Bliven. 93:200, Dec. 22, 1937. *Vote for Collective Security*; with editorial reply. J. L. Childs. 93:328, Jan. 26, 1938. *Memorandum on National Policy*. B. Bliven. 94:43, Feb. 16, 1938. *Merrily We Roll to War*. 94:60, Feb. 23, 1938. *Mr. Hull's Foreign Policy*. 94:157, Mar. 16, 1938. *What Next?* B. Bliven. 94:167, Mar. 16, 1938. *Collective Security: a Debate*. Earl Browder, C. A. Beard. 94:220. Mar. 30, 1938. *With Love to Adolph*. 94:233, Mar. 30, 1938. *National Defense, a Progressive Policy*. Symposium.
- News Week.—11:40, Mar. 28, 1938. *Drifting toward War*. Raymond Moley. 11:14, Apr. 25, 1938. *Foreign Policy; Warn Dictators Hands Off*.
- Pacific Affairs.—10:377, Dec., 1937. *American Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1937*. F. V. Field.
- Political Science Quarterly.—53:1, Mar., 1938. *American Military Policy and National Security*. E. M. Earle. Bibliography.
- Reader's Digest.—32:37, Feb., 1938. *Our Responsibility toward Peace Abroad*.
- Round Table.—27:604, June, 1937. *America and the Democracies*.
- Saturday Evening Post.—210:23, Feb. 5, 1938. *We Love a Crusade*. G. F. Eliot.
- Saturday Review of Literature.—17:3, Mar. 12, 1938. *Defense of Democracy*. G. S. Slocombe. 17:9, Mar. 26, 1938. *A Reply to G. S. Slocombe*. B. E. Schmidt.
- Scholastic.—32:12, s. Apr. 2, 1938. *Hull Maintains Faith in World Cooperation*. 32:20, s. May 7, 1937. *Congressional Group Seeks to Condemn Aggressors*. 32:14, s. Feb. 19, 1938. *Foreign Policy Stirs Ire of Congressmen*. 31:32, Oct. 30, 1937. *New Foreign Policy for America*.
- Spectator.—158:791, 854, 896. Apr. 30-May 14, 1937. *Atlantic: Bond or Barrier?* A. Willert.
- Time.—30:17, 24. Oct. 18, 1937. *Quarantining war: address of President Roosevelt at Chicago, Ill., Oct. 5, 1937*.
- Vital Speeches.—4:2, Oct. 15, 1937. *Address of President Roosevelt at Chicago, Ill., Oct. 5, 1937, on Quarantining War*. 4:335, Mar. 15, 1938. *Restore the Family of Nations; Trade Treaties, Arbitration*. R. L. Buell. 4:354, Apr. 1, 1938. *Would We Fight in Europe? A Dangerous Sort of Misunderstanding*. J. P. Kennedy. 4:368, Apr. 1, 1938. *Our Foreign Policy; America's Con-*

- tribution to World Peace.* C. Hull. 4:386, Apr. 15, 1938. *Our Imperative Task; to Mind Our Own Business.* W. E. Borah. 4:407, Apr. 15, 1938. *Greatest Service the Nation Can Give; the Protection of Democracy.* H. Hoover.
- Yale Review.—27 (n.s.):366 No. 2, Dec., 1937. *Conflict in Our Far Eastern Diplomacy.*

NEUTRALITY POLICY OF THE
UNITED STATES

An Electrical Transcription Copy of the Regular Type of Intercollegiate Debate

UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA AFFIRMATIVE *vs.* ARIZONA STATE
TEACHERS COLLEGE NEGATIVE

The adequacy of the neutrality laws and ideals of the United States and the efficacy of its foreign policy in the matter of keeping the United States out of foreign entanglements and in preventing war came in for considerable discussion among college students during the debate season of 1937-38.

The following debate was held between the two Arizona educational institutions just mentioned at the Phoenix Junior College Auditorium, Phoenix, Arizona, on the evening of February 11, 1938. The debate was recorded by electrical transcription and later taken off the records and revised and edited by Professor W. Arthur Cable of the University of Arizona, Director of Debate at that institution. The transcriptions were arranged for by Professor Merle Ansberry of Arizona State Teachers College at Tempe, Director of Debate. Professor Cable contributed the speeches to this volume.

The question discussed was stated: Resolved, that the neutrality laws of the United States should be strengthened.

NEUTRALITY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

First Affirmative, Noal R. Gray
University of Arizona

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: We of the University of Arizona appreciate debating against the Arizona State Teachers College at Tempe, the University of Arizona taking the Affirmative of the proposition, *Resolved, that the neutrality laws of the United States should be strengthened.*

In this proposition there are, of course, two terms. First, "*neutrality laws.*" By neutrality laws we mean those laws dealing with neutrality now in effect and passed by our Congress. The provisions of this Act are these: it provides that the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war shall be prohibited by our President when he deems that a war situation is present in a foreign country. Second, that the export of other articles is also prohibited at the discretion of the President. Third, that there shall be no lending of money to any belligerent in case of such a proclamation. Fourth, that American Republics are excluded from the Act. Fifth, it sets up a National Munitions Control Board, headed by the Secretary of State, which shall handle the shipping of munitions by American citizens and American corporations. Another provision is that the Act of Neutrality shall expire on March 9, 1939.

This is what we mean by the *neutrality laws of the United States*. And now for the second term, *strengthening* these laws. By strengthening these neutrality laws we mean adding provisions to this Act by amending it so that the purpose for which the law was made shall become more capable of being put into effect, that purpose being to keep the United States out of war. By strengthening the neutrality laws we propose to accomplish this purpose.

Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, says, "In a future war there can be no neutrals." Neutrality in the strict nineteenth-century sense has been displaced. The League of Nations, the Pact of Paris, the new sanctions used by the international cooperation of governments, make the old definition of neutrality obsolete. Let us look at the definition of neutrality given in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* for 1937. Quote: "Maintenance of an attitude of impartiality in a nation's dealings with either belligerent. But with the creation of a League of Nations, however, a new conception arose. The League is based upon international solidarity. Hence, neutrality and a League of Nations are mutually exclusive." Therefore, the proposition is that the University of Arizona shall point out why and how our present neutrality laws should be strengthened in order to keep the United States out of war.

Let us for a moment look at the Negative. They have two alternatives. They must either say that the neutrality law should be weakened or they must say that the neutrality law should be maintained as it now is.

Now, let us for a moment look into the importance of this question. Do we realize that if tomorrow morning the headlines screamed that war was declared upon Japan by the United States, the students assembled here would be going to war instead of going to their morning classes? Do we realize that the Spanish war in 1898 had for its beginning the sinking of a ship, the *Maine*; that the catastrophe of 1917 had its *Lusitania*; and that the impending Japanese crisis has had its *Panay*? Do we realize that war is possible? It could come even tomorrow morning. Therefore, it is important that we should strengthen our neutrality laws in order to keep the United States out of war. In my speech, I propose to point out the present weaknesses in our neutrality law, and to show that it should be strengthened to keep us out of war. My colleague, Mr. Hostetter, will point out the ways in which the Affirmative plan will strengthen our present neutrality law in order to keep us out of war.

And now as to the weaknesses of the present law. In the present law, as read to you a moment ago, the export of arms, ammunition, and other implements of war is prohibited by proclamation of the President. He has no alternative if war is declared. If President Roosevelt should find that war exists between Japan and China and declares the Neutrality Act in effect, what would be the result under the present statute? The result would be that he would place an embargo upon shipments to China—which is badly in need of them—as well as to Japan. There is no discretion under the present law. Japan would be helped because

China would be weakened. Certainly it is not the policy of the United States at the present time to help Japan and weaken China. Therefore, the present Neutrality Act could not with moral justice be invoked by our President. That is a serious weakness. If we did invoke the present law we would pull down upon the United States the combined hatred of all the civilized nations of the world. These mandatory provisions which give the President no alternative, no discretion in administering the law, are serious weaknesses to the peace of the United States.

Now another weakness of our present neutrality law. The American Republics, all of them—Mexico, Chile, Peru, all of South America and Central America—are excepted by the statute. If Japan were tomorrow to come flying over Mexico, starting destruction, the Neutrality Act would be of no avail. The provision of the Neutrality Act that American goods be not shipped to belligerents would be inoperative. The provision that Americans could not lend money to either belligerent would be of no use. If any country attacks South America or any American Republic, the Neutrality Act has no effect. That is a serious weakness in the present law which should be strengthened.

Let us consider a few other points that should be strengthened. The Act expires in March, 1939,—its death will be upon us before we know it. In less than a year and a month, the Neutrality Act as it now stands will be ended. Certainly it should be made into a permanent policy of the United States in order to keep us out of war.

Again, there is no provision in the present Act providing for the stopping of propaganda. The causes of war are both internal and external. If propaganda is allowed to create in our nation a furor against another country, as happened in 1917, then propaganda will inevitably cause war. The present Act of Neutrality does not provide for stopping this insidious appeal to the American people and that should be done. The Act, then, should be strengthened by stopping propaganda.

At the present time under the Act there is no adequate giving to the President, the administrator, the executor of the laws, a method to prevent the causes of war from arising first, within the United States, and second, from causes of war arising outside of the United States, in the other nations of the world. It has been known for a long time that strict neutrality is impossible. In the modern world with its interdependence—with its growing together of peoples dependent on one another in banking, governmental, social, and religious activities—the world is becoming a unit; and for one nation to stick its head in the sand and become an ostrich on the moving sands toward war, is ridiculous. There can be no strict neutrality. Cordell Hull, our Secretary of State, has realized this and has said that the Neutrality Act is for the purpose of keeping the United States out of war by preventing the causes of war from arising within the United States and outside of the United States.

Reviewing the war history of the world, we find that in the last three hundred years there have been but

three exceptions to the general rule, that, in any great war, all nations become involved. And at the present time certainly that prospect will apply with greater effect than ever.

So far in this discussion the Affirmative of the University of Arizona has pointed out the weaknesses in our present neutrality law, supporting the position that they should be strengthened in order to maintain the peace of the United States of America. My colleague, Mr. Hostetter, will outline the provisions in detail of the Affirmative plan, which will strengthen our law. The Negative has two alternative courses—either to advocate weakening our present law or to defend it as it stands.

First Negative, Kenneth McKee
Arizona State Teachers College at Tempe

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: As representatives of the Arizona State Teachers College at Tempe, we, too, are happy to discuss so important a question with the gentlemen from the University of Arizona. We, too, feel that this question which we are to debate this afternoon is a vital one—one which is to have a decided effect on the future foreign policy of the United States.

Let us consider this neutrality policy advocated by the first speaker of the Affirmative—this policy of neutrality which does not mean impartiality but means partiality—this policy of neutrality which strengthens our neutrality laws by removing the mandatory provisions and gives to the President more discretion—this policy of neutrality which does not mean isolation but

which means international cooperation—this plan which admits that neutrality is impossible on the one hand and plans for it on the other.

In the past, beginning with the administration of George Washington, it has been the policy of the United States to keep away from any type of cooperative effort involving European powers. We have been isolationists; we have avoided “foreign entanglements.” The statesmen, the diplomats of the United States have felt—and have been backed by public opinion—that it would be wise if the United States did not cooperate in moves toward world peace. Our government has not been willing to cooperate with other powers in preventing international conflicts which arise from misunderstanding. We need only look at the instance of the United States not joining the League of Nations. A great many students of international law feel today that the League failed primarily because the United States was not a supporter of that organization.

It seems to us of the Negative that the question at stake today is really this: is the United States going to continue to exclude herself from all participation in the settlement of disputes of world importance by accepting the proposition set forth by the Affirmative, or is she going to adopt a type of international policy which attempts constructively to aid in the settling of international misunderstandings?

May I read a few opinions about the policy of strict neutrality which it seems the gentlemen of the Affirmative must necessarily advocate here this afternoon. Mr. Key Pittman, United States Senator from Nevada

and Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, says in the *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* for May, 1937: "It is held by high authority that it is unneutral for a neutral, after a war has commenced, so to change its financial and commercial relations with the belligerent as to take such belligerent by surprise and suddenly deprive it of sources of supply on which it had depended and the deprivation of which will seriously injure it in the conduct of defense." We see from this type of statement that our present Neutrality Act is not in the strict sense of the word a neutrality act at all. And is it not logical to assume that even if the present Act were invoked, it would be considered an unfriendly act by the belligerents and might, rather than keeping us out of war, plunge us into one? What was Italy's attitude toward the sanctionist nations in her Ethiopian campaign? Under the Affirmative plan, the invocation would be against but one belligerent. Would not that be even worse than invoking it against both, insofar as the dangers of war are concerned? And part of the Affirmative plan is to keep us out of war!

In either case, it is merely a selfish motive which activates us in applying or even enacting such laws. Therefore, we of the Negative feel that our present Neutrality Act must either be amended to get around these international complications which, if developed far enough, would mean a declaration of war against us, or the Act must be done away with. In view of the fact that we feel that the Act is so defective in theory and in effect, in view of the present condition of our foreign relations, in view of the fact that the President has felt

that it is so inadequate that he has failed to invoke it in the present Sino-Japanese conflict, and in consideration of the international views of the Secretary of State, we do not want the Act amended—we choose the second alternative. We favor the repeal of the present Neutrality Act. We favor placing the responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations where it belongs—on the shoulders of the President and the Secretary of State.

Let me read another statement concerning the neutrality policy of the United States as carried out under the present Act. Professor Fenwick of Bryn Mawr College says in the *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* for May, 1937: "Alas, we now have before us only a policy of neutrality. What is neutrality? In fundamentals it is a policy of washing your hands of any responsibility for law and order in the world. I say it with all due respect and no criticism at all of those who hope to obtain peace by neutrality. I am not unaware of the difficulties of the alternative policy." And, further, this student of international law says: "In international relations, however, the policy of neutrality now seems to be our only refuge. It is not a genuine policy of neutrality. Our new law ought to be called a policy for keeping the United States out of war. I doubt whether it will do it but that ought to be its name. It is not a neutrality policy. Neutrality means treating both alike and that can only mean complete withdrawal from all intercourse of any kind with belligerents."

Now, Mr. Wilson and I feel this afternoon that the present Neutrality Act should be done away with be-

cause it is not an Act designed to achieve real neutrality, for real neutrality is impossible, as admitted by the first speaker of the Affirmative. We say further that the present Act—much less any extension of it—is not in accord with the present policy of international agreements as propounded by Secretary Hull. We feel that the policy is not an expression of the desires of the American people. We feel that the citizens of the United States are not willing to make the sacrifices required by this Act or any enlargement of it.

Let me illustrate this last contention with the following example. Our policy of freedom of the seas would be sacrificed in the event of the invocation of our present Act. Even if the present Act were invoked, it would cut our trade with the Orient to the extent of one-fourth; likewise we all know that the merchants in this country, the producers of cotton, the exporters to and the importers from Japan, have not been willing to adopt any kind of effective boycott upon Japanese goods in the past. What would be the reaction to an arbitrary ruling that trade was to be stopped?

Consequently, we of the Negative feel that since neutrality is impossible and is not even desirable, that since arbitrary invocation of any neutrality law would tend to lead us toward rather than away from war, a most emphatic “no” should be given to the question: “Should our neutrality laws be strengthened?”

Second Affirmative, Gordon W. Hostetter
University of Arizona

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: While in research for this debate it was my pleasure to investigate many definitions of the word *neutrality*, and in the course of this investigation I came across the definition as given by the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. I repeat that definition. It was given by my colleague, Mr. Gray, in the first speech. I repeat it in order that the gentlemen of the Negative may understand that we of the Affirmative are not advocating economic isolation this afternoon. As was said, our authority is the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Neutrality, in the new sense, means international solidarity. The reading of the quotation would go as follows: "With the creation of the League of Nations, a new conception of neutrality arose. This conception is based upon international solidarity." And so it would seem that the Affirmative and the Negative are quite in accord on the idea that the United States should abandon its policy of economic isolation, on the idea that the United States should progress under this new definition, under this enlarged meaning of the word *neutrality*.

But why is it that the Affirmative proposes to stand by these laws which have been created, not destroying that creation, but taking the defects that the gentlemen of the Negative have pointed out, and attempting to strengthen what we both consider weaknesses?

Now the plan of the Affirmative is essentially simple. There is nothing about the plan to be feared. The

President shall be given discretionary administration of the law. Whenever two nations are engaged in armed conflict, either declared or undeclared, or when one nation is engaged in civil strife, the President shall take the lead in demanding immediate arbitration of that conflict. He shall be able to choose as to the aggressor and the victim of the aggression. He shall invoke this law, not against both nations, but against the aggressor nation. Now in the present Chinese-Japanese conflict, the members of the Negative have pointed out that our neutrality legislation has not been invoked. I think, however, they were reasoning from a false premise. They did not realize that the reason the administration has not invoked the present neutrality legislation in the Sino-Japanese conflict is that if that legislation were invoked it would be absolutely discriminatory in favor of Japan. For if we invoke it equally against each country, Japan will not suffer in any way near the degree in which China will suffer. Neutrality, in the old sense, is "wind in the sails of the aggressor."

An unneutral America could, however, without moving a single man or gun, work for peace and for social progress. Let me bring to you Henry L. Stimson's idea of neutrality. Quote: "When the average man," speaking of an American, "speaks of neutrality, he often confuses it with impartiality," which it seems to me the members of the Negative have done this afternoon. It should mean just the opposite. If a war involves a power which has control of the seas it may mean that, by remaining neutral, we are in effect taking sides with that power against its opponents who do not control the

seas. We today, therefore, mean by neutrality that we wish to keep out of war. War is no longer a contest between two nations which the rest of the world can stand by and watch. War has become like a prairie fire which will spread with great rapidity and becomes immeasurably destructive. Therefore, it is the business of the whole world to unite to prevent it from starting and, if it starts, to stamp it out. That is the attitude of realists. The people who think they can stand off and watch and not ultimately become involved are dreamers.

And so we propose that the President be given this discriminatory power; that he be given the power to discriminate between the aggressor and the victim of the aggression. However, the Affirmative goes on record as admitting openly that if we do not have international cooperation, this collective solidarity and security that the Negative has advocated, our plan and the Negative's also, could not possibly work. But if this thing does not work we will have the safeguard of the law, the fundamental root laws still remaining, while the Negative will have nothing.

We plan for the President to cooperate with the other powers of the world in applying economic sanctions against an aggressor nation. This in its real sense should be neutrality. All of the present provisions now in force regarding American neutrality and those that we are mentioning shall be applicable, either in whole or in part, as the President sees fit. If the arbitration is spurned—that is, the President's offer of arbitration—or if the award of that arbitration is disregarded by either party or both, it shall be within the President's

discretion as to what steps he thinks best to take. This expressly does not include military action against the aggressor nation or nations. The Affirmative cannot condone any measures which must encompass military action in their attempt to destroy war. We do favor economic sanctions; we favor any measure short of actual military action. But we do not see the purpose of a law the avowed object of which is to keep us out of war if it is going to lead us directly into war to protect our standards.

Our next change would make this amendment and the previously enacted laws applicable within the President's discretion to any conflict taking place anywhere in the world. The Affirmative goes on record, therefore, as favoring to a certain degree, the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine. This clause shall render Article IV of the present neutrality law null and void. It is easily understood that we cannot invoke such a law, that we cannot invoke discriminatory powers, that we cannot invoke real neutrality against a nation in the Far East or against a nation in Europe without including South America or the Central American countries. Any such action must be world-wide. It must be a world peace move. So we, along with the Negative, I imagine, favor the complete repeal of Article IV of the present neutrality law in order to strengthen that law.

Now last: an organization shall be established which we refer to as the Board. The function of this Board shall be to ascertain the truth of all news articles, stories, comments, or any other form of published material, including radio, concerning all the belligerents against

whom the President has invoked this neutrality legislation. Now what do we mean? Do we mean government censorship? We certainly do not. By no means. We merely mean that when neutrality has been invoked we are going to have this Board meet, we are going to have all of the news concerning those belligerents referred by the press associations to this Board. At the end of three days at a maximum, the Board must turn those articles back to the press associations with one of the three following comments: (1) at the top of the article they will write, "This news story substantially true"; (2) "This news story is not true"; or (3) if in three days—and this is entirely possible—the Board has not been able to ascertain the truth of the news story, it will merely put at the byline of the story this comment: "The government has been unable to ascertain the actual facts of this article and therefore cannot say whether it is true or false." The people of this country respect their government. The people of this country would come in time to look for this comment in their daily press in order to discover what their government had to say; to discover whether they were again being given such stories as those of the Belgian baby without hands. That sort of thing is what we must avoid!

Therefore, in conclusion, let us summarize what has been done thus far. The Affirmative has abandoned the old-time idea of neutrality; we have gone forward to the new definition of neutrality, that definition employed by the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Henry L. Stimson, Cordell Hull, and Nicholas Murray Butler—that is

the neutrality we advocate. We are in essential agreement with the Negative, with the exception of the fact that we believe that if we carry the present law forward and remedy its defects we will be strengthening our chances of remaining out of war. We would not destroy the edifice which we have been carefully building.

Second Negative, Fred Wilson
Arizona State Teachers College at Tempe

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: May I again call your attention, as did my colleague at the beginning of his speech, to the course of this debate. It seems that we are debating the question of neutrality laws which are interpreted as having nothing to do with neutrality; we are debating neutrality which has nothing to do with impartiality; we are debating an extension of an Act which now demands invocation—and which has not been invoked; we are considering giving to the President more discretionary power when he has assumed that power under our present Act; we are asked to believe that the President will become the epitome of justice under an extended plan; we are told that the League of Nations and neutrality are mutually exclusive; we are told that neutrality means the opposite of impartiality; we are told that sanctions are not inconsistent with neutrality and that sanctions will not lead us into war; we are told that a dictatorial control of the press is not censorship. We are presumed to favor the repeal of Article IV of the present Act. In view of the fact that we favor repeal of the entire Act, this must

necessarily be true—but that does not mean that we favor the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine. We do not favor avoiding war by mere postponement.

Neutrality is frequently referred to as a means of preventing war. This is a popular appeal. Now a thorough analysis, however, indicates that neutrality may lead to war. Historians of the first World War agree that if foreign minister Edward Grey of Great Britain had made it clear to Germany in July, 1914, that England would aid an attacked France, hostilities might not have broken out. The possibility of English neutrality encouraged the Kaiser. This is the idea conveyed by part of an article which appeared in *The Nation* of February 20, 1937, the article to which the members of the Affirmative team referred in bringing out two rather interesting points. They did not refer, however, either to the ideas expressed previous to or following their quotation; as a result, I want to give you the gist, or perhaps a direct quotation would better serve the purpose in clarifying our position: "In exactly the same way the hope of American neutrality today will encourage a potential aggressor. If Germany were certain that England and America would remain aloof from the next international struggle, war perhaps would be upon us already. The chief and unchanging purpose of the Nazi governments and foreign policy at this time is to neutralize Great Britain. With London neutral and Washington indifferent, France or any other nation would be at the mercy of a sudden offensive. Such a neutrality as is advocated by the American isolationists has been Hitler's greatest hope. He rejects collective

security. Instead of having all the countries guarantee the peace, he urges that when hostilities break out between two states, other nations withdraw at once from both sides. Hitler insists upon the localizing of smaller conflicts. He regards this as the essence of complete neutrality. Only the aggressor and the attacked fight—the others sit and watch. Now Germany marches into Czechoslovakia, Russia, or France. England sits by and remains neutral. Germany wins the war. Next, Germany violates Poland. The powers maintain a rather benevolent pacificity. France's turn would be next and then England's." Going on we find that neutrality, when it is followed to its natural and logical conclusion, means the end of international law and the collapse of diplomacy. Now here is where the first quotation of the Affirmative came in when they said, "Neutrality is truly the wind in the sails of the aggressor"; and that certainly is true. Hitler advocates neutrality because he wants to pave his way to military victory, and American pacifists advocate neutrality because they do not understand this and the other realities of world interests and of world situations. They can see the formal side, and they think there is nothing more to it. They think that neutrality will keep us out of war. Now if we examine one of the latest crises in international affairs—and that is what we intend to do—we can see what warrants this discussion of our policy. It is a fact that at some time in the near future—perhaps tomorrow, as the Affirmative put it—the world may be plunged into international conflict. Whatever we might do to prevent this from occurring again cer-

tainly should be considered and accepted if it is humanly possible. Let us look at the situation in the world today. When we do, we can see how this policy of neutrality works in practice. France, England, the United States, and most of the small powers are reasonably neutral in respect to the Spanish situation. As a result, Germany and Italy are able to do about as they please. Now suppose that England, France, Russia, the United States, and the other non-Fascist countries all openly sympathized with democratic Spain and wanted it to win. Would this not be enough to force Germany and Italy to withdraw? Germany is weak from a social, financial, and economic standpoint as well as, relatively so, from a military standpoint. Would not a firm, diplomatic stand by the present neutrals suffice to expel the aggressors from Spain and achieve real neutrality, if there is such a term available?

The partial neutrality such as exists in Spain today has fostered Fascist aggression. A note now to Germany and Italy to get out of Spain would probably lead to war. Those two countries took a chance because they have learned to know the weaknesses of democratic diplomacy. Together they would be extremely weak against the United States and the non-Fascist governments. If they were made to feel that the other states would cooperate, they would be less eager to antagonize these other nations. Non-intervention is neutrality, and non-intervention has been the great factor in the rise to power of Hitler and Mussolini. To scrap neutrality is not to plunge us into war—it is to

bring peace by proving to the Fascists that other nations will not stand idly by and permit aggression.

When a combination of powers comes about, it does not represent neutrality as pointed out by the first speaker of the Affirmative when he said that "neutrality and a League of Nations are mutually exclusive"—although this was later denied by Mr. Hostetter when he said that, without international cooperation, their plan could not possibly work. In other words, when we form an international front and combine the leading powers of the world and tell this power and that power that they are not to do this or that, we are not, we believe, attempting to keep the United States neutral, nor perhaps are we really keeping the United States out of the current conflicts which may lead us to war. We feel that when the Affirmative advocates this combination of power—with which we agree—they are advocating something which may lead us to war and something which is certainly not neutrality. What would some of the prominent backers of even our present Act—Hiram Johnson or William E. Borah—say to the present Affirmative interpretation of this proposition?

The Affirmative do not advocate isolation; they advocate economic solidarity. They plan to have the President of the United States tell when, how, and where war exists and who is the aggressor. Following this, arbitration is offered—in fact, insisted upon—and the award would be upheld by a community of nations or a group of nations backing this decision. Of course the United States would not force acceptance by the

use of arms—what if none of the others did, either? And if they did, is this neutrality?

Now let us go just a little further and consider other examples in our present muddled diplomatic situation. "Early in January, France became slightly suspicious of German activity in Morocco. Paris rapped on the table and she rapped hard and within twenty-four hours Hitler made a statement disavowing any intention of digging himself into Morocco. Today France may be poised for similar decisiveness in the whole Spanish problem. Germany and Italy have already sent to Spain many troops for the comfort of the Spanish 'Peoples' Front.' France will not act without Britain. This means that it will have to overcome English objections, but if both countries do move against Germany and Italy's aggression in Spain they can end the civil war soon." Similar situations would arise very seldom for the United States, but as the gentlemen of the opposition put it, an unneutral America could, without moving a single man or gun, work for peace and social progress.

The information which I have just given to you was taken from the February, 1937, issue of *The Nation*, the article from which the gentlemen of the Affirmative quoted to us. This article tells us, and the Affirmative and Negative have both agreed, that neutrality is impossible. Therefore, any amendments which they would tack onto the present Act could not lead to a neutral America. We feel—and strangely enough the Affirmative, the proponents of more stringent neutrality legislation, seem also to feel—that the only solution for

this problem of security for all lies not in neutrality or neutrality legislation but in an international front, a combination of nations or powers which will, with a common purpose, be able to tell the aggressor and the attacked the rights each has and will enforce those rights. The Affirmative, too, favor what they call "economic solidarity," but not beyond a point where it will interfere with the temporary pleasure of the United States.

Let us review what has occurred thus far in this debate. The members of the Affirmative team advocate changing and revising the Neutrality Act. My colleague, Mr. McKee, pointed out that we not only did not want to strengthen that Act but we were in favor of doing away with it entirely—and that is just what we want to do. We feel that, since neutrality is an impossibility and is undesirable, the plan proposed by the Affirmative should not be adopted, but we should eliminate our present law and allow our State Department to conduct our foreign relations unhampered by needless restrictions.

**First Negative Rebuttal, Kenneth McKee
Arizona State Teachers College at Tempe**

It would be wise at this time to have an analysis of the two cases as they have been presented here this afternoon. May I evaluate them, see in what particulars they disagree, and reaffirm the Negative stand? It is somewhat difficult to evaluate this debate at this point, in view of the fact that both sides seem to have

agreed upon a number of points which we of the Negative felt were inconsistent with the Affirmative proposal. The first point upon which we came into agreement was that the United States can no longer be an isolationist nation, cannot fail to cooperate in international peace movements in the world, as she has done in the past. It seems that about the only thing we disagree upon is whether the present Act should be enlarged or whether it should be eliminated.

The gentlemen of the Affirmative believe that the present Neutrality Act, although it is faulty in many particulars, can be revised and rewritten so that it will fit our foreign policy. They say that the present Act is too mandatory—that it doesn't give the President freedom enough in deciding upon our foreign policies—and they propose to strengthen it by making it more discretionary. The gentlemen forget that the Neutrality Act as it now exists is quite flexible. The President, if he sees fit, evidently does not need to invoke the Act. He has not done so in the present Oriental conflict.

Another point which the gentlemen of the Affirmative have brought forth and which to us seems to be inconsistent with their case is the application of economic sanctions. The last speaker just declared that "We are in favor of a plan for economic sanctions against aggressor nations, but we are not in favor of any type of military force which will tend to enforce these sanctions." This is an idealistic policy, friends, for it is well known by students of international law that whenever economic sanctions are applied against a belligerent, it is in effect the same as a declaration of war and will

result in, first, preliminary skirmishes—the sinking of ships which are trading in unneutral waters and, finally, a declaration of war. So it occurs to us that the Affirmative plan for applying economic sanctions but not taking into account that they will have to uphold these sanctions with military force is idealistic.

Further, the gentlemen say that the Act should be revised so that there would be Federal control of propaganda in the United States. Perhaps they are correct but we ask, why, then, if all these provisions and amendments which the Affirmative propose are necessary, why, if they propose to do away with the essence of the Act as it now exists, should we go on with the framework that remains after stripping it of its provisions? Would not even this framework be inconsistent with their proposal? Why go on with this old rotten framework? Why not repeal the Act entirely and rewrite our policy of foreign relations along the lines of complete international cooperation?

Our friends of the Affirmative say that we want neutrality, which they interpret variously, but fundamentally, as a policy of keeping us out of war. They continue that they are in favor of economic sanctions but are not in favor of any type of military action to enforce these sanctions. We feel that this type of policy is not only impracticable but is impossible. We feel that there would be little point in adopting their revision of the Neutrality Act. We feel that the Act should not be revised or rewritten but that it should be done away with entirely and a new, broader interpretation of international cooperation should be adopted by

the United States. Peace for the world or for the United States does not lie in any policy of isolation or selfishness. It lies in a policy of world-wide cooperation of nations in settling their disagreements.

First Affirmative Rebuttal, Noal R. Gray
University of Arizona

FRIENDS: *Resolved, that the neutrality laws of the United States should be strengthened* is the proposition—not that neutrality should be adopted by the United States. We are specifically debating the Neutrality Act itself. This Act at the present time provides that the President shall take certain measures in order to keep the United States out of war. It has abandoned the old definition of neutrality in that it realizes the fact that there can no longer be a neutral. The Negative team has said that there are weaknesses in the present law and then has jumped to the conclusion that the Act should be discarded. We now have the law—it is still in existence. The Affirmative is building on the existing law. If the Negative throws the law out, what will it go back to? It can only go back to what happened in 1917, to the old doctrine of neutrality. The law is here now and if our opponents throw it away, the law is repealed. They go back to the Jeffersonian Doctrine of strict embargo—and that is impossible. The Negative has not attacked the soundness of the proposition, *Resolved, that the neutrality laws of the United States should be strengthened*.

Now let us look at their argument against economic

sanctions. They say that economic sanctions are steps toward war. But do you realize, ladies and gentlemen, that law and order in our streets is by moral and economic sanction—that we have law and order in our very streets by the combined cooperation of the citizenry of our cities? In unity there is strength and in international cooperation, which we would achieve by strengthening our present neutrality law, there will also be strength. The law now provides that the President, when he shall find that there exists a state of war which threatens or endangers the peace of the United States, shall proclaim such fact and therefore the Act shall be in force. Our plan is merely an extension, a strengthening, of our present neutrality laws. The Negative has not contested the fact that the present law is weak because it does not now provide for the stopping of propaganda; they have not contested the fact that the American Republics should be included within the law. The proposal that the Affirmative is presenting this afternoon is to strengthen our present law in order to insure keeping the United States out of war. The Negative says that the present law is so defective that it ought to be repealed. In other words, our opponents plan to weaken the present law. This is a retrogressive step and it is impossible to conceive that Cordell Hull and our present administration would even think of doing such a thing. The Negative says that neutrality means treating both alike. Granted. But that nineteenth-century definition of neutrality is not in this debate. The proposition has but two terms—*the neutrality laws* and *strengthening* those laws. Neutrality

can be ruled out. We are debating, not neutrality, but strengthening the neutrality laws. Let us confine ourselves to that point.

They say that the Act should be done away with because it is selfish. The second Negative speaker refutes his own argument by saying that if the Act is enforced it will cut our trade one-fourth with Japan. He is self-refutatory in that connection. How can the United States be selfish if Americans will give up their trade in order to insure that there will be world peace? Furthermore, they go on to say that the present Neutrality Act and the strengthening of that Act are not in accord with our present administrative policy. Let me quote to you from Cordell Hull. He says: "Theoretically a nation can isolate itself from the rest of the world, but just as in the case of an individual who would lead a hermit's existence, and of a family or a community which attempts to segregate itself, an inexorable price must be paid and, in the end, paid by individuals through the lowering of their material, moral, and spiritual strength." In other words, the administration, through Cordell Hull in the Department of State, is in favor of strengthening our Neutrality Act and not weakening it and throwing it away.

We can see, then, that the Affirmative has pointed out, first, the weaknesses of our present Act; and second, how the Act should be strengthened. My colleague, Mr. Hostetter, has pointed out the specific Affirmative proposal which will strengthen the Act, insuring that the United States shall be kept out of war.

Final Negative Rebuttal, Fred Wilson
Arizona State Teachers College at Tempe

FRIENDS: At last we seem to have reached a definite point of clash. The last speaker for the Affirmative has indicated that we of the Negative are too much concerned with neutrality as a policy for the United States and too little concerned with the present Neutrality Act. Our position has been essentially this: We feel that a Neutrality Act means an act designed to keep the United States neutral; we feel that any discussion of neutrality acts must necessarily take into consideration the subject of neutrality. We contend that the Act should not be strengthened but that it should be repealed. Why? Because as we have consistently pointed out it is both undesirable and impossible to be neutral. Mr. Gray has just granted that neutrality might mean impartiality—although he feels that it has no place in this debate. We feel that it has and we want to show again why we feel it is impossible to be neutral.

I quote to you from Mr. Molyneau, who as head of the Carnegie Endowment for World Peace says this, "The world is internationalized in everything but government." To go further, we find that H. G. Moulton and John B. Pass—twenty-one years ago, mind you,—said this: "European people must be made to realize that only through international cooperation can social and economic disintegration be avoided. Wholehearted participation in a constructive program of international cooperation is the solution." William Y. Elliot

of Harvard University said, "Democratic ideals in government cannot be upheld by pursuing a policy of peace at any cost, but champions of democracy should be willing to fight for their ideals." Further, we find that Professor Eagleton in his article, *The Analysis of the Problem of War*, says, "A neutrality policy does not prevent war." Thomas Lamont, who, as you know, was the head of the House of Morgan during the World War, said in speaking of those war days: "Those were the days when the American citizens were asked to remain neutral in action, in word, and even in thought, but our firm had never for one moment remained neutral. We didn't know how!" We of the Negative subscribe to what Mr. Lamont has said. We don't know how to be neutral, nor do the Affirmative, as they have admitted.

Now, getting back to definitions, our friends of the Affirmative quoted as their definition one from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Despite Mr. Gray's last statement concerning what neutrality might mean, we should like to cite to you the definitions of neutrality from Bouvier's *Law Dictionary* and from the *Oxford Dictionary*. Both of them seem to be pretty much in agreement with that of the Affirmative except for one thing. The *Oxford* says that "Furthermore, neutrality" in addition to what the Affirmative say, "means an abstinence from decided views, feelings, or expressions; of complete indifference." The *Oxford Dictionary* will probably be accepted as an authority and it says that in a neutral state one must abstain from decided views

and feelings. Both members of the Affirmative have agreed that this is impossible.

Furthermore, Mr. Gray has attacked our argument concerning economic sanctions. Yet he has just said that, "The laws of our cities and our communities are sanctions and they are enforced by the will of the people and the laws." Even so, both members of the Affirmative say that economic sanctions which they are advocating in their so-called policy of neutrality would not lead us into war—and yet they must be enforced. Are the laws of Mr. Gray always accepted graciously? If the reason we obey our laws is our love of government, why are courts and policemen necessary? As my colleague, Mr. McKee, pointed out, to expect nations to accept sanctions without protest is idealism. The peoples of the world today are in no mood to tolerate economic sanctions issued by this country in itself, unless they have a cooperative body as we advocated in the beginning. This body must be large enough to back up the statements which it makes. Evidently the members of the Affirmative are in accord with what we think would be the means of keeping us out of war. We advocate international cooperation—not selfish individualism!

Now let us summarize this debate. We of the Negative feel that neutrality must be discussed in this debate although Mr. Gray does not; we feel that strengthening our Neutrality Act is useless because we can't be neutral and we don't want to be if we could. Furthermore, a policy such as the Affirmative advocate would lead us into war, as Mr. McKee pointed out in his discussion of

sanctions. We feel that international cooperation, not neutrality legislation, is the answer to the problem. We do not advocate aggressive militarism nor do we propose the companion of isolationism, pacificism or peace at any price.

Final Affirmative Rebuttal, Gordon W. Hostetter
University of Arizona

FRIENDS: It seems to me that we have had a most enjoyable afternoon here, that the two teams have been in almost perfect accord throughout this debate, with the exception of the point, as the last speaker said, that the Negative is going to do away with the existing framework, while we are retaining it. Now something that the last speaker did not point out was what they are going to do after they do away with the existing framework. They are going to depend upon international solidarity; they are going to depend upon international cooperation. But those are vague terms. If my memory doesn't fail me, in 1917 we went to war to "Save the World for Democracy." Now I don't propose to go to war again to save the world for democracy, despite what the gentleman from Harvard University has to say on the point. I think that we were fooled once.

And now the definition of neutrality: the entire debate goes back to the definition of neutrality. We were quoted a definition from Bouvier's *Law Dictionary of 1900*. That was published in 1900—that was a Negative quotation. Our definition of neutrality was taken

from the 1937 edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. We could not even write down refutation as this debate went on because we were in perfect accord with practically everything that the Negative said. The Negative is trying to pin a nineteenth-century definition of neutrality upon the Affirmative, thereby establishing the Negative case, and the Affirmative simply refuses to accept that definition. We introduced our definition in the first speech and it so happens that our definition of neutrality comes from Cordell Hull, Henry L. Stimson, the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, and all are in accord with the Affirmative case. And so it looked almost from the start as if there would be no debate.

But is there a debate? Let's go into the fundamentals of the thing. There has been one clash and that clash is that the Negative proposes to destroy what we have now, and we propose to build upon it. So let's come down to common ground and see just what would happen. Suppose that you, as members of the audience, are working on jobs at, shall we say, \$25.00 per week. Now of course you have hope of improvement; you dream of advancement—that is the American dream. You don't want to be working for \$25.00 per week the rest of your life. So you look around—you are constantly striving for advancement. BUT do you quit that \$25.00 job and go out and look for this advancement? Or do you look, at the same time holding the \$25.00 job? The man must have his income. Likewise, we must have something to fall back upon in case international cooperation fails.

Now, there is nothing whatsoever in the present neu-

trality laws which will bar this plan of international co-operation. As a matter of fact, within the Affirmative amendments of the present Neutrality Act we provide for the checking of propaganda—which the gentlemen of the Negative did not cover at all; and if their plan is going to work under any circumstances, propaganda must be checked, and yet they have made no provision for that. That's one point. Another point is that we are going to give the President discretion to name the aggressor. We are going to put in the economic sanctions. I have been called an idealist because I have hoped that the economic sanctions will work without military backing. Perhaps I am. I am an idealist but I cannot see the troops of the United States going to war again to save the world for democracy or any other doctrine. If the United States cannot obtain cooperation in this plan based upon this neutrality, then we must go back to economic isolation. But let's hope that we don't have to. Let's accept this new, this authoritative, this 1937 definition of neutrality—let's build a framework, a framework for our laws; a framework for our plan. We must have some focal point, some edifice. And as I said at the conclusion of my last talk, we must build upon an edifice. We cannot destroy and start from nothing. The members of the Negative have advocated that we destroy the plan that has been in operation only for a year or two and that has NOT been proved unsuccessful, despite the statements of the Negative. They have advocated that we destroy it, and what do they offer in its place? They offer certainly an idealistic proposal, international co-

operation. We advocate that we go forward with the present law. strengthen it, and at the same time that we seek the *same* international cooperation that the Negative has advocated in all of this debate.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: NEUTRALITY

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

- Allen, G.—*Collective Security*. 1936. World Peace Foundation.
- Atwater, E.—*Neutrality Revision before Congress*. 1937. Digest. pa.
- Baker, R. S.—*Neutrality 1914-1915*. In *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters*, vol. 5. 1935. Doubleday, Doran.
- Beard, C. A.—*Devil Theory of War*. 1936. Vanguard Press.
- Borchard, E. M. and Lage, W. P.—*Neutrality for the United States*. Yale University Press.
- Bradley, P.—*Can We Stay Out of War?* 1936. Norton.
- Brewer, D. C.—*Rights and Duties of Neutrals*. 1916.
- Cam, G. A. (Comp.)—*United States Neutrality Resolutions of 1935, 1936, and 1937*. 1937 New York Public Library. Pa. 10¢.
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.—*Neutrality and American Policy on Neutrality*. Mimeographed. Gratis. 1937. The Endowment.
- Curti, M. E.—*Peace or War*. 1936. Norton.
- Dulles, A. W. and Armstrong, H. F.—*Can We be Neutral?* 1936. Harper.
- Johnson, J. E.—*Neutrality Policy of the United States*. 1936. Reference Shelf Series. H. W. Wilson.
- Potter, P. B.—*Collective Security and Peaceful Change*. 1937. Univ. of Chicago Press.
- Raushenbush, H. S. and J.—*War Madness*. 1937 National Home Library.
- Seymour, C.—*American Neutrality 1914-17*. 1935. Yale Univ. Press.
- Shotwell, J. T.—*The Heritage of Freedom*. 1934. *On the Rim of the Abyss*. 1936.
- Townsend, Ralph—*There is no Halfway Neutrality*. Pamphlet. Privately published. P. O. Box 347, San Francisco, Calif. 10¢.

Wright, P. Q.—*Neutrality and Collective Security*. 1936. University of Chicago Press.

MAGAZINES AND PERIODICALS

- Annals of the American Academy.—186:41, July, 1936. *Economic Implications of American Neutrality Policy*. A. W. Dulles. 192:42, Je., 1937. *United States in a War Minded World*. C. Binder. 192:51, Je., 1937. *Neutrality and International Responsibility*. 192:93, Jl., 1937. *Economic Preparation for Neutrality*. 192:99, Jl., 1937. *Planned Neutrality*. P. C. Jessup. 192:107, Jl., 1937. *Dangers of Local Neutrality Legislation*. W. R. Castle, Jr., 192:89, Jl., 1937. *American Economic Policies for the Impending World War*. J. D. Mooney.
- Asia.—37:808, Nov., 1937. *Neutrality Put to the test*. S. Raushenbush.
- Atlantic.—160:545, Nov., 1937. *We Fight no More*. D. L. Cohn.
- Canadian Forum.—15:5, Feb., 1936. *American Liberals and Neutrality*.
- Catholic World.—145:138, May, 1937. *American Neutrality, Past and Present*. W. G. Downey.
- Christian Century.—52:1478, Nov. 20, 1935. *American Neutrality*. 53:214, Feb. 5, 1936. *Do We Want to be Neutral?* 53:1741, Dec. 30, 1936. *America Must Preserve her Neutrality*. 54:342, Mar. 17, 1937. *Is Neutrality Moral?* 54:1195, Sept. 29, 1937. *America and the War in China*. R. Niebuhr.
- Christian Science Monitor.—p. 4, Sept. 11, 1935. *Is Neutrality Possible?* D. P. Myers.
- Commonweal.—27:281, Jan. 7, 1938. *Ultimate Security*.
- Congressional Digest.—15:3, Jan., 1936. *Establishing a Neutrality Policy for America*. Pro and con. 16:195, Aug., 1937. *Neutrality Act of 1937*.
- Current History.—47:13, Oct., 1937. *American Neutrality*. 47:25, Nov., 1937. *Can this be Neutrality?* The editors.
- Digest.—1:22, Sept. 11, 1937. *American Neutrality*. Pro and con.
- Foreign Affairs.—15:537, Jl., 1937. *Rough Hew them How We Will*. W. Lippmann.
- Foreign Policy Reports.—13:166, Oct. 1, 1937.—*Neutrality Act of 1937 with Text*. R. L. Buell. 13:206, Nov. 15, 1937. *United States in the Spanish Conflict*. R. L. Buell.

- Forum.—97:89, 165, 249, Feb.-Apr., '37. *How to Stay Out of War: Open Forum of Opinion on Keeping America Neutral.*
- Ind. Woman.—16:38, Feb., 1937. *America Wants Neutrality; What Type Shall It Be?* F. J. Libby. F. L. Schuman
- International Affairs.—16:853, Nov., 1937. *Recent American Neutrality Legislation, with Discussion and Excerpts from President Roosevelt's Chicago Address.* J. W. Garner.
- International Conciliation.—331:610, Je., 1937. *Neutrality Act adopted by Congress.* Text. 327:169, Feb., 1937. *Can Present Legislation Guarantee Future Neutrality?* F. R. Coudert.
- Living Age.—351:555:352:90, 184, Feb.-Apr., 1937. *American Neutrality.* A Symposium.
- Nation.—141:425, Oct. 16, 1935. *Can America Remain Unentangled?* 142:173, Feb. 12, 1936. *Can We be Neutral?* 144:167, Feb. 6, 1937. *Effective Neutrality.* 145:144, Aug. 7, 1937. *Neutrality in the Far East.* 145:283, Sept. 18, 1937. *Neutrality, a Dangerous Myth.* G. Stone.
- New Republic.—86:Feb. 12, 1936. *Heat and Light on Neutrality.* C. A. Beard. 91:319, Jl. 28, 1937. *Neutrality in the Far East.* 92:144, Sept. 15, 1937. *Scuttle or Bluster.* 92:172, Sept. 22, 1937. *Cost of Neutrality.* 92:268, Oct. 13, 1937. *What Are We Going to Do About China?* 92:327, Oct. 27, 1937. *Positive Neutrality.* 94:249, Mar. 30, 1938. *Immunity from War.*
- News Week.—10:44, Oct. 4, 1937. *Duty to be Neutral.* R. Moley.
- North American Review.—244:9, No. 1 Sept., 1937. *Neutrality with Bated Breath.* H. B. Hinton. 244:216, No. 2 Dec., 1937. *Further Course of Neutrality.* H. B. Hinton.
- Reader's Digest.—30:37, Apr., 1937. *Cowardice of Fixed Neutrality.* J. Wallace.
- Review of Reviews.—94:71, Sept., 1936. *American Neutrality.* R. A. MacKay and R. L. Stanfield.
- Saturday Review of Literature.—16:9, Je. 5, 1937. *Neutrality for the United States; with Reply by P. S. Wild, Jr.* L. Colcord.
- Scholastic.—31:15, Oct. 2, 1937. *Can America Stay Neutral in a World at War?* 31:32, Oct. 30, 1937. *New Foreign Policy for America.* 31:6, Nov. 6, 1937. *Shall the Existing Neutrality Law Be Applied?*
- Sewanee Review.—46:133, April-Je., 1938. *American Neutrality.* J. H. Flye.

- Vital Speeches.—3:535, Je. 15, 1937. *Neutrality, and Uncharted Sea.*
B. M. Baruch. 3:668, Aug. 15, 1937. *Neutrality and Unmentionable Diplomacy.* J. T. Bernard. 3:700, Sept. 1, 1937. *Sino-Japanese Dossier.* K. Pittman. 3:738, Oct. 1, 1937. *Neutrality for the United States.* E. M. Borchard. 4:84, Nov. 15, 1937. *Schooling our Patience; Virtues of the Neutrality Act.* E. D. Thomas. 4:114, Dec. 1, 1937. *Invoke Neutrality at Once.* G. Soule.

ANGLO-AMERICAN BOYCOTT ON
JAPANESE GOODS

A Joint Debate of the Traditional Type

MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY AFFIRMATIVE *vs.*
GONZAGA UNIVERSITY NEGATIVE

The undeclared war between Japan and China aroused considerable interest in the college debating world during the season of 1937-38 and numerous phrasings of questions involving some action on the part of the United States to stop hostilities were common. The following debate is one of them. It was held on the evening of Saturday, February 12, in the President's Parlors of Gonzaga University, Spokane, Washington.

The question was stated: Resolved, that the governments of the United States and Great Britain, acting together, should declare and enforce a boycott on all Japanese goods.

The single, critic judge system was used and resulted in a decision for the Negative.

The speeches presented here were collected and submitted to *Inter-collegiate Debates* by Professor James N. Holm, Director of Forensics at Montana State University.

ANGLO-AMERICAN BOYCOTT ON JAPANESE GOODS

First Affirmative, William Scott
Montana State University

MR. CHAIRMAN, FRIENDS: Mr. Coombs and I are privileged to meet the Gonzaga team this evening to discuss the solution for a question which has nearly drawn several nations into armed conflict in the last few months. Just this evening as we left our hotel the newsboys were shouting, "France, England, and the United States Re-arm." This new naval preparedness race has been precipitated by the refusal of the Japanese to abide by a treaty which these three nations had drawn up with her.

The question: "Resolved, that the governments of the United States and Great Britain should jointly declare and enforce a boycott on all Japanese goods," should be so construed as to mean the complete cessation of economic intercourse between the United States and Japan, and between the British Commonwealth of Nations and Japan. For practical argument this evening, we suggest that discussion of the practicability of Anglo-American cooperation be waived.

Japan today is carrying on an aggression in China which is not and cannot be justified. Even the League of Nations has made a feeble condemnation of this Japanese aggression. In spite of what we hear about

moral justification for Japan, she is not entering China to find a home for her crowded peoples, nor is she attempting to befriend China as she so often claims. This war is only a continuation of an exploitation which has been going on for over thirty years. Japan says that she must have more territory for her population, but when we realize that Belgium and the Netherlands have 228 and 137 more people per square mile respectively than Japan and are yet noted as among the most peaceful and contented nations in the world, that argument falls by the way. Japan, according to M. J. Hillenbrand in the latest *Catholic World*, has only 1,000 settlers in Manchuria and after five years has developed practically none of the rich agricultural resources of that country. Charles A. Beard, noted historian and student of the Orient states, "Why should the democratic nations of the world yield anything to governments that seek a high birth rate and then demand goods abroad and the right of migration over all the earth?"

The crisis caused by the aggression of the Japanese war machine necessitates action. First, violation of treaties must cease. To be sure, there is no nation that has not at some time broken a treaty, but the time has arrived when treaties must be respected as representing more than the material upon which they are written. Great Britain and the United States could do well to set a future precedent for treatment of treaty violators—by the display of disapproval through a boycott. Today Japan is violating at least three treaties of which she, with the United States and England, is a signatory.

First, the Kellogg-Briand Pact which states that no nation shall go to war until all peaceful methods have been exhausted; secondly, the Nine Power Treaty which insures Chinese neutrality and equal rights for all nations in China; and thirdly, the 1936 London Naval Agreement setting limitations upon armaments which I mentioned at the beginning of my speech. Violation of the last has forced three other nations to arm in self-defense.

Countless losses, the losses of every war, are intensified in this struggle. We are all acquainted with the Chinese determination to destroy all in their retreat so that nothing will be left for the aggressor. This is especially hard on the two billions of Japanese investment which the Japanese claim they are protecting. While the Chinese are no doubt accustomed to seeing death in its Oriental forms of famine, drouth, plague, and the other eruptive forms of nature, death by Japanese bombs and bullets need not be added. It might interest us to know that we are helping to supply these very bullets. In 1933 we shipped two million tons of scrap iron to Japan. Such incidents as the Panay bombing, the murder of a British ambassador, and destruction of foreign investments are all too likely to lead us into another world conflagration should this struggle continue. If the results of the World War serve as a criterion, Japan will ultimately lose, even should she be victorious.

Summarizing the Affirmative arguments thus far, a policy which will throw a monkey wrench in the cogs of the Japanese War Machine is necessary; first, because

of the violation of treaties by the Japanese and secondly, the losses occurring in this struggle could cease if the war were brought to culmination.

The Japanese War Machine is vulnerable to an economic boycott, especially by the United States and Great Britain. I say War Machine purposively because I feel that the Japanese people are being driven into this battle by a relentless and militaristically inclined handful of men at the head of their government. First, Japan has been carrying an unfavorable trade balance for many years, which reached a high in the last year of 780,000,000 yen. Secondly, the Japanese are supplied with eighty per cent of their imports from the United States and the British Commonwealth, according to the latest figures from the *World Almanac*, and we in turn take over sixty per cent of the Japanese exports. If this trade were to cease, Japan would have no money with which to purchase war materials in which she is so lacking. She has little oil and coal, no rubber or phosphates, practically no iron, indeed very few of the necessities of modern warfare. Most of these materials are shipped from the countries mentioned in this question. The Japanese resources are so depleted that a boycott would now spell complete withdrawal from China. The third reason that a boycott would be effective is that Japan is weak financially. Her people are overtaxed and are carrying a debt of \$260 per person. Her former scanty gold reserves of \$339,000,000 were further depleted by a recent shipment of \$60,000,000 to this country for raw materials. Without gold her credit is non-existent, and she already has been refused credit

by United States banks because of the risk. Japan is so destroying both herself and China that neither nation will be able to trade with us much longer.

In conclusion, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Coombs and I ask you as citizens of a democracy to forward an active movement toward peace through a boycott. We feel that such action is necessary to show our disapproval of the violation of treaties and to attempt to curtail the huge losses resulting from such a war. I have demonstrated to you that a boycott by the United States and Great Britain would halt the march of the Japanese Military Machine because of the machine's dependence upon our trade, because of the shortage of war materials, and lastly because of the tottering financial status of Japan. It is time that the United States and England as democracies should assume the offensive in the pursuit of peace in the place of our present idle, self-centered tactics.

First Negative, Jack Clark
Gonzaga University

MR. CHAIRMAN, GENTLEMEN: The question to be discussed has already been stated by the Affirmative. However, it may be well to point out that the Affirmative must support this proposition on the premises that the United States and Great Britain are not only obligated to enact an economic boycott, but also that there is a justification for such action. They must show that a boycott could be enforced to halt the war effectively in China.

It is the belief of the Negative that forced death in all forms is brutal. We agree with the Affirmative that the killing of innocent people is immoral and unrighteous. And it is for that very reason that we claim that such a boycott as the Affirmative suggest should not be enforced against Japan: First, because economic sanctions would not effectively halt the war; and second, because such a boycott would cause untold sufferings to millions of innocent people.

In order that an impartial decision be reached it is imperative to decide first of all if there is any real justification for the United States and Great Britain's entering into a dispute that is strictly none of their business. The Affirmative assert that such a justification does exist. They base their assertion on the claim that Japan is the unjust aggressor.

However, in accusing Japan of being the aggressor proponents of an economic boycott disregard the fact, substantiated by the reports of officials of foreign governments, located in the Orient, that it was China which brought on the actual warfare in many cases. First, on July 7, Chinese troops fired on the Japanese garrison at Peiping. It was the same story at Shanghai, where Chinese soldiers killed a Japanese naval officer and his aide. In both cases Japan tried for a peaceful settlement but instead was goaded into accepting the challenge of war.

Furthermore, who are we of the United States and Great Britain to judge Japan an unfair aggressor?

According to the Lytton Report in China, Communism "has become an actual rival of the national govern-

ment." According to that same report, "Japan has suffered more than any other powers from the lawlessness of these conditions."

So we see Japan faced by a huge country that has been in a period of disintegration since its revolution in 1911. A country whose government borders on anarchy and is harassed by a rival communistic faction as strong as the national government itself.

Yet because Japan's interests in China are vital, because her trade with China is of paramount importance, and because Japan set forth to protect her two billion dollar investments and the trade which is the backbone of her country, she has been labeled an unfair aggressor.

Glancing back through the history and the geographical expansion of both the United States and Great Britain, we can only wonder on what grounds either of these two nations can judge the fairness or the provocation of the aggression.

The fact that Japan possibly had as much right to take Chapei as we had to take Vera Cruz in 1914 must enter into the thoughts of all who are to judge. The fact that treaty parties landed 1600 troops to protect the settlement at Shanghai, after an American war vessel had to bomb a section of Nanking to save women and children from a savage soldiery in the uniform of the Chinese Nationalist Army must not be thrown out as having no bearing on the case. The history of Theodore Roosevelt's taking the Canal Zone and "letting Congress debate" must have a direct bearing on the decision. And again, when we thought that our inter-

ests in Cuba demanded intervention, we have intervened. We have not hesitated to land marines in Haiti or the Dominican Republic or Nicaragua. We have exploited all we desired from Mexico whenever we wanted it. Our entire Southwest is composed mostly from land taken from Mexico.

The same has been true of the expansion of Britain. Her expansion has been greater than that of any other country.

We see, then, that the case in Japan today is exactly like the case of our intervening in Latin-American affairs. We see that the reasons for her intervening in China are directly comparable to the reasons for our intervening in affairs that concerned other American nations and for our adapting our Monroe Doctrine to our actions seventy years ago. We see that Great Britain's expansion is a great deal more pronounced than the expansion of which Japan is accused.

Who then are we of the United States and Great Britain to judge Japan an unjust aggressor?

But what is more, it is doubtful that economic sanctions applied against Japan would prove effective in stopping the war. It is true that such sanctions had absolutely no effect in former cases and there is no reason to suppose that they would be effective in this case.

In the recent Italo-Ethiopian War, the League of Nations declared, not only sanctions against Italian goods, but also an embargo against all materials of war. An attempt was made to render all loans impossible, and an embargo was placed on all materials of war. Yet, in face of these sanctions, the populace of

Italy was fused only more strongly behind Mussolini; the effect was a continuation of the aggression against Ethiopia. This is an example of the ineffectiveness of an official boycott by, not merely two nations, but by fifty-seven nations of the League, with the sympathetic collaboration of nearly all the countries of the world.

The same story is true of the recent wide-spread unofficial boycott against Germany for her Jewish and religious persecutions. Thousands of organizations undertook to boycott German goods. The effect was the same as in the case of Italy—practically nil. There resulted only an increased Anti-Jewish and religious policy.

Judging the future by the past, we believe it safe to conclude that a boycott could not effectively result in a halting of the Sino-Japanese war. Moreover, even in its failure a boycott against Japan would cause untold suffering to millions of innocent people.

When one realizes the philosophic outlook of the Japanese and the geographical structure of Japan, he cannot help but realize that to declare a boycott on Japan is to declare war against the entire populace.

In the first place, patriotism is an unknown thing, in our sense of the word, in Japan. There is not a patriotism for country, but rather a patriotism for the Emperor, who to them is a God-man. Love of the Emperor is the religion of the land, and it is this fervor and the appeal to the sense of duty on the part of every citizen that places the greatest honor on him who follows his Emperor. It is this ultra-fanatical patriotism, the religion of the land, that makes us realize that every Nip-

ponese citizen would follow his Emperor, even to death.

And when one realizes that sixty-four million people attempt to eke out a livelihood on a piece of land not as large as California, that only 15 per cent of that land can be cultivated, that one-half of the population exist entirely because of agriculture, and that at least eleven million of these agriculturists owe their existence directly to the silk industry, then can he realize that it would be those millions of people that would suffer because of a boycott.

Agriculture could not support them, for there is no available arable land. Industry could not absorb them for already over one-half million are unemployed in the industrial field. And yet they could not force the nation to stop the war, for they would not. It is their religion, their greatest honor, their patriotism, to die for their Emperor. A boycott would join them even closer behind their Emperor, and, as happened in Germany in 1919, it would be the women and the children, the aged and the ill that would suffer.

Gentlemen, there is no hope of success large enough to justify an economic boycott against Japan.

Second Affirmative, Walter P. Coombs
Montana State University

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Already in this debate, the gentleman from Gonzaga has outlined some so-called reasons why we should not boycott Japan. Let us look more closely at the Negative and see how unfounded and distorted are their contentions thus far.

They have attempted to justify the Japanese invasion of China on the grounds that it is an attempt to destroy the onward march of Communism. Because of that, the gentlemen of Gonzaga seem to favor the Japanese-Fascist war menace.

But how true is this charge? The falsity of it can be shown by demonstrating that at the present time Chiang Kai-shek is and has been anti-communistic in practice and policy. The *Catholic World* for February, 1938 points out that during his regime over 20,000 Communists have been executed. Why didn't the Japanese help him out in his endeavor? Simply this. Japan is not interested in Communism. She realizes that by saying she is stopping Communism she will have a great many foreigners on her side. She has just stolen the Western World's thunder. Just as in Spain, General Franco kills Spaniards in an attempt to quell Communism, so does Japan kill Chinese for the same false reason. Worst of all, the gentlemen of the Negative seems to have fallen for this popular fallacy, also.

Both my colleague and myself have warned that the present Fascist war menace is becoming more and more emboldened by its repeated victories in Manchuria, Ethiopia, and in Spain. The same aggression has led to the present Sino-Japanese conflict, because no one has been able to stop the world-sweep of Fascism. The present situation in China offers an unexcelled opportunity for us to stop peacefully the present onrush of militarism and Fascism that will ultimately threaten the United States if it is allowed to rush unchecked.

My colleague, Mr. Scott, pointed out to you the cer-

tain lawless "have not" nations which have embarked on a program of war and plunder. We have seen how these treaty-violating nations are succeeding. Yet, in the case of Japan, as Mr. Scott pointed out, conditions are different, for Japan is extremely vulnerable to an economic boycott. Nathaniel Peffer writing in *Harper's* tells us, "Japan has never fought a war without financial assistance from the West."

An editorial in the *Nation* magazine points out, "that Japan is in an extremely serious economic position, and that matters are growing worse, there is no doubt. Her government expenditures have doubled, and the proportion spent for military purposes has increased from one-third to one-half. Her foreign trade has declined greatly."

Even if she wins, it will cost not much less than now to continue to police the captured territory. The economically ignorant men who forced her into this adventure against the will of the civilian leaders have started something they cannot finish.

All this adds up to this indisputable conclusion that since Japan is in such a vulnerable position, the adoption by the nations which buy and sell most of her goods of an economic boycott will stop that conflict in a few short months. Without our purchases and without our materials, Japan cannot succeed. The truth of the matter is that Japan fears a boycott because she realizes that her activities in the Orient will be hampered to such an extent that she will lose her objective, domination and subjugation of China.

It must be remembered, ladies and gentlemen, that

we have a vital interest in stopping this conflagration in the East. Freda Utley, noted British economic expert, writing in the *Nation* says: "If the United States is not interested in saving China for moral or ideological reasons, it may be influenced by the fact that one of the main ambitions of Japan in North China is to develop it into a great cotton growing area, and thus become free of the need to import American cotton."

Yet there are moral reasons, too, why we should stop this conflict, when it is so easy to accomplish it through a boycott. The mere fact alone that thousands of defenseless women and children who serve no military purpose are being killed outright by the military machine of Japan justifies action. Added to this is the outstanding fact that the American and English people are strongly against this war, and as such they see the benefits of an economic boycott in putting a stop to it.

It is our belief that England and America fear an extension of this war. They realize that wars anywhere on earth today must and will threaten the peace and security of the democratic nations. Until we take some definite steps to stop those wars already in progress, then and then alone can we have some semblance of peace.

With the Orient in turmoil today, with plane-dropped bombs killing Chinese civilians, and with Japanese armies piercing deep into the old middle kingdom in bloody defiance of pact, petition, and protest, now is the time for us to act. Such a program offers America a chance to follow President Roosevelt's proposal made at Chicago, when he said, "In a world of mutual suspi-

cions, peace must be affirmatively reached for. It cannot just be wished for. America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace." That, friends, is the policy we must follow today.

Over the radio last night, the head of the Red Cross made an eloquent plea for Americans to send in contributions for the aid of Chinese refugees from Japanese aggression. Friends, this simply means that we are in the end paying for the war in China. Once again we are left holding the sack by feeding the refugees. This alone offers us full justification for an economic boycott.

Our friends of the Negative say that such a boycott is a warlike weapon which will lead to war. Does it sound reasonable to you, ladies and gentlemen, that Japan, harassed as it is in China, unable to win from that defenseless nation, and menaced at the back by the huge forces of Soviet Russia, could come 6,000 miles over here to attack us? Such is not only unthinkable but preposterous. Military experts have repeatedly insisted that such an action is impossible, even without war in China.

In conclusion, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to review briefly the Affirmative case as presented here this evening. In the first place, Mr. Scott told you how vulnerable was Japan. He mentioned to you that Japan was vitally dependent upon us because we and Great Britain bought the greater part of her silk, which was her greatest export. He pointed out to you her lack of raw materials, and how she was dependent upon us for all of these things.

He showed how this Japanese aggression, this terrorism and disregard for American rights and all treaties might lead to further war unless we take positive action to check these imperialistic motives. He showed how this could only be done through economic boycott.

I pointed out to you how this problem could be solved by the cooperation of Great Britain and the United States. I showed how vital was our interest in stopping this aggression and how this boycott would offer us a positive peace program that would take the place of our present passive attitude, that is, helping instead of hindering Japan.

It is to the best interest of every member of this audience to help in this boycott that we have proposed. Doesn't it sound reasonable to you that by the simple expedient of refusing to buy their goods and to sell them supplies which they need in order to carry out the war, that we can stop that war? Our opponents have brought up several hazy objections which we have shown to be unfounded and false. In view of these facts, we feel and we are sure you agree that the only way for us to stop Japanese aggression peacefully is to institute an economic boycott against all Japanese goods. Save peace, save China, save us! Let's boycott the aggressor nation!

Second Negative, Don E. Dirstine
Gonzaga University

MR. CHAIRMAN, GENTLEMEN: The gentleman from Montana who has just left the platform is, so he has

told us, unsatisfied with the statements of my colleague because of their lack of proof. So far in this discussion, the Negative has but once had necessity to resort to authority, to the Lytton Reports of the League of Nations. On the other hand, our opponents, advocating this boycott of Japanese goods, have presented what they term proof of their case in four specific instances. Let us just briefly consider the authenticity of this proof. First, they quote to us an article from the magazine *Asia*, declaring Japan is a treaty breaker and consequently, we must apply a boycott. On the authority of a travel magazine, they blindly accept this assertion and erect on it a superstructure of economic chaos. Their next two authorities are the magazine *Nation* and Senator George Norris. And yet, gentlemen, right here is where their foot slips. Both the *Nation* and Senator Norris are leading proponents of a Japanese boycott. Granted! But the boycott which they advocate is an unofficial boycott. In fact, as stated in this month's *Reader's Digest*, in a quotation, Senator Norris favors such a boycott because "it does not require any government action and hence the government could not be charged with an unfriendly act." Likewise the *Nation* has never dared to advocate an official boycott of Japanese goods.

Yet that is exactly what our opponents must do. Limited by the terms of the question and by their own definition, they are daring to advocate direct government action against Japan by the United States and Great Britain. Three-quarters of their proof, three-

quarters of their authorities have folded up under scrutiny. What of the remaining one?

For their last authority, the gentlemen from Montana quote to us Nathaniel Peffer to the effect that a Japanese boycott is practical. And yet, Mr. Peffer, again referring to the February issue of the *Readers' Digest*, clearly states that he considers such a boycott to be inadvisable, that it should not be applied under present circumstances. Gentlemen, there in brief are their four authorities, their proof, discredited and cast down. There is the authority for their case, an authority without a foundation.

We have learned from these gentlemen of the Affirmative that, since Japan has broken the Nine-Power Treaty, it is our moral duty to enact this boycott of Japanese goods. Frankly, gentlemen, if the Affirmative speaker thinks that a boycott is moral under these circumstances, he doesn't know what the word "moral" means. Let me refer him just briefly to the Bible as a proof of this. I wonder if he remembers that famous dialogue between God and Abraham just before the impending destruction of Sodom. Abraham asked God, "Wilt Thou destroy the righteous with the wicked? Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" and God answered that if there were only ten innocent people within the walls of that city, only ten, for their sake He would not destroy the city. And yet, in Japan, as my colleague has so ably pointed out, untold millions of innocent laborers, of innocent women and children, would suffer destitution and starvation due to this proposed

boycott. Gentlemen, it is impossible even to conceive of this boycott as "moral" in any manner or form.

Some of you gentlemen out there in the audience tonight, may smoke a pipe. After a hard day's work at the office, when you sink back in that big easy chair for an hour's quiet smoke, just how do you light that pipe? Do you strike a match and apply it in the customary fashion to the bowl of the pipe, or do you walk over to the stove and thrust the whole pipe into the fire? That second alternative, foolish as it seems, is exactly what our friends of the Affirmative have proposed.

What they apparently don't know, or knowing, pass over, is the fact that last November an official spokesman of the Japanese government declared that Japan would regard any official boycott of her goods, by direct action of a foreign government, as a direct declaration of war! These Montana gentlemen have dared to stand before you and advocate an official boycott, a boycott that not even the most foolhardy member of Congress has dared to stand before the people of this country and propose for adoption. War, with all the horrors, all the misery, all the suffering, that it entails. We learned our lesson back in 1918; we're still suffering from that lesson. No, my friends, the last thing we of America want is another foreign entanglement, another foreign conflict. A war exists in the Far-East, a regrettable conflict. Yet, that is no reason why we should thrust ourselves into the midst of it.

The gentlemen advocating this boycott tell us that Japan is the unjust aggressor. We of the Negative are not so sure. We know that China precipitated the

fighting in several instances; that they opened actual hostilities near Peiping at the world-famous Marco Polo bridge incident, and again in Shanghai. Japan, too, has been at fault. We are broad-minded enough to admit that. But, in brief, both nations have erred, both are at fault. Why, then, should we precipitate ourselves into the midst of this foreign conflict which does not concern us? How can we range ourselves at the side of one nation and arbitrarily try to place all the blame on the other?

But, neglecting for a minute this probability of war, and a strong probability it is, what would be the result of such a boycott in this country? At first glance a boycott seems like an easy manner of putting the screws on someone else without affecting yourself. However, in actual practice it doesn't work out that way. An economic boycott of all Japanese goods, as the American Federation of Labor recognizes, would result in greater loss to the United States than to Japan. That seems like a strange statement, but a brief consideration will show it to be true.

The United States buys from Japan each year eighty-five million dollars worth of raw silk. That raw silk is taken into this country and manufactured here into silk garments. Four hundred thousand American citizens depend for a livelihood upon this process of manufacture. Out of the price of a pair of silk stockings sold in this country, ten cents goes to Japan. The rest stays here in the United States. These people, these Americans, both laborers and manufacturers, are the ones who will suffer.

The gentleman from Montana over yonder is already writing down an answer to that. He's going to tell you that we can change to rayon or lisle. Forty per cent of silk manufacturing machinery cannot be converted to these harsher threads, even if the women of this country would wear these harsher, coarser materials. Forty per cent of existing machinery and overhead would have to be scrapped. That doesn't appear so advantageous for the United States, does it?

However that, in itself, is but a small part of the disadvantages accruing to the United States from a Japanese boycott. If this measure were adopted, if we discriminated against Japan, what could we expect in return but retaliation? Certainly Japan would cease buying American cotton.

Each year Japan buys 1,800,000 bales of cotton from the United States. Each year Japan pours into American coffers over \$65,000,000 for this cotton. That source of revenue would be lost to American planters in the South and heaven only knows, gentlemen, that it's those same southern cotton planters who have had such a desperate struggle to keep from bankruptcy and to sell their crop during these past few years.

Our trade balance with Japan is very favorable; that favorable trade balance alone exceeds our entire amount of exports to China. Our trade with Japan as a whole is about four times as great as our trade with China. These facts alone make the idea of a Japanese boycott indefensible. We stand to lose too much!

There, in brief, gentlemen, is the Negative case as we have presented it. Cleaving to two main points, we

have shown first, that there are no moral reasons for instituting a Japanese boycott, and, second, that economically such a boycott is indefensible.

In proof of the first, we have shown both nations at fault in this Oriental struggle; we have shown the social and moral losses which result from a boycott; and, consequently, have pointed out that a boycott under these circumstances, though doubtful of success, is, in itself, essentially immoral.

In proof of the second, we have pointed out the losses sustained by American manufacturers of raw silk as well as by their employees, and general economic detriments, both to the cotton grower and to trade in general, emphasizing the fact that our economic interests lie on the side of Japan.

On these two points, moral and economic, the Negative is content to rest its construction.

**First Negative Rebuttal, Jack Clark
Gonzaga University**

MR. CHAIRMAN, GENTLEMEN: Throughout the course of this discussion we of the Negative have opposed an economic boycott against Japan because it is doubtful, first of all, that such a boycott would effectively halt the Sino-Japanese war. We have pointed out that neither the United States nor Great Britain are in a position to judge Japan an unjust or an unprovoked aggressor. It is true that her position in the present controversy is not commendable, but it is common knowledge that she is not entirely to blame. As long as

both nations are at fault there is no moral reason for our entering into this dispute which is in itself strictly none of our business.

We have shown you that it is, on the other hand, our moral duty to refrain from enacting such sanctions against Japan, because of the evil effect it would have on the innocent populace of Japan and on the laborers of our own country as well.

But it is not an entirely moral question of either declaring or refusing to declare a boycott. It is an economic question as well. We have shown you that the United States and Great Britain stand to lose economically by such unwarranted action against Japan.

And yet even in view of these facts the Affirmative persist in upholding the stand that a boycott should be enforced because China is not a Communistic stronghold, and because Japan is vulnerable to a boycott at this time.

In considering their first assumption it would be well to point out that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, himself, was a staunch Communist before he took over the Nationalist Government of China. And according to the Far Eastern Survey by the United States Government, nearly the whole of north China, about one-sixth of the entire country, is virtually infested by Communists. In that territory there are something over ninety million Communists. The claim, then, that China is not harassed by a faction of Communism as strong as the national government itself can only be considered a fallacious plea for the purity of China.

The Affirmative as far as I can tell are the only ones

who seem to think Japan vulnerable at the present time. According to late issues of both the *Literary Digest* and the *Nation*, conservative estimates claim that Japan is prepared for a boycott. It is a well known fact that she has been frugally conserving her oil, rubber, coal, iron, and steel supplies. According to observers of the Far Eastern situation, Japan is prepared to carry on her war with China for at least a year, even in the face of an economic boycott.

When one weighs the reasons, pro and con, both moral and economic, I am sure that he will agree with us of the Negative, that the United States and Great Britain should not declare or enforce an economic boycott against Japan.

If you should ever be asked to decide on the policy of our nation in this matter, remember the Chinese laugh at Americans fuming over Japan's doing in her back yard, what America insists on doing in hers.

**First Affirmative Rebuttal, William Scott
Montana State University**

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Mr. Coombs and I have come to the alarming conclusion that neither we nor our authorities know what a moral issue is, to quote the gentlemen of the Negative almost verbatim. However, we feel that until the Negative can justify the violation of treaties and murder in a moral sense, that they must be immoral along with us. As yet all that they have said concerning our moral misinformation is that our proposal would injure the Japa-

nese and that having once been an imperialistic nation ourselves, we are in no position to judge Japan. I would like to ask the audience if those two arguments are justification for the slaughter which the Japanese are perpetrating in China today.

The Affirmative contend that we as United States citizens should take action against Japan and that action should consist of peaceful disapproval by the institution of a boycott. In spite of the mention made by the Negative that such action would result in war, they have not shown you how war could be carried on between two nations half-way across the earth from each other. Especially since we have shown that Japan couldn't even carry on war with her next-door neighbor, should we cease our trade. In spite of the fact that Mr. Clark himself just said that war would result should we even declare our proposal, we hesitate to accept him as an authority. However, it is easy to see how the dangerous incidents which we mentioned early in the discussion could easily lead to a major conflagration should this struggle go on.

Again I repeat, this war can be stopped by the Affirmative proposal because first, Japan's trade, her life blood, is chiefly with the United States and the British Empire; secondly, without this trade, Japan would have no war materials; and lastly, her financial status does not warrant war without our aid. The Negative questioned whether Anglo-American trade is so necessary to Japan, but our figures from the latest *World Almanac* stand uncontested. Our stand for cooperative peace was challenged by the Negative with the aged argu-

ment of foreign entanglements. Since when has their "splendid isolation" kept us out of war? The opposition has presented what is too often a Negative case, destructive criticism with nothing to substantiate their own arguments.

Another Negative attempt to justify this aggression was the statement that Japan needs more soil for her starving people to raise food. They said that only fifteen per cent of Japanese soil is tillable. We were pleasantly surprised to hear the figures but, according to a survey taken by the United States Department of Agriculture in collaboration with Japanese authorities, Japanese soil is capable of producing three times as much as it does at present. Even today Japanese farmers are competing with importers for the domestic rice market. Poor Japanese indeed!

To please our Negative friends, perhaps a moral reason for boycott suggested by them is to protect Japan's starving infants, comfort the indigent aged, and relieve the proverbially overburdened taxpayer by halting the war. This could be accomplished as well as to set a precedent for future treaty breakers and to stop the tremendous war losses. It is our duty, along with the agencies already pledged, to stop the Japanese army, to further this peace movement with our active support.

Second Negative Rebuttal, Don E. Dirstine
Gonzaga University

MR. CHAIRMAN, GENTLEMEN: In reviewing this debate as a whole, we of the Negative have been opposed

by this one stand on the part of the gentlemen of the Affirmative; "Japan is a treaty breaker; therefore, the United States should adopt an economic boycott of all Japanese goods." We of the Negative fail to see the logical connection between these two statements, but, neglecting even that, we might look into this matter of treaty violation.

In this pamphlet which I am holding up, I have heavily underlined a list of twelve treaties which China has made and then broken; twelve, all within the past five years. I'm going to read a few of them just so you can see both sides of this treaty-breaking dispute before you pass judgment and decide which party is to blame. The first one at the top of the page is a treaty known as "Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia." Immediately below it is the "Agreement Relating to the Chientao Region," likewise violated by the Chinese government.

Still another is the "Agreement Concerning Mines and Railways in Manchuria" and the "Treaty Respecting South Manchuria." There are any number more I could mention, all treaties drawn up, signed, and then broken by China. Our friends from Montana have accused Japan of breaking the Washington Nine Power Treaty. We hurl the same charge at China. Japan was promised, according to the terms of that treaty, that there would be no discrimination against her goods in China. Yet, gentlemen, if you will investigate a little, time after time will you find instances of discrimination against Japanese goods on Chinese railroads. Time after time, you will find these Chinese

railroads distinguishing between Japanese and other foreign goods, levying external sabotage against Japan.

No, my friends, it won't do to sit back calmly and say "Japan is a treaty-breaker. We must punish her." We can't levy an absolute charge like that. To be fair, to be practical, to be logical, we must say, "Both nations have broken their promises. Both are at fault. We have no moral obligation either way." That, gentlemen, is the only attitude which we can take. We can't arbitrarily place the blame on either one or the other.

There, briefly, is the Affirmative case; now let us look to the Negative. We have opposed a Japanese boycott because of the great possibility of resultant war, war, as the Japanese government stated, being the inevitable outcome from an official boycott. We have opposed this boycott because it is official, because it involves direct action by our governments. We have shown the British government characterizing it as "inopportune."

Then, passing above even these detriments, we have argued against such a boycott on both moral and economic grounds. We have pointed out how doubtful of success such a measure is, how boycotts have failed and even destroyed their intent in other cases. Then, assuming for argument's sake, we have contemplated the result of such a boycott, if successful, showing these moral reasons against it. As my colleague so well pointed out, a boycott would bring starvation and horror to the laborers of Japan, laborers already heavily overburdened. On this account alone, we of the Negative maintain such a boycott to be ethically indefensible.

Then, going into economic issues, we have looked at the effect of the Affirmative plan in this country and have seen hundreds of thousands of American citizens deprived of their work, hundreds of employers bankrupt and destitute. We have seen an unbearable burden placed on the loaded shoulders of the cotton planter; we have seen one of our best customers shut off from our trade to favor a country with whom our trade and our profit is slight.

And why? Because two nations thousands of miles away are engaged in battle. Because two nations have each violated treaties, have each sinned against one another. Should we embroil ourselves in this conflict for no reason at all? Should we actively discriminate, even go to battle, on the side of either? Gentlemen, we of the Negative bring you the answer, "NO!"

**Second Affirmative Rebuttal, Walter P. Coombs,
Montana State University**

FRIENDS: In this, the last rebuttal speech, let us look at the attacks made upon us by the Negative and see just where those attacks fall down. In an attempt to justify the Japanese invasion of innocent China, they have said in essence—"Both nations are at fault, so let's allow the war to go on."

In this war the guilt is clear. The unprecedented attack on China by Japan is clearly the fault of Japan, as we have pointed out. The fact remains that the aggressor nation is Japan, and as such it should be singled out and punished through an economic boycott.

They have argued that Japan is "innocent" of all these charges and then they say that the boycott will hurt the innocent victims.

In their zeal to repudiate China, they have forgotten that the "innocent" victims are all found on the Chinese side. People who serve no military objective are being killed outright by the Japanese. Do our opponents close their eyes to the obvious? They say they hate war, but they want this one prolonged. They fear to do anything about it, because they say a boycott will hurt Japanese citizens who want nothing to do with the war. Which is worse, friends? Harming Japanese citizens through a boycott of a few months' duration, or killing innocent Chinese by the thousands in a two years' war? Clearly the wholesale murder, to which the opponents close their eyes, is the more reprehensible.

Of course, the Japanese are against a boycott and they would consider it harmful to them. As I pointed out before, Japan fears a boycott and is urging us not to adopt it, because they could not continue their aggressive policy without the trade with the United States and Britain, which a boycott would destroy.

They say that a boycott is immoral in its very essence and therefore we should not adopt it. Friends, this is a similar case to the one I mentioned before. A boycott is not half as immoral as allowing the war to go on unchecked. They cannot show one source in the Bible to the effect that war is a grand and noble thing.

Then, they said the boycott would not work if it was tried. The falsity of this statement can be shown by saying that the boycott is working on a small scale at

the present time, and there have been many historical boycotts which have worked. At the present time we need only the added impetus that the government could give to provide an air-tight boycott. Already, Japanese aggression has been slowed down, due to the unofficial boycott existing here and abroad. With every citizen participating, it is logical to assume that the boycott could do all we claim, and even more. Not only would it stop the Japanese aggression, but it, as I pointed out before, would provide a positive peace policy and would stop the increasing danger of our becoming embroiled in the war through more Panay incidents.

In view of all these facts, the course of action is clear. We have shown you how vitally dependent upon us Japan is, and how necessary it is for someone to put a stop to the aggression that threatens to embroil the whole world. The increasing slaughter of defenseless Chinese, which we are paying for in two ways, provides the moral reason for a boycott. Besides this, we have pointed out the actual danger existing in the world, when wars are allowed to reign unchecked. Wars anywhere on earth will threaten our peace and security. Japan's militaristic policy threatens the peace and security of the world right now. In view of these facts we advocate the immediate adoption of a boycott.

In contrast we see the Negative's attack on our plan fall down through lack of proof. They have called us immoral because we hate war and want to do something about it. They have said that "American women wouldn't like to boycott Japanese silk," and that there is no reason for our interest. To all of these objections

we have answered with the simple, undeniable fact that to save peace and to save us, we must boycott Japan.

My colleague and I sincerely believe that, because of these reasons, we should adopt the boycott immediately.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: THE JAPANESE SITUATION

Books

- Abbott, James Francis—*Japanese Expansion and American Policies*. New York. The Macmillan Co. 1916.
- Bailey, Thomas Andrew—*Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crisis*. Stanford U. Press. 1934
- Chang, C. F.—*The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*. London, H. Milford. Oxford U. Press. 1931.
- Dennis, Alfred, L. P.—*The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*. Berkeley, Calif. U. of Calif. Press. 1923.
- Dulls, H. R.—*The Old China Trade*. New York. Houghton, Mifflin Co. 1930.
- Hornbeck, S. K.—*Contemporary Politics in the Far East*. New York. D. Appleton & Co. 1916.
- Johnson, J. E.—*Chinese-Japanese War*. (Ref. Shelf.) Vol. 8. No. 8, 1933.
- Kawakami, Kiyoshi Karl—*Japan Speaks on the Sino-Japanese Crisis*. New York. The Macmillan Co. 1932.
- Masaoka, Naoichi—*Japan to America*. New York & London. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1915.
- Meng, Chih—*China Speaks on the Conflict between China and Japan*. New York. The Macmillan Co. 1932.
- Peffer, Nathaniel—*Must We Fight in Asia?* New York and London Harper and Brothers. 1935.
- Pitkin, Walter Boughton—*Must We Fight Japan?* New York. The Century Company. 1921.
- Treat, Payson J.—*The Far East; a Political and Diplomatic History*. New York & London. Harper and Brothers. 1928.
- Willoughby, W. W.—*Foreign Rights and Interests in China*. Baltimore, Md. Johns Hopkins Press. 1920.
- Willoughby, W. W.—*The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations*. Baltimore, Md. Johns Hopkins Press. 1935.

PAMPHLETS

- Arnold, Julian—*China, A Commercial and Industrial Handbook*. Wash., D. C. Gov't. Printing Office. 1926.
- Arnold, Julian—*The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations*. Pullman, Wash. Pullman Press. 1936.
- Cambon, Jules; von Kuhlmann, Richard; Chamberlain, Sir Austin; and others—*Japanese Foreign Relations*. Also a paper on *Anglo-American Relations*. New York. Harper and Brothers.

PERIODICALS

- Annals of the American Academy of Political Science.—192:5-14, July, 1937. *Far East and American Foreign Policy*. Field, F. V.
- Asia.—241:53-56, January, 1924. *Shall the Powers Intervene in China?* H. G. Woodhead. 22:134-138, Feb., 1922. *Peace by Law in the Far East*. Harding, W. 21:1036-1041. Dec., 1921. *Chinese Custodians of the Open Door*. Harding, W. 37:794-796. Supplement to. 1937. *Japan's Case*. Brotter, H. M. 37:796-797. Supplement to. 1937. *China's Case*. Brotter, Herbert M. 37:806-807, Supplement to. 1937. *Foreigners Under Fire*. Buck, Pearl S. 37:815-818, Supplement to. 1937. *American Opinion on Japan*. Mc Reynolds, George E. 37:791-793. Supplement to. 1937. *The Shot Heard Around the World*. Peffer, Nathaniel. 37:808-811. Supplement to. 1937. *Neutrality Put to Test*. Raushenbush, Stephen. 37:798-800. Supplement to. 1937. *World Issues at Stake*. Yutang, Lin.
- Century.—103:377, Jan., 1922. *Playground of the Spoilers: Would War with Japan Solve the Far Eastern Problem?* N. Peffer.
- Christian Century.—55:198, F. 16, '38. *After Intervention, What?* See Montana Bibliography. 54:1195-1196, Sept. 29, 1937. *America and the War in China*. Neibuhr, R. 54:942-944, July 28, 1937. *Behind the Eastern Crisis*. 54:1443, Nov. 24, 1937. *Japan Rebuffs Brussels: China Asks for International Aid*. 54:1131-1133, 1937. *An Open Letter to the People of Japan*. Jones, E. Stanley.
- Contemporary.—152:513, Nov., '37. *America, Britain & the Far East*. A. F. Whyte. 152:700-706, Dec., '37. *Japan and the Open Door*. LeClaire.

- Current History.—43:467, Feb., '36. *Why Bother about Japan?* T. Dennett. 47:106-114, Oct., '37. *Notes and Documents Relative to the Sino-Japanese Situation*. 47:29-34, Oct., '37. *Asia's Irrepressible Conflict; Background of the Present Battles*. Chamberlain, W. H. 47:25-29, Oct., '37. *China—Back to the Wall*. Hodges, Charles. 47:30-31, 1937. *Pacific Retreat*. Hodges, Charles. 47:19-25, 1937. *Power of Japan*. pp. 20-23, Jan., '38. *Japan's Stake in Empire*. Chamberlain, William Henry. 10-15, Jan., '38. *History in the Making*. The Editors. 24, Jan., '38. *Post-Mortem on an Incident*. Tolstoy, Andrew. 35, Jan., '38. *Cooperation in Cartoon*. 68-72, Jan., '38. *China's Refugees*.
- Foreign Affairs.—Jan., '38. Many Articles on the Subject.
- Foreign Policy Reports.—13:54, May 15, '37. *Anglo-Japanese Rivalry in Southeast Asia*. E. O. Hauser. 13:278, F. 15, '38. *America's Role in the Far Eastern Conflict*.
- Fortune.—17:109, Apr., 1938. *Policy Toward Japan*. Fortune Survey.
- Harpers.—149:145-152, July, 1924. *England and America*. Gardiner, A. C.
- International Conciliation.—236:33, Jan., '38. *Questions on our Policy in China Conflict & Sec. of State Hull's Reply*.
- Literary Digest.—71:5-6, Nov. 5, 1921. *Mr. Harding's British-American Doctrine*. 81:20, April 12, 1924. *What Keeps Japan and China Apart?*
- Nation.—145:391, 394, Oct. 16, '37. *Will We Blockade Japan?* Article and editor comment. D. Pearson. 146:209, Feb. 19, '38. *Drive to Put us into War with Japan*. O. G. Villard. 146:117, Jan. 29, '38. *Policies in Japan*. 146:145, Feb. 5, '38. *Does the Boycott Hurt American Labor?* 146:407, Apr. 9, '38. *America's Gift to Aggressors*. H. C. Engelbrecht.
- Nation.—145:89-100, July 24, '37. *Behind China's Conflict; with Editorial Comment*. Stewart, M. S. 119:199, Aug. 20, '24. *Bossing the Far East*. Karakhan, L. M. 145:211-212, Aug. 28, '37. *Boycott Japanese Goods*. 113:619-620, Nov. 30, '21. *China Asks: Do You Mean Hands Off?* N. Peffer. 145:335-336, Oct. 2, '37. *Don't Buy Silk*. 145:309, Sept. 25, '37. *Embargo Against China*. 145:505, Nov. 6, '37. *Issues and Men; the Use of the Brussels Conference*. Villard, O. G. 145:144-145, *Neutrality in the Far East*. Aug. 7, '37. 349. Oct. 2, '37. Utley, Freda. 145:262-263, 1937. *What Chance Has China?* Stewart, Max-

- well S. 145:89, 1937. *War in the East*. 145:164, 1937. *Will Chiang Fight?* 145:231-233, 1937. *Can Japan Be Stopped?*
- New Republic.—93:296, 301, Jan. 19, '38. *What America Could do to Japan*. Lin Yutang. 28: sup. 10-11, Nov. 16, '21. *Anglo-American Cooperation*. 92:60, Aug. 25, '37. *America and the Far Eastern War*. 34:31-33, March 7, '23. *Anglo-American Cooperation*. 36:296-298, Nov. 14, '23. *Does Cooperation with Britain Mean Intervention?* 92:230, Oct. 6, '37. *Embargo Means War*. 91:319-320, July 28, '37. *Neutrality in the Far East*. 92:359-360, Nov. 3, '37. *Nine Power Politics*. Peffer, N. 92:147-148, Sept. 15, '37. *Roosevelt's Far Eastern Policy*. J. Mitchell. 92:88, Sept. 1, '37. *Should We Join the War in China?* 92:172-173, 1937. *On Hating the Japanese*. Bliven, Bruce. 92:115-116, 1937. *The President Heads Towards War*. 92:172-173, 1937. *Cost of Neutrality*.
- News Week.—10:16-18. Sept. 27, '37. *U. S. Promotes Neutrality*.
- Overland.—78:58-60, Dec. '21. *Glimpse Through the Open Door*. I. D. Hull. See Montana Bibliography.
- Saturday Review of Literature.—June 5, 1937. Wild, Payson S. p. 9.
- Vital Speeches.—3:669. Aug. 15, '37. *China, Japan & Ourselves in Perspective*. G. Clark. 1:373, March 11, '35. *America's Interest in the Far East*. N. Roosevelt. 4:284, Feb. 15, '38. *Let's Avert War; Economic Pressure as a Peace Measure*.
- Yale Review.—(n.s.) 27, No. 2:366. Oct., '37. *Conflicts in our Far Eastern Diplomacy*. A. W. Griswold.

LARGER NAVY IN THE PACIFIC

A Direct Clash Debate

NORTH CAROLINA STATE COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE
vs. UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA NEGATIVE

A direct clash debate is similar to a tennis game. In tennis it takes several games to make a set and several points won to make a game. In a direct clash debate, one issue of the debate is bandied back and forth in speech, rebuttal and counter-rebuttal until the clash like a tennis game is won. Then a new clash, served by the other side as in tennis, is taken up and played until won. A judge, who follows the discussion, awards the decision upon the merits of the debaters in handling the issue used in the clash, but may stop the clash and award the decision if any speaker gets off the subject or fails to stay within the rules. This type of debating is a popular form of developing refutation and rebuttal technique, is interesting to the audience, but does not present the debate subject in a complete way. It is not the purpose of this type of debating to present all the evidence, but to examine and fight out the issues implied within a debate, in whole or in part, depending upon the number of clashes included in the debate. A direct clash debate may be of indefinite length, three, five, or seven or more clashes. The winner is determined by the number of clashes won by the sides.

The debate presented here was given over Station WPTF, Raleigh, North Carolina, Feb. 16, 1938. The subject discussed was obviously suggested by the Sino-Japanese conflict and was stated: Resolved, that the United States should maintain a permanent fleet in the Pacific approximately fifty per cent stronger than Japan's.

The judge of this debate was Professor Zon Robinson, Director of Debating at Wake Forest College. The speeches were collected and submitted to *Intercollegiate Debates* by Professor Edwin H. Paget, of North Carolina State College, who first conceived and introduced the direct clash type of debating.

LARGER NAVY IN THE PACIFIC

First Affirmative, H. R. McSwain
North Carolina State College

(Note: The first speech on each side in a direct clash debate outlines the position of the side in the debate.)

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE RADIO AUDIENCE:
We are very happy to meet the debaters from the University of Pennsylvania this evening. We welcome them to the State College campus and to North Carolina.

In supporting the query: Resolved, that the United States should maintain a permanent fleet in the Pacific approximately fifty per cent stronger than the Japanese fleet, the Affirmative sincerely hopes that the United States will not be drawn into another world conflict. Yet, realistically realizing the high distrust and uncertainty in world diplomatic circles, the Affirmative maintains that our policies cannot be based upon well-wishes and hope. When we see the alignment of the Fascistic *vs.* the Democratic nations, we do not believe that our policies can be based upon hope. When we see Japan's continued aggression and demand for parity in armaments with the United States, we are convinced that our foreign policy and naval program cannot be based upon hope. Upon these convictions we base the Affirmative proposal upon three major issues:

First, such increase in our navy will place the United States in a powerful position to bargain for disarmament agreements. It is out of such a condition that the only successful armament agreement has come.

Second, in the event of another World War it is very probable that Japan will be an enemy of the United States; therefore, the United States Navy must be fully prepared to protect a 12,000 mile Pacific coast line, reaching from Alaska to the Hawaiian Islands and the Panama Canal.

Third, the United States should adopt the Affirmative proposal to give the United States an adequate defense of both coast lines. With our present strength, an engagement in the Pacific would draw practically all of our naval defense from the Atlantic, leaving our Atlantic coast line undefended except by the Army. We base our case upon these three issues, and are prepared to prove them.

First Negative, Herbert Bowman
University of Pennsylvania

(Outlining the Negative position)

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE RADIO AUDIENCE:
We, the debaters from the University of Pennsylvania, extend our most cordial thanks to the South for the cordial welcome we have been afforded, and especially to Radio Station WPTF. We of the Negative maintain that a peaceful and mutually helpful relationship is the prime objective in any program we might adopt concerning the Japanese policy, and to advance such a pro-

gram we say there is no need for the proposal that has been put forth for an increased Navy.

We oppose the Affirmative upon the first issue at the outset, and declare that the chance for an armament agreement is made not more possible, but less possible, if such a proposal is adopted. In the second place, we oppose the Affirmative upon the second argument, in which they claim that a World War is imminent and that Japan is our most probable enemy. In the third place, we oppose the Affirmative upon their third argument in which they claim that without such a proposal being adopted the United States does not maintain an adequate defense against Japan or the Far East.

(The Affirmative waived the period for clarification of the issues, provided for in the Direct Clash Rules, accepting the Negative's statement of them.)

First Clash

Affirmative, C. K. Watkins
North Carolina State College

The Affirmative contends that the plan which the Affirmative has brought out will tend to bring about another armament conference. We are basing this upon our records in the past, and upon history as it has been in the past. In the past the United States has always been ready, and still is ready, to enter any reasonable armament agreement with any other nations. In view of this fact, there has been only one armament conference which was successful—that of the armament conference in Washington, in 1922.

The Affirmative points out that in 1922, the United States had the largest Navy in the world and one that was rapidly becoming larger and stronger. Then, Great Britain and Japan realized that the United States was steadily outbuilding them, and realized because of financial limitations that they could not hope to maintain the race. Therefore, they were willing to agree to an armament reduction campaign. This resulted in a 5-5-3 ratio, and Great Britain and Japan were willing to accept this. At the present time, Japan refuses to accept any agreement except equality, and that equality in total tonnage. This means, while the United States has two coast lines to defend, Japan has only one, and a short coast line, and yet she asks parity with us. The United States and Great Britain do not feel that they can accept these demands of Japan, and therefore refuse to engage.

However, Secretary Hull has pointed out that the United States is always willing to enter any reasonable armament agreement with any nations. Based on the history in the past, the Negative contends that by increasing the Navy until it is possible for it to be fifty per cent stronger than Japan's Pacific Fleet, with each nation trying to overbuild the other, we cannot do away with war. We propose this as one method by which this race might be ended.

Negative, Henry Luffberry
University of Pennsylvania

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: The last speaker has tried to point out to us that it is possible for the United

States, by increasing the size of its fleet in the Pacific, to bring about better relationships and to bring about the possibility of another world disarmament conference. We of the Negative contend that this is not true.

Let us consider the facts of this item. The United States has now a Navy in the Pacific Ocean much greater than Japan's. This is true because of the fact that by rule of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States a ratio was set at 5-5-3, a ratio which has just lately been broken by Japan. It is therefore to be assumed that Japan has not yet been able to build up a Navy to the size held by the United States. Let us consider the possibilities of bringing about peace by increasing our fleet. One nation has already broken this pact. Can we, too, break this pact? We will increase the likelihood of war, or are we merely taking the same sort of step as we did before the World War, and leading to the war.

The Negative contends that it is not possible to increase a Pacific fleet in the Pacific Ocean without starting just such a naval race, and going through the same problems we went through just twenty-five years ago.

Affirmative, H. R. McSwain
North Carolina State College

The last speaker of the opposition contends that to increase our naval strength we increase the likelihood of War and decrease the possibilities of disarmament agreements. He ignored the argument of my colleague that the only successful armament agreement between

the major powers was brought about at a time when the United States had one of the largest navies in the world. At that time, in 1922, the United States had a Navy equal to England. We had a program under construction that made us superior to England. Eighteen-inch guns? The United States had under construction at that time 18-inch guns. We were fast becoming the most powerful naval power in the world. Japan and England were then willing to enter into a naval agreement with us, the only successful naval agreement in history.

The gentlemen of the opposition maintain that the United States now has a Pacific Fleet much greater than Japan's. Let us look at the figures given by Paul Mallon, a prominent western correspondent. His figures, which agree with most figures given, are that in capital ships the United States has 15, but normally only 60 per cent of our fleet is kept in the Pacific, giving us nine capital ships in the Pacific. Japan has ten. The United States has 27 cruisers, about 15 in the Pacific. Japan has 26. The United States has 35 destroyers, 21 in the Pacific. Japan has 76. The United States has 21 submarines, about 13 in the Pacific. Japan has 41. Can this be called a larger fleet in the Pacific than Japan has?

Negative, Herbert Bowman
University of Pennsylvania

Let us consider the first assumption that was made by the Affirmative in his last speech—that by building a larger Navy than other nations, we establish a feeling

of respect for our own country. To the contrary, we of the Negative believe that nothing is inspired but fear by such a program. We believe that any armament agreement among the nations is defeated by just such measures. There has been talk of an armament conference. What is the purpose of an armament conference, if it is not to establish amicable relations, to create hope that international problems may be met without resorting to conflicts?

And what defeats the purpose of such if it is not the feeling among members of such a conference of hatred of each other and the attempt to increase the Navy to put into use strong armaments? Such measures will tend only to increase that fear and to increase that hatred.

Decision: The Affirmative

In awarding this decision, the judge would like to point out the failure of the last speaker of the Negative to answer the specific arguments put forward by the Affirmative; namely, that the only successful naval agreement has come about by a big armament program, and that Japan has a much larger fleet in the Pacific than the United States.

Considering this, I award the clash to the Affirmative.

Second Clash

Negative, Henry Luffberry
University of Pennsylvania

In introducing the second clash, which is the privilege of the Negative, we should like to point out that if there

was another war, that the Fascist nations would be the enemies of the Democratic nations. You cannot disagree with me on this point. There are three major Fascist nations in the world—Italy, Germany, and Japan. We cannot consider Spain a major power. There will be four nations involved together in a new war: Japan, Italy, Germany, and Spain.

What is it that the Fascist nations are after at the present time? It is to overthrow all Communism, and that is their greatest aim. The United States has not yet taken the step toward Communism. This gives the United States no interest in a World War between Fascism and Communism. We can stay secure just as we could have in 1917 by staying out of the national conflicts; and, as has been said, we have everything to lose and nothing to gain. So why should we take that step again? Another World War will result in an alignment of power, with Fascists and Communists as opponents to Democracy.

Affirmative, Harold Zekaria
North Carolina State College

The gentlemen of the opposition submit that we had nothing to lose and nothing to gain by staying out of the war in 1917, but what about 1914, 1915, and 1916, when we were not in the war? We sat idle and did not prepare to go to war, and when 1917 came we had everything to lose. The Negative say that Fascist nations are not interested in the United States. What is the Japanese fishing fleet doing off the coast of Alaska? Japan has appropriated 87,000 yen for investigation of

our fisheries off the coast of Alaska. In the event of another World War, Japan will seize Alaska just as soon as the war breaks out. Alaska's gold and coal deposits are needed by Japan, and remember that Alaska is nearer to Japan than to the United States.

The gentlemen of the opposition say that they are trying to decide arguments without war, but that is what the Fascist nations are trying to make us do, and will do unless the United States prepares for conflict.

Negative, Martin Day
University of Pennsylvania

It is the privilege of the Negative to place the burden of proof upon the Affirmative to prove that there will be a war between the United States and Japan. How can we prove that the United States will be in a war with Fascist nations? Fascist nations are opposed to Communism. Japan's activities in China today are attempts to blot out Communism. They are operating in China and cannot be a menace to the United States. They are attempting to set up a stable government in the northern provinces of China.

In a conference your own Senator Reynolds, a few days ago, said that Japan would not be a menace to the United States for at least twenty-five years, for it will take her that long to complete her conquest in China. War with the United States cannot be in the minds of the Japanese. We are Japan's friend because we are Japan's customer. Forty per cent of Japan's imports were from the United States in 1934 and in 1935. And,

therefore, we have to say that Japan is one of our customers and we are one of Japan's customers, and we have too much in common to go to war. One does not fight one's customers!

Affirmative, H. R. McSwain
North Carolina State College

The gentlemen of the opposition have asked the Affirmative to prove that the United States will clash in war with Japan. They have quoted our own Senator Reynolds as saying that Japan would not be free in China for twenty-five years. That is just what the Affirmative contends.

When Japan has completed her conquest in China, she will then be a strong and powerful nation, ready to turn to Alaska for the rich mineral deposits there. We must adopt a long-time program, recognizing the possibilities of Japan having an expansion program which includes Alaska.

Washington correspondents, and some of the inside circles in Washington, according to Wake Lucas, local correspondent, believe that this is Japan's program, and that we must prepare for it to prevent Japan from becoming the most powerful economic and naval power in the world.

The Decision: Negative

I should like to point out that the Negative in introducing this clash have, according to the Direct Clash Rules, accepted the burden of proof. The second

speaker of the Negative, in saying that the Affirmative had the burden of proof, was technically wrong. Nevertheless, the last speaker of the Affirmative failed to answer the last argument of the Negative; that is, that the United States and Japan are each other's best customers and will not fight each other. I, therefore, award this clash to the Negative.

Third Clash

Affirmative, Harold Zekaria
North Carolina State College

Considering the distrust among nations, it is very probable to believe that war will be started in the near future. The United States is acquainted with this fact. When this World War breaks out, Japan will be on the side opposing the United States. Japan, to continue to prosper, must have raw materials. Today, because she must have these, we see her taking the northern provinces of China to get iron and cotton. If there was a World War, the United States would be busy protecting her Atlantic coast line, leaving Japan free to grasp the Dutch West Indies for their 53,000,000 barrels of oil annual production, and would try to get coal and gold from Alaska. At this time, America will possibly be trying to protect both her coast lines and she will have to divide her Navy between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Japan can take Alaska while the United States is attempting to protect the Hawaiian Islands, her western coast, and the Panama Canal.

America will be able to protect her coast lines only if she has a fleet in the Pacific approximately fifty per cent stronger than Japan's. Unless we do this, Japan will go ahead and will get what she wants. The coast which America must protect is very large, while the Japanese coast is small. Our coast line is approximately 15,000 miles long, while Japan's is only 3,000 miles of practically impregnable coral islands. We must adopt the Affirmative proposal for any equality of power in agreements or disputes.

Negative, Albert Rosenthal
University of Pennsylvania

Our opponents have tried to show us what will occur if there is a World War, that our Atlantic Coast will be in danger, while the fleet is in the Pacific. We believe that both the Atlantic and a Pacific Fleet are unnecessary. If there is a World War, the United States will be on the side of Great Britain and France, and will be against Germany and Italy.

Our allies in Europe are equipped to prevent an attack upon our Atlantic coast line; therefore, it will be easy to concentrate both fleets in the Pacific. It is unnecessary for our Government to have a fleet fifty per cent stronger than Japan's in the Pacific, because we know that the United States will only fight in a defensive war. For this we only need a Navy the same size of Japan's in the Pacific.

Japan will have to come all the way across the Pacific to fight the United States, and if we had a Navy in the

Pacific as large as theirs, it would be large enough to defeat a Navy that had come two thousand miles. Therefore, we do not need a Navy fifty per cent stronger than Japan's in the Pacific.

Affirmative, H. R. McSwain
North Carolina State College

The last speaker of the opposition said that the United States has nothing to fear from the Atlantic waters, in knowing the fact that in the event of another war the United States will have Great Britain and France as allies. In the event of such a war, Germany would attempt to force France out at the beginning of the war. Twice in the last war it looked as if Germany was going to win. She may next time. Italy would bottle up the British fleet in the Mediterranean. Great Britain would also need to protect her colonies in Africa and throughout the world, having her fleet spread over twelve thousand miles. The United States could not expect any assistance from either of these nations.

If our Pacific fleet would withdraw into the Atlantic, it would leave our 12,000 miles of Pacific coast line undefended. The last speaker of the opposition said that the United States would not need a fleet fifty per cent larger than Japan's in the Pacific, regardless of the fact that Japan has only 3,000 miles of coast line to defend, and the United States has 12,000 miles, reaching from Alaska to the Panama Canal. And, at the same time, we have a very vulnerable Atlantic coast line to be protected also.

Negative, Henry Luffberry
University of Pennsylvania

The speaker of the opposition has just said that Germany almost "wiped" France off the map during the World War. This was not in naval battles as the gentlemen of the opposition intimated might be in the next war, but it was in the conflicts of our armies.

In that war the British fleet kept Germany's fleet bottled up almost throughout the war. It was kept blockaded near its own shores. It was only the German submarines that gave the Allied nations any trouble. When the Allied fleets had been called into action, they soon took the situation in hand.

The gentlemen of the opposition say that England would not be able to cope with Germany and Italy in a World War. We know that the British fleet is greater and stronger than Germany's and Italy's put together.

The United States has three times the coast line to defend that Japan has, and the Affirmative says that we need a navy of greater strength to protect us against Japan who has only 3,000 miles of coast line. Yet, Japan would have to cross the Pacific before they can possibly attack our shore. Therefore, the United States Navy is now sufficient to protect our shores, and would be able to concentrate on the Pacific coast if attacked by Japan.

The Decision: Affirmative

In this debate we see how far a debate can wander from the original clash. The Affirmative is guilty of

this, as well as the Negative. But the Negative wandered from the issue introduced by the Affirmative, that Alaska would probably be taken by Japan. The second Affirmative speaker came back to the 12,000 mile Pacific coast line which we must defend. The second Negative speaker again wandered from the clash and talked mainly about Europe and our Atlantic defenses. I therefore award the clash to the Affirmative.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: LARGER NAVY IN THE PACIFIC

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

- Denlinger, S. and Gary, C. B.—*War in the Pacific*. 1936. McBride.
 Finger, C. J.—*Our Navy*. 1936. Houghton, Mifflin.
 Stein, R. M.—*M-day, the First Day of War*. 1936. Harcourt.
 Talbot, Booth, E. C.—*All the World's Fighting Fleets*. 1937. Appleton-Century.
 Wesley, E. B.—*Guarding the Frontier*. 1935. Univ. of Minnesota.

MAGAZINES AND PERIODICALS

- American Mercury.—42:775, Dec., 1937. *Waving a Bloody Japanese Shirt*.
 Christian Century.—55:195, Feb. 16, 1938. *Admiral Leahy Testifies*.
 55:230, Feb. 23, 1938. *Why Mr. Roosevelt Wants a Super-Navy*.
 54:156, Dec. 15, 1937. *Are we Arming to Fight Japan?* H. E. Frey.
 Christian Science Monitor.—p. 1, March 9, 1938. *How Many Ships Make Security?* J. P. Baxter.
 Congressional Digest.—17:79, March, 1938. *Roosevelt's Program for Increases in the Navy*. W. D. Leahy.
 Current History.—48:18, May, 1938. *Mr. Roosevelt's Little Navy*. J. C. Winslow. 48:13, Mar., 1938. *Armaments for Peace*.
 Literary Digest.—125:2, Feb. 19, 1938. *Anglo-American Cooperation and Demands that Japan Reveal Naval Plans*. 125:3, Jan. 8, 1938. *Navy Second to None*. 125:3, Feb. 12, 1938. *New Strength for the Navy*.

- Nation.—146:200, Feb. 19, 1938. *Big-navy Stuff*. 146:157, Feb. 5, 1938. *Roosevelt Re-armament Program*. O. G. Villard.
- New Republic.—85:90, Dec. 4, 1935. *Bigger, Brighter Battleships*. 93:253, Jan 5, 1938. *Will We Arm to Scare Japan?* 94:5, Feb. 9, 1938. *Behind the Big Navy*. 94:17, Feb. 9, 1938. *Naval Program of Pacifism*. 94:210, Mar. 30, 1938. *Rough Seas for the Super-Navy*. C. A. Beard. 94:240, Mar. 30, 1938. *For Impregnable Defense*. G. F. Eliot.
- News Week.—11:11, Jan. 10, 1938. *Big Navy*. 11:11, Feb. 7, 1938. *Our Duty, a Navy Second to None*. 11:9, Feb. 21, 1938. *Navy Race; Japan Passes the Buck to Mr. Roosevelt*. 11:14, Feb. 28, 1938. *Debate on Big Navy Plans*.
- Political Science Quarterly.—53:1-13, Mar., 1938. *American Military Policy and National Security*. E. M. Earle.
- Scholastic.—32:2, Feb. 26, 1938. *Let's not Kid Ourselves*.
- Vital Speeches.—4:357, Apr. 1, 1938. *Naval Preparedness: What Road Shall We Take?* R. R. Belknap.

REFERENDUM ON DECLARATION
OF WAR

A Western Conference Debate

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN AFFIRMATIVE *vs.*
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA NEGATIVE

During the debate season of 1937-38 the Western Debate Conference, composed of the larger Mid-Western universities, discussed the Ludlow Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, proposing to authorize a Referendum Vote on the declaration of war except in cases of invasion of the territory of the United States. The following debate is one of this series of discussions.

The question for debate was stated: Resolved, that the proposed Ludlow Amendment to the Federal Constitution should be adopted.

The debate was held at the University of Wisconsin on the evening of February 17, 1938, and was taken down in shorthand and later revised and edited by the speakers. The critic judge system was used and Professor I. M. Cochran of Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota, acted on this occasion. In addition a vote of the audience was taken, but the result of this vote was not furnished for publication. The debate was presided over by Byron L. Johnson, President of the University of Wisconsin Forensic Board.

The speeches were collected and contributed to *Intercollegiate Debates* by Professor Henry L. Ewbank of the Speech Department of the University of Wisconsin, with the active cooperation of Professor A. Craig Baird of the University of Iowa Department of Speech

REFERENDUM ON DECLARATION OF WAR

Chairman—Byron L. Johnson

President of the University of Wisconsin
Forensic Board

FRIENDS: This is the second round of the Western Conference Debating season. The University of Wisconsin, Affirmative, on my right, is meeting the State University of Iowa, Negative, on my left. This is the first time we have been privileged to hear this question debated here on our campus, and we are very pleased at the opportunity. I am glad to act as chairman because it is the first time Wisconsin has instituted the procedure of having a student chairman. I am especially pleased because the last time I stood on the platform before Professor Cochran I was partly responsible for the debating. This time all I have to do is to see to it that the wheels go around, so, without further ado, you will hear a debate on the question, Resolved, that the proposed Ludlow Amendment to the Federal Constitution should be adopted.

The first speaker for the Affirmative will be Mr. Horace Wilkie, Wisconsin.

First Affirmative, Horace Wilkie
University of Wisconsin

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: There is no need for a war referendum here tonight. The invaders from Iowa are upon us. In the words of Patrick Henry: "We must fight. An appeal to arms and to the God of hosts is all that is left to us." So let us draw the lines of battle and proceed to the attack.

With both the Orient and the Occident aflame with war, with President Roosevelt demanding a navy which will be able simultaneously to defend both of our coast lines, our interest in international affairs has been dramatically increased by recent developments. Because of this, the proposal we are discussing tonight becomes a matter of vital concern to all of us. The Ludlow Amendment, submitted by Representative Louis Ludlow of Indiana, is by no means a new proposition. The idea of a war referendum has been sponsored by several of our leading statesmen. Even President Roosevelt, a bitter opponent of the present proposal, in 1924 offered as his suggestion in the 1924 Democratic Party platform the following plank: "Our government should seek a joint agreement with all nations for a war referendum except in case of actual or threatened invasion."

Let it be understood at the outset that we of the Affirmative do not claim this amendment to be a panacea for the solution of the ailments of war. We do hope that it will be an important step in the general direction of peace. Before my colleague discusses with you the effect of this amendment upon our foreign pol-

icy, let us consider the exact provisions of the amendment and how it would fit into our Constitution. Here is how the amendment reads:

"Except in case of an invasion of the United States or its territorial possessions and attack upon its citizens residing therein, the authority of Congress to declare war shall not become effective until confirmed by a majority of all votes cast thereon in a national referendum. Congress, when it deems a national crisis to exist, may by concurrent resolution refer the question of war and peace to the citizens of the state."

Let us underline the word "invasion." Should we be invaded, should this be a part of our Constitution, the present method of declaring war would be unimpaired. You will recall that President Roosevelt, speaking on the declaration of war, said in substance that the power to declare war lies in the hands of the President and the Secretary of State. The Ludlow Amendment is a measure which will check this power. In regard to the authority of Congress to declare war we must recognize that if the government should attempt to fight an undeclared war, it would be crippled by its inability to make use of the war powers of conscription both of men and of natural resources.

The history of the United States is replete with vivid examples of how this amendment would have worked had it been part of our Constitution, and a careful examination of the facts in connection with the World War will clearly reveal the justice of our proposal. We all remember that in 1914 the World War began, and for two years our diplomats strained themselves to keep

us out of war. In 1916 Woodrow Wilson was renominated as the Democratic candidate for President. In his party platform the following statement was made:

"In particular we commend to the American people the splendid diplomatic victories of our great President, who has reserved the vital interests of our government and its citizens and has kept us out of war."

"He kept us out of war" became the slogan of the campaign. Thomas R. Marshall in accepting the nomination for Vice President, and for ultimate obscurity, made the following statement:

"The American people have chosen their own issue this year. The real issue of this campaign is the preservation of peace."

The national Democratic campaign committee selected as its slogan "Peace and Prosperity." Following a vigorous campaign, Woodrow Wilson was re-elected on the basis of this issue. In his inaugural address he made no mention of any change in his former policy, and yet within a month he stood before Congress and asked them to declare war upon Germany. Citing grievances against the German government, he demanded that the world be made safe for democracy. Elected because he had kept us out of war, he had turned around to ask us to go to war, and without giving us an opportunity either to approve or reject the new idea. We are not here to contend that the people were either for or against the declaration of this World War. We merely wish to prove to you that there was considerable doubt on the question. Speaking on the

declaration of war Senator Vardaman of Mississippi said in the Senate:

"It will not be forgotten that American voters at the polls last fall approved the Wilson Administration and continued it in office as a reward for keeping us out of war. The President suggested if the people who are now engaged in this war in Europe had been consulted there would be no war. If I may be permitted to indulge in a little speculation I will say if the people of the United States were consulted, the United States would not be declaring war on Germany today."

Senator La Follette submitted 15,000 telegrams from forty-four different states, nine out of ten of which were opposed to the declaration of war. He climaxed his protest by submitting a petition from California signed by over 8,000 citizens asking for a war referendum. In the light of the arguments advanced by those who claimed that the people were overwhelmingly behind the government on this decision, doesn't it seem a little inconsistent that the "minute men" were sent out to spread their propaganda among the people after the declaration of war had been made? If the people were so in favor of war, why was this propaganda necessary? If they were so in favor of war, why were enlistments so slow that it was necessary to have a draft law? Under the circumstances would it not have been better if the Ludlow Amendment had been part of our Constitution? Wouldn't it have been fairer if Wilson had been forced to stand before Congress and ask them for a declaration of war subject to the approval and confirmation of the people? Wouldn't it have been more

democratic if Wilson had offered the people an opportunity either to approve or reject this new policy that he offered?

Should our Congressman make a mistake in voting on a tax measure, we can always remove him from office and thus ultimately repair the damage, but should our Congressman fail to represent us on the declaration of war, we cannot in a later election repair that damage; we cannot in a later election return the dead to life, and the maimed to physical fitness. We would rather have this primary decision, this decision of such paramount importance left to the people to decide in the privacy and the quiet of a voting booth, rather than leave it to a Congress subject to the cries of "traitors," to the subversive influences of lobbyists' interests, and to the general war hysteria.

We who favor the Ludlow Amendment have cited for your consideration a concrete example taken from the annals of history, which shows the simple justice of our proposal. We urge the Negative to turn the yellowed pages of history, to search their minds and stretch their imaginations to give us a specific case in which our proposal would not have functioned properly. We would like to know, and I am sure you would, too, just under what specific circumstances we should go to war without having the people vote on it. In summary, then, we have thus far argued that the adoption of the Ludlow Amendment would safeguard the most precious rights of the American people; it would remove the possibility of our being plunged into a foreign war without the consent of the majority of the electorate. In a very

real sense, it is a necessary safeguard to democracy itself. When war is declared, drastic and paralyzing limitations are forced upon the nation. The nation is put under martial law. We become an armed camp, and civil liberties of all types are taken from us, and many of us are immediately threatened with the loss of life itself. In circumstances like these the least we can do is guarantee that these calamities shall not come down on us against the will of the people.

First Negative, Baker Waterman
University of Iowa

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: The first Affirmative speaker has asked a question which, I think, leads us to the fundamental issue in this debate. He asked: "Under what circumstances should we go to war without a popular vote?" We will agree with him that public opinion should control the decision to go to war. In such an important matter as this, the question is, can public opinion control Congressional action without the necessity of a popular referendum? Can public opinion control the government? "Government by public opinion," says Lord Bryce, a famous English diplomat and political scientist, "exists when the views and wishes of the people are conveyed to the government without the necessity of electoral machinery."

How can this happen? What is public opinion? It is a sort of unanimity of judgment, the result of a conflict of views, the product of discussion and debate. When there is a real public opinion existing, there are

common motives which all of us recognize and know are shared by the other members of the group, and to which we can appeal when we want to get approval for our courses of action. You students at Wisconsin know this. I read in the paper that you are going to force the employers in downtown restaurants to hire more than 30 student waiters at a prescribed minimum wage of thirty-five cents an hour. How can you do this? You are counting upon the strong public opinion among yourselves in this community to support the restaurants which "play ball" with you and pay minimum wages to their student help. Of course, all people don't understand public opinion. There is the story about the fellow who used Listerine for six months to get rid of halitosis and then discovered he was unpopular, anyway. But even he could not ignore public opinion.

Let us turn to the pages of history and find out if public opinion has been reflected in the decisions of our governing body. Let us go back to the World War in 1917, which the first speaker mentioned. Wasn't popular support in 1917 in favor of our going to war with Germany? Mr. Wilkie cites several arguments to prove this was not the case. He says in the election of 1916 it was the mandate of the people that Wilson keep a policy of peace, and yet we would remind you that, lurking in the background, was this qualification: "We, the people, want peace with honor." At the time Wilson had won a diplomatic victory. No German submarine had sunk any of our boats for the preceding six months. As far as anyone knew, this contest of diplomacy was over. Moreover, Wilson himself recognized

this qualification in our foreign relations. In a letter to Senator Stone, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which was later published, Wilson made this statment: "We covet peace and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor."

Mr. Wilkie also maintains that if the people had a chance to vote upon going to war we would not have entered the war. He cites a number of telegrams sent to Senator La Follette; yet call to mind that Senator La Follette stood alone, a lonely figure who held out to the end in favor of peace. Wasn't it natural that what pacifist sentiment there was should be reflected to that particular man?

He said, "Why was it we had to send out 'minute men' to put out propaganda and whip up the public morale if they were in favor of going to war?" He overlooks the fundamental fact that putting out propaganda is one of the techniques of war and stirs people up to vigorous action in support of a policy. This propaganda was engaged in by all allied governments. In fact, one historian says that one of the fundamental reasons why the allied powers defeated Germany was that they upset and undermined the morale of the German army by their propaganda.

Mr. Wilkie also asks: "Why did the government have to conscript men, if public opinion was in favor of war?" We must consider practical conditions—four million men taken out of private life. How could this be brought about without disruption unless the method of the lottery was chosen? As a matter of fact, conscription was planned in advance of our entry into the

war. The National Council for Defense, an organization of business men and government officials, made this plan and submitted it to the President before he decided upon declaring war.

But I would like to consider some other facts to show you that Congress really does express the will of the people, that there was a consensus of opinion in 1917 which had expressed the attitude of willingness to fight. Political leaders on both sides were in favor of going to war. Elihu Root, who as Secretary of State attended the Hague Conference, said in a meeting at Madison Square Garden, "There is no question about going to war with Germany. She is already at war with us."

State political groups had taken vigorous action. The Non-Partisan League in North Dakota, an organization of farmers, had its legislature adopt a motion endorsing its campaign, "Peace until war is necessary." Clearly, this is an attitude of readiness to support the government.

Religious groups, which today are so energetic in their support of the cause of peace, at that time were militant. A conference of New Jersey Methodists, which represented more than 70,000 communicants, refused by a five to six vote to go on record as favoring a peaceful solution of the international crisis. Yet the Affirmative speaker says that if people are given the chance to vote upon the proposition, they will never be in favor of war. A congress of 158 churches in New York City, when polled upon this very proposition, decided to go to war.

Moreover, labor groups had expressed themselves. Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, summoned his chieftains to Washington and it took but one day to pledge labor to the question without reservation. Since we see political groups, religious and labor groups, organized opinion-forming groups, had this attitude of readiness to go to war, how can we accuse Congress of not reflecting the will of the people and not acceding to public opinion in this matter?

We believe not only has Congress been guided by public opinion in the past, but is likely to be in the future. Congress is very sensitive to its responsibility. Representative Sumners of Texas, in a speech in the House the other day, said he never had any conception of what the weight of responsibility or sense of responsibility meant until he was called upon to answer at a quarter after three one morning, to the roll call on the war resolution. Isn't this sensitiveness apparent in all debates and discussions of Congress? Don't the members frequently quote letters and telegrams and polls such as the Gallup poll? We believe Congress has in the past and will in the future be guided by public opinion.

In order to make the will of the people effective, it isn't necessary to add this additional procedure. But the proposal is also unnecessary because Congress is a competent body. It has superior knowledge and capacity. In the first place, Congressmen are closer to the sources of the news. They do not have to depend so much upon the viewpoint of the particular newspaper they happen to read. They are in personal contact with

the news writers and diplomats in our own State departments and foreign governments. They are in contact with the Army and Navy officials. Therefore, they can get at first hand reports of what these men actually do know, regardless of what they may write in the papers.

Moreover, they can get expert advice as to the real meaning of this news. Let me give you a specific example which might have had a considerable effect in determining public opinion in that critical period. Throughout March, 1917, the press reported a series of allied victories when the fact was that the German army was retreating to a truly strategic position which later became known as the Hindenburg line. They set up a defense which proved impregnable for many months. All the time they were retreating the press reported a series of allied victories. Yet an army man, being familiar with the topography and knowing military strategy, might be able to advise a Congressman, who had come to see him that actually this was not a series of victories. The conclusion is clear. The people might over-estimate the strength of Germany but an army man would not do so.

Secondly, our Congressmen do have capacity to deal with these problems. They are not isolated. They are less likely to be carried away by any war hysteria. We at home move among a group who share similar ideas to our own. We live in a society largely restricted to our own community. However, in 1917, our Congressmen had to meet men like Senator La Follette with his devastating logic. When he argued Germany could not be at war with all mankind because evidently Nor-

way and Sweden didn't seem to think so, and that this could not be a war against democracy because only England and France of the allied powers were democratic, our Congressmen had to stop and think.

In brief, it seems to me it is unnecessary for us to adopt this proposition because Congress has in the past and will in the future be guided by public opinion. Our common sentiment will be made effective in this important decision of our national life. Moreover, Congress is a competent body to deal with such vital matters.

Second Affirmative, Gordon Dupee
University of Wisconsin

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Before continuing the constructive case for the Affirmative I would like to take up with you some of the arguments that Mr. Waterman has just advanced. I have taken down a few of his remarks that we might quote them accurately. This is the first thing that comes to my mind, the most salient point of his speech. He said my colleague, Mr. Wilkie, was claiming that our case rested upon this point, that if the people are given a chance to vote on war or peace they would never go to war. Therefore the Affirmative wants the Ludlow Amendment. Let me clear up this misconception right now. Mr. Wilkie said we do not believe that the Ludlow Amendment is a panacea for war. It may not stop the American people from going to war. We hope that it will. But tonight our case is not to prove that the Ludlow Amendment will keep us out of war.

Our case tonight rests on the point that on a matter so paramount as one of life and death, not life and death at home, but life and death on foreign soil, the people should be consulted. Our argument is not on war or peace. We hope for peace, but we are not guaranteeing that the Ludlow Amendment will bring peace. Our argument is for democracy, direct and pure democracy. On a question as paramount as life and death, and in times of war and times of a crisis, not only is your own life involved, but the very essence of democracy itself is involved. The minute war is declared under the provisions of such measures as the Sheppard Act recently considered by Congress, the powers of the President are almost dictatorial, allowing him conscription of men, of property, and of profits. Our bill of rights, our freedoms,—freedom of speech, freedom of the press—go by the board in time of war. Are you willing to let the very essence of democracy itself go by the board, as well as gambling your own lives on the arguments of the Negative that Congress is truly representative of the American people?

Now, we agree that in many cases Congress does represent the American people very adequately. Mr. Wilkie was not maintaining that had there been a referendum vote during the World War we probably would not have stood back of the government. He was trying to bring to light by factual evidence that there was a reasonable amount of doubt. Some people wanted a referendum and some people did not want to go to war. We shall never know now whether or not America wanted to go to war then, but we do know the tragic

cases of many mothers who are saying, "Yes, the government and the President took my son to war and sent him back in a coffin." We want the American people to vote on their own fate so that if we go into another foreign invasion and some of us come back in coffins, those who voted to send us to that invasion will have the coffins on their consciences. We want the people to have something to say about it. Then the burden will not rest on the government and there will not be that element of doubt.

Now, returning to the constructive case of the Affirmative, you will recall that my colleague presented factual evidence about this reasonable amount of doubt of the advisability of entering the World War. He suggested how much more fair, more democratic it would have been had Woodrow Wilson on April 2, 1917, stood before the Congress of the United States with a request that they pass a resolution asking the American people whether they wanted to confirm a declaration of war on Germany. To be brief, my colleague and I are asking you what legitimate reason is there for not putting a formal declaration of our next foreign invasion, our next war on foreign soil, should there be one, up to you and me and to the members of the Negative, to the American people. We want that question answered. What legitimate reason is there for not using the democratic process of the referendum?

All of you who are here tonight are cognizant of the close defeat of the Ludlow Amendment in the House of Representatives. You who have read your daily newspapers, followed your weekly periodicals, and listened

to the statements of Congressmen and world commentators, know that the Ludlow Amendment met on all sides, with the exception of the House of Representatives, with rather severe criticism. Now, in the endless parade of arguments, the endless parade of straw men, one argument, one criticism stood out above all others. To state it succinctly; Mr. Roosevelt, the forgotten man Alf Landon, William Randolph Hearst, and yes, even the *Chicago Tribune*, cried unanimously that to remove from Congress and the President the right to declare war is to emasculate the entire foreign policy of the United States. Why? Because the Ludlow Amendment, it was claimed by these men, would tie the hands of our diplomats by removing that all important weapon of international bargaining, the mysterious implicit threat of war. Enough of straw men.

Again let us take a concrete situation and get away from theory. In the Panay incident of a few weeks ago, the State Department in demanding of the Japanese Government punishment of the guilty parties, full indemnities, and unconditioned apology, in effect was using the implicit threat of war. In other words, although no war was declared, between the lines was the implication that if immediate redress were not offered further consequences would follow of more serious nature. That, my friends, in some essence is the implicit threat of war.

Now I ask you what is there in the simple Ludlow Amendment which asks for a referendum, a vote by you people to confirm a declaration of war by Congress before it becomes official? What is there in that amend-

ment which is going to stop us from demanding from governments, when they insult us, full indemnities, punishment of the guilty, and full apologies? Obviously, nothing. Therefore, the Ludlow Amendment does not in a concrete situation interfere with our foreign policy in the use of the implicit threat of war.

Now let us carry this concrete problem to its hypothetical extreme and put the supposed hampering elements of the Ludlow Amendment to their stiffest test. Suppose the Japanese had flaunted the United States, what would have happened then had we had the Ludlow Amendment? President Roosevelt could have sent a stiffer note demanding immediate redress, and if he did not get it and we suffered continued indifference from the Japanese Government, then President Roosevelt could have said to them, "My Government views your actions with alarm and unless we have immediate redress from you I shall be forced to go to Congress and ask them to go to the people with a declaration of war against Japan to be confirmed by the American people." There is the explicit threat of war. Has the Ludlow Amendment been a hampering influence? We don't see that it has.

Now the question is, with the Ludlow Amendment, with the government being forced to come to you and me for confirmation on a question as important as war, will that make foreign nations respect us less? Will it make our power in the international field less felt? I think I can answer that question by showing you the dilemma that those that say it will must grapple with. Now, supposing that a crisis arises. One of two things

can happen. Either the people are with the government, in which case the government declares war, sends a referendum to you and me and we confirm that referendum and in all probability go to war. That is one side of it. The other side is this. Suppose Congress declares war and they send the referendum to the people and the people do not confirm it. What then? Well, the situation is complicated, to say the least. However, what is so bad about that? If the government declares war and the people of the United States do not want war, then we have the advantage of the Ludlow Amendment, in empirically ascertaining that fact. Then it is high time we checked up on the government because they are not administering the wishes of those whom they supposedly represent. Let the Negative tonight, if they would cry out that we are stripping diplomacy of its essential weapon by our proposal, meet this dilemma. Either the people are with the government in a time of crisis, or they are not. If they are, that can be empirically ascertained by a referendum. If they are not, then the referendum will show that the government and the people are separated and will restrain the government from running counter to the wishes of the people. That, we believe, is democracy in essence.

Second Negative, Robert Schulz
University of Iowa

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: We are really involved in a question which is vitally important to each one of us, as can be seen by the arguments that

have been thrown back and forth so far this evening. Without further ado let me get down to the basic views in this case. First of all, I feel that the Affirmative has been trying to throw the burden of proof onto the Negative to show why we should not have the Ludlow Amendment. They have said that these arguments have existed and that they are false, instead of showing us why we should amend, why it is needed, why the present machinery is not working at the present time. The first speaker went on to point out that perhaps people were in favor of war and perhaps they were not, and, anyway, Mr. Wilson went ahead and declared war. I believe my colleague has attempted to show you that the people, with public opinion behind them, did force Congress and President Wilson to declare war. I believe one of the most important questions raised by the Affirmative speaker was: In what cases should we go to war without having the people vote upon such a proposition?

Now, I am not one as a university student to quibble over authorities or sources of authorities. I believe that is above university debating. However, he read a version of the Ludlow Amendment to you. We found there was some little difficulty in ascertaining just what the Ludlow Amendment was, because in the time that it was in the judicial committee in Congress, Mr. Ludlow was amending the amendment. Thus I feel that what I am about to read is a more accurate statement of the question which the Affirmative are trying to have us adopt this evening. This version is taken from the *United States News*, January 17, 1938, a supposedly

authentic paper from Washington, D. C., and also from *The Congressional Record* for January 12, 1938. It reads as follows:

"Except in cases of attack by armed forces, actual or immediately threatening upon the United States or its territorial possessions, or by any non-American nation against any country in the western hemisphere, the people shall have the sole power by a national referendum to declare war or to engage in warfare over seas. Congress when it deems a national crisis to exist in conformance with this article shall by concurrent resolution refer the question to the people."

In other words, the Affirmative by their own proposal is giving us a plan in which the people will not have the power to declare war in over half of the world and we cannot see how that inconsistency can exist, and yet in their arguments they say the people should have the power to declare war in all cases. Now, you name one case in which they should not have the power, and yet they turn around and ask the Ludlow Amendment as a solution and the Ludlow Amendment itself says the people shall not have the power to declare war when any nation is attacked in the Western Hemisphere. We feel that is a vital inconsistency in their own case.

To proceed with the arguments which have been outlined; Mr. Dupee said it is not up to the Affirmative to prove the Ludlow Amendment will keep us out of war. But what we of the Negative are primarily interested in is peace! The second speaker of the Affirmative admitted that to some extent Congress does represent the will of the people. If that is the case, if Congress does represent the will of the people, surely Congress repre-

sents the people in the making of war and declaring of war. Therefore, we are primarily interested in the Ludlow Amendment. Will it or will it not cause more wars? Or will it tend to cause more wars? Or will it bring peace? Yet in his next argument he turns around and says we must have a referendum because in a war democracy is threatened.

Now, I fail to see the connection there. If the amendment isn't going to stop wars in any way, by his own admission, then adopting it is not going to be a check and a help to keep democracy from being threatened. There has to be a closer tie than that, and we feel, as I will show later, this amendment is really a threat at democracy itself. And he has asked the vital question, why should we not put the question of foreign war to the people? Now, my colleague has gone ahead at some length to show why we should not put the question of foreign war to the people. First of all, it is unnecessary, because Congress does represent the will of the people; and secondly, because Congress is the only logical and the best body to declare war. We feel further that we should not adopt the Ludlow Amendment because it is entirely inconsistent within itself. As I have already pointed out, you are still going to allow Congress to have the power to declare war in practically one half of the world. Furthermore, we should not adopt the proposition which the Affirmative is offering tonight because many disastrous results would follow. Herein we think is the very crux of the debate inasmuch as the Affirmative has failed, we think,

to point out a vital need why we should adopt the Ludlow Amendment.

We feel we should not adopt it because of the results that will follow. First of all, it will tend to disrupt our American system of representative government. I suppose this is where Mr. Dupee and I are locking horns. He claims it will give us more democracy. Let the people vote! Yes, that is democratic government. However, I would like to point out to you we have developed in this country, indeed in most democratic countries throughout the world, a system of representative government, not direct democratic government. Mr. Finer, writing for the London School of Economics says, "In every case where a successful democracy exists, it has done so under a system of successful representation." Furthermore, I would like to quote from Thomas Jefferson who says, "Modern times have the singular advantage, too, of having discovered the only device upon which these rights can be secure, to-wit, government of the people, acting not in person, but by representatives chosen by themselves."

Just how will this tend to do away with our representative form of government? First, it will weaken responsibility of the representatives themselves. Think what feelings those Senators must have had, in 1917. They knew that when they declared war they were sending every man, woman, and child in America into war. The Affirmative are offering a proposition where in substance they say, "Well, we can declare a national crisis to exist and if the people go to war it is their own fault, they brought it on. It is their baby, let them take

care of it." Furthermore, Congress would be distrustful. They would say that if the people are not going to trust us here, how can they trust us in any other case?

This proposal strikes at the very heart of our congressional government. As my colleague argued, congressional government is very necessary in the United States. In coming from Iowa to Wisconsin, we traveled over a vast area which represents people that have different interests. From California to New Jersey, people are allowed to come together in Congress through representatives and press their own interests. As the Affirmative pointed out, at the time of the war, Senator La Follette received many telegrams from people who did not want to go to war. Because we have all these diversified interests in this country, where else can public opinion be ascertained except in such a body as Congress where unlimited debate is the rule?

Now, he said, we should not give the sole power to declare war to Congress because in case of war Congress is carried away by war hysteria. Take it to the people where in the quiet of a voting booth they can determine how it will be decided. Well, I will leave that question up to you.

We will admit that Congress gets very rampant at times but I will show to you later, I hope, that the people will be more carried away by propaganda. Take the case of Supreme Court reorganization. What happened? It was proposed by the President. Immediately a wave of discussion rose in this country; some for, some against. In Congress there was a long debate.

The matter was threshed out. Public opinion was brought into play and what happened? Public opinion held sway over the power of the President and we did not have a packed Supreme Court. Because we have men like Borah, Johnson, Norris, La Follette and Glass, we are able to ascertain public opinion and carry forward a governmental program which is in operation for the benefit of the American people.

Such a system as congressional government, we feel, prevents impulsive minorities and trenchant majorities from getting control of our government at any one time. This plan which the Affirmative is offering is only an entering wedge into our system of democratic representative government. It will only tend to destroy rather than to give us a democratic government as they said it would do.

Furthermore, we feel that a disastrous result would follow the adoption of such a plan because of the dilemma which would confront our government. They asked how we should handle the dilemma we presented. We ask them how they would solve the dilemma their plan offers. First of all, suppose we have a pacifist President. Mr. Dupee went into detail to show how minor incidents—he cited as a concrete example the Panay incident—could be dealt with under the Ludlow Amendment. Supposing the Japanese felt, "Well, the people over there are standing for isolation. Maybe they won't back the government and maybe they will. Therefore, we can go ahead and repeat such minor incidents as the Panay." Thus other Panays are sunk and American feeling is rising higher and higher. The

people didn't want war until after the election in 1916 when we said we would not go to war. What happened? Unrestricted submarine warfare and public indignation had risen to such a point that war was declared by Congress. Thus we feel that a pacifist President will have his hands tied.

Or take the case of a headstrong President who wants to send a punitive expedition around the world. He has the same power under their plan as at the present time. Thus our opponents are caught between two horns because a pacifist President would not be able to keep these minor incidents which lead to war from multiplying, and a headstrong President would be able to lead us into war by punitive expeditions.

Furthermore, we feel the proposal they are offering is impractical. They haven't told you how it will work, how long it will take to get a vote, who will decide the question of when invasion is threatened, or who will decide when a threatened invasion is being made upon America or South American countries. Thus we feel we have answered your questions as to why we should not have the right to vote on the Ludlow Amendment.

**First Negative Rebuttal, Baker Waterman
University of Iowa**

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: The second speaker of the Affirmative said we do not believe that the Ludlow Amendment is a panacea. He does not believe that the law will keep us out of war but that if only the mothers of the country had a chance to vote

on the proposition of going to war, they would not send their sons off to war. Thus he agrees with the first speaker; he believes that this is an effective way to secure peace. Therefore, it seems to me, that the argument I stated in my first speech, that public opinion in 1917 did support our entrance into the war, has point, because it means that in times of crisis we may not act as afterwards we think we should have acted. We may be carried away; our opinion may be changed at the moment.

But, let us restate the same arguments constructively. Let us consider this issue. Will the adoption of this amendment increase the influence of the people over our government? I would like to submit to you that the views of these two teams can be summed up this way. The Affirmative believes in government in consultation with the people and we advocate government by the consent of the people. We say public opinion already controls the action of the government. Congressional action is a reflection of the public will. This is the argument I devoted most of my first speech to proving. And secondly, Congress can be trusted with this responsibility because it is sensitive to its responsibility to the people, and because it is a competent body, possessing superior knowledge and capacity superior to our own.

There is a second issue which has risen in this debate. It is the question; Will the adoption of the Ludlow Amendment endanger the vitality of representative government? It seems to me there is more than one principle involved here. We believe Congress should be responsible to the people. Yes. That is one prin-

ciple. But we also believe Congressmen should be representatives not merely delegates. They are not alone to be mouthpieces of public opinion. Where public opinion has not been definitely formed, where there is still room for discussion, we expect them to be leaders, to point out the issues at stake, to bring the facts to us, and to lead the discussion. How will the adoption of this amendment contribute to the downfall of this representative government? It is through the power of ideas, the idea which Glenn Frank has called a heresy, the idea that Congress should check their conscience and intelligence at the door of Congress.

After the recent election in 1936 there were certain columnists who said the people have given a mandate to President Roosevelt, that they wanted his program to be completed. Then the columnists argued that the people thought the farm bill should be adopted, that the wages and hours bill should be adopted, that the Supreme Court bill should be adopted, that the housing bill should be passed. In other words, every particular item must be passed because there is a great mandate from the people to carry out the Roosevelt program. We submit this is not the meaning of our representative government. Congressmen are expected to consider these measures. We haven't made up our minds on every item. We do not want to give the President free rein and I do not think the President has this opinion. Therefore, it seems to us that, by contributing to the growth and power of this idea, the adoption of the Ludlow Amendment would be a vital force in undermining representative government.

There is another issue. Would the adoption of the amendment hamper the State Department in dealing with foreign affairs? The Affirmative presented a dilemma. They said in times of crisis the people are either behind the government or opposed to it, but it isn't with times of crisis that we are primarily concerned. We are considering the influence of the State Department in times of peace. We do not bank on power politics. We do not believe every representation of Secretary Hull to the Japanese Government means that if we do not agree with his opinion we will back up our own opinion by force of arms. We believe it is to our advantage to have the State Department insist upon the peaceful adjustment of international problems through negotiation, to insist upon the respect of all nations for the rights of other nations. We think the adoption of this amendment would introduce the uncertainty of our own trust in the State Department's ability to handle such problems, and lead to a lack of respect in foreign capitals. Therefore, we think there is no necessity for the adoption of this proposal because of the very grave evils which are likely to follow it.

First Affirmative Rebuttal, Horace Wilkie
University of Wisconsin

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Before proceeding into rebuttal of the Affirmative arguments, let me clear up the matter of the specific amendment that we are debating. It is the Ludlow Amendment as it appears in *The Congressional Record*. That is the amendment we first

read *without* the additional amendment Mr. Schulz has added. We are debating the original amendment and not the amendment as it has been amended. Perhaps there is a good deal of worth in Mr. Schulz's amendment, but we are not debating that question. We are concerned primarily with the Ludlow Amendment itself.

Now, a good deal of shrapnel has been thrown at my arguments regarding the public sentiment at the time of the World War. Our opponents have been claiming that the people were unanimously or substantially behind the government, that they were willing, and they in fact did force the government into war. If that is the case, why did they return Wilson on the slogan, "He kept us out of war?" If they were so in favor of war and willing to force us into war, why didn't they return Hughes rather than Wilson? The Negative has argued that only after the election was there unrestricted submarine warfare. Two and a half years had gone by, and throughout that two and a half years there had been unrestricted submarine warfare. Why should this few months period make this tremendous difference? Why should we be forced into war using this as an excuse when that same excuse had existed over the whole period since the beginning of the World War? A great deal has been said about the relation of Congress to the people and the question of democracy. They have asked us to point out the vital need which calls for the Ludlow Amendment. The vital need is better democratic government, the need of the people to decide this one particular issue.

Now, let us again point out that this declaration of

war is not like a tax measure. If a Congressman fails to represent us in the declaration of war, we have no way of repairing that damage; whereas, if Senator La Follette votes the wrong way on a tax measure, we can vote against him in the next election and return somebody else who will ultimately repair the damage he has done. It is a different matter when it comes to the declaration of war, for once we are in war we lose all vestiges of liberty. Moreover, we may have had several thousand people killed and our property more or less confiscated. We must separate this particular issue from all other issues that face the government today.

As I say, the Negative has claimed that Congress is expressive of the will of the people. We all know that one of these recent Gallup polls of public opinion showed that 75 per cent of the people were in favor of a war referendum. Yet Congress in its typically representative capacity has voted down even consideration of the bill. Doesn't this seem to indicate that there are times where Congress may differ from public opinion? Because of this situation—even though it may not occur very often—it is still occurring often enough to convince us that we must have this measure to give the people the right to declare war.

Now, our opponents have commented about hampering the Secretary of State. We must agree with them when they say that we insist on peaceful adjustment of our difficulties. We are not arguing war and peace. We agree that at all odds we should have peaceful means for settling our disputes. Should war come, and should we be involved in a situation where we may have

to fight on foreign soil. then let us give the people, the men who will go to the foreign countries and die, the people who will pay and whose children will pay, the costs of the war—let us give them the power to declare whether or not we shall fight upon foreign soil.

Second Negative Rebuttal, Robert Schulz
University of Iowa

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: As I said before, I was not going to quibble over authorities or anything like that, but I resent having my name attached to the Ludlow Amendment because I am opposed to it. But I am really confident that this amendment taken from the *United States News*, which is authentic, and the *Congressional Record* for January 12, 1938, is the same which was actually going to be voted upon by Congress. I may suggest that because the amendment does read that way is perhaps one reason why Congress did vote it down and didn't feel it was necessary and didn't feel public opinion would support it—because the amendment is inherently inconsistent. However, the Negative is not going to take the stand that our objection rests upon the interpretation of this amendment, though I do feel it is something that should be considered. After all, the Affirmative proposal is giving the people half the power. If it is so vitally important that the people should have the right to vote on the war referendum, why not give it to them in all cases? Why limit it to the case of war overseas? We feel that any war against a nation which invades the western hemi-

sphere would be a war overseas. However, we are not going to let that stand as the sole argument against the Affirmative proposal, and shall continue further.

It has been argued that if the people did not support war, why was Mr. Wilson returned to office. That is just the point. There was a change in public opinion. The last speaker said there could not have been a change in public opinion because for two and a half years there had been unrestricted submarine warfare, but the yellowed pages of history show you that for nine months preceding the election in 1916 there was not one American boat sunk. The American people felt that the German empire had come under the influence of our diplomacy. Thus after the election the information was received from the German government that unrestricted submarine warfare would be carried on. There was a change in public opinion, and there is an instance; the thing we have been talking about. That is the point where congressional government comes in, because at that time the American people felt their interests, whether private or directed from a feeling of public responsibility, were being violated and that it was necessary to go to war.

Furthermore, he said that the Gallup polls showed the people wanted this plan. I would like to point out that the *Literary Digest* poll also showed that the people wanted Mr. Landon.

Now, when war comes up for consideration, it is the one big issue at that time. The people are not vitally concerned in other things, and thus the issue would be expressed in public opinion. The cry of the Affirmative

has been, "Give the people the right to vote in case we should go to war overseas." We feel they have not shown an adequate need why the people should have that right. We have shown to you that Congress does represent the will of the people. Under their own proposal, what would happen? Congress will not declare a national crisis to exist until the people want it, and once the national crisis is declared the people will always vote "Yes." Thus the whole amendment offers no cure in any way; it offers nothing new.

We feel war is of such vital importance to the people that public opinion will be crystallized and thus there is no need for the Ludlow Amendment. Our opponents have said we should show why we should not accept the Ludlow Amendment and that is just what we have been trying to do. We feel we should not adopt the Ludlow Amendment because Congress is representative of the will of the people. They practically admitted this. Mr. Dupee admitted Congress does represent the will of the people certainly in national issues. We believe Congress is the only representative body, the best body to declare war. So far the Affirmative has said nothing about that.

Furthermore, we oppose the motion because the Ludlow Amendment is inconsistent within itself. Lastly, we hold that it should not be adopted because it would bring many disastrous results. I showed you that it would disrupt our representative system of government. As yet we have heard nothing about that argument. Congressional government is the very basis upon which American government has functioned and, we hope,

will continue to function in the future. The proposal they are offering is an entering wedge to destroy that government. Furthermore, we showed you that, by tying the hands of the Executive, by giving him a dilemma which could not be solved under their proposal, we would actually tend to have more wars. These irritating incidents would increase, public opinion would be heightened, and the people would clamor for war.

Lastly, we have questioned the practicability of such a measure. So far, we have not heard how the vote would be taken, how long it would take, whether national defense would be jeopardized, or who would decide when invasion was threatened. Those are questions which the Affirmative should have answered in their constructive speeches. Therefore, we feel that we should not adopt the Ludlow Amendment.

I wish to take the opportunity to thank all the people from Wisconsin for listening to us. We also wish to thank the Affirmative for their part in the debate. We would like to point out that last fall Wisconsin and Iowa had a contest in tall corn, and we hope this contest this evening has not been a contest of tall tales!

Second Affirmative Rebuttal, Gordon Dupee
University of Wisconsin

MR. CHAIRMAN: Let us make a hasty review of some of the main objections the Negative have made. In the first place they say it is an amendment of our democratic form of government, which delegates our power to representatives. We grant that. But we say declar-

ing war is a different matter from delegating power to your representatives to decide whether to build a dam on the Tennessee River, or to take care of the farmers in Montana, or to levy some kind of tax, or to accept Mr. Mellon's art collection. Such matters I think our representatives are adequate in handling. But let me put this question to you. You may be willing to let Congress represent you on matters of taxation because those are complex movements and hard to figure out, but there is nothing complex about the evidence we have of the past, futile and tragic World War. There is nothing complex, for many of us here in this audience, in the decision of whether or not we are willing to stand behind our government and fight on foreign soil. We say that on this one decision, because it is a matter of life and death, the people should be asked to vote directly.

The opposition argued that if the government is for war they will propagandize the people for war and the people will be for war. Well, then, they say, what is the use of having our amendment? We want our amendment merely as a democratic guarantee. Let us have the empirical facts as to how many people were for that war and how many people were not for that war. In cases of doubt—such as the last war which cannot be decided because we have no empirical facts—we have only controversial statements—let the people decide themselves. If the people decide to go to war, in all probability we shall go to war. But we ask for the right to make our own decision on whether or not we are willing to send ourselves or our children to fight on

foreign soil. That is really the moral issue of this debate. That is the whole point of the Affirmative, whether you value your life enough to demand the right to vote on whether you will risk it, or value it so little you are willing to trust 531 Congressmen to determine what shall happen to it. The decision may involve two or three or four million Americans and thirty or forty billions of dollars. Such was the cost of the last little seventeen-month conflict.

Now then, on this wording of the amendment, we accept the Negative's unwillingness to bicker. However, for your own edification I would like to point out that the Negative presented to you Senator La Follette's amendment to the Ludlow Amendment. The Ludlow Amendment was entered in the House of Representatives, and Senator La Follette introduced this amendment to the Ludlow Amendment to take care of the Fascist movement in South America. It did not come into the debate at any time because the Ludlow Amendment was defeated in the House of Representatives. This wording happens to be Senator La Follette's amendment to the Ludlow Amendment, and not what we are debating tonight.

You will remember the argument of the last speaker on the reason why we returned Wilson to office in November, 1916, on the campaign slogan that he kept us out of war, while on April 2, he put us into war. The reason for that change, they say, was that on February 1 Germany declared they would not follow the Sussex pact and would carry on unrestricted submarine warfare. However, Wilson took office on March 4 and in

his inaugural address, as Mr. Wilkie has shown, he said nothing about declaring war on Germany. That can be verified by reading his inaugural address. Yet one month after that inaugural he suddenly declared war on Germany without asking the people who had returned him to office because he kept us out of war whether they had changed their minds. There is the Affirmative case. We believe this is a question of democracy. Are you willing to turn a matter of life and death, of war, of the loss of your democratic powers over to your Congressmen, or do you naturally want your own right to vote on that and to express your own opinion in a national referendum?

Professor I. M. Cochran, Critic Judge

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: This was the first discussion I have heard on this question and it was very interesting and very enlightening to me. Now, the decision is the thing you are interested in primarily, and so I am going to give you that the first thing. The decision goes to the Negative.

The particular reason for that is that the Affirmative based a great deal of its case on Woodrow Wilson's being returned to office on the issue that he kept us out of the war. The Negative, it seems to me, had the advantage on that. The question of submarine warfare entered into this considerably and it seems to me the Negative had all the advantages on the evidence there. The Affirmative argued that there had been indiscriminate submarine warfare for some time before the elec-

tion, but the evidence which the last Negative speaker brought up, that it wasn't until after the election was over that the indiscriminate submarine warfare began, corresponds with my recollection. On the question, too, as to the public support of Wilson, as to whether the people really would have voted for Wilson whether he was for war or peace, it seems to me the Negative brought up the most concrete evidence to show that the people were really in favor of war, or at least they were not opposed to war. They were not opposed to war as it was then waged. I think it was the first Negative speaker who cited several concrete instances of religious bodies and labor bodies which showed that they were with the President in his support of war.

On the question of the amendment I think the Affirmative had the advantage but I couldn't see that it was a real issue in the debate. The Negative yielded on that point anyhow.

It was a very interesting debate and I would like very much to have voted for the Affirmative because I liked both the speakers. They were both pleasant, and spoke very interestingly. They were perfectly clear. They did omit one very important thing which the Negative challenged them to show at least twice in the debate, and that is just exactly how the referendum would work. They didn't say very much about the practicability of the problem and how they might overcome the possible danger that might exist while the vote was being taken. That, it seems to me, was the biggest omission of the Affirmative, but it is a pretty important omission because, after all, we do want to

know, if this amendment is to be passed, just exactly how it is going to work out. and how it is going to affect us at the time.

BIBLIOGRAPHY ON WAR REFERENDUM

MAGAZINES

- Christian Century.—54:1617, Dec. 29, '37. *Let the People Vote on War*. H. E. Fey. 55:7, Jan. 5, '38. *Ludlow Amendment*. 55:85, Jan. 19, '38. *Ludlow Amendment Discussion*.
- Christian Science Monthly.—p. 1, Jan. 5, '38. *Americans Have the Right*. L. Ludlow. p. 1, Jan. 5, '38. *It Would Solve Nothing*. D. J. Lewis.
- Congressional Digest.—17:50, Feb., '38. *That War Referendum*. O. G. Villard. 17:39, Feb., '38. *Congress Discusses Its War Making Powers*.
- Forum.—98:238, Nov., '37. *Should We Vote on War?* 1. *Hold the Voters Responsible*. L. Ludlow. II. *The Ballot is too Slow for Defense*. C. I. Faddis.
- Good Housekeeping.—102:4, June, '36. *Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory*. W. F. Bigelow. 104:4, Feb., '37. *Let's Vote Before We Fight*. W. F. Bigelow. 104:4, Aug., '37. *Over There*. W. F. Bigelow. 106:24, Jan., '38. *Before the Drums Beat*. W. F. Bigelow.
- Literary Digest.—125:6, Dec. 4, '37. *War and the Ballot Box*. Arguments Pro & Con. 125:7, Jan. 1, '38. *War Referendum*.
- Nation.—146:256, Feb. 26, '38. *Instead of the Ludlow Bill*. D. R. Williams. B. W. Bradley. 146:61, Jan. 15, '38. *That War Referendum*. O. G. Villard. 146:61, Jan. 15, '38. *The Ludlow Amendment*. 146:71, Jan. 15, '38. *That War Referendum*. 143:335, Sept. 19, '36. *Issues and Men*. O. G. Villard.
- National Education Association Journal.—26:285. Dec., '37. *Peace Amendment*. L. Ludlow.
- New Republic.—93:212, Dec. 29, '37. *Amendment Against War?*
- Scholastic.—31:27, Jan. 15, '38. *Should The People Declare War?*
- Vital Speeches.—4:165, Jan. 1, '38. *Let the People Decide*. A. Capper. 4:162, Jan. 1, '38. *Trust Your Navigator*. R. E. Byrd.

REORGANIZATION OF THE
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE

An Intersociety Direct Clash Debate

WINTHROP COLLEGE

It is the custom of the forensic societies of Winthrop College for Women, of Rock Hill, South Carolina, to hold an annual debate for college supremacy. As there are three societies, the rules of participation provide that the winner shall in the succeeding year assist the other two. In the debate held on the evening of April 2, 1938, the Winthrop Society, assisted by a speaker from the Curry Society, which won the year before, met the Hampton Society, likewise assisted, in a discussion of the Reorganization of the Federal Executive, as provided in the Byrnes Bill recently before the United States Congress. This was the occasion of the thirty-eighth contest of these forensic societies.

The following debate illustrates very well the working of the type of debate called the Direct Clash, presented elsewhere in this volume in the discussion of a Larger Navy in the Pacific. In this particular debate the important position of the judge or referee is particularly significant. Sometimes in this type of debate there is a board of judges. In that case there has to be a consultation before the clash can be stopped or a decision awarded.

The question discussed in this debate was stated: Clio Hall does endorse the Byrnes Bill to reorganize the Federal Executive Departments. The judge of the debate was Mr. Charlie L. Cobb of Rock Hill, S. Carolina. Miss Grace Stuckey, President of the Debaters' League of Winthrop College, presided. The speeches were collected and contributed to *Intercollegiate Debates* by Dr. Warren G. Keith, Head of the History Department and Director of Debating at Winthrop College. Mr. Keith's debate team, entered at the Pi Kappa Delta National Tournament, achieved the distinction of participation in the final debate in the womens' debate division.

REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE

Preliminary Statements

Affirmative Declarant, Mary Ellen Adams
Winthrop Society

Historic as this occasion is, I am somewhat overcome by the fact that I am standing here tonight the first speaker, the declarant, in this annual clash between the societies. I appreciate very much the honor which my society has bestowed upon me and if my corsage is shaking just a little now it is because there are many emotions seeking to overpower me; but let me assure the ladies of Hampton that fear of any opponent is not disturbing me. We of Winthrop are happy to have as our assistants the ladies from Curry. If I remember correctly, and I was in the audience last year, that society won the decision by an overwhelming audience vote. The question at that time was an endorsement of the Hull Reciprocal Trade Agreements. This year we have turned again to the political scene for our question which is found in the proposed reorganization of the Federal Government. To state it as it appears on the program and as our gracious chairman has just read it: Clio Hall does endorse the Byrnes Bill to reorganize the Federal Executive Departments.

As declarant for the Affirmative, I propose to explain

the meaning of this query, and just what we maintain is embraced by it. Furthermore, I will indicate to you the issues which will be joined in this debate. Winthrop supports the Byrnes Bill, which is entitled "A bill to provide for reorganizing agencies of the government, extending the classified Civil Service, establishing a General Auditing Office, and a Department of Welfare, and for other purposes."

This bill proposes to commit the Congress to the following reorganization: First, to empower the President to reorganize the Executive Department, a power delegated, but to expire in 1940. Second, to create a new Department of Welfare to administer laws dealing with the social aspects of governmental activity. Third, to replace the Civil Service Commission by a Civil Service Administrator appointed for fifteen years. Fourth, to reorganize the whole system of audit and control of government expenditure now in vogue by separating the two, transferring all accounting functions in the hands of an official under the sole control of Congress. Fifth, to set up a permanent agency to be known as the National Resources Planning Board. This Board now exists as a temporary agency.

Says the *Nation*, for Feb. 26, 1938, "The Byrnes bill in its present form is a sane and effective step toward streamlining the Executive branch of the government to aid in making it capable of resisting the pressures of a frantic world." In fact, let us keep this in mind that all we propose to do in the Byrnes Bill is to streamline the Executive Department in an age of speed and efficiency.

The demand for reorganization has become greater as this century has grown older. Reorganization is a question that has disturbed every president since Cleveland. No president has ever found the time to accomplish the task and no Congress before this has even undertaken the task. Twenty-eight years ago, at President Taft's suggestion, a commission to study ways and means for improving the efficiency and economy of the Executive Departments was set up by Congress. Later Harding secured the appointment of a special commission of reorganization, but he failed. Coolidge encouraged the movement. President Hoover was authorized by Congress to act, but when he did act Congress did not support him. Four reorganization bills have been introduced in the House. Two passed, but their history is no more significant than this—"Lost in committee."

The purposes of reorganization are expressly declared in the language of the bill to be:

- (a) To reduce expenditures to the fullest extent consistent with the efficient operation of the government
- (b) To increase the efficiency of the operations of the government to the fullest extent practicable within the revenues
- (c) To group, coordinate, consolidate, reorganize, and segregate agencies and functions of the government, or any part thereof, as nearly as may be, according to major purposes
- (d) To reduce the number of such agencies by regrouping or consolidating those having similar functions, or any part thereof, as may not be

necessary for the efficient conduct of the government

- (e) To eliminate overlapping and duplication of effort

Tonight we have the Byrnes Bill, and I call to your attention that we shall stand on the following issues:

Reorganization will promote efficiency in government. Reorganization as embodied in this bill will safeguard the rights of the executive and the legislative branches of the government, and of the people. This plan of reorganization is better than any other proposal.

Negative Declarant, Helen Bryant
Hampton Society

As first speaker on the opposition represented by Wade Hampton, it is my privilege to repeat somewhat the things our opponent, the lady from Winthrop, has said about this historic occasion. We have long been acquainted with the work of the debaters in these societies and I remember as a freshman how pleased I was to be permitted to take part in the line-up on the fence, since I recall on that occasion we participated in a popular "Up to the Fence" movement. It was my first vote after having had the "goddess" smile on me and I then conceived the ideal of representing my society in this annual clash. Here we are tonight surrounded by the lovely ferns sent to us by our friends from Charleston. It is indeed a happy event. What I have always liked about these clashes is that there never has been the least feeling of resentment or "sour

grapes" over the results, and I remember painfully for my society that we were on the Negative last year with Curry opposing us, while tonight they assist us.

But let us address ourselves to the task in hand, I rise to say that I do not know of any question I would rather discuss, or one that I would rather expose the fallacies of, than this proposed reorganization bill presented by Senator Byrnes. We all love Senator Byrnes; he is our Senator, our hero, and we fought with him against the Supreme Court Reform Bill. Tonight, we cannot follow him.

We join issue with the ladies of the Affirmative and we deplore the method used to present the history of reorganization. It is really not as hopeless a matter as the Affirmative seem to indicate.

We will state our issues and then, in the time that is left, discuss various features of the measure. First, this bill gives the President too much power. Second, the abolition of the present Civil Service setup is unwise; and the proposed reform will create most serious evils. Third, the proposal to replace the Comptroller General by an Auditor General responsible to the Congress and to the President is unwarranted.

We accept the issues assumed by Winthrop. They propose that this bill will promote efficiency in government; now we will be prepared to raise the question if there are not some things more precious than efficiency. Then their second proposal is very cleverly worded. I am delighted that the representative of Winthrop gave me a typed copy of her issues because I am sure that I cannot keep from thinking of it in a

different language. She wants to say it will not let Mr. Roosevelt become a dictator; but she very cleverly takes it on our blind side by saying—"Reorganization will safeguard the rights of the executive and the legislative branches of the government, and of the people." Now we warn our opponents that if their strategy follows a certain course we will anticipate this argument by proposing the issue: This proposal is dangerous because it will enable any President—not just Mr. Roosevelt—to assume greater powers than are embraced in the Constitutional setup accorded the Chief Executive.

Then we accept their issue that their proposal is better than any other proposal. It depends on what they will admit as another proposal. Perhaps in the course of the clash around this issue, we shall be thought of as introducing an alternate plan. Such is not our purpose.

As the gentleman who sits in judgment on us this evening knows, we of the Negative now have the opportunity to present our general objection to this question and to attempt, if we deem it wise, to dismiss the whole question by showing how impossible or absurd are the issues of the Affirmative. But we choose rather to show you that there is a potent fallacy running through the general assumption of the Affirmative.

Generally speaking, we shall weave throughout our arguments the following objections to the proposal. First of all, this bill represents a surrender on the part of Congress of powers, which, under our present constitutional system of government, should never be delegated to the executive branch of the government.

Second, it empowers the Executive to abolish agencies of government by abolishing the functions. Third, this measure will convert emergency measures and institutions into permanent ones. Fourth, we are opposed to it because it is an omnibus bill which throws into one jumbled mass various unrelated organization plans. Furthermore, any one of the specified objectives calls for far-reaching changes in the present administration setup and any conscientious legislative disposition of the proposals would require separate consideration of the several parts of the bill.

Miss Stuckey, the Chairman: Has Winthrop any response to make? There being no response, we will proceed with the first clash. The Chair recognizes Miss Barnes of Winthrop who will introduce the first clash.

First Clash

First Affirmative, Mary Barnes Winthrop Society

The Affirmative will now introduce the issue for the first clash. We propose this issue: Reorganization will promote efficiency in government. I do not believe I need to dwell at any length on proving the value of efficiency in government. We must keep in mind the insistent demand for conserving energy in executive work and in preventing the many delays, and in avoiding the friction between departments. Somewhat as promised by Mr. Roosevelt in October, 1932:

"We must abolish useless offices. . . . We must merge; we must consolidate subdivisions of government . . . and give up luxuries we can no longer afford.

"We are not getting an adequate return for the money we are spending in Washington, or, to put it in another way round, we are spending altogether too much money for government services which are neither practical nor necessary. In addition to this, we are attempting too many functions, and we need a simplification of what the Federal Government is giving to the people."

An efficient administration requires location of authority. Certainly every department of our government is now weakened by the present setup of distributed jurisdiction. All welfare functions should be put under one head. Similarly, one head should be given to the vast and unwieldy machine of Civil Service; thousands beyond its fold should be brought in. The inefficient Comptroller General should be replaced by an Auditor General; because too many times the former's action causes most serious delays, whereas the latter can check the honest expenditure of funds without causing delays. Then the Department of Interior has taken on added functions until all similar activities should be grouped under one heading to be called the Department of Conservation. To include all governmental agencies pertaining to welfare under one head will certainly render them more efficient and prevent duplication.

Finally, a Federal Planning Board will anticipate changes in the governmental system without causing serious delays. In the same way as the Army Department plans ahead, so will this department blueprint social-political changes. Lastly, this bill proposes to take

the 50 new agencies and bureaus at Washington and by 1940 give them a definite alignment with the various departments. Thus efficiency—or location of authority—in government will be effected by this bill. Thus, if we agree to reorganize constructively the top-heavy and unwieldy Federal agencies—as this bill proposes to do, we will make the government more efficient. There are today fifty Federal agency legal divisions; twenty-four agencies to lend Federal money; three interested in insuring loans and deposits; at least thirty-four interested in the acquisition of land; sixteen working to preserve wild life; twelve for home and community planning. Surely here is a need for taking out these duplications. That will render our government efficient.

Yet in coordinating all this machinery, the bill does not create any new agency. There is no provision which will permit the President to create a new agency. It is true that a new department—that of Welfare—will be created; but the Executive will transfer bureaus and agencies from other departments to it, along with the independent agencies that up until now have not been assigned to a special department. Certainly this concentration of welfare agencies will stop duplications and promote efficiency.

Honorable Judge, I challenge our opponents, the ladies of Hampton, to meet this point of passing this bill to render our government more efficient.

First Negative, Nettie Wells
Hampton Society

We of Hampton accept the issue and in the two minutes allotted to me, I shall show you how the bill will promote inefficiency.

This bill would, under the guise of promoting efficiency, actually cause duplications, confusion, and extravagance in the expenditure of public funds. I refer to resolutions passed by the National Farm Conference, Feb. 9, 1937, at Washington, D. C., in which Congress was called upon to retain certain functions of government in the Department of Agriculture. Yet the passage of this bill will take out of the Department of Agriculture all functions involving the preservation and reproduction of plant life and animal life on the public lands, and functions pertaining to water conservation and soil conservation. This bill would put these functions in a new Department of Conservation. Now here is where this is quite inefficient.

Conservation is a policy and it should be practiced by all departments. But the bill will divide functions between the Department of Agriculture on private lands and the Department of Conservation of public lands. Is this efficiency? Such views were expressed by the General Federation of Women's Clubs, January 12-15, 1938, at Washington, D. C., and the National Grange, meeting at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, November 18, 1937. Similarly, some 208 organizations have petitioned Congress against this change. November 18, 1938, says Senator Byrd of Virginia: "A mere regroup-

ing and shuffling of bureaus, divisions, agencies, committees, commissions, boards, authorities, administration, and whatnot will not necessarily mean increased efficiency or economy."

This bill has provision for making permanent many of the temporary functions of the government adopted as temporary measures during the depression. Functions which have cost the people of the United States thousands of dollars and which are notable for inefficiency, waste, and extravagance. In other words, the present bill proposes to freeze all the politically arranged departments so that not a political-soul will lose out. For after this bill is passed, Congress will have little say so over abolishing a department. Once the President makes a change, Congress cannot remove it except by a two-thirds vote unless the Executive is willing. It will perpetuate inefficiency.

Let me cite you an excellent instance: in one notable example it shoulders a burden on the Federal Government which has no place there. I refer to the National Resources Planning Board. This is, at present, a temporary affair, one of the many commissions waked up by the depression. Do the ladies of the Affirmative think that all are agreed on a permanent National Resources Planning Board? Right or wrong, it will be congealed in the government setup with five members, each at \$9,000 a year, and the right to employ all assistants and other employees to perform the work imposed on it. Why? So that we can "P-L-A-N" it that way.

I should like for the ladies to tell us if this is the same board President Roosevelt bragged about down

at Charleston when he said we planned it that way. Are they to "plan" another situation like this one? Honorable Judge, I have attempted to prove further by one specific instance that this bill will not promote efficiency. This bill is nothing but an attempt to freeze up the political appointees before a Republican thaw sets in!

Affirmative Response, Eleanor Briscoe
Winthrop Society

The opposition has just attempted to answer our issue by saying that the passage of the bill would promote inefficiency. She seems to think that there is a design behind the bill to cause thousands of Federal employees to be taken up bodily by the government and made into a permanent setup that can never be destroyed.

First, she did not deny that we want efficient government. She merely said that this bill could cause inefficiency because some 208 agricultural organizations meeting in various parts of the country said that it would. But now she was kind enough to hand me the list clipped from the *Congressional Record*. I will not dispute the fact that these organizations adopted the resolutions, but I do want you to see who cited them before the Senate, why Senator Pittman of Nevada. And the facts do prove that Senator Pittman evidently has been energetic in getting these resolutions. Honorable Judge, let me tell you why Senator Pittman and others are opposed to reforms planned in this bill. Each one of the bureaus and agencies, which we propose to

merge and assimilate, has employees. They vote in some state congressional election. They have relatives and friends, and they can influence organizations to pass resolutions. They can threaten Congress. Congress can never buckle down to the task of reorganization. The Executive is the only one that can. Now, naturally when he proposes to take away some of the various agencies of the Department of Agriculture the employees are going to complain, and the greatest complaint will come from a state where conservation is needed.

Again let me further support our argument. If the government is to function efficiently, it must have the selection and retention of employees under the merit system of Civil Service. We do not propose to protect all in the face of the day of judgment from the Republicans—does that mean of Maine and Vermont? The President has the power under this bill to consider each agency and if it cannot be merged, abolished, or consolidated, to place the employment in such agencies under the Civil Service. Naturally, if any agency is merged with a department that functions through the Civil Service, the employees will receive the benefit. This is efficiency in government which our bill will promote.

Judge's Decision

The judge, Mr. Cobb, exercised his prerogative to stop the clash and explain his reason for so doing and the reasons for his award.

MADAM CHAIRMAN: I propose to stop this clash here

on the ground that inasmuch as the clash was initiated by the Affirmative, and the Negative had the opportunity to answer that challenge point by point but has failed to do so completely, the Affirmative should win. And since the Affirmative speeches kept to the arguments of the Negative, the Affirmative side has won the clash.

The Chairman, Miss Stuckey: Will the score keeper register one clash for the Affirmative. The Hampton debaters will now introduce a clash—any of their choice. Are the ladies of the Negative ready? The Chair recognizes Miss Inez Crawford of Hampton.

Second Clash

First Negative, Inez Crawford
Hampton Society

We take our stand on the issue that to abolish the office of the Comptroller General and to substitute therefor an Auditor General would be extremely unsound and dangerous in its possibilities; it would destroy existing safeguards against unlawful expenditures. It is unsound because the Comptroller General is needed in his position. This office was created seventeen years ago because the World War era of spending demonstrated to Congress the need of an agency independent of the government's executive-spending departments to make certain that appropriations were spent only as Congress intended them to be spent. Today,

this office is independent of the Executive; though he is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, for a fifteen-year term, he can be removed only by Congress.

The Comptroller General has been unpopular with Congressmen and with executive heads. He can say "no" without risking his job. He can save money and protect the Treasury against unauthorized spending. However, he can be checked because Congress can make or unmake any of his rulings, can vote or not vote sums of money. But once an appropriation has been made, the Comptroller becomes a watch dog. Now, the new bill wants to make a pet poodle out of this person. When money has been appropriated for a special purpose, the Comptroller will not let the Executive Department juggle the money around until it appears under another heading.

Since the establishment of the Comptroller General's office in 1921, \$80,000,000,000 has been expended in accordance with the law. So we ask our opponents, what is wrong with this office that it should be abolished? We ask them to tell us whether it is true that this office has incurred the displeasure of certain Congressmen and other officials who now want to destroy it?

Let us turn to note the criticism launched against the office when the head refused to sign a warrant for the expenditure of \$525,000 for the construction of a factory at Reedsville, W. Va.

Then the Comptroller General refused to permit fifteen million dollars on the creation of the famous shel-

terbelt out west. Time after time he has refused to allow the expenditure of funds because there was no authority in law for such.

For fourteen years this officer went along without criticism. But finally when he refused to permit expenditures not in accordance with law, the "powers-that-be" decided to get rid of him.

What do the ladies of Winthrop propose to use as a substitute? They would give the power to approve or disapprove expenditures to the Budget Director, who is dependent for his position upon the President, the fountain head of all spending. Then they would set up a new independent functionary, as Auditor General, to audit expenditures, but only after the money has been paid out.

Furthermore, the Constitution holds Congress responsible for seeing that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." It would be extremely dangerous for Congress to surrender this power to the Executive, since once it is given it cannot be recalled except by a two-third vote, or over the veto of a President. At the present time Congress retains a check over the Comptroller General. If the Byrnes Bill is adopted Congress will have surrendered this power. Therefore, since all sorts of extravagances and mismanagement of funds would result if Congress were to allow the Executive Departments to be their auditors and budget directors; since Congress with difficulty could repeal such a measure; since the Comptroller General is functioning well now, we must conclude that the Byrnes Bill in the re-

spect of abolishing the office is unsound and the tendency is dangerous.

First Affirmative Response, Anne Cox
Winthrop Society

We join with our opponents on this issue. To hear their argument one would think that the Comptroller General started in our government the day George Washington was sworn in office as President and has been dogging the footsteps of every executive officer since. A little of the history of this affair will help us to consider it properly. President Taft attempted without success to establish a budget system. President Wilson finally succeeded in getting a system installed; it provided for placing both audit and control under the Comptroller General and made him removable only by Congress. Wilson vetoed the bill on the ground that it was an invasion of the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the government to create an officer who could control executive expenditures without being responsible to the Executive.

In the Harding administration the bill was repassed, but with an amendment making the Comptroller removable by the joint actions of Congress and the President. That bill became law and we operate under it tonight. The present reorganization bill, let me say, has been made to coincide with the belief of Wilson that the control of expenditure is an executive and not a legislative responsibility. Therefore, the Director of the Budget will perform all the executive functions now performed

by the Comptroller General. But at the same time the bill provides for an independent audit through an Auditor General, appointed by Congress and responsible only to Congress. This Auditor General shall have complete power to make a current audit of every expenditure. The two men perform the functions of one; but the confusion of powers—legislative and executive—is eliminated.

But let us inquire into the history of this Comptroller General's office. Through the reorganization, Congress is supposed to surrender control over the spending of money by our government. Now up to 1921 we had no Comptroller General. Up to 1921 Congress had no such check; in those great days Congress appropriated the money as the Executive expended it. When the bill was passed, everyone thought it was a sure safeguard. But it has not worked. It is true that the first report in years, of improper expenditure, came to Congress on March 4, 1938, just five days after the debate on reorganization started. Yet our opponents say that to destroy it is to destroy a safeguard. We have shown you that we have the effective check on budget and on expenditures. All that we want to do is to stop trying to do two things at the same time—We propose to let the executive department keep the books; and let the auditing check be in Congress. Congress can remove its auditor—but the Executive cannot touch him. We challenge the Negative to show wherein our proposal is deficient.

Second Negative, Mary Darby
Hampton Society

We of the Negative thank the Affirmative for the history of the Comptroller General. It seems to us that it little matters how he got started, it is what he has become today. The lady from Winthrop insists on asking us to point out something of its merits.

We are glad to read to you excerpts from the *Washington Post* of March 8, 1938, an article by Franklyn Waltman entitled "Politics and People—Use of Farm Funds for New Richberg Idea Shows Need for Treasury Watchdog." It reads somewhat as follows:

"If Senator Harry F. Byrd and his colleagues opposing the pending bill for reorganization of the government need a concrete illustration of the reasons why the Comptroller General's office and function should be maintained unimpaired, they will find it in the Department of Commerce. There someone let the cat out of the bag prematurely—and it is a nice black cat, too.

"It will be recalled that in recent days Donald R. Richberg, former N. R. A. Administrator, now sitting at the President's right hand as an apostle of government cooperation with business, has urged the establishment in the Commerce Department of a Bureau of Industrial Economics.

" 'The Department of Commerce,' Mr. Clapper wrote last week, 'is organizing a new Bureau of Industrial Economics to aid business. This is a beginning toward carrying out a suggestion made in a recent speech by Donald R. Richberg and an idea on which he has collaborated for some time with Ernest G. Draper, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, and one of the few businessmen of long experience left in the administration. . . .

“Ironically, the funds to be used come from the Department of Agriculture, which has allocated \$1,000,000 to Secretary of Commerce Roper to foster the sale of agricultural products. The Department of Commerce will use this money to create a new service for business on the assumption that the fortunes of agriculture and business are interwoven.”

“Here we have a proposal to use for one purpose funds which Congress authorized for another and entirely different purpose. It is justified on the ground that the fortunes of agriculture and business are interwoven. If that criterion became a standard, governmental funds appropriated for the benefit of agriculture could be used for virtually any purpose.

“Furthermore, it is reasonably clear that the Comptroller General, whose function is to see that funds are spent in accordance with legislative provision, would not, if he performs his duty, permit the use of this fund to set up the proposed Bureau of Industrial Economics. Under the reorganization bill, this power of the Comptroller General would be transferred to the Director of the Budget. The latter, at best, is an arm of the President whose duty is to translate the presidential will into financial and appropriation bills and policies.

“When Lewis Douglas disagreed with the presidential will he had no alternative but to resign. He was replaced by an Acting Director of the Budget, whom Mr. Roosevelt may replace any day he wishes by a man more to his liking. Indeed, we now have only an acting Comptroller General, who may be superseded whenever he earns the presidential ill will. Once the proposal to abolish the Comptroller General’s office is voted down, we may hope to have a Comptroller General with security of tenure and he would be a check against the sort of thing now being contemplated in the Commerce Department.”

These statements embody proof of our contention, there is a need to keep the present Comptroller General.

Second Affirmative Response, Marie Johnson
Winthrop Society

The ladies of Hampton seem to dwell on the fact that prejudice guides those who planned this bill, that they attempted to secure approval of the Comptroller General, or the "C. G." as he is called, for some illegal business and when he wouldn't agree, they turned to destroy him. The issue as we see it is this: Does the substitute protect our expenditures? If an executive officer, after our bill becomes law, should spend money for which he had no legal warrant, the Auditor General would find it out and the wrongdoing would be shown up. Now I grant you that the money could not be recalled. There is a more serious evil which I want to point out. The "C. G." is not above playing politics and at present he can delay expenditures for all sorts of technical reasons. We propose to make the government more efficient and useful by dividing the labors of this office.

Judge's Decision

MADAM CHAIRMAN: I rise to stop this clash and to award the decision to the Negative. I hoped when this clash was initiated that the Affirmative would give us various reasons as to why the Affirmative counter-proposal would be an effective check.

The Chairman, Miss Stuckey: Let the award be given to the Negative. The score is now one to one.

It is time for the Affirmative to initiate another clash. Are you ready?

The Chair recognizes Miss Mary Ellen Adams of Winthrop who will initiate the third clash.

Third Clash

First Affirmative, Mary Ellen Adams
Winthrop Society

We now turn in the third clash to propose this issue: Reorganization as embodied in this bill will set up effective safe-guards for both the executive and the legislative branches of the government and for the people.

Under our constitutional framework, the execution of the laws passed by the Congress is a definite and distinct function of the Executive Branch of the government and accountability for their proper execution rests upon the President. Hence the Chief Executive should have a free hand to arrange, coordinate, and make more effective, the machinery by which laws are executed. Actually for the Congress to refuse this power or to hamper the President is plainly usurpation of executive power.

We maintain that because our government has become so complex, so unwieldy, so filled with bureaucrats that the Executive needs this reorganization to make him a more competent administrator.

For example, the House of Representatives has already passed a measure which would give the President six assistants in the form of secretaries. What, in other

words, the President has now, we propose to legalize in the form of a corps of assistants appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

Furthermore, the rights of the Congress will be safeguarded in this bill. The Congress may at any time erect statutory safeguards against changes it does not desire. It can lay down standards for executive guidance. The Congress does not have time to pass on each executive order. If the Congress spent its time dealing with re-groupings or shifts of executive agencies its time for regular business would be exhausted. But it can keep a close watch on the Executive.

Many Congressmen object to this bill because it means loss of control over patronage. These Congressmen want to keep the bureaus and agencies in a position where they must appeal directly to the Congress for special appropriations and where the employees are personally obligated to some legislative member. Any general re-shuffling of bureaus and commissions runs in direct opposition to the vested interests of many Congressmen. At the same time, individual bureaus and departments which jealously guard their own preserves stimulate congressional resistance. But now, Honorable Judge, these things do not warrant any conclusion that the Congress is losing its rights. In fact, the rights of the Executive are safeguarded because the Congress actually usurps executive powers when it continues a situation similar to that existing in Washington today.

The rights of the people will be guarded because the people still elect their officials and through them they can influence the conduct of government. Moreover,

the great number of citizens who work in the Civil Service will see themselves protected by the merit system under the provision of this bill devised to embrace them.

But, again, more people will have their rights safeguarded by that provision of the bill which sets up a Department of Welfare. Just look at the affairs to be handled by this department. It will have charge of public health and sanitation; the protection of the consumers; education as permitted by the federal system; relief of unemployment; relief of needy and distressed; and vocational rehabilitation. These are not new things to our government. These are burdens of the people, now carried by the government. What we propose to do is tie them up in one Department of Welfare where welfare agencies may be coordinated. The efficiency gained will mean safeguards for the rights of the people.

Within our bill, the President will be a more efficient President with more complete control of his powers. The Congress will have power to make or unmake; and what it loses in patronage is political and personal and not constitutional and fundamental. The people will gain greater protection and recognition of their rights.

**First Negative Response, Mamie K. Ritchie
Curry Society**

We accept the issue raised in this clash—that is, the right of President, Congress, and people will be safeguarded. Let us state it in a Negative way, the rights

of the people and of the Congress will be jeopardized by the granting of this power to the Executive.

We are not raising the cry of dictator. We are not saying that Mr. Roosevelt will usurp all powers. But we are about to show you that if this bill is passed it will place such powers in the hands of the Executive that the rights of Congress and the people will be menaced at all times.

This bill gives the President too much power. He can abolish the functions of a bureau. He is empowered to issue reorganization executive orders, transferring the function of one agency to another; then abolishing the first agency. He has until July 1, 1940, to reorganize the whole system. He can reorganize the executive branch without the sanctions of Congress. This bill gives him discretionary power without a congressional check.

Yet the Affirmative tell us that this bill safeguards the powers of Congress.

Second, this bill doesn't safeguard the maintenance of many Federal boards created by acts of Congress which require independent action in their respective fields. Third, the rights of the people cannot be safeguarded when a single Civil Service administrator is appointed to take the place of the bi-partisan commission. And when some 200,000 employees will be taken over into the merit system without the preliminaries of examinations.

I have shown you three instances in which this bill does not safeguard the rights of Congress and the people.

Allow me to conclude by quoting from an article by Dorothy Thompson, from the *New York Herald Tribune*, Friday, March 25, 1938:

"In respect to the functions and activities of the agencies which are to be reorganized, there is an insidious substitution of minority tyranny over majority rule.

"The President is given power to reduce, coordinate, and consolidate the various executive agencies, with the exception of certain specific quasi-judicial functions.

"Incidentally, there is grave doubt as to what would happen to public corporations like the T. V. A., since the President in his mishandling of the present controversy has, according to the newspaper accounts, adopted the view that such public boards are to be treated as the special domain of the Executive and not of Congress.

"'At any rate,' as was observed by Mr. Arthur Krock, under this broad grant of power which would exist up to the 1940 presidential campaign, 'the President could cut any department until it would amount to nothing but the office of a Cabinet member.' Moreover, Congress could not exercise any check, because in practice a two-thirds vote of Congress would be needed to nullify or to modify any such Executive order, and even at that such a preponderant majority of Congress could not make its will felt if there was a congestion of legislation since the prerogative lasts only for 60 days.

"This has obvious family resemblances to practice under Nazi and Fascist governments, where this principle is carried to the full limit of first letting minorities capture control and then abridging to the point of eliminating the rights of the majority."

Second Affirmative, Amelia Veronee
Curry Society

The speaker for Hampton has not answered our clash in a direct way. Rather, she has pointed out some instances where this bill might interfere with the rights of the people and of Congress. She failed to show us how Congress would lose any power, or where any check could be placed permanently upon the legislative body. The many bureaus and departments have been created by Congress, and have been and are now administered by persons or commissions that are responsible to the President. If we leave out the bogey of dictator injected into this argument, we will find there is little left to the Negative statement. Once, for example, we had neither a Civil Service Commission nor a Comptroller General yet the rights of all were conserved.

Furthermore, this bill will not permit the President to encroach upon Congress. Senator O'Mahoney of Wyoming assured the Senate of this when the question with respect to the powers of the President to abolish functions arose, and it became clear that many Senators entertained the belief that the bill would give the President the power to cut off or suspend the operations of functions authorized by Congress. The members of the committee agreed to make it plain in the bill that no such change would be or could be authorized.

The power in this bill permits the President to regroup and coordinate the functions. It is the business of the President to do this. In fact, history shows that

a similar power was granted to the President in an act of March 3, 1933. For 18 months this power was in the hands of the President, yet he did not abuse that power.

To return to the protection of the people, the question is this, shall Congress for the public welfare order a reorganization? Congress is hereby prepared to do things no Executive could ever do: for the protection of the public to set up a Department of Welfare, to establish a Resources Board, and to alter the whole accounting system which itself was changed by Congress in 1920. Congress can protect the people and it will not lose any of its powers.

Second Negative Response, Sarah Taylor Curry Society

We of the Negative wish to continue this clash by pointing out that it is not necessary for Congress to give up its fundamental powers under the Constitution to the Executive. For this reason several Senators feared that Congress must have some safeguard, so an amendment was offered by Senator Wheeler of Montana. Now if there is no danger to Congress, why did Senator Wheeler offer and find support for an amendment which says plainly that Congress must have powers to alter by a simple majority any change made by the President?

This bill gives the President power. Now it is a fact that the basic difference between democracy and Fascism is over the issue of the separation of power. Let

me quote you from an article by Dr. Charles N. Wilson, in the *Political Science Quarterly* for the last issue of 1937.

"The freedom of the individual depends upon the separation of public powers. And furthermore . . ."
(*Interrupted by the Judge.*)

Judge's Decision

I shall stop this clash here because in my opinion the Affirmative speakers have established their point—that the bill will safeguard the rights of the people and of the governmental divisions. As explained by the Affirmative and not refuted by the Negative, this bill is merely a piece of routine work for Congress. The Negative, too, I fear fell into the style of pulling our ears—or I believe we call it more politely using an "ad populum" appeal.

The Chairman, Miss Stuckey: The Affirmative now has two points and the Negative, one. We will proceed with another clash. Are the ladies of the Negative ready?

The Chair recognizes Miss Edith Bedenbaugh of Hampton.

Fourth Clash

First Negative, Edith Bedenbaugh
Hampton Society

We propose the issue: The abolition of the present Civil Service organization is unwise, and the proposed reform will create most serious evils.

Let us first see what the bill proposes to do. In Section 201, it proposes to establish an organization to be known as the Civil Service Administration, at the head of which shall be an Administrator chosen for fifteen years, with various qualifications, enumeration of which we will waive at this time.

Actually then, it offers to substitute a single Administrator, to be appointed by the President, for the Civil Service Commission of three members. We maintain that the present Commission system of three members is much to be preferred to a single-administrator system.

Let us examine the merits of the present Commission: It is bipartisan. It has the confidence of the laboring classes. William Green, in a letter to Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas, states that the A. F. of L. is opposed to the single Administrator but favors the commission. It must act as an Appellate Court in matters of transcendent importance to the people of the Civil Service. The Commission must pass upon matters of policy and interpretation of regulations. A three-man body can treat matters more fairly, more justly, and more comprehensively than a single Administrator; because the latter, whether justly or not, would be accused of treating questions in a partisan way. A carry-over Democrat would meet with serious abuse from Republicans, and vice versa. All this would weaken the respect the people have for Civil Service. Therefore, the three-person Commission is preferable to the Administrator. To abolish it is unwise.

Since the Commission acts as a court, we would set

up a one-man system of a court in place of the three-man system of today. A principle that we follow nowhere in all our judicial system. The change would introduce serious evils. Furthermore, we are opposed to this change because it means a serious damage to the principles of Civil Service in the hands of an administration already engaged in undermining the Civil Service. Our point is that we not only oppose the change because of the nature of this bill, but also because the provisions for execution will be in the hands of an administration quite unfriendly to Civil Service. Just look at the record, (*Congressional Record*, Senate, page 3786, March, 1938). From 1884 to 1933 the total number of employees in the executive branch of the government increased from 131,000 to 563,000; and in this same period the percentage of these employees under Civil Service increased from 10.5 to 82.9 per cent. This covers the period of the World War, when the great Woodrow Wilson extended the merit system to include 72 per cent of his appointments. Look at the change by June 30, 1937, when we had some 841,000 employees, to say nothing of the employees in the various alphabetical departments. Of this 841,000, 63.2 per cent were under the Civil Service. Listen to what the National Civil Service Reform League declared in 1935: "At no time since the enactment of the Federal Civil Service Law has the merit system faced such a critical test as now."

Let me conclude by saying that there is no fault in the mechanism; the fault is in the attitude. A Presi-

dent who has been no friend to Civil Service cannot be trusted when he proposes to remove this check.

First Affirmative Response, Marie Johnson
Winthrop Society

Our opponents have brought forth an issue on the removal of the Civil Service Commission and the substitution for it of a single Administrator. The sole issue, it seems, is whether by placing the administration of the law and the rules in the hands of one Administrator instead of a Commission, we are making a harmful change.

I shall answer their contention. First, they quote Mr. William Green of A. F. of L. Allow me to cite a letter from one of the C. I. O. Affiliates. The United Federal Workers of America in a letter to Senator Byrnes favor the administrative system. Now we agree with our opponents in praise of the Commission, but we maintain that there should be a single Administrator because it will locate definitely and forever responsibility for the efficient administration of the Commission. It is not essential whether one is at the head or whether three men, just so responsibility can be fixed.

The Negative speaker makes a great point of the bipartisan quality of the present Commission, and uses that as a piece of evidence for keeping it, because we will then have a non-partisan board. Then she turns around and declares that a single Administrator cannot keep his mind single and honest—or he may be accused of partisan leaning. Yet today the three-man Commis-

sion has on it, I believe, two Democrats and one Republican. Yet the Negative believe that the one Republican in the minority will keep the Commission non-partisan. Already two Democrats today guarantee a partisan bias; just as two Republicans, perhaps, some distant day will guarantee partisanship. Then our next point is that the same complaint could be made against a single Attorney-General, or a single Secretary of State; or the same argument could be used in favor of having a triple non-partisan commission in charge of the post office. Thus, we see the issue of the Negative is absurd.

Second Negative, Inez Crawford
Hampton Society

One of the great strengths of the present system is that the commissioners are appointed by the President, and confirmed by the Senate, for an indefinite period, and they may be removed at will by the President. Thus, we have a system that is responsive to the will of the country every four years; whereas the present bill will set up a single person to serve for 15 years who is not removable.

The important thing is, Honorable Judge, that at one time the bill contained clauses giving the President power to remove the director, but now that has been dropped out. This violates the principle of checks and balances. We agree that a minority member on the Commission may not be able to change the majority members when they insist on doing wrong; but he can be a watch dog, and can make a noise when danger is

nigh. A one man Civil Service dictator, answerable solely to the President for his continuing tenure, cannot provide this protective vigilance. His decisions are not checked by colleagues. No one checks his ideas while they are in formation. This system is not the way of democracy. Shall we surrender the substantial control of over 800,000 employees to one man?

**Second Affirmative Response, Anne Cox
Winthrop Society**

This matter of a single Administrator was urged upon Congress by President Hoover, and the President was urged to recommend this at the instance of the president of the Civil Service Commission, Governor Campbell. (C. R.—Senate p. 3777.) Furthermore, the Civil Service Reform League at various times has advocated change. Dr. Westel Willoughby of the Brookings Institution, in 1929, arrived at the same conclusion. But in addition to these authorities, let us further substantiate this contention by showing you the reasons given by Governor Campbell.

1. The influence of one personnel agency would be made to extend to all parts of the Federal service.
2. A single Administrator would keep in close touch with the President and the cabinet heads.

**Third Negative, Mamie K. Ritchie
Curry Society**

This change should not be made because a single Administrator would be affiliated with, or suspected of

affiliation with a political group. Republicans would have no confidence in a Democrat and vice versa. A single Administrator would not be able to look out properly for the welfare of the whole body of employees, because if a man, the women would be neglected, if a woman, the men. Yet the present system recognizes the necessity of representing both men and women on the board.

We of the South are afraid this Administrator might come from a section of the country where we are thought of as share-croppers or "pore-whites" or badly in need of missionaries. Or a southerner who was vilely prejudiced toward the North might be appointed, and it would be bad for the northerners. A Commission of three will not permit sectional bias.

Furthermore, religious faith should never be a bias of qualifications. But with a single Administrator religious prejudices might creep in. A three-man Commission would not allow this to happen.

Third Affirmative Response, Eleanor Briscoe Winthrop Society

Let me be more specific. This change to a single Administrator should be made because it will promote efficiency. Efficiency, as we have said, requires location of authority. It is now weakened by the present setup of distributed jurisdiction. In all branches of our government where duties are executive rather than judicial, one executive head has proved to be more efficient and satisfactory. You notice our Constitution

calls for a Commander-in-chief—not a commission of commanders.

Your Commission tends to become a debating society instead of an executive agency. Then, too, the present Commission depends upon advisory boards, so will the Administrator; but he can act quickly and efficiently. I argue then that the Administrator should be accepted on the point of *efficiency*.

Judge's Decision

I will stop the clash and award the decision to the Affirmative. Since it is apparent that the Negative will not furnish further proof to offset the counter rebuttal of the Affirmative. I will say here apologetically that I am afraid the judge is in an unenviable position in this type of debate. Not always trusting to my judgment, I am afraid another judge could have given this case to the Negative by as many points.

The Chairman, Miss Stuckey: The decision goes to the Affirmative since the winning of this clash makes them winners, three to one.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

- Hellman, F. S. (Compiler)—List of References on the Reorganization of the Executive Departments. 1936. Library of Congress.
Houghton, N. D.—Realities of American Government. 1937. Macmillan.

MAGAZINE REFERENCES

- American Mercury.—43:404, Apr., 1938. *Roosevelt's Bid for Dictatorship; Reorganization Bill*. F. R. Kent. 42:1, Sept., 1937. *Dr. Roosevelt's Propaganda Trust*. G. Carroll.
- American Political Science Review.—31:699, Aug., 1937. *Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National Government of the U. S.*
- Business Week.—P. 18, Apr. 2, 1938. *Behind the Reorganization Switch*. P. 19, Je. 12, 1937. *Brookings vs. President. Institute Opposes his Reorganization Plan*.
- Commonweal.—27:726, Apr. 22, 1938. *Reorganization Bill*.
- Congressional Digest.—16:225, Oct., 1937. *Proposed Reorganization of Federal Departments*. Pro and con. 17:36, Feb., 1938. *Provisions of Reorganization Bill*. 17:99, Apr., 1938. *Provisions of the 1937 Reorganization Bill*.
- Literary Digest.—P. 13, Dec. 11, 1937. *Congress Which Way?*
- Nation.—146:317, Mar. 19, 1938. *Whipping a Dead Horse: Reaction to the Government's Reorganization Program*. 146:372, Apr. 2, 1938. *Freedom and the Executive*. 146:400, Apr. 9, 1938. *Shadow Boxing in a Crisis: Fight over the Reorganization Bill*. 146:406, Apr. 9, 1938. *Reorganization and Bunk*. P. Y. Anderson.
- National Municipal Review.—25:437, Sept., 1937. *Federal Reorganization Bills in Congress*. J. Blanchard.
- Nature M.—31:45, Jan., 1938. *Look out for the Greased Pig: Must Legislation for Reorganization*. 31:105, Feb., 1938. *Press and Reorganization*.
- New Republic.—94:263, Apr. 6, 1938. *Reorganization Jitters*. 94:290, 303, Apr. 13, 1938. *Great Caesar Bill*. 94:319, Apr. 20, 1938. *Whose recovery? Meaning of Defeat of Reorganization Bill*. 94:358, Apr. 27, 1938. *Rainmaker but no Rain*.
- News Week.—11:10, Mar. 7, 1938. *Senate Primes Its Guns for the Reorganization Bill*. 11:12, Mar. 14, 1938. *Reorganization Bill: Senate Makes Its Last Stand Against the White House*. 11:44, Mar. 21, 1938. *Reorganization*. Raymond Moley. 11:12, Apr. 4, 1938. *Hard-Boiled Lobbying Inquiry Marks Reorganization Fight*. 11:9, Apr. 11, 1938. *Battle Over Reorganization Test of Roosevelt's Prestige*. 11:13, Apr. 18, 1938. *Revolt; defeat of Reorganization Bill Beclouds President's Future*.

- Reader's Digest.—32:1, Jan., 1938. *We Have No National Government.* A. B. Bates.
- Saturday Evening Post.—210:5, Nov. 20, 1937. *You Can't Beat the Government.* Stanley High.
- Science.—(n. s.) 86:242, Sept. 10, 1938. *Proposed Reorganization of Federal Departments.*
- Scholastic.—32:7, Apr. 23, 1938. *Reorganization Bill Killed in House.* 32:158, Mar. 19, 1938. *Reorganization Bill before Senate.*
- Time.—31:8, Mar. 28, 1938. *Reorganization Renaissance.* 31:10, Apr. 4, 1938. *Ninth Inning Rally: Reorganization Bill.*

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN MASS-
PRODUCTION INDUSTRIES

An Oregon Plan Debate with Panel Discussion

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH AFFIRMATIVE *vs.*
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI NEGATIVE

The problems of capital and labor with reference to collective bargaining agreements and the settlements of disputes over working conditions occupied the attention of the vast majority of debaters during the season of 1937-38. In the debate presented here, another angle is discussed, that is, the proper organization of labor for the purpose of the best type of collective bargaining in the mass-production industries which have been for the most part unorganized in the past.

The debate was held at the University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, February 3, 1938, and was followed by a panel discussion in which some of the professors of the University of Missouri engaged. The question discussed was: Resolved, that collective bargaining in mass-production industries should be conducted by non-company industrial unions. A vote was taken at the end of the discussion on the merits of the question to ascertain the attitude of the audience toward the problem. The unusual feature of the debate was not its form, which is very well known and often used, but in the combination with the panel discussion; and also the debate was transcribed on acetate records as given, a practice that is becoming quite common with the advent of speech-recording machines.

The manuscripts were taken from the records, slight corrections made, and were contributed to *Intercollegiate Debates*, by Professor Loren D. Reid, Director of Forensics at the University of Missouri, and Professor Charles W. Lomas, Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN MASS- PRODUCTION INDUSTRIES

Introduction By the Chairman

The debate team of the University of Missouri has the privilege this evening of entertaining the team from the University of Pittsburgh. The debate with Missouri is one of a series in which the Pittsburgh team will participate on this tour.

The debaters have already had a brief introduction to Columbia. They were guests at noon of the Rotary Club and participated there in a discussion of the subject of collective bargaining in industry, which is essentially the same as that of the debate this evening.

It has been the policy of the Director of Forensics and of the faculty committee on forensics to invite outstanding universities to participate in debates here on the Missouri campus, on subjects in which these visiting teams have an especial interest. The University of Pittsburgh is located in the heart of a great steel and coal district; its students have many opportunities to study the subject of trade unions and investigate the problems of labor unionization. The speakers who are to discuss this question with us this evening are especially interested in the Steel Workers Organizing Committee and the industrial disputes which have been taking place in their own home city in recent days.

Both are planning to enter law and to specialize in labor legislation.

As a part of the plan for the debate this evening, an attempt is being made to record the speeches. A complete text of the debate will be made available through the use of the recording apparatus here before us—partly in order that the discussion may appear in the annual debate volume, which is entitled *Intercollegiate Debates*. This is the Yearbook of Intercollegiate Debating, and these teams are especially honored in being included in the lists of those whose speeches are to be published this year. Altogether, only eight or ten debates are so published in each year. The microphone is connected with the recording machine and the debate will be taken down *verbatim* from beginning to end.

The debaters from the University of Pittsburgh are Mr. William Stark, who will present the Affirmative case, and Mr. Ben Siegal, who will appear as second speaker in the cross-examination. The speakers from the local University are Mr. Irwin Glatstein, who will present the Negative case, and Mr. Robert Black, who will cross-examine.

This presentation of the speakers brings to your attention the fact that the debate is being conducted this evening on what is called the Oregon cross-examination plan. One speaker from each team will present the case for that team, and afterwards these two speakers will be cross-examined by the second members of the teams.

Immediately following the debate proper, three members of the University faculty will speak for five min-

utes each: Professor O. R. Johnson of the College of Agriculture, Professor Russell S. Bauder of the School of Business and Public Administration, and Professor Elmer Ellis of the College of Arts and Science.

When these speakers have contributed their part of the program, we will have a vote on the merits of the case. The members of the audience have in their hands, I believe, a ballot which is attached to the program. The tellers will take up the ballots later and the chairman will announce the decision at an appropriate time. The audience is requested in this connection to pass upon the merits of the question itself rather than simply upon the success of the individual speakers as such.

While the vote is being tabulated, the audience will have an opportunity to make its contribution to the debate and we will invite each of you who has an interest in the question to present any suggestions or comments to the debaters themselves that you think appropriate at that time.

The question for this evening is: Resolved, that collective bargaining in the mass-production industries should be conducted by non-company industrial unions. Mr. William Stark of the University of Pittsburgh will present the Affirmative case.

First Affirmative, William Stark
University of Pittsburgh

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: On behalf of my colleague, Mr. Siegal, and our coach, Mr.

Lomas, I should like to express the appreciation of the University of Pittsburgh for the opportunity to be here this evening and to present the case of the non-company industrial union.

For some three months now we have been looking forward to this opportunity to come to Columbia and we have been planning on it and thinking a lot about it. You can imagine my surprise when we pulled into St. Louis Union Station yesterday and Mr. Siegal turned to me and with his arms out he said: "Well, here we are in Kansas." (Laughter.)

In the discussion of this problem of industrial *versus* craft unions in terms of collective bargaining, you must realize, of course, that we from Pittsburgh come from a center of a strong, well-organized, ever-growing drive among workers in American industries. You must recognize further that 68 per cent of all manufacturing industries in the United States are concentrated north of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi River. That our state, Pennsylvania, has 12 per cent of the manufacturing industries of this country and Missouri has 2 per cent of the manufacturing industries. There are many other differences and these differences we are attempting to reconcile in this discussion this evening.

For purposes of clarification, we feel it advisable to define certain terms in the proposition as stated: Resolved, that collective bargaining in mass-production industry should be conducted through non-company industrial unions. We define mass-production, or manufacturing industries, on the basis of a report of the United States Census which includes some sixteen classi-

fications such as: iron and steel, transportation equipment, rubber, textiles, the processing of non-ferrous metal, the manufacture of plate glass, printing, food, forest products, and several others. An industrial union, both sides must agree, is one that enrolls all workers, skilled and unskilled, employed in one particular industry into one unit. A non-company union is obviously one that is not dominated by the management of a particular company, and a craft union is one that enrolls highly skilled workers who perform one type of skilled labor into one union.

At the outset, allow me to make it very clear that we are here to-night, not to debate the C. I. O. *versus* the A. F. of L. We are here to debate industrial unionism *versus* craft unionism. We mention the A. F. of L. and the C. I. O., not as synonymous with industrial or craft unions, but merely as examples of what these terms mean in actual facts. We are not interested in the individual leadership of these organizations, but only with the policies of the leaders as they affect the organization of our industries in the United States. Our major premise in this discussion is that a strong, well-organized labor movement is for the best interest of the people of the United States. Our minor premise is that only industrial unionism can accomplish this purpose of strong organization among workers in the mass-production industries. And from this we are led to conclude that industrial unionism is for the best interest of the country and should be sustained in this particular discussion. That a strong labor organization is for the welfare of the nation is self-evident, aside from the

consideration of craft or industrial structures of union. For example, there has been no major rail strike in the railroad industry since 1921; in the coal-mining industry we find production is quite regular except for the few days each year when contracts between the employers and the United Mine Workers are rewritten. In the men's and women's clothing industry we find uninterrupted production from one end of the year to the other, except for seasonal interruptions. The Congress of the United States has seen fit to recognize this fact, that strong labor organization is for the national welfare, by enacting a continuous stream of legislation recognizing this principle. Starting with the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932, succeeded by the N. R. A. of 1933, and again succeeded by the National Labor Board of 1934, and culminating in the Wagner Act of 1935, we find that the Congress of the United States has found this principle to be a good one and to be sustained in the United States. They have recognized collective bargaining to be a sound policy, and they have recognized further that only a vast, extensive organization can further this objective of collective bargaining. Strong labor organizations then, minimize strikes and insure continuous production, and from this we can conclude that they are for the best interests of the country.

The fundamental issue in this debate, then, resolves itself into what form of organization in the manufacturing industry is best suited to fulfill this premise. What form of organization gives the strongest organization to labor itself? Industrial unionism, we feel, is the only

form this strong organization can take if it is to be successful. Now let us look at craft unions in manufacturing industries throughout history. Crafts, we say, have failed in the manufacturing industry, except where there have been strict craft lines, and there has been success in very, very few instances in mass-production industries. In the manufacturing industry, for instance, within the A. F. of L. itself, previous to 1933, the United Mine Workers and the International Ladies Garment Workers and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, of a decided industrial nature in all three cases, were the most successful unions in the American Federation of Labor. The American Federation of Labor, itself, seems to have ignored organization in mass-production industry because, obviously, craft unions were not capable of handling this mass organization. From 1933 to 1935 we find that the United Mine Workers, the International Ladies Garment Workers, and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, three industrial unions within the union itself, increased in strength some 132 per cent. Craft unions—strict craft unions—within the A. F. of L. increased 13 per cent in this same period of time. The N. R. A. went further than that in its 1933-35 period; it meant spontaneous organization of workers all over the country, and the A. F. of L., as it saw fit, granted or refused to grant charters to these organizations that arose spontaneously. For example, in the auto and rubber industry they granted what is known as federated local charters which covered all the workers in one particular plant. But in every one of these charters granted there were conditions

attached and the conditions were that as soon as these federated local unions became strong enough, the craft unions in the A. F. of L. had the right to raid these unions and take whatever members fell under their jurisdiction.

The result of this is quite obvious. No less than fifty-two local unions in the automobile craft industry alone were killed in 1933, in one year. A further example of this: there were several thousand aluminum workers organized in the Pittsburgh area, organized spontaneously. The American Federation refused them a federated local charter which they had already granted to other industries, and this particular union died a quick death. In other words, then, whenever the American Federation of Labor has modified its organization along industrial lines, it has grown and prospered; when it has allowed open raiding of established unions by old-line craft unions, it has decreased and declined in strength.

Why, you ask, have craft unions failed? We hold that craft unions have failed because of the character of their organization as contrasted with the nature of American industry. The American Federation of Labor charges high dues and restricts its membership. The Planing and Mill Workers in the Northwest, for instance, were invited to the American Federation of Labor's Carpenters' Convention in Miami in 1935, for the first time in eight years. They were given a voice, but no vote. These same men were counted by President Bill Hutchinson of the Carpenters' Union when it came to voting in the A. F. of L. But they weren't

given a vote in the Carpenters' Convention because they weren't able to pay the high dues, or were unwilling to do so. A second bad feature of the craft union is that it is narrowly constructed and contains only skilled workers. It takes in none of the unskilled workers in any industry. For example, in 1919, to illustrate this point, there was a strike in the steel industry in and around Pittsburgh, and there were all types of unions and all types of men out on strike at that particular time. Now a machinist at that particular time couldn't go out on strike and he still can't go out on strike unless he has the consent of the president of a moulder's union. The moulder may be working right next to him in a particular plant, but the moulder can't go out on strike with the machinist until the president of the moulder's union, who may be thousands of miles away, gives his particular consent. And thus we see that strikes are easily broken due to the highly concentrated natures of this particular craft union which doesn't allow the concerted strength to be shown on the part of organized labor.

Now let us look at the nature of American industry, in contrast to the nature of the craft union itself. Conditions have become such within American industry that the craft unions are decreasing more and more every day, so now there is not a single industry where a craft is so important that it is not in immediate danger of being abolished, or has not been abolished. In the steel industry, for instance, one man may be called upon to do six or seven jobs in one particular day, wherein no skill is required. In the glass industry, in

and around Pittsburgh, we find young men and young women, under twenty-one years of age, working machines and blowing glass and constructing glass products, where previously the most highly skilled worker in American industry probably was the glass-blower. So we see that skills, if they have not been eliminated, are about to be eliminated very, very shortly. It is important for the skilled workers of any particular plant to organize with the unskilled workers if they are to protect themselves and their jobs against increased mechanization. It is utterly impossible by the very nature of American craft union organization to compete with, or at least match, the organization of American industry as it is at present constituted.

And now let us look at the progress of industrial organization over the past two years. I am citing figures to you for the twenty-three-month period between November, 1935 and October, 1937, when the Committee for Industrial Organization grew in membership from one million to four million. Steel workers increased from 10,000 to 500,000 with 463 signed contracts in the steel industry. Automobile unions grew from 30,000 to 400,000, with 381 agreements in every single principal automobile company in the country, with the exception of Henry Ford. The rubber workers grew from a few thousand to 75,000. Textiles were organized to the extent of 300,000. The United Electrical Workers union has grown until it now has 145,000 members in twenty-three months and, now, the C. I. O. is the largest single labor organization in the history of the United States; and these industrial unions are able

to match the employer on an industry-wide or country-wide basis. I would like to introduce on this point, some more specific information on the nature of the success of the industrial union in the East, specifically, the Allegheny River valley which extends from Pittsburgh to Freeport, Pennsylvania, an area of twenty-two miles in length and about two miles on each side of the river. Industries situated in this particular twenty-two-mile area include the Aluminum Company of America, the largest single aluminum works; the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company's plant, one of the largest in the world; the Schenely Distillery, the largest single distillery in the world—in addition to forty-three separate steel companies, anthracite coal mines, and the principal steel establishments in the country, and many other industries. And if you hunt in this area of twenty-two miles, you find almost 100 per cent organization. The C. I. O. held a conference several Sundays ago. There were 313 delegates here representing 55,750 workers from this area of twenty-two miles in length. There was almost 100 per cent organization in every single one of the industries in that whole valley. There were 22,000 steel workers, 2,000 distillery workers, 18,000 glass workers, 6,000 aluminum workers; and, incidentally, at this point I would like to point out that under the old craft union there were exactly 67 members in a craft union in the aluminum works in the Allegheny valley. They now have 6,000 members. There were 5,000 miners represented here. There was a 100 per cent organization of the power employees, 600 power employees; but previously to the C. I. O. there wasn't

a single power man organized. Every automobile repair shop in the Allegheny valley was represented at this conference, and there was hardly a single worker who was not organized.

And the obstacles of this Pittsburgh area, I want to assure you, were second to none in the entire United States, probably with the exception of Harlan County, Kentucky. For example, in 1934, Mrs. Roosevelt couldn't speak anywhere in the town of Homestead, Pennsylvania, except in the United States Post Office because that was the only property in the entire town that was not controlled by, or dominated by, the United States Steel Corporation. In 1936, Vandergrift, Pennsylvania, another town north of Pittsburgh, still advertised itself as a 100 per cent non-union town. It now has a strong steel-workers organizing committee local there.

In Ambridge and Altoona, Pennsylvania, we find two towns notorious for fifteen years as the outstanding, the most notoriously rotten, anti-union towns in the entire country. Duquesne, Pennsylvania, for twenty years had a mayor, a single man, by the name of Crawford, whose brother, incidentally, was president of one of the largest steel companies in the Pittsburgh area. Crawford repeatedly said whenever a union meeting was to be held: "Why Jesus Christ, himself, couldn't speak in Duquesne, let alone a union organizer."

So we see that there was a long tradition behind the organization in Pittsburgh. We find there's a tradition of hatred, a tradition of violence, and in spite of this great tradition, the figures that I cited to you previously

prove extremely significant. Industrial unionism has conquered this tradition in western Pennsylvania and even to mention the American Federation of Labor in this same Allegheny valley is to invite serious trouble.

And now I introduce a very significant piece of evidence in this discussion. I introduce a quotation by a gentleman whom our opponents will admit to be one of the outstanding spokesmen, if not the outstanding spokesman, of American labor. I read you what this gentleman said concerning this entire problem: "The organization of men by industry rather than by craft brings about a more perfect organization, closer cooperation, and tends to develop the highest form of organization. The causes of jurisdictional disputes are considerably decreased. When men are organized by industry, they can concentrate their economic power more advantageously than when organized into craft unions. It is becoming more and more evident that if unskilled workers are forced to work long hours for low wages, the interests and welfares of skilled workers are menaced. The advantages of industrial unionism are so obvious that one can scarcely conceive of any opposition thereto."

I want to repeat that sentence and give you the man's name: "The advantages of industrial organization are so obvious that one can scarcely conceive of any opposition thereto." The man who made that statement is no one else but William Green, present president of the American Federation of Labor.

In conclusion, we have attempted to show you that it is self-evident that a strong, well-organized labor

organization is for the best interests of the American people. We have proved our minor premise that such organization is possible only with an industrial type of union organization. We are inevitably led to conclude that industrial unionism itself is for the best interest of the United States and should be employed in all collective bargaining negotiations in manufacturing industries.

First Negative, Irwin Glatstein
University of Missouri

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: At this time I want to welcome Mr. Stark and Mr. Siegal from the great Cathedral of Learning to the plains of Missouri. I regret only one thing, that while I'm playing host to these gentlemen from Pittsburgh I find it necessary to be in such complete disagreement with them. While I was sitting over here and listening to Mr. Stark's speech, I found it was necessary for me to agree with Mr. Stark in his definition of mass-production industries, and his definition of industrial unions. There'll be no argument there on our part. We agree with Mr. Stark, too, in the need of collective bargaining in mass-production industries; but I believe there will be a little doubt, a hesitation to agree that collective bargaining in mass-production industries shall be carried on by non-company industrial unions. I can also, at this time, thank Mr. Stark for his history of labor organization as it is established to-day, and I can thank him also for saving me the trouble of pointing out a great many of the weaknesses of craft unions, but it

is my purpose to show you the weaknesses of industrial unions.

Now, beneath all these statistics that Mr. Stark has given you and beneath all this rhetoric, I could find only one contention that Mr. Stark is basing his case upon, and that is: the need of the workers in the mass-production industries for some form of collective bargaining, and there's no question concerning that. We of the Negative insist upon some form of collective bargaining. Mr. Stark, however, seems to believe that the solution of labor difficulties is in the industrial union. Exactly what form of labor union is best suited to solve all these labor difficulties I will propose a bit later. But at this time I shall attempt to concentrate on parts of Mr. Stark's speech and see what I can do with that. No one can deny that conditions vary from plant to plant and from industry to industry, and it seems to me that with such varying conditions it is foolhardy to set up a single form of collective bargaining within these industries. We must have some form of bargaining which will be beneficial to the majority of the workers; yet the industrial unions insist that all the workers be organized according to a common mean. There is to be no fluctuation. All organization is to be according to the strict rule until the mass revolts and puts the worker out.

Mr. Stark himself has referred to the intricacies connected with labor in the mass-production industries. In automobile manufacture, in spite of Mr. Stark's statement, there are still some thirty or forty crafts within that organization. There are the painters, for

instance, and the upholsterers, and the automobile mechanics, and the electricians, and a great many others. And yet Mr. Stark would have a single agency bargain collectively for all these various crafts, insisting that if they allow the crafts to bargain for themselves there will be jurisdictional disputes. There will be too much friction. Progress in industry will be halted. Now, so far as I've been able to figure out this problem, by concentrating the right to bargain collectively in one man, all that will be accomplished is that all this bickering for the various industries is going to be carried on by one individual. The amount of bickering cannot be stopped. These men must be played one against the other, because that's the way collective bargaining is carried on. The employer tries to give as little as is possible, and the employee tries to get as much as he can conveniently inveigle away.

This leads me to my next indictment of industrial unions. Industrial unions depend upon unity of support. Unity of support is the life-blood of industrial unions. And unity of support is unobtainable in industrial unions. I hope it isn't necessary to remind you that we are dealing with living men and women, we're not dealing with wooden figures. Thirty or forty crafts within an industry indicate thirty or forty temperaments. Individuals have different points of view, different outlooks. In a polyglot membership, dissension and disharmony are inevitable. And dissension and disharmony are going to play the death knell of industrial unions if I may take the privilege of making a prediction.

These are, of course, but a few of the indictments against industrial unions. However, they are factors in mass-production industry, and being factors in mass-production industry, they must be taken into consideration by any organization which plans or intends to carry on collective bargaining in those industries. However, since the industrial union is the antonym of democracy, we believe that it should be swept from the American scene.

A study of the constitution of the United Mine Workers, which both Mr. Stark and Mr. Siegal will be familiar with, will show you exactly what I mean. We look at article two, section two and we see that the executive of the United Mine Workers must approve all measures, that he fills by appointments (subject to no control but his own) all vacancies in the International Board, and further, that he may create these vacancies by suspending any International officer for insubordination or, if you want more specific terms, as the constitution says: "for just and sufficient cause." And, moreover, any attempt to stop this action on the part of the president may be very conveniently stopped by him, for he is the man who appoints the committee which must approve and pass upon all suggestions, legislation, and amendments to the constitution. Now, we find further, in article ten, section one, that the president of the United Mine Workers has the sole power to order and recall strikes. In other words, the president of the United Mine Workers is the sole organization, and may God help the poor mine workers if they happen to have, mind you, a president incapable or

dishonest or with whom it is impossible to arbitrate, for there is no local autonomy.

This all harks back to the old question of whether we should be governed by laws or whether we should be governed by men. In 1917, by making the world safe for democracy, it was decided that we should be governed by laws and not be governed by the president of the C. I. O.

It has been demonstrated time and time again that the industrial union seeks to set itself up as the sole bargaining agent of the laborers, despite the wishes of the workers themselves. It is not news to you that a great many of the strikes of the past few years have come from the outside, representing a nation-wide struggle for concentration of power and a complete disregard for the will of the worker himself. The General Motors strike of 1936 and 1937 has shown you exactly what this minority of workers has been able to force upon the American public. At one time during that strike, 110,000 of the 135,000 Detroit workers protested and petitioned against being thrown out of work. That strike was costing the workers a million dollars a day in lost purchasing power, needlessly, for the union was insisting upon one point all the time on which the General Motors did not agree. General Motors conceded every point to the union except one, that the union should be the bargaining agent for those who did not wish it to be their representative. That point could have been settled during the first week of arbitration.

More flagrantly, we can see where the union, where the minority in the mass-production industry—and in

this particular example in the Flint plants of Fisher Bodies, was responsible for 50 men sitting down, throwing 14,600 men out on strike; and that, of course, is incompatible with our ideals of the rule of the majority. I could go on and give illustration after illustration. I could probably call upon any of you sitting in the audience and you could give me an example along identical lines. You've all been able to see what less than fifteen per cent of the organized workers have cost the consuming public.

Industrial unions have, within their jurisdictions, all the workers of competing employers, so far as one product is concerned. Mr. Stark seems to believe that a strong organization will stabilize production and minimize strikes. Now the definition implies that there must be a representative from each craft or from each skill within the industry. Admittedly, membership in industrial unions must be voluntary. After all we are a United States, a democratic country. Now membership in this organization, if I may repeat myself once more, being voluntary, any craft may withdraw from that union as a result of being consistently over-ruled by a majority of unskilled workers and being used by them for the purposes known only to the unskilled group. The craft unions will withdraw, and have withdrawn, and when such a thing happens, the industrial union is no longer in existence. This has been demonstrated by the Allis-Chalmers case, the Waterbury craft workers, and the Worthington Pump case, to refer but to a few of the cases, in which the skilled workers, finding it impossible to work along with the industrial

unions, and finding it to their disadvantage to work along with them, have withdrawn. Their withdrawal, of course, has brought about a complete collapse of the industrial unionism, and there we have the whole question of collective bargaining to contend with again. I believe it may be seen that Mr. Black and I are not in sympathy with either the craft or the industrial unions, and I believe the arguments I have brought forth this evening will show you why. And it is for that reason we have evolved a series of principles upon which we insist all unions in the mass-production industries must be based.

In the first place we insist upon a union organization which will do the greatest good to the greatest number. After all, there are some hundred and thirty million consumers in the United States. Let's think of them, instead of a very, very small per cent of the workers. The industrial union, by definition, by actual practice, does not take these people into consideration. We insist upon a union organization which will be conducted along democratic lines, in which the workers themselves will determine the structure of their organization to fit their own needs and to their own best advantage—this, the industrial union does not do.

We insist upon a union organization which will be free from politics. One which will allow the worker to maintain and freely exercise his franchise. This, the industrial union will not let him do.

We insist upon union organization which will allow the employer to maintain standards of efficiency, rather than standards—if you can call them such—of the pos-

session of a union card. This, of course, the industrial union cannot permit. The source of power of industrial unions rests with their ability to hold the employee's job and to protect him from the inroads of efficiency and the younger man.

We insist, finally, upon an organization which will use reason as an argument rather than the big-stick. Mass economic pressure cannot be expected to carry a labor union very far, even in the mass-production industries. We of the Negative believe that the setup must be far more intellectual, and we insist that any organization which shall carry on collective bargaining in the mass-production industries must be in conformance with the principles which we have just set up, and it stands to reason that the industrial union does not conform to these principles.

Introduction by the Chairman

Mr. Robert Black, of the University of Missouri, will now conduct the cross-examination of Mr. Stark of the University of Pittsburgh.

Negative Cross-Examination, Mr. Robert Black University of Missouri

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Mr. Stark, before we become futher embroiled in the heat of the conflict here, let us review a few of the points on which we of the Negative are thoroughly in accord with the gentlemen of the Affirmative. For instance, your

definition of the term "industrial union" includes a majority of all the classifications of workers in and around a given industry. An industrial union actually is described as one which includes all the workers of a particular industry enrolled under one union. In other words, your industrial union includes a majority from the unskilled workers?

STARK: They aren't divided as to skilled and unskilled. It's a division as to a whole industry.

BLACK: Well, the majority of a whole industry . . . in other words, suppose we should have fifty skilled workers in an industry, and a hundred and fifty unskilled workers should have sole bargaining power for the fifty skilled ones. Is that correct?

STARK: If they belonged to one union, one hundred and one workers in that particular plant should have the sole bargaining right.

BLACK: No matter what their occupation?

STARK: Whether they are skilled or unskilled!

BLACK: Now I started out here to review the points on which we were at accord, but it seems we differ already. Do these bargaining agents which the unions send out—they are, of course, familiar with the problems of both the unskilled worker, which, in this case we outlined and with the different classifications of the skilled workers? Now, for the skilled workers—let's say there are ten different classifications of skills: upholstering, pattern-making, and so on. Now the bargaining agency is going to be thoroughly familiar with the problems which confront each particular classification of skills?

STARK: That seems to have worked out in industrial unions up to now.

BLACK: Where do you secure these bargaining representatives? They must have unusual ability to be so familiar. . . .

STARK: You must understand that collective bargaining is not necessarily carried on by one individual. There may be representatives of as many as five or six individuals, departments, or plants, sitting down to write a contract with five or six members of the management.

BLACK: Possibly as many individuals as there are crafts represented?

STARK: Oh, likely and . . .

BLACK: Oh! (Laughter.)

STARK: That's a possibility, in other words.

BLACK: Well, of course when we have this collective bargaining conference between the employer and the employee—rather the representatives of the employee—there isn't, under your conditions, the plan for asking the man representing the industrial union to give way for one classification; that is, he might not gain sufficient concessions for the pattern-makers, say, if he gets a certain concession for the unskilled workers—he's likely to slight one particular classification isn't he, in order to achieve his ultimate end?

STARK: Well, anything is possible and that certainly is possible.

BLACK: I agree with you that anything is possible when you have one man representing forty diversified interests.

STARK: And forty individuals, particularly.

BLACK: You have had some experience in union organization, haven't you?

STARK: I believe I might say that I have.

BLACK: You are familiar, then, with industrial unionism and you can tell what the average result is of the wage differential when we have skilled and unskilled workers in the same union. Now what is the average result? Is that wage differential decreased or increased?

STARK: Usually the wage differential is lowered. That is, the unskilled workers tend to get a higher wage than they did under craft organization, or no organization at all.

BLACK: Well, then, in view of that fact, who would you say would be the least anxious to enter an industrial union—the unskilled worker or the skilled worker?

STARK: Well, that's hard to say. An unskilled worker goes in because he thinks he is going to get strength; the skilled worker goes in because he has strength. The skilled worker may have more intelligence, or he may not; there are many conditions and we can't generalize.

BLACK: All right, if we can't generalize, let's just drop that point temporarily here. Do you know that in the past three months there have been a number of cases in which just this development we have been discussing has been brought out? For instance, the Worthington Pump case and the Allis-Chalmers case . . .

STARK: A question . . . where was the Worthington Pump case? I never heard of that.

BLACK: Well, I'll review it for you. It came before the National Labor Relations Board. In the Worthington Pump case, the pattern-makers petitioned the National Labor Relations Board, and requested that they be allowed a separate bargaining agency. Now they were formerly in the S. W. O. C. which is an industrial union . . .

STARK: Yes. Yes, it is. Are you sure the Worthington Pump case came in there? I'll take your word for it.

BLACK: Yes, if you don't believe me I'll show you the case. And the National Labor Relations Board granted these pattern-makers permission to be represented by the Pattern-Makers Association. Now here you have a group of workers being represented by the S. W. O. C. and another group by the Pattern-Makers Association. Now we dare not have industrial unionism existing there do we, because we have two different bargaining agencies for that particular industry?

STARK: I'll give you a case where the reverse worked out . . .

BLACK: Well, wait a minute. Will you just agree (laughter) with my statement here?

STARK: How many pattern-makers were there?

BLACK: In that case there were seventy-two pattern-makers. Sixty-nine petitioned to be represented by the pattern-makers.

STARK: How many other workers were there in the plant?

BLACK: I don't have that in mind. But, nevertheless, the point is this, we have two separate bargaining agencies.

STARK: Just a moment for a question of fact. Do we have two separate bargaining agencies?

BLACK: One classification is withdrawn, and according to your definition all classifications must be represented in industrial unions. Is that not right?

STARK: Well, I'm afraid that according to the definition I gave you it would seem to be.

BLACK: Well, then, we no longer have an industrial union in such cases as this, do we?

STARK: What about the other workers? Wouldn't they be in an industrial union?

BLACK: Well, they would be in one. But how could there be any industrial union existing according to your definition? You said it must include a majority from each classification.

STARK: From each industry. You tried to get me to make that statement. I refuse to admit that. (Laughter.)

BLACK: Nevertheless, we have these classifications existing, and each represented by a separate bargaining agency. Under the definition you gave, I understood that a real industrial union had to include a majority of each classification of unskilled workers and skilled workers.

STARK: Now I believe I said it was a majority of all the workers in a particular . . .

BLACK: Well, then, let's not drag this out.

STARK: All right! All right!

BLACK: It's not, according to the definition, is it, a simon-pure industrial union? Isn't that what you would call a quasi-industrial union?

STARK: No. I'll cite you an economist to back up my definition.

BLACK: Well, I agree that there is a pure industrial union and a quasi-industrial union, and craft unions, but I believe that you're trying to draw out a brief that will cause argument. However, we'll drop this point for the moment. Do you believe in the responsibility of the individual for his legal contract?

STARK: I certainly do.

BLACK: Do you believe in the responsibility of a corporation for its responsibility to a contract?

STARK: Yes.

BLACK: Well, then, you must believe in the responsibility of a labor union for its contract.

STARK: I do.

BLACK: Are you familiar with the General Motors strike in Detroit in 1937?

STARK: Yes.

BLACK: Do you recall at that time a contract signed in good faith between the General Motors Company and the United Automobile Workers?

STARK: I think that happened.

BLACK: And in the next six months there were two hundred strikes in that plant after this contract had been signed?

STARK: And what happened after the six months? There wasn't a single one.

BLACK: But what about the six months? Is that indicative of responsibility?

STARK: Well, that is just a development—a growing pain of industrial organization.

BLACK: A growing pain? Well, how do we know that these growing pains are ever going to cease?

STARK: They did cease in the automobile industry, specifically.

BLACK: They ceased in the middle of 1937. For all that we know they may be resumed at any time.

STARK: The contracts, or charters of industrial unions now include specific penalties against wild-cat strikes.

BLACK: And while we're on this subject of contracts, you gave quite a scathing indictment of the American Federation of Labor's refusing to be so democratic as to allow certain local unions to vote at a convention.

STARK: That was a Carpenters' Convention and they were planing workers of the Northwest.

BLACK: A carpenter's union. And was that a mass-production industry?

STARK: No. But I just introduced that as evidence of how the craft unions worked.

BLACK: Mr. Stark, under this General Motors strike, to return to it . . . those were duly constituted industrial union authorities who terminated that strike, were they not—and signed the contract?

STARK: Yes.

BLACK: And there were two hundred strikes? You conceded that.

STARK: Yes, I think that is right.

BLACK: You think that can happen in a well-constructed union with recognizable responsibilities?

STARK: A well-constructed union?

BLACK: A union of sound construction.

STARK: No.

BLACK: Well, that was the United Automobile Workers—one of your industrial unions.

STARK: I know. But look at the United Mine Workers where the opposite facts were the case. An old union which has been established for years doesn't find these same conditions existing.

BLACK: Well, (laughter) these United Mine Workers whom you uphold here, their responsibility is pretty great, isn't it? They're established?

STARK: Yes.

BLACK: You advanced as a point the rapid growth of industrial unions. I know you cited a number of statistics on it, and cited the rapid growth of the industrial union. Would you be willing to take oath—now you've had some actual experiences there—now would you be willing to swear that to the best of your knowledge and the factors which have come to your attention, every member of an industrial union is taken in only because he pays his dues and fulfills requirements? Would you certify that the dues are collected in every case?

STARK: Not in every case. You mean when they first join?

BLACK: Yes.

STARK: I wouldn't say every case to anything.

BLACK: Don't they make concessions to some people?

STARK: I imagine in cases of unemployment they don't insist——

BLACK: Well, in the case of employment, do they always insist on the payment of dues?

STARK: They always insist upon the payment of the dues, and if it is possible, they collect them if a man is working.

BLACK: You have heard contentions to the contrary, haven't you?

STARK: No, I haven't.

BLACK: Now you stated—I'm not sure that I understand you on one of your principal points—I can't believe that I did. You stated that mass production is doing away with skilled workers. Is that your belief?

STARK: That is my belief. If they haven't been done away with, they will be very shortly.

BLACK: That under mass production we're going to have no skilled workers? That it is absolutely going to do away with them?

STARK: Skilled work is gradually being replaced by machines.

BLACK: Well now, these men that handle these machines, don't they have to have some degree of skill? Those machines don't run by themselves.

STARK: Of course they don't. But this skill can be acquired inside of two or three weeks.

BLACK: Now you've read a number of economists, no doubt, on this subject. Have you ever come across the work of Stuart Chase?

STARK: Yes, I have.

BLACK: You have read his book, *Men and Machines*?

STARK: I've read parts of it . . . not the whole book.

BLACK: How do you reconcile your belief with his that mechanization is increasing the proportion of skilled workers?

STARK: I don't attempt to reconcile it.

BLACK: Well, that's only his opinion, isn't it?
(Laughter.)

STARK: Yes, and mine is only my personal opinion.

BLACK: That's your personal opinion that they're being decreased, and it's his opinion they're being increased.

STARK: I'll give you books to show that they are being decreased.

BLACK: Thank you, Mr. Stark. Ladies and gentlemen, we of the Negative in this case believe that collective bargaining in mass-production industries should not be carried on by non-company industrial unions. Now we've had statistics thrown in our faces.

Mr. Stark's use of statistics reminds me of the drunken-man's use of the light post, it is for support rather than for illumination. If he is intending to make his point and to show you the general all-around usefulness and efficiency of an organization, maintaining that rapid growth is a criterion, why even we could cite you such organizations. From the standpoint of rapid growth we have the K. K. K. and the Townsend Plan, and the I. W. W., but where are those organizations today? Why, they're as dead as mackerels. Yet they have the requirements, if rapid growth is to be the only

requirement to prove the merit of an industrial organization or a collective bargaining agent. However, I can't say that in all cases, because Mr. Stark has himself admitted that responsibility is also one of the prime requisites of any union.

Now what has there been in the history of the industrial union to show responsibility besides the record of the United Mine Workers group? Look at the record of the Automobile Workers Association, and look at the records of the hundreds of other cases where employers refused to bargain with the industrial unions because they can't take them at their word. They believe that if they sign a contract in good faith it won't be carried out by the union. They certainly have a number of examples to prove that their attitude in this case is a logical one.

My colleague, Mr. Glatstein, advanced the contention that industrial unions were entirely undemocratic in principle and in origin. It would seem that there is much evidence for this, witnessing much concentration of power in the hands of one man.

Now we know that this is no debate to determine the relative value of the C. I. O. and the A. F. of L. but, nevertheless, the C. I. O. is an association of industrial unions and it is a well-known fact that a number, the majority of the contracts signed and held by John Lewis, expire on the same day. I'm not trying to say that he doesn't intend to renew those contracts, but if he should call a general nation-wide strike, imagine the position of power of one man. Nor I did not hear our adversaries

mention the effect of these unions upon the consumer or upon the employer, the industrialist.

Of course, there are only a hundred and twenty million consumers in the country—a hundred and twenty-eight million, to be more precise—and I suppose there are nearly thirty million workmen, so perhaps the consumers' interest in this matter doesn't count. Perhaps the fact that this strife caused by the conflict of two different types of unions which results in wide-spread areas of industrial conflict is extremely deleterious to the public safety and ultimately results in the raising of commodity prices which the consumer pays in the end, perhaps that is not important; perhaps the consumer has no place in this question. Perhaps the demand of the power-inflamed industrial union leaders upon the already harrassed employers and industrialists will not break their backs, and our entire economic system will not fall down if they are allowed to continue their way unchecked.

We believe that there is only one sure criterion for the guidance of our steps in the future and that is our experience of the past. And what has there been indicated in the entire history of the American labor movement to indicate the permanent stability, the lasting effectiveness, and the general all-around morality and responsibility of the industrial type union?

**Affirmative Cross-Examination, Ben Siegal
University of Pittsburgh**

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I deem it a great honor to be able to appear before you this evening and defend the case of industrial unionism against the case of craft unionism as presented by the members of the University of Missouri debate team. Now I've been treated very royally here and it's a bad policy, they say, to disagree with your host. But I'm sorry—this is one time, as they would say—I'm from Missouri and I want to be shown.

Now, Mr. Glatstein, you stated, did you not, that conditions vary from plant to plant and from industry to industry? You at the time stated that, in order to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement, one man must necessarily negotiate that agreement for industrial unions, is that right?

GLATSTEIN: One agent.

SIEGAL: One agent. Do you know how collective bargaining agreements in industrial unionisms are negotiated, Mr. Glatstein?

GLATSTEIN: Well, from my reading of the matter, it seems that one negotiator sits down and he attempts to get as much as possible, usually fails, and they send another man to satisfy the capitalist, and he sits down and attempts to . . .

SIEGAL: Let me interrupt you. (Laughter.) I don't think you know how collective bargaining is negotiated in sound industrial unions, Mr. Glatstein. In fact, collective bargaining in industrial unions is nego-

tiated by members, maybe of different groups within that industry, with the employer of that industry, who take into account conditions of work within that varied industry. That is how collective bargaining is negotiated in mass-production industry, Mr. Glatstein, if you would look up in any form the agreements negotiated by the S. W. O. C., the U. A. W.—the U. A. W. is the United Automobile Workers—the United Mine Workers, and every other large industrial union within the country.

Now, Mr. Glatstein, you said that industrial unions depend upon unity of support, did you not?

GLATSTEIN: I did.

SIEGAL: You said that within an industrial union you would have dissension and disharmony that would be inevitable, did you not?

GLATSTEIN: I did seem to bear out that contention.

SIEGAL: Now, let me ask you another question. Are you interested in industrial peace, Mr. Glatstein?

GLATSTEIN: I certainly am.

SIEGAL: That's fine! Now will you tell me how you are going to get industrial peace when you have said, by your own statement, that thirty or forty different craft unions would be slated against one another in negotiating wage agreements? Can you tell me how you are going to get industrial peace, Mr. Glatstein?

GLATSTEIN: It certainly won't be done by letting one agent bargain collectively for thirty or forty different unions.

SIEGAL: I have had varied experience with industrial unions. One agent does not in any case negotiate

a collective bargaining agreement with any employer within an industrial union.

GLATSTEIN: If you have more than one agent bargaining collectively, then you no longer have an industrial union. You have a series of, as Mr. Black has said, quasi-industrial unions.

SIEGAL: I beg your pardon. An industrial union is a form by which one contract is negotiated for all the workers in the industry. We take in consideration, ladies and gentlemen, that an industrial union contract must also have wage differentials, and in order to get these wage differentials, they have different men from different parts of the industry with varied amounts of skill negotiating the wage contract. That is how the wage contract was negotiated in the United Automobile Workers, which is definitely an industrial unit. Now, Mr. Glatstein, you said that industrial unions do not have a system of democracy within them, did you not?

GLATSTEIN: I believe my answer based on the constitution of the United Mine Workers of America will bear that out.

SIEGAL: Do you know, Mr. Glatstein, how Mr. Hutchinson of the Carpenters' Union worked for his workers? Do you think that there's democracy within that union, Mr. Glatstein?

GLATSTEIN: I believe that we're debating industrial unions. I'm not attempting to set up a support of craft unions.

SIEGAL: Oh, then, Mr. Glatstein, then you are definitely opposed to strong unionism in the United States?

GLATSTEIN: On the contrary, I insist upon it.

SIEGAL: Well, then, how are you going to get it if you are not defending craft unions, and at the same time saying industrial unions . . .

GLATSTEIN: I set up a series of seven principles and any union which can answer those principles will have a union organization.

SIEGAL: Then any union which cannot answer those principles should not be in the United States. Is that right?

GLATSTEIN: I believe that contention true.

SIEGAL: Can you name me a union which does conform with your principles, Mr. Glatstein?

GLATSTEIN: There was a time, too, when everyone thought the world was square.

SIEGAL: Oh, I don't care. That makes no difference to me. (Laughter.) Ladies and gentlemen, he says—in the first place he makes the statement—that he wants strong union organization. In the second place, he's defending craft organizations. In the third place, he tells you that craft organization does not conform to his principles. And, in the fourth place, he comes back and says that he wants strong organization.

Now I want to know how he is going to get strong organization when we've definitely proved that industrial unions, where they have been tried, have increased in the time of three years to 4,000,000 workers—the largest labor organization within the United States. Now, Mr. Glatstein, you said that whenever there are several industrial unions the workers should decide for themselves what type of unions they want to belong to. Is that right—in support of craft unionization—that is?

GLATSTEIN: Well, not in support of craft unionization. But I . . .

SIEGAL: You say that workers should decide what type of organization they should belong to, is that right?

GLATSTEIN: Be it craft or industrial!

SIEGAL: That's fine. Did you ever hear of the General Steel-Craft case, Mr. Glatstein? That was in Granite City, Illinois.

GLATSTEIN: I heard a few . . .

SIEGAL: Do you know what happened there?

GLATSTEIN: I'm not acquainted with . . .

SIEGAL: Well, then, I'll tell you.

GLATSTEIN: All right, you do that. (Laughter.)

SIEGAL: Ladies and gentlemen, in Granite City, Illinois, there were two forms of organization. There was an industrial union which had about 2,500 members and a craft organization which had about 500 members that had been set up by an election through the N. L. R. B. which decided that the industrial union should be the bargaining agent.

Now do you know, Mr. Glatstein, that just as soon as the workers found out that the industrial union had 2,500 workers whereas the craft union had 500 members, every single member of that craft organization left it and went over to the industrial organization. Now can you tell me how you are deciding that? Aren't you deciding that on the basis of what the workers want to join?

GLATSTEIN: In that case I believe that the industrial union would have been the acceptable form.

SIEGAL: But you said that . . .

GLATSTEIN: In the Allis-Chalmers case, however, the industrial union was not accepted, nor in the Worthington Pump case.

SIEGAL: Well, how about that? I have some more here . . .

GLATSTEIN: So have I. (Laughter.)

SIEGAL: You say in the Allis-Chalmers and the Worthington Pump case that the workers by their general consent should decide upon the form of organization. Now, Mr. Glatstein, can you tell me why the craft unions, after 50 years of experience, have failed to organize the steel, rubber, automobile, textile, and every other form of industry?

GLADSTEIN: In the first place, as I brought out in my constructive speech—or attempted to bring out in my constructive speech—the union must take into consideration the human element if we have the ideal situation.

SIEGAL: Thank you, Mr. Glatstein.

SIEGAL: After all, ladies and gentlemen, it is the purpose of our consideration to include the human factor, but I must ask you to take into consideration specific facts, specific statements, and also specific figures. And we have shown you, as Mr. Stark has shown you, that industrial organization in this country rose to four million members within the slight time of three years, where craft organization within this country increased up until 1919 to about four million five hundred thousand and then started on a decline and never once

since that time has it gotten the numbers that industrial organization has at the present time.

Now you stated that craft unions have withdrawn in special cases from the S. W. O. C. and formed separate craft organizations—that is, groups of workers have withdrawn and formed separate craft organizations, did you not, Mr. Glatstein?

GLATSTEIN: I did.

SIEGAL: Did you know of the United Automobile Workers case in which, in 1933, the United Automobile Workers were granted federated local charters by the American Federation of Labor? And that these local charters set up industrial unions? And there were fifty-two of them formed? And did you know that in 1935 the craft unions within the A. F. of L. decided to raid these federated locals? And do you know that everyone of these fifty-two locals was killed because of raids by craft unions? How do you explain that situation, Mr. Glatstein?

GLATSTEIN: Do you really expect me to explain everything that has happened in the labor situation in America? There are a lot of things connected with labor that I cannot explain. However, as I said in my constructive speech, and as I say here, I reiterate that we are not defending craft unions. This is a discussion upon industrial unions. We are pointing out the defects of industrial unionism.

SIEGAL: That's fine! Will you state the question for me, Mr. Glatstein?

GLATSTEIN: Resolved, that collective bargaining in

the mass-production industries should be conducted by non-company industrial unions.

SIEGAL: That's fine! Now will you tell me this one fact, then? How can collective bargaining be carried on—will you please tell me—without one of these two forms of organization?

GLATSTEIN: Why, yes. By the company union.

SIEGAL: You're defending company unions, Mr. Glatstein?

GLATSTEIN: By no means.

SIEGAL: Well, then, why do you say . . .

GLATSTEIN: Of course we have the quasi-industrial union which may be part craft or part industrial.

SIEGAL: You're defending that, Mr. Glatstein?

GLATSTEIN: No. I'm naming the system of union organization which the workers themselves in any particular plant decide is necessary and to their advantage, and I'm defending no other union organization.

SIEGAL: Why, there are only two types of union organization, ladies and gentlemen. There is craft-union organization and there is industrial-union organization. We're defending industrial-union organization. Surely Mr. Glatstein has to be defending craft-union organization, or amalgamated craft, or quasi-industrial as he says. I really can't believe that.

GLATSTEIN: Not necessarily, if you want to quibble about the interpretation of the term, I'm willing to do that.

SIEGAL: No, it's not quibbling. I said that you must defend one or the other points, Mr. Glatstein.

GLATSTEIN: That's your point of view. We're try-

ing to point out the weaknesses inherent in industrial unionism. We admit that in some phases such as the United Mine Workers where the conditions are peculiar to no other form of industry—where the conditions of the miners who are isolated, are different from any experienced by other workers.

SIEGAL: Yes, this is the argument I think you mean. Can you name a manufacturing industry in which you want to have a craft organization? In which you are opposed to industrial organization? Just one.

GLATSTEIN: Why, yes.

SIEGAL: Which one?

GLATSTEIN: Why, the United Automobile Workers.

SIEGAL: That's fine! Now you are opposed to industrial union organization in the United Automobile Workers because you think the automobile workers should decide which union they should join?

GLATSTEIN: Why, yes.

SIEGAL: Didn't you know—didn't I cite to you the case of fifty-two federal locals in which there was an industrial formed and just as soon as the craft unions attempted to raid it, the fifty-two locals were killed? Did you know there was an organization of four hundred thousand within the industrial organization within the U. A. W.? Now how do you reconcile that fact with your defending it from the United Automobile Workers? You say that they should join what they wish. I asked you to tell me one case. Now I've shown you here that they did join what they wished. Is that right?

GLATSTEIN: Well, in that one particular case . . .

SIEGAL: Well, name another one!

GLATSTEIN: Well, if they joined the United Automobile Workers because they thought it to their advantage, then well and good. However, if they joined it through coercion, then, of course, there is some disagreement. If they were allowed membership in that organization through non-payment of dues and suspension of initiation fees, then that is something else to take into consideration.

SIEGAL: Ladies and gentlemen, I don't think there is any further argument on that point. Just one more question, and that is: You say that the Ku Klux Klan has been an organization which flourished and then failed, the Townsend Plan, and also the I. W. W. Will you tell me if the I. W. W. is an industrial organization?

GLATSTEIN: I believe that it was an industrial organization.

SIEGAL: It was, or it was not?

GLATSTEIN: It was.

SIEGAL: Define for me an industrial organization.

GLATSTEIN: My definition of an industrial organization is that which conducts collective bargaining for all the employees in an industry . . .

SIEGAL: That's enough. "In an industry" . . . do you know . . .

GLATSTEIN: Pardon me, will you let me finish my definition?

SIEGAL: I'm sorry. Go ahead.

GLATSTEIN: . . . in an industry producing any particular object.

SIEGAL: Industrial organization in an industry producing any particular object?

GLATSTEIN: Yes.

SIEGAL: Do you know that the I. W. W. took in workers from every type of industry? Then how can you say that the I. W. W. is an industrial organization?

GLATSTEIN: Well, the C. I. O. seems to be doing the same thing.

SIEGAL: I beg your pardon. The C. I. O., the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, the Automobile Workers take in workers in automobiles, steel, and every other form; but the I. W. W. would take into one big union, workers in automobiles, steel—from any of them, that is. This is the type of union form which we are not defending this evening. The gentleman is talking about something different from what the proposition states. Thank you, Mr. Glatstein, that is all.

I just want to say one thing, that the gentlemen from Missouri this evening have said that they want strong organization but they have declined to defend any specific form of organization. We have shown you that the only way you can get strong organization is by strong industrial unions, and we have shown you that the growth of these strong industrial unions is caused, not because of coercion, but because of the desire of the worker to join an organization which can protect his interest, and that is exactly what industrial organization has done for American labor; and craft organization has failed after fifty years of organization even to crack any one of the mass-production industries. I just want to remind you of one thing before I sit down

and that is, remember that we have not debated the C. I. O. versus the A. F. of L. We have debated the policies of craft unionism versus the policies of industrial unionism.

Chairman's Introduction

We are now to have the opportunity to hear comments on the subject for debate this evening by three members of the faculty of the University of Missouri. First, we will hear from Professor R. S. Bauder of the School of Business and Public Administration.

Panel Speech by Professor Russell S. Bauder

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I am glad that it is not necessary for me to take a position in this matter. I would like to make the observation that those persons interested in the development of social organization are now able to observe a most interesting experiment, the question of industrial unions.

The first requisite of successful labor organization is stable, permanent, cohesive membership. If there is any one characteristic of American labor history, it is the tendency towards separatism—towards pulling apart. Up until 1890 the history of trade-unionism in the United States is one of trade-union activity in periods of recovery and Utopia-hunting in periods of depression. Organization had to be started afresh with each period of industrial recovery and the trade-unions

had to invent some formula for developing stability of organization.

The old cigar makers under Adolph Strasser and Samuel Gompers probably did more than any other one organization for developing this formula—stability of organization—whether industrial or craft. The formula which they developed was one of high dues and benefits—“pure and simple unionism” as they called it. The idea of high dues and policy was to increase the number of contacts between the wage-earner and his union. He was supposed to pay high dues and in return for those high dues he was supposed to secure certain benefits in the form of what might be called social insurance—chiefly, sickness and death benefits. Very few unions experimented extensively with unemployment insurance. As a condition of remaining in good standing and being able to receive those benefits, it was necessary that they continue to pay dues. With that formula of high dues and benefits, trade-unionism went through the depression of the “nineties” with a loss of membership but with their organizations intact. That formula was not available for the industrial unions. It was not possible for the workers whose pay was low, because they could not pay enough in dues.

Those industrial unions which have been successful have had to find some formula to hold the membership together. Otherwise they would be in the situation that anthracite coal unionism faced in the opening period of the century—10 per cent of the membership paying dues, but when it came to a real issue, 90 per cent standing with the union. Obviously that is not stability.

The United Mine Workers were probably the first of the industrial unions to find a solution to that difficulty. They found it in the very easy answer of the check-off. The employer signs the workers into the union by paying their dues, deducting the amount from the wages. If you worked in the union mines, you were a member and that was an end of it. The employer forwarded the dues to the union office. The problem of organizing was no longer serious. It was relatively easy to secure the check-off in the coal industry because it was already used for powder charges, for grocery bills, for housing, and for numerous other things.

The next type of union to evolve stability was in the needle trades. There you had in the large industrial centers a group of workers who were Socialists. They went Communist, of course, when Russia went Communist. But it was a group of Socialists who were already class-conscious. And that class-consciousness gave them the cohesion, the stability which would permit them to stick together. With the new industrial unions, none of these choices are available. They must, therefore, find some new kind of formula.

Their experiments with the problem, under the sponsorship of the class-conscious unions, are most interesting. They are attempting to make their trade-union something more than a bargaining institution. They are trying to make them social institutions. They are trying to make the unions cover everything the workers desire, not only work and bargaining, but recreation and self-expression. Perhaps the outstanding example of this is the production by the International Ladies

Garment Workers of a play on Broadway entitled *Needles and Pins*. It was not put on, it was not planned as a Broadway production; it was planned to give those members interested in dramatics a chance for self-expression. These new unions are trying that experiment. If it works, industrial unionism is with us to stay, not altogether, but in those industries where we have it. If it does not work, industrial unionism probably will break apart, as many organizations have in the past.

Panel Speech of Professor O. R. Johnson

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: In following Professor Bauder in the discussion of the subject in question, I appreciate that I am distinctly a layman. Mr. Bauder has studied the labor problem for many years. He is, in fact, a specialist in this field. Having been trained in agriculture, particularly in agricultural economics, I am probably too much of an individualist to maintain an unbiased viewpoint in discussing this subject.

To me the beginning of labor organization was an honest attempt and a necessary one to secure for workers some bargaining strength against a highly organized employer group. It does not appear that craft organization has been particularly successful, although it has made many notable improvements in the working conditions for the welfare of the labor group. The vertical type of union involved in the subject in the present discussion has apparently succeeded in mustering greater power in their bargaining with employers. I do not

condemn them for using this power; but I have been hoping that they would show greater intelligence and a more comprehensive understanding of the difficulties involved, particularly a greater appreciation for the nation's stake in this conflict. As I have interpreted their efforts, they seem to be reluctant to give national welfare much consideration.

It seems to me that in the very nature of this type of organization the tendency will be to permit demagogues to control the setup. Anyone who can control the vote of the unskilled and the less well-informed workers can dominate this organization. The evidence up to the present seems to be that this is occurring and that the public is the party suffering most. The leadership they have mustered so far shows little appreciation of the economics involved. Unless this more powerful organization and the employer interest, which they are opposing, generate a better understanding of the public welfare aspects of their conflict, there really is serious danger that their greater success may lead to serious consequences for the public. One can scarcely generate much enthusiasm or optimism for a movement which gains power as rapidly as that which has been secured by the committee for industrial organization. Generally, power secured thus rapidly will not be very intelligently directed and may easily become dangerous. In some other countries, federal control over the exercise of such powers has been found necessary. Here the Federal Government has seemed to encourage the granting of greater and greater powers to such loosely directed groups.

There are unquestionably some serious weaknesses in this new form of labor organization. If we can eliminate those weaknesses, great good can be accomplished. Labor needs more effective bargaining power than it has had up to date, particularly in the unskilled trades.

The very fact that it is possible for the unskilled and less well-informed to dominate the labor organization seems to me to indicate that this setup might easily become a national menace. If we can eliminate this danger, that the uninformed will dominate, and so conduct this vertical union that the more level-headed will still direct their activities, a great gain will have been accomplished. We certainly need more effective cooperation between labor and capital in our industrial and merchandising fields. Present conditions indicate that there is danger that less cooperation will be realized. If this is the result, it will be very unfortunate for our national well-being. To me, an outsider, it seems impossible to secure through bargaining any great improvement when the bargainers are not fully familiar with all the conditions surrounding the industry. Therefore, representatives to bargain for a labor group should, it would seem, come from that labor group rather than from some outside organization. If representatives of such a labor group are chosen from among their own numbers, and if this vertical type of organization can bring together the crafts and the unskilled workers, and if their direction is still left in the hands of the more intelligent of the entire group, then great gains should be realized. But if a group of workers is represented by outsiders who know nothing of conditions within the

organization, we have then introduced a factor which seems to lead inevitably to lower efficiency in dealings between employer and employees, and the public will have to pay the bill.

Panel Speech of Professor Elmer Ellis

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: It is notable that in the discussion this evening all speakers seem to have been agreed that the organization of labor is desirable. We have come to accept as a people the idea that an organized, efficient, and disciplined labor movement is a very desirable thing.

Looking at the discussion to-night, I felt that the case for the industrial union might have been put in different fashion in this way: the general acceptance of the desirability of organizing labor has been due, I think, to the general acceptance of the desirability of raising the standard of living of the groups that are on the lower levels now. One of the largest groups here is that which we label as unskilled labor. One of the great arguments against the industrial union is that those skilled employees who enjoy a semi-monopoly position under the craft-union organization, do not enjoy quite so much of that advantage under the industrial union. This seems to me to be one of the overlooked arguments for the industrial union. That is, the pressure for increasing income goes where we think it ought to go—to increasing the standard of living of those who get the least in the form of real wages.

Referring to the main question, one must admit the

possibility of Professor Bauder's suggestion that our present industrial unions may be merely temporary. On the other side, however, it is true that we have never really tried it before. The I. W. W. did, in its later stages, attempt to become a group of industrial unions, but for the most part it did not really succeed in organizing anyone but part of the migratory labor groups which are the hardest kind of unskilled labor to organize and the worst kind to keep organized. In spite of this, we have never really tried to organize our mass-production industries into industrial unions, to say nothing of succeeding to the degree that the C. I. O. has. With another depression it may go the way of the Knights of Labor and the I. W. W. But only time can decide this, and certainly there are enough new factors in the situation to make an analogy to these historic organizations very questionable.

It certainly seems safe to conclude that craft unions as a type organization have failed to organize our mass-production industries in any substantial way. Their successes have been in other types of labor. They have helped their own members; certainly there are no better organized unions anywhere than the present organization in the building trades. But through all our history, unskilled labor has remained unorganized.

With the enactment of the Wagner Act, we have begun a serious attempt at enabling labor to organize those mass-production industries which had not been organized before. This meant the mass-production group, and thus far the success of the C. I. O. has been phenomenal.

I do not know any more than any one else—I am sure, a good deal less than Professor Bauder—what the future has in store for us. But I am sure that if we really are serious about this matter of wanting our labor to have a sound organization, it would be a real tragedy if the organization of the mass-production industries we have to-day would fail.

Chairman's Conclusion

We'll now ask the audience to vote. Will you take time now to fill out your ballot, expressing your judgment as to whether or not the proposition wins—that collective bargaining in mass-production industries should be conducted by a non-company industrial union. You're not expected to vote on the merit of the debaters individually. We'll allow a little time for voting and then the ushers will collect the ballots.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN MASS- PRODUCTION INDUSTRY

PAMPHLETS

- American Academy of Political and Social Science—*Problems of Organized Labor*. 1936. \$2. American Academy.
Foster, W. Z.—*Unionizing Steel*. 1936. p. 46. 5¢. N. Y. Workers Lib.
Foster, W. Z.—*Industrial Unionism*. 1936, p. 58. N. Y. Workers Lib.
Lewis, J. L.—*The Future of Organized Labor*. C.I.O. pamph. No. 2, Wash., D. C. C.I.O. 5¢.
National Industrial Conference Board—*Individual and Collective Bargaining in May, 1934*. 1934. Pa. 50¢. The Board.

National Industrial Conference Board—*Industrial and Collective Bargaining in Public Utilities and on Railroads October, 1934.* 1934. 50¢. The Board.

Official Publication of the C.I.O.—Committee for Industrial Organization, Washington, D. C.

Official Publications of the A.F.L.—American Federation of Labor, Washington, D. C.

Rawlins, Wm. D.—*Wanted—Improved Labor Leadership.* Lexington Avenue Civic Assoc. Inc., 570 Lexington Ave., N. Y.

Stolberg, Benjamin—*Behind the C.I.O.* Scripps-Howard Newspapers, Jan. 14-26, 1938.

Wolman, Leo—*Ebb & Flow in Trade Unionism* N. Y. National Bureau of Economic Research. 1936. 251 pp. \$2.50.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Decisions and Orders of the NLRB. Volume 1 and 2.

U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Education and Labor. Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, parts 1 and 2.

MAGAZINES AND PERIODICALS

American Econ. Review.—27:4, Mar., '37. *Problem of Structure in American Labor.* P. Taft.

American Scholar.—6 No. 2:180, '37. *C.I.O., A.F. of L.* P. Brissenden.

American Mercury.—41:137, Je., 1937. *J. L. Lewis, His Labor Record.* G. Carroll. 40:196, Feb., '37. *Steel vs. John L. Lewis.*

Business Week.—June 5, 1937; p. 27. *Behind the Battle in Labor.* p. 15, Jan. 30, '37. *New Strategy in Labor War.* p. 13, Mar. 6, '37. *Steel-Labor Unions.* p. 39, Aug. 3, '37. *Washington Labor Capitol: C.I.O. Does the Best Public Relations Job.* p. 13, Mar. 13, '37. *How Many Big Unions? Divided Labor Movement.* p. 14, Mar. 13, '37. *Lewis Sizes Up His Next Foes. Prepares Textile Attack.* p. 20, Feb. 20, '37. *Lewis Turns to Coal.* p. 18, Aug. 10, '37. *C.I.O. Starts Oil Campaign.* p. 16, Mar. 20, '37. *C.I.O. Textile Plans; Hillman, Leading Union Forces Says He Won't Demand More Than Employers Can Pay.* p. 13015, June 12, '37. *C.I.O. Fate Hinges on Steel Strike.*

- Business Week.—p. 18, May 29, '37. *C.I.O. Federation*. p. 17, May 8, '37. *Next, The Steel Independents*. p. 40, May 15, '37. *Pushes Drive on Shore Industries*. p. 15, May 15, '37. *Steel Interprets The Wagner Act*. p. 13, July 3, '37. *Steel Strike Teaches Lesson*. p. 15, July 10, '37. *Labor Fights on New Fronts*. p. 32, May 22, '37. *Behind the Steel Labors News*. p. 27, June 5, '37. *Behind the Steel Strike*.
- Canadian Forum.—17:162, August, 1937. *Chilled Steel: the C.I.O. and Reactions*. M. Farrell.
- Christian Century.—54:929, Jl. 21, '37. *Employer Explains Why Some Refuse to Sign Contracts*. F. H. Selden. 54:645, May 19, '37. *Does the South Need John Lewis, Textile Union Drive Planned*. J. H. Marion Jr.
- Carpenter.—56:206, March, 1936.
- Current History.—46:27, Apr., '37. *Labor Marches Sitting Down*. 46:28, July, '37. *C.I.O. Comes to Canada*. G. Spry. 45:33, Oct., '36. *Toward Indust. Democracy*. Ref. Shelf 11 No. 3. 45:16, Mar., '37. *G.M.C. Versus C.I.O.* 46:61, May, '37. *How the C.I.O. Works*. H. Harris.
- Forum.—98:54, August, '37. *I Am a Labor Organizer*.
- Harper's.—174:642, May, '37. *Labor on the March*. E. Lewinson.
- Liberty.—14:21, Nov. 6, 1937. *Are the Unions Headed for Civil War? Will Irwin (one of a series on Will Labor Seize the Balance of Power?) (Last of series.)*
- Literary Digest.—123:6, Mar. 13, '37. *Steel Bows. Lewis and C.I.O. Break Through the Open Shop Wall*. 123:7, Apr. 17, '37. *\$10 a Day vs. C.I.O. Ford Threat*. 123:4, May 29, '37. *Ford vs. C.I.O.* 123:7, Jan. 9, '37. *C.I.O. Strikes. Lewis's Drive to Organize Auto Industry Ties Up Gen. Motors Plants*. 123:5, Mar. 20, '37. *Happy Lewis: C.I.O. Chief Optimistically Looks Toward New Victories*. 123:9, June 5, '37. *Labor War: A. F. of L. Battle Against Growth of C.I.O.*
- Machinists Monthly Journal.—48:492-3, Aug., '36; 48:139-44, 176-7, Mar., '36; 48:28-31, 46-8, Ja., '36; 47:711-15, Dec., '35.
- Monthly Labor Review.—44:5, Ja., '37. *Organized Labor Movement 1929 to 1937*.
- Nation.—144:298, Mar. 13, '37. *John L. Lewis and Co.* H. Brown. 144:725, July 26, '37. *C.I.O. Far Western Front*. R. L. Neuberger. 145:119, July 31, '37. *Big Steel, Little Steel and C.I.O.* B. Stolberg. 145:31, July 10, '37. *Man of Today*. 145:59, July

- 17, '37. *Violence, Law and Labor*. 144:579, May 22, '37. *Mr. Green's Solidarity*. 144:503, May 1, '37. *Battle of Oshawa*. R. Irwin. 144:203, Feb. 20, '37. *C.I.O. Moves On*. B. Stolberg. New Republic.—90:60, Feb. 24, '37. *C.I.O. Breaks Through*. 90:155, Mar. 17, '37. *Labor's Decisive Victory*. G. Soule. 90:375, May 5, '37. *Steel Signs Up*. M. H. Voise. 91:61, May 26, '37. *A. F. of L. Gets Some Competition*. 91:91, July 2, '37. *Year of C.I.O.* M. H. Voise.
- News Week.—9:5, April 10, '37. *Textiles: C.I.O. Throws Money and Men Into New Drive*. 9:18, Mar. 20, '37. *U.A.W. Closes Chrysler as C.I.O. Girds for Textile War*. 9:7, Mar. 2, '37. *Open Shop Steel Opens a Door to Lewis and C.I.O.* 9:10, Mar. 13, '37. *Steel and J. P. Morgan Nod to Lewis*. 9:6, May 29, '37. *Labor: Ford Says No, Steel Workers Vote Yes and U.A.W. Remembers Its Sacred Obligations*. 10:7, July 10, '37. *Congressmen and Governors Argue Case of the C.I.O. vs. the People*. 9:11, May 15, '37. *C.I.O. Pressure from the Ranks Drives Lewis into New Fields and New Conflicts with A.F. of L.*
- Review of Reviews.—95:15, April, '37. *Progress of C.I.O.*
- Scholastic.—29:14, Oct. 10, '36. *Both Sides of the Labor Fight*. J. L. Lewis, W. Green. 30:12, March 13, '37. *C.I.O. Multiplies Drive to Organize Big Industries*. 30:18, Mar. 20, '37. *Steel, G. E. to Bargain with C.I.O. Unions*.
- Vital Speeches.—3:301, Jan. 15, '37. *I Solemnly Warn the Leaders of Industry*. J. L. Lewis Same Ref. Shelf 11, No. 3, 196, April, '37. Also Congressional Digest 16:157, May, 1937. 3:22-3, Oct. 15, '36. *Future of Labor*. J. L. Lewis.

BOOKS

- Brooks, Robert R. R.—*When Labor Organizes*. Yale University Press. '37.
- Catlin, Warren Benjamin—*The Labor Problem in the United States and Great Britain*. Rev. ed. N. Y. & London, Harper & Bro. 1935.
- Chambers, Walter—*Labor Unions and the Public*. Coward-McCann, Inc. '36.
- Christenson, C. L.—*Collective Bargaining in Chicago 1929-30*. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1933. \$3.
- Commons, J. R. and Andrews, J. B.—*Principles of Labor Legislation*. Harper & Bros. 1936.

- Commons, J. R. and others—*History of Labor in the U. S.* v. 1, 2. Macmillan. 1921.
- Cummins, E. E.—*Labor Problem in the U. S.* Van Nostrand. 1935. \$3.75.
- Daugherty, C. R.—*Labor Problems in American Industry.* Revised. Houghton Mifflin. 1937.
- Donohoe, H. A.—*Collective Bargaining Under the N.R.A.* Catholic Univ. of America. Pa. \$1.25. 1935.
- Feldman, H.—*Problems in Labor Relations.* Macmillan. 1937. \$2.75.
- Hardman, J. B. S.—*American Labor Dynamics.* Harcourt, Brace. 1928.
- Hepner, H. W.—*Human Relations in Changing Industry.* Prentice-Hall. 1934. \$5.
- Johnsen, Julia Emily—*Collective Bargaining.* Wilson, 1935, 808-5, R. 33, V. 10, N. 1. *Industrial vs. Craft Unionism.* (Reference Shelf) H. W. Wilson, 1935. *Industrial vs. Craft Unionism.* (Reference Shelf) H. W. Wilson, 11, No. 3, 108-13, April, 1937.
- Metcalf, H. C.—*Collective Bargaining Today and Tomorrow.* 1937. Harper's.
- Minton, Bruce and Stuart, John—*Men Who Lead Labor.* Modern Age Books. 1937.
- Nichols, E. R. and Logan, J.—*Arbitration and The N.L.R.B.* (Ref. Shelf) 11, No. 7, '37. H. W. Wilson Co., N. Y.
- Perlman, Selig—*History of Trade Unionism in the United States.* Macmillan. 1923.
- Sokolsky, George E.—*Labor's Fight for Power.* 1934. Doubleday, Doran.
- Spencer, W. H.—*National Labor Relations Act.* 1935. University of Chicago Press.
- Sullivan, Edward Dean—*This Labor Union Racket.* Hillman-Curl, Inc. 1936. 311 pp. \$2.
- Walsh, J. Raymond—*C.I.O. Industrial Unionism in Action.* Norton. 1937.
- Ware, N. J.—*Labor in Modern Industrial Society.* Heath. 1935.
- Wolfson, T. and Weiss, A.—*Industrial Unionism in the American Labor Movement.* 1937. League for Industrial Democracy.

THE UNION CLOSED SHOP

An Intramural Debate

DENISON UNIVERSITY AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE

During the debate season of 1937-38 the Ohio colleges discussed the closed shop plan as a method of solving the labor controversy. This discussion was just one of the many angles to this complex problem which arose during the consideration of labor and capital affairs introduced by the selection of arbitration of labor disputes as the annual Pi Kappa Delta proposition. Elsewhere in this volume is a discussion of the industrial union in mass-production industries, which is another phase of this important problem.

The Ohio colleges stated their debate proposition: Resolved, that the union closed shop should be adopted throughout American industry.

The present debate is one between the two teams from Denison University which represented that institution during the season in the Ohio debate conference, and later turned their arguments upon one another in an intramural debate, a frequent practice among debate squads throughout the country.

The speeches were collected and forwarded to *Intercollegiate Debates* by Professor Lionel Crocker, Director of Debate at Denison University.

THE UNION CLOSED SHOP

First Affirmative, Robert G. Gordon
Denison University

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Let me first state the proposition which we are debating today. It is: Resolved, that the union closed shop should be adopted throughout American industry. It is the purpose of the Affirmative to bring to you facts proving that the union closed shop should be adopted throughout American industry.

We have a labor problem today, and how we need a solution to this problem! I challenge any one of you to turn on the radio this evening without hearing news comments concerning problems facing labor today. I challenge any one of you to pick up a newspaper today without seeing glaring evidence in headlines and sub-headlines of our labor problem. I challenge any one of you to sit in on a general discussion of world problems without hearing discussion of labor problems. What does this show? It shows that we have a problem, and that a solution is needed for this problem if we are to progress. Now let us analyze the problem to see what Americans are thinking (if they are), and to see what can logically be offered as a proposed solution.

Today, we are in a depression; and as has been suggested by George E. Sokolsky, "It is not a 'Hoover depression,' *but it is a depression.*" When stock markets

fall below 50, that's a recession; but when stock markets fall below 30, well then, that is a depression. In short, this is the effect, but what is the cause? The facts are before us, and we of the Affirmative propose to *do* something about them.

Now, this is what we believe: We believe that the ultimate and true way of industrial life is that found in a society which is both *economically sound* and *socially desirable*, and its way of life should be fulfilled by the workers today—in a shop arrangement in which collective bargaining can be maintained, and in which the union is normally left open to all persons competent to work; such an arrangement being the closed shop with the open union, wherein the workers may have their voice, and where unionism leads to true democracy. It is this type of closed shop which the Affirmative are defending throughout this debate.

We of the Affirmative also believe that true industrial democracy is not being fulfilled by workers today. We do not have an economically sound or a socially desirable industrial society. Employers have provided an industry of productivity and order. Research has brought us to the threshold of a new day (we are told) in which the employees need work no longer in poverty, misery, and ignorance; but, we have often used our knowledge to exploit men rather than to free them. Employers believe that all the employee has to do is push this lever, or stamp that pedal, and presto-chango, we have a finished product. Ladies and gentlemen, industry isn't just as easy as this "one-two" process of production, for we have personalities to con-

sider. Because we do have personalities to consider, and because we are concerned with these personalities, let us glance at three employer-employee problems that are existing today.

First of all, we have the problem of unemployment, and, equally important, the problem of wages received. Second, we find a lack of personal relationship between the employee and the employer. Third, there is an "unbalance" in our industrial society today, an unbalance toward the side of the employer.

Let us consider the first problem—the problem of unemployment and of wages received. Millions of our fellow men are unemployed and supported by charity. Let me quote to you Harry L. Hopkins, who said: "How many Americans were unemployed in March, 1933? Call it 18,000,000 or 13,000,000, the smallest figure is bad enough. In any case, it is nearly one employable worker out of five." Mr. Hopkins made this statement before the Mayors' Conference in Washington, D. C., November 17, 1936.

Then, according to the government document, *Average Annual Wage and Salary Payments in Ohio, 1916 to 1932*, on page 6, we read that "for the occupation group, 'wage earners,' the reports show an average wage and salary payment of . . . \$1,457 for 1929." Economists tell us that the minimum wage necessary to keep a family in health and decency in 1929 was \$2,000. The Brookings Institution's 1937 report gives figures which show that the conditions I have given you for Ohio are representative of conditions throughout our

country. You see, I am not speaking of unemployment or low wages in any isolated instances, about conditions in Podunk Center, but I am presenting to you the facts as I find them on a national scale. That is why we of the Affirmative consider this first problem important. We believe that the answer to this problem is the closed shop. My colleague, Mr. Cosway, the third speaker for the Affirmative, will go on to show you how the closed shop will solve the existing problems.

And now, problem number two, the lack of personal relationship between the employee and the employer. Men in industry today are looked upon as being mere "cogs in the machine" and not personalities in industry. Let me quote to you from J. David Houser, the President of Houser Associates, industrial analysts. Mr. Houser made the following statement in an article entitled, "The Blind Spot in Labor Relations," in the *Nation's Business*, September, 1937:

What the employee wants in the situation where he spends half of his waking hours and most of his energy is exactly what every human being asks of life—respect for his personality, his human dignity, an environment that he comprehends, and a sense that he is progressive.

This is what we are asking for the man in industry. We are not going to center our attention wholly on wages and hours, but we are also going to give attention to the maintenance of human personality. As Charles P. Taft has so admirably said: "Benevolent despotism in the political field is something we don't think much of in the United States. Why should we think any more of a benevolent despotism in industry? A man

has a right to a voice in those matters that affect him in his job."

And so the answer to the second problem lies in the method of collective bargaining through the closed shop. Collective bargaining, strengthened by the closed shop, will mean that every worker, as well as the employer, will have a voice in the affairs of the shop. The worker will no longer be regarded as a "cog" in industry, but will then be regarded as something human, as a personality in industry. Hence, problem number two.

Our third problem deals with the unbalance in our present industrial society. Millions of our laborers' homes are under the shadow of insecurity and fear; a vast number even in prosperous times live in poverty while the wealth of the nation is controlled by a few. We have the age-old problem of property rights; society is divided into two factions, the "haves" and the "have-nots"; property for use has now become property for power which means the control of the lives of the masses by a small number of very rich persons. Big business—General Motors Empire, 140 Wall Street, the House of Morgan, and that great individualist, Henry Ford, who said: "Just you let any man come to me and bargain; if he is not satisfied with his wages, let him get out." La Follette said, "Henry Ford is a nice guy; only he has his feet in 1937 and his head in 1837." In the book, *Principles of Economics*, by Spahr and others, we read that "forty families in the United States control 70 per cent of our wealth." I believe that these facts show you that we have an industrial unbalance today. What I say is, let us bring this balance back

to a dead level at center. I do not say, "Give the employee control!" or "Show partiality toward the employee!" but I do say, "Give the employee his voice." Again, through the closed shop, collective bargaining will be able to work for the betterment of the workers' conditions. There will be a more perfect balance of power between employer and employee.

I have presented these three problems in industry today: First, unemployment and low wages. Second, the lack of personal relationship between employer and employee. Third, the unbalance of our industrial society. We shall continue to show that the closed shop will solve these problems. The Negative must either deny these facts, an almost utter impossibility; or they must present a counter plan of solution. We shall await their choice.

In closing, I should like to ask one question of the Negative: "Do you, or do you not, believe that equality of bargaining power should be brought about?" We *do*; therefore, we believe that the closed shop should be put into effect throughout American industry.

First Negative, Jesse Skriletz
Denison University

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: We of the Negative believe that the open shop policy must be retained in American industry. Mr. Gordon has spent his entire speech in an attempt to show you that our present situation is in dire need of revision, and that the method of solution lies in the adoption of the closed shop. May

I state in passing that I fail to see the connection between the closed shop and many of the problems listed by Mr. Gordon? After hearing his speech, I am more convinced than ever that the Affirmative are trying to foist some kind of panacea upon us without taking stock of the effects the panacea may have. However, I shall deal with this more fully at a later time.

Is the need of a change so absolute that we must sacrifice our individuality to the socialistic leadership and following of the labor union? Will the labor union closed shop policy be the way toward economic stability? Would the Affirmative have us put labor control into the hands of union leaders, or would they demand government supervision? We ask the members of the Affirmative to answer this question.

Before going further, let us define the open shop and the closed shop, something which the Affirmative failed to do. The *Bridgemen's Magazine*, official organ of the Iron Workers Union, defines closed shop as follows:

Closed shop, then, is the term for a shop, factory, store or other industrial place where workmen cannot obtain employment without being members in good standing of the labor union of their trade. This is demanded by the unions. . . . They insist that the shop be closed against all employees who, not already belonging to the union of their trade, refuse to join it.

Now, the definition of the open shop, as given by the Anthracite Commission, appointed by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1903:

No person shall be refused employment, or in any way discriminated against on account of membership or non-

membership in any labor organization, and there shall be no discrimination against, or interference with, any employee who is not a member of any labor organization by members of such an organization.

These definitions clearly bring out the following points: First, under the closed shop, only members in good standing of the unions may obtain employment. However, open shop employers refuse to discriminate between union and non-union men, basing their judgment on the ability of the man, not his affiliation. Second, the closed shop demands that union rules prevail, making the employer yield to union rules where they affect the conduct of the establishment.

We of the Negative say that there is a need of remedy, but we deny that the remedy can be brought about through the closed shop. More important, we feel, is the matter of results: Will the closed shop result in a matter of better economic stability, as Mr. Gordon would lead us to believe? It is a known fact that the union is in no way financially responsible, as an organization, for damages it may cause in any controversy. For example, I quote from a pamphlet entitled, *The Onward March of the Open Shop*:

The United Mine Workers of America attempted to unionize the coal miners of Arkansas. As a result, damages which their own papers estimated at from \$200,000 to \$500,000 were caused. The United Mine Workers organization was sued in the courts; practically its sole defense was that since it is unincorporated, it is beyond the reach of the law.

A second item which would result from the adoption of the policy of the closed shop is the matter of de-

creased production. Interference through strikes would result in curtailment of production because of the "walk-out" of the men at the order of union leaders, even for a slight grievance. We need only to note the injurious effects of the steel strikes in Ohio during 1937 where, not only were there riot and martial law, but there was a loss of steel production which affected many other industries besides the steel industry itself.

Further proof of the restriction of output comes from the official report of the Construction Division of the United States Army, investigating this matter in 1920. I quote again from the *Onward March of the Open Shop*:

While rates and materials have increased throughout the United States, it is also a fact that production has decreased to such an extent that it is very marked in certain localities. Bricklayers who at one time laid an average of fifteen hundred bricks per day on straight walls are now averaging between six and seven hundred; plumbers who roughed in and finished five fixtures in five days have shown a decided decrease in the work performed. The carpenters, too, who fitted, hung, and locked four and five large doors per day seem to be no more, and so on down the line. The universally attractive high standard of wages paid to organized labor have placed the second rate craftsmen on a par with the high class, efficient artisans, and instead of the average day's work being raised it is proportionally lowered because the first-class journeyman must carry along his less efficient brother, which results in the above condition.

Again I ask, if the unions cause the above results, does American industry want the closed shop which will prohibit the working of non-union men?

Now, let us turn to a more desirable solution to the problems which, we have all agreed, do exist. We of the Negative maintain that government supervision is the solution to the industrial crisis. We do not mean the adoption of some radical scheme, but we favor the adoption of economically sound, and as Mr. Gordon has said, "socially desirable" methods of correction.

The plan which the Negative suggest as an alternative solution to the problems facing labor is that of voluntary arbitration.

In order to clarify our stand, however, may I at this time present some conclusions of experts in the matter of compulsion in arbitration. Edwin S. Witte, Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin, writes in his book, *The Government in Labor Disputes*:

Not only is compulsory arbitration unconstitutional . . . but it will not work under the conditions now existing in the United States. . . . It is necessarily not a judicial but a law-making procedure—and law-making by the arbitrary fiat of outsiders often poorly informed regarding the points at issue and the practices of industry.

Samuel Gompers, first President of the American Federation of Labor, writes in his book, *Labor and the Employer*:

The only real effect (of compulsory arbitration laws) is to . . . make wage-earners dependent upon a political agency to carry industrial problems into politics.

Finally, Frank Murphy, Governor of Michigan, in his address at the National Conference of Social Work, on May 28, 1937, said:

My objection to compulsory arbitration of labor disputes is that it is neither feasible nor practical . . . when . . . logically pursued, compulsory arbitration of labor disputes would seriously restrict many basic constitutional guarantees. Labor and capital, having placed their fate in the hands of courts and judges, would become active contestants for the control of government.

Moreover, compulsory arbitration, as it has been in effect in foreign countries, has also been proved a failure. Many countries, including France, Italy, Germany, and Great Britain have tried compulsory arbitration. I need take only one illustration. The Economic Research Department of the Twentieth Century Fund, Incorporated, in its book, *Labor and the Government*, says:

Compulsory arbitration had been tried during the World War . . . but had given rise to so much dissatisfaction on the part of both employers and employees that it was abandoned. Voluntary arbitration under collective agreements and government mediation have worked successfully in Great Britain for many years.

I have gone into this discussion with such detail not because we of the Negative favor compulsory arbitration, but so that I may make clear to you that we favor, and here we give our plan, *voluntary arbitration*. By voluntary arbitration is meant collective bargaining, or the joint determination between employers and employees of the conditions of employment. Under the present Wagner Act, passed in July, 1935, labor is given the right to collective bargaining and to organize if desirable. The National Labor Relations Board, set up

by the Act, has the final word in proceedings, and may resort to court measures to enforce its hearings and decisions. What is needed, ladies and gentlemen, is not coercion, but a combination of this voluntary action in arbitration and mediation, under which a non-biased party gives a decision, which may, or may not, be accepted by the employer or employee.

Two of the best illustrations are the National Railroad Adjustment Board and the National Mediation Board. These are successful boards, established for the solution of industrial relations problems. They have, we are told, brought industrial peace in their fields. For example, according to a recent issue of the *Digest*, there has not been a large railroad strike since 1926.

A plan similar to these are the best solutions to be had. Compulsion, either in the form of compulsory arbitration or compulsory membership in unions, under the closed shop, is undesirable. That organization of American industry by an extensive closed shop is futile is easily seen; that the results are not desirable because of conditions in labor unions and that a mediation board, supported by voluntary action will solve our problems, strengthen the Negative argument for the maintenance of the open shop throughout American industry.

Second Affirmative, Nicholas Titus
Denison University

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: My colleague, Mr. Gordon, has just presented to you a great body of facts

which prove conclusively that there is a great need for a change in our industrial relations. Mr. Skriletz, who has just preceded me, has admitted that these conditions exist. He has admitted that there is a need for some solution to the problems facing us. This was, it seems to me, the only alternative the Negative could have taken.

I am now going to give you specific examples of the benefits which have come about through unionism—benefits not only to the employee, but also benefits for the employer. Then, I shall attempt to prove to you that in order to get the maximum efficiency from unionism, we must adopt the policy of the closed shop. I shall show you that the closed shop will not only alleviate the present industrial problem, but will be a forward step toward promoting democracy in our industrial relations.

The following article appeared in *The New York Times*, dated October 13, 1937:

3 MORE B. M. T. UNIONS WIN WAGE INCREASES

. . . Following its agreement with the Transport Workers Union, granting a 10 per cent wage increase and closed shop, the B. M. T. management Monday night signed similar contracts with three other unions, it was learned yesterday. All operative employees of the B. M. T., subway, elevated, trolley and bus system are now covered by the agreement which was negotiated by Mayor La Guardia's fact-finding committee.

Here we see a specific instance of where unionism has brought about an actual benefit—a ten per cent

wage increase—but more than that it also brought the closed shop for that workers' group.

Charles P. Taft is a well-known and respected authority on labor relations, having had a great deal of first-hand experience in solving industrial problems, particularly in the state of Ohio. Mr. Taft, in a recent speech before the Michigan State Bar Association, testified as to the valuable work which unionism had accomplished in the past years. He said:

In some cases, nearly always through unions, agreements have been reached setting up tribunals to decide questions about which the men and the management can't agree. And that is a fundamental step in democracy, the creation of courts of justice. This whole process would hardly have been achieved if labor unions had not existed.

We have examples of the good that unions have done for the employer, as well as for the employee. Sutherland and Woodward in their book, *Introductory Sociology*, tell us that: "When the unions were not engaged in conflicts with employers, some of them found time to expand their activities along other lines." An outstanding example is the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, which has organized programs of adult education, established a workers' bank, erected low-cost housing projects for employees, collaborated with employers in improving methods of production, and on one occasion loaned funds from its own treasury to carry a company through a critical period. Thus we see that unions are not antagonistic toward the employers, for in this one instance, they even helped tide the company over a difficult period by lending it money.

We must dispel from the minds of our people that theory that the union is ready to eat up the employer. We must show them that the principle of the closed shop seeks merely to allow the laboring man to have a voice in the industry of which he is a part.

Now that we have seen what advantages can accrue through unionism, let us look into the possibilities that would come through introducing the closed shop. We of the Affirmative believe that only through the closed shop can the advantages of unionism be made most effective and put on a solid and more permanent basis. However, worth far more than any assertions we may make is the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, handed down sixteen years ago in the *American Steel Foundries vs. the Tri-City Central Trades Council* (1921) which stated:

A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the employer refused to pay him in wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with employer. . . . *To render this combination at all effective, employees must make their combination extend beyond one shop.* It is helpful to have as many as may be in the same trade in the same community unionized, because, in the competition between employers, they are bound to be affected by the standard of wages of their trade in the neighborhood.

We of the Affirmative wholeheartedly agree with the Supreme Court that "to render this combination at all effective, employees must make their combination ex-

tend beyond one shop." The closed shop is simply unionism stepped up another notch in the industrial scale.

The closed shop will get the maximum degree of benefits from unionism because it will tend toward an equality of bargaining power between employer and employee. The Supreme Court decision just quoted confirms the statement. Now then, we must answer the question, of what value is equality of bargaining power? Here I should like to quote the opinion of Dr. Harold H. Titus, given in his book *Ethics for Today*:

In organization there is strength, and relative bargaining power may determine whether the surplus shall go to the employer in profit, to the workers in wages, or to the consuming public in lower prices. In the past the employer has had a distinct advantage in bargaining power. This has been made possible by the fact that the state has recognized and protected his property rights in his business, while it does not recognize nor protect the rights of workmen to an adequate standard of living.

Since relative bargaining power may determine whether surplus shall go to the employer in profit, to the workers in wages, or to the consuming public in lower prices, we of the Affirmative agree that the balance of bargaining power has been in the hands of the employer in the past. We know that it was because of having the weight of bargaining power on their side that numerous capitalists have become fabulously wealthy, while their employees haven't had enough money to buy the product which they helped to build. For example, in 1929, J. P. Morgan and his seventeen

partners are said to have held ninety-nine directorships in seventy-two corporations with combined assets of about \$20,000,000,000. Yet in 1929, when \$2,000 was estimated to be the amount needed to support a family in health and decency, more than 16,000,000 families, or 60 per cent of the total, had incomes below that standard. Nearly 6,000,000 families, or more than twenty-one per cent, were getting incomes of less than \$1,000 a year. The figures just given were taken from Dr. Titus' book, *Ethics for Today*.

All of this leads us to the next point which is, namely, that the closed shop will tend toward more industrial democracy. Democracy implies that there shall be the greatest good for the greatest number. According to the figures I have just given, it would seem that there is a conspicuous lack of democracy in a system where so few men can control the flow of surplus into their own pockets, while the mass of workmen receive hardly a living wage. By bringing about more of an equality of bargaining power between employer and employee through collective bargaining, the closed shop will be definitely making a fundamental contribution to democracy. There is not much democracy in a setup in which one faction (the minority) can dictate to the larger group what its wages shall be, what its conditions of work shall be, and when and how it shall work.

Louis Adamic, writing an article in the November, 1937, issue of the *Forum*, entitled "The Truth About the C. I. O.," says:

With all the faults of its leaders and in spite (as well as because) of the nasty and complex labor situation currently

developing in this country, the C. I. O., to repeat, is clearly an expression and manifestation of the American laboring masses' urge—as yet ill understood in their own minds—for democracy and equality, as against absolutism or Fascism in the shop and factory, and for more democracy, more liberty, less absolutism generally, in the life of the American people.

Thus we see that the closed shop will bring about the greatest amount of efficiency from unionism, as well as insuring and making more permanent its advantages. Furthermore, as I have shown you, the principle of the closed shop, by bringing about more equal collective bargaining power, will result in a greater degree of democracy in the United States.

Second Negative, Karl Faelchle
Denison University

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I cannot help feeling that Mr. Titus, who has just finished speaking, has missed much of what my colleague, Mr. Skriletz has said. Mr. Skriletz, you will remember, has pointed out to you the evils which will arise from the closed shop because of the increased power of unions and union officials. Moreover, he has given us another solution to the problem which will allow more efficient collective bargaining to work. Mr. Titus has made no attempt to deny the evils which my colleague has pointed out; moreover, he has attempted to hedge the issue by showing the supposed advantages of the closed shop.

This leads to the question which Mr. Gordon has asked us, namely, "Do you, or do you not, believe that

equality of bargaining power should be brought about?" During the course of my speech, I shall bring you our answer to the question.

My colleague, Mr. Skriletz, has pointed out some of the evils of the closed shop. He has shown you, in the first place, that only union members are permitted to work. In other words, unions have the right to say who shall be hired and who shall be fired. In continuation of this point, let us look at the case of the Chicago Motor Coach Company, as it is given in Edward D. Sullivan's book, *This Labor Union Racket*. Here, twenty-five men were fired because their work was inefficient, and a general strike was called by the American Federation of Labor because they were fired. However, 1,000 men in the plant said that they would walk out if these twenty-five men were re-hired, because such men in the plant would lower their standard of work. In this example, we see that union men are already attempting to dictate to employers, in spite of the fact that we do not have the closed shop. Mr. Skriletz has also pointed out that unions can and have caused reductions in the productivity of the workers. I do not feel that more examples or evidence is needed.

There are, however, more evils of the closed shop than those which Mr. Skriletz has presented. The skilled worker is reduced to the level of the unskilled laborers. By this I mean that the minimum wage that is set by unions will become the maximum wage that the employer will pay. In other words, ultimately, neither worker will be able to work for individual attainment above the minimum wage.

Secondly, we find upon investigation that unions place their own demands above the interests of the members. In the *Reader's Digest* of October, 1937, we read that laborers in the coal industry had paid their unions \$7,000,000. This vast amount, mind you, came from a group of coal workers, miners and the like, who were little able to waste their income; however, this money was used to further the power of the Committee for Industrial Organization, generally known as the C. I. O., by strikes in other industries, *and not for the workers in the coal industries*. Gentlemen, just what do you propose to do with such union management under the closed shop?

Mr. Gordon, you will remember, attempted to show you that employers now have an unfavorable balance of power and that we should bring the power back into equilibrium. We maintain that the closed shop will not equalize the power, but that it will swing the balance in favor of the unions and, more particularly, in favor of a few union leaders. At the present time, unions are not incorporated; hence, they cannot be sued. In John A. Fitch's book, *Causes of Industrial Unrest*, we find two major objections to the closed shop: first, the closed shop gives great power to the unions without corresponding responsibilities. Proof lies in the fact that when a union man does attempt to arbitrate, all that he comes to the meeting with is the threat of a strike, while the employer has the full liability of his business, the right to be sued, and a life-time of work to offer. Secondly, the employer is the responsible party in a contract and can be compelled by the courts to keep

contracts, while the union is irresponsible and cannot be so compelled. Proof of this assertion is further brought out in the recent strike at Pontiac, Michigan. Here, the union had signed a closed shop agreement, in the form of a contract, with the employer, and in that agreement there was the statement that there would be no more strikes. Just a few weeks after the agreement, the union called a strike, thus breaking a contract, yet the company could not take legal action against the union. The whole story of the strike was published in the Detroit *Free Press* and the *Columbus Dispatch*, both authoritative papers.

This brings us back to the damage which is done in the plants by the fighting between the union and non-union men. As has been pointed out, the employer, not the union, pays for the repair of these damages. Mr. Bliven's article, "Sitting Down in Flint," in the *New Republic*, January 27, 1937, points out the damage done within the plants. He says: "Fifteen hundred men had lived for two weeks in a building never intended to be lived in at all." The men had used the seats intended for the cars for beds, the tools for fighting, and had broken almost all of the windows in the plant. "With regard to the conduct of the workers in the General Motors Buildings," Bliven said, "I hope the Senate Civil Liberties Committee will investigate that riot. I believe that they will find it as disgraceful an incident in American labor relations as we have seen in a long time." This gentleman was in the plant at the time.

Let us summarize what the Affirmative would have

us believe to be an asset to the workers. They tell us that under the closed shop, the balance of power between labor and capital would be in equilibrium, when actually they propose to give labor a monopoly. As I have already proved, labor would have the right to say who shall be hired and who shall be fired, to regulate the amount of a day's work, to restrict the membership of the union, thus restricting the number of workers available for any given employer. The closed shop would give the unions great powers without corresponding responsibilities. With all of this power given to the unions, you of the Affirmative must prove that the closed shop would not ultimately mean closed-union closed shop. The C. I. O. and the American Federation of Labor are not perfect, you must admit, but you do not say what you are going to do with them. Is it not reasonable to suppose that they will never stop trying to get more power? Certainly, their greatest degree of power would be the closed-union closed shop.

Labor unions have little or no regard for the law in our United States. Permit me to quote from a speech by Governor Davey of Ohio, made in Akron, Ohio, September 23, 1937: "You and I have noticed that in some places the C. I. O. leaders have thumbed their noses at the court."

The Affirmative, through their question, have intimated that we cannot have collective bargaining without the closed shop. Since we have been asked for our opinion of the principle of equality of bargaining power, I say that we favor *equal* bargaining power. We do not favor a labor monopoly under collective bargaining

through the closed shop, however. May I point to (1) the Railroad Brotherhood that has had very effective collective bargaining and mediation without the closed shop, (2) to the Goodyear Rubber Company which has collective bargaining and fair wages, according to the workers in the factory, (3) to the International Harvester Truck Company, at Fort Wayne, Indiana, where there are fair wages and an effective company union. I have worked for this company, and I know that their labor policy is fair, (4) to the baking industry of Columbus, Ohio, where there is open shop, fair wages, reasonable hours, and good working conditions. From these, and other examples, we of the Negative believe that collective bargaining will be made effective, and is being made effective, without the closed shop, with its evils.

The issue before this country is not the question of a partial closed shop or a voluntary closed shop, but a national closed shop system maintained by conscription which, like a colossal reaper, would mow down the rights of the individuals of our land. According to Merritt's book, *Open Shop and Industrial Liberty*, a national closed shop means:

1. Closing the doors of industry of the nation to all but union men.

2. Closing transportation and the markets of the nation to all but union goods.

3. Vesting in a private society the power of commercial life and death over their fellow beings.

We believe, therefore, that the closed shop should not be adopted throughout American industry, and that the

conditions can be improved by the means of voluntary cooperation under government direction, which we have suggested.

Third Affirmative, Richard Cosway
Denison University

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: We are now approaching the end of the constructive speeches in this debate, and it seems to me to be worth our while to see just where the debate has gone.

You will remember that Mr. Gordon, the first Affirmative speaker, spent his time telling you of the need for a change in our system of dealing with labor problems and labor relations. Undoubtedly, he could have given you more information, had he had more time; however, Mr. Skriletz, the first Negative speaker, made it unnecessary for us to spend further time on the question of need by obligingly admitting the need.

Let us note, therefore, that this debate is now concerned with methods of solving a problem which both sides admit to exist. It is not a question of plan or no plan, it is a question of which shall we use, closed shop or government interference through mediation.

Mr. Skriletz has asked us some rather interesting questions which I should like to answer at this time. First, Mr. Skriletz asked: "Is the need of a change so absolute that we must sacrifice our individuality to the socialistic leadership and following of the labor union?" Here, I must condemn Mr. Skriletz; he has used some pretty words, intended, no doubt, to scare us out of our wits. However, I, for one, am not to be scared. I must

ask Mr. Skriletz to tell us what is wrong with "socialistic leadership" before I can answer his question effectively. Concerning the loss of individuality, however, I say that we have never intended to lose the individuality of persons, which we in America hold so dear.

"Would the labor union closed shop policy be the way toward economic stability?" I came here intending to answer this very question, and, in the course of this speech, I shall present evidence to show that the closed shop will lead us to economic stability and toward more security for the workers.

"Would the Affirmative have us put labor control into the hands of union leaders, or would they demand government supervision?" Neither. We maintain that a democratically controlled and operated union is the best way to solve the problem.

If we consider the speeches of the first two Negative speakers, we may see that their attacks have resolved around the *force* which unions will have under the closed shop. They do not deny that the employer, through his power of hiring and firing, now has complete control over the lives and happiness of his workers. Nor, you will note, do they fail to emphasize the employer's right of "private property" which, the Negative maintain, is harmed when a strike ensues. They do not mention the fact that now the employers control the jobs of the employees which, relatively speaking, are of much greater importance to the employee than the factory is to the industrialist. We must not be unmindful of these facts.

Mr. Faelchle would have us believe that the damage

caused by strikes is due to the strikers. Our answer is that, in most instances, violence is caused by the presence of police or "scabs" at the scene of the strike. In the economics text book, *Elementary Economics*, by Fairchild, Furniss, and Buck, Volume two, page 588, we read:

The purpose of the strike does not demand that the workers resort to methods of violence. . . . Yet each strike creates a situation in which violence to persons and property is very likely to develop, and many strikes have degenerated into a state of disorder closely bordering on civil war. It is to be noted that violence of this sort is rarely directed at the employer's person or his property; though property is often destroyed in the course of the disorder, this is usually an indirect result of the strikers' activity and not an intentional policy of the union. The chief causes of violence in strikes are two: the presence on the scene of conflict of non-union strike-breakers, and the interference of the public through its police force or militia.

It is to be noted that the authors of this text, along with other economists, conclude that the violence is due, not to the strikers, but to the *employers*, who attempt to break the strikes without settling the claims of the strikers.

Many of you, no doubt, have seen the pictures taken at a recent attack on strikers, *unarmed* though they were, by armed police in a recent strike. Many of the strikers were *shot in the back*, although no attempt at violence had been made by the strikers themselves. This occurred in Chicago; moreover, union men were maltreated at the Ford plant in Detroit, Michigan, when they peaceably attempted to organize Ford's

workers. For further information, may I suggest you read Leo Huberman's informing little book, *The Labor Spy Racket*.

It is my belief that, if the strikers were satisfied, they would not strike; moreover, I believe that if the closed shop were adopted, strikes would be decreased if not completely abolished. I sincerely believe this for two reasons. In the "Analysis of Strikes in June, 1937" in the *Monthly Labor Review* for October, 1937, we read that 59.6 per cent of the strikes beginning in June were for union recognition. Eleven and four-tenths per cent of the strikes were specifically for the closed shop. When we consider the number of workers involved, however, we learn—and please note this—that *more people struck for the closed shop than for any other comparable reason*, even including the strikes for improvements in working conditions. When the closed shop is adopted, all of these strikes will be eliminated.

The second reason why I believe that the adoption of the closed shop will check strikes is merely a matter of law. Remember that violence is caused by the presence of "scabs" in the factory, in many cases. Now, if all employers had adopted the closed shop, they could not allow "scabs" to enter their plants, because, by that act, they would be guilty of breaking their contracts. Since this would be upheld in any court in the land, the employers would be very unlikely to employ "scabs"; hence, the cause of irritation would be removed, we believe.

Mr. Faelchle has raised a worth-while question in the matter of the responsibility of the unions. May we

say that under our plan, unions would be incorporated. In other words, they could be sued in any court of justice. This would, no doubt, make the unions more responsible than they now are.

And now, let us turn to the point where we may see how the closed shop will work. I am prepared to give you evidence of the improvement of the workers' conditions because of the use of union contracts. Moreover, I am prepared to use as my example one of the industries used by Mr. Faelchle in his speech. According to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics report from the *Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1936*, page 892, we read that wages in *union* bakeries were, on the average, \$4.58 higher per week in 1933 and 1934 than the wages in *non-union* bakeries in the same years. Moreover, whereas the non-union wages decreased four-tenths per cent from March, 1933 to December, 1934, the union shops lost 3.6 per cent, thus showing that these shops re-acted to the decreased revenues caused by the depression and still received more in salaries, as expressed by the chart. The interesting thing comes when I tell you that union shops are defined as those which have contracts with a union; those which hold no contract are known as non-union shops.

We are able to learn several things from the facts I have just given. They show, in the first place, that there is increased bargaining power for the unions in union bakeries. Now, since, under the closed shop, all plants would have union contracts, the obvious fact is that wages would be increased. Moreover, we can see that union leaders did not make exorbitant and impos-

sible demands as the Negative speakers would attempt to lead you to believe.

Admittedly, closed shop increases bargaining power. According to the figures I have quoted, increased bargaining power makes it possible for the employees to improve their working conditions. We can see, therefore, that even by Negative admissions, closed shop will solve the problem through increased collective bargaining.

And now, may I give you some suggestions for putting the Affirmative plan into working efficiency. We, of the Affirmative, favor the industrial form of union. However, if some other type of union proves to be better able to meet the problem, we have no objection to the use of that type of union.

We maintain that whatever type of union organization is used, it must have national correlation. This will result in increased power for the union members, acting as a group.

We do not favor placing power into the hands of one or two union leaders; it is for this reason that we would choose to have our national unions incorporated and placed under a democratic form of government. The leaders of the unions should, by all means, be completely responsible to the workers. This will eliminate the danger of a dictatorship or any undesirable power in the hands of a few men, which Mr. Skriletz mentioned.

Not only will each union be correlated throughout the nation, but all of the unions will be represented in a body. If it is found necessary and desirable, we see

no reason why employers should not have representation on that body.

What we are aiming for, in other words, is not strikes and warfare, but peace and cooperation. The Negative teams have admitted the need for some kind of a change in dealing with labor problems. We present the closed shop; moreover, we maintain that we have shown that this principle will work, and that it will be free of the evils mentioned by the Negative. We agree with Charles P. Taft, who said, "The strike, like civil war, ought to be a last resort." It is our opinion that strikes will be the last resort and that the working conditions of men in industry today will be improved by cooperation rather than fighting.

**Third Negative, Robert Hillbish
Denison University**

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: May I call to your attention one outstanding fact concerning Mr. Cosway's speech and, for that matter, concerning the other speeches of the Affirmative? They have spent their time telling us of the great value of unionism, not the closed shop. I wish to state that we of the Negative have no quarrel with trade-unionism or any other movement which aims to aid the working classes of our country. We have, however, a very serious quarrel with that phase of the present trade-union movement which aims to establish a complete labor monopoly of the industry of this country by abandoning the principle of the open shop.

Our attitude should *not* be that of partiality to employees any more than a partiality to employers. It should be one of public consideration! And, in view of public consideration the Negative here and now indict on two charges those persons, first, who would under the guise of the closed shop obtain monopolistic control of industry and thereby restrict efficiency in production; and second, we further indict those who would secure this unlimited power of monopoly and restricted efficiency under the closed shop *by disregard for the law*.

The Affirmative have failed to prove to us that there will not be restriction of out-put under their plan. Moreover, they have not shown us advantages of the closed shop but only advantages of unionism to which we have, long since, agreed. The plan which Mr. Cosway has presented gives us no idea of what the Affirmative speakers intend to do with labor leaders who are now in power. In short, the Affirmative has failed to defend that which it came here to defend and is merely defending unionism as such.

American industry is, economists say, where it is today above all foreign competition, because of the individual productivity of American labor. May I give you a little economics? Efficiency of production means labor can be paid more; therefore, labor can buy more because their buying power is increased and because there are more goods to purchase. Certainly, employers are satisfied because their earnings are more, and the public benefits because of more material prosperity in their community. The criterion of efficiency of pro-

duction is certainly not opposed to the best interests of the public; therefore, the policy of labor should encourage efficiency of production.

However, as we have shown before, investigation has disclosed that closed shops have invariably, by a series of rules and regulations, restricted not only men and women from entering their ranks, thus tending to decrease the number of skilled workmen in this country, but they have also restricted the output of industry. My colleagues have stated that a closed shop means a closed union; in other words, a closed union is inevitable under the monopoly that a closed shop will set up.

We have asserted that the closed shop restricts entrance into unions by apprenticeship restrictions. Dr. J. M. Motley, writing on apprenticeship in American trade-unions for Johns Hopkins University, states: "About 70 of the 120 unions in the A. F. of L. together with some half dozen unaffiliated national unions enforce apprenticeship regulations."

Closed shops have gone so far as to adopt in their by-laws fines for over-production. Former Governor Allen of Kansas testifies that union miners have been fined as much as forty-five dollars for producing too much coal in a week. In Baltimore, the Plumbers Union, which controls the plumbing trade of city business, states very clearly in its laws that each plumber must report back to the shop before starting his next job. Section 31 of the Carpenters Union of Idaho Falls states: "Where a contractor has five or more journeymen employed steadily he may have two apprentices.

But at no time shall he employ more than two apprentices."

Article 9, section 1, page 72 of the minutes of the Rochester convention of International Associations of Machinists states: "The rates of apprentices shall be one for every ten machinists, instead of one for every five as at present."

Such are the rules of restrictive trade-unions under closed shop. Our general indictment against the trade-unions which restrict efficiency when they secure monopolistic control is well stated by former President Hadley of Yale University: "The chief reason why thoughtful men look upon trade-unions with so much distrust is because they discourage industrial efficiency."

This, then, is what we may expect to be enforced if we abandon the principle of the open shop and permit unions to secure general monopolies and monopolistic control of labor and industry in this country under the closed shop. I am challenging the Affirmative to give us facts showing that closed shop would not swing the balance of power completely to labor and create a labor monopoly which would rival the great business trusts of the past.

What was the outstanding feature of early business trusts? The answer is absolute disregard of the law. Moreover, absolute disregard of the law is characteristic of this new labor trust.

Here are the records:

- (1) A law was passed in Kansas prohibiting strikes,

and 40,000 miners went out on strike merely to show that organized labor is above such control.

(2) In West Virginia, twenty-four miners accused of murder happened to be members of the United Mine Workers of America. Immediately, the United Mine Workers announced their intention of supporting the accused to the limit (of their treasury).

(3) After the Little Steel Strikes of 1937, a union organizer confessed to the dynamiting of a main water line in the Republic Steel Corporation. He hid from the police for three days in a C. I. O. hall, protected by armed strikers. It is to be noted that the Committee for Industrial Organization is one of the greatest advocates of the closed shop.

Surely this labor trust compares well with the lawless record of Big Business of forty years ago. And yet, the Affirmative tells us that the need for some change is so great that we must meet the demands of organized labor, representing 35 per cent of the workers of America, and force the other 65 per cent to pay the high initiation fees, reduce production, restrict efficiency, and conform to the policies of a labor monopoly.

Justice Thayer of the Massachusetts Superior Court said:

No state except under its police power can enact a law that will deprive a person of his life, liberty, or liberty of property. If the state cannot do it, how foolish to think that an individual or a group of individuals can. Property includes not only things tangible but also the right to work.

And yet, this power of which Justice Thayer speaks, is the power which the Affirmative asks us to put entirely

into the hands of the unions and their most remarkable leaders, under closed shop. Compared to this monopolistic control of labor of those outside their selected ranks, the old time business trusts were only mildly dangerous.

The solution to the problem which the Negative have suggested lies in such means as mediation, conciliation, and voluntary arbitration which Mr. Skriletz has pointed out. May I point out that no Affirmative speaker has attacked the plans which we have suggested? Does this not reveal the fact that the plans we suggest are above the attacks of even the Affirmative? When we but compare the Affirmative plan, with all its evils, with our plan, we see that our plan is the solution to the problem which should be adopted.

To summarize the debate thus far, may I give you the points we have shown you:

(1) Closed shop means closed-union closed shop. This results in limitation of membership on the part of the unions.

(2) Restriction of out-put, together with other evils which we have mentioned, results from the adoption of the closed shop.

(3) The closed shop will give labor a monopoly, thus swinging the balance of power completely in the favor of labor.

(4) Worst of all, these things will come about through utter disregard of the law of our land.

First Negative Rebuttal, Jesse Skriletz
Denison University

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: It seems that the Affirmative team puts the entire blame for the present economic conditions upon the shoulders of the employers. The pictures they have painted about our labor conditions seem to put conditions in America on equal footing with conditions existing in Germany, Russia, or Italy, where industry is governed by an outside force. I do not think conditions of that extreme exist here in America.

Mr. Gordon based his arguments upon three points: first, that wages increased under closed shops; second, that there are no personal relationships between employee and employer; and third, that there is an unbalance in labor relations which can be remedied only by the adoption of a closed shop policy.

Let us look at his first point—that of wages. How can Mr. Gordon, as well as Mr. Cosway, say that the closed shop has been entirely responsible in the increasing of wages? What is his basis of proof? Even now, according to figures found in the *Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1936*, on pages 167 and 423, the percentages show that only approximately 8 to 10 per cent of the workmen belong to an organized union. Wages have been on the increase since the beginning of the twentieth century. That 8 to 10 per cent could actually influence employers to set wages is ridiculous. That their help was incidental is more appropriate.

Mr. Gordon's second point involves personal relationships. With present working hours now definitely set,

the workingman finds more leisure time than ever before. What are various industries doing to take care of this leisure, and to improve personal relationships between employer and employee? Only this—take a look at the sports section in any daily paper. You will invariably find results in various sports in industrial leagues. During the winter it is basketball and bowling; during the spring and summer it is baseball, golf, and tennis. Competition may be between various industrial plants in a city, or between business departments in a single shop. All workmen are eligible to compete, and even the bosses fall in line for their share of the sport. Yet, Mr. Gordon says there is no semblance of personal relationship in present day industry.

Finally, he points out that there is unbalance in industry today. Just when, Mr. Gordon, hasn't there been unbalance? As early as the first English Industrial Revolution we find the craft guilds—comparable to our present day unions—could not attain even a balance, let alone a perfect balance. I asked the question before, and I'll repeat now: "How can the Affirmative prove that their plan of the closed shop is the means of economic stability?"

Mr. Gordon, you said, "We need democracy, we need collective bargaining." Might I repeat a statement made in my constructive argument. We have, under the Wagner Act, the *right* of labor to organize for collective bargaining. You ask for a right to *coerce* organization for bargaining. We do have a democracy; what you are demanding is dictatorship by union leaders.

May I also remind you that we have told you of the

methods of solving the problem which are now *in effect*. We have shown you how they are working; whereas, we have shown you that the closed shop will not work. We therefore maintain that the closed shop should *not* be adopted throughout American industry.

First Affirmative Rebuttal, Robert G. Gordon
Denison University

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I would like to pigeon-hole the entire Negative case by making it analogous with the story of the Good Samaritan. You recall how the Levite came along, saw the man, then passed by on the other side of the road. Likewise, the Priest came along, looked upon the man, then passed by on the other side of the road. Gentlemen, that is exactly what you have done this evening. You have come along, *looked upon* the facts which we have presented, and then passed by on the other side of the road. You have admitted that we should have some new system of handling the problem; however, you suggest a plan which is the one we now use. You tell us to change to the plan which we now have. What logic, may we ask, is there in that idea?

You say that your plan is better than ours, Mr. Skriletz. Yet, your plan is the very one you have been attacking from the beginning of this debate. You are against the open shop's evils—violence, strikes, lock-outs, etc.; yet, you will not accept a workable substitute, the closed shop.

You have misquoted us, attempting to show that

employee control will result from the adoption of the closed shop. In my first speech, I pointed out that the worker must not be allowed to *control* industry, but he must have a voice in industry and its control. Our plan, we believe, is set up in such a way to prevent the development of such monopoly or harsh control.

You have constantly mentioned the term monopoly when speaking of our plan. You have assumed much; you have proved nothing. You speak of monopolies under the closed shop. Let me prove that monopolies exist under your plan of open shop. I wish to offset your argument with these facts:

“Sixty-two men in the United States control all of our national income.”

and you speak of monopolies;

Definition of employer: “sole authority having power which he most often uses for his own immediate profit.”

and you speak of monopolies.

You suggest voluntary means of solving labor disputes. May I ask, if the employers and employees were so willing to bargain voluntarily, why have they not done so long before this? You suggest voluntary arbitration. Do you not know that Henry Ford was taken before an arbitration court some months ago, the decision went against him, but nothing has, as yet, been done about the decision? You suggest government interference most glibly; however, you have given us no way of putting the courts in a position to be able to handle labor cases. Then, what if 50,000 men strike,

as they have done before? How can you punish these men and make them follow the decision of the courts? Where is there a jail, for example, large enough to hold 50,000 men?

You object to organizations of workers on a national scale. What is your opinion of the National Association of Manufacturers, whose books you have oft quoted, which is a national organization of employers? We maintain that the coming of huge corporations has made necessary organization among workers. To make strong the workers' organizations, we favor the adoption of the closed shop.

In conclusion, since we have shown that the Negative plan is failing to meet the problems facing labor today, since they admit that these problems exist, and since the closed shop will solve the problems, we believe that the closed shop should be adopted throughout American industry.

Second Negative Rebuttal, Karl Faelchle
Denison University

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: The matter of strikes and their prevention has been one of great importance in this debate. The Affirmative speakers would lead you to believe that a closed shop would cut down the number of strikes. I have already shown you where contracts mean nothing to the unions when they choose to call a strike. My opponents tell you that they will have equal representation between the employee and employer, and, therefore, conciliation will *ipso facto* result.

This is, to be sure, a desired result; however, may I ask them how *they* will be sure that representatives from either side will not walk out of a meeting if concessions are demanded. Mr. Gordon just challenged us to show how voluntary arbitration will work. May I inform Mr. Gordon that arbitration boards now have the power of the judicial system of our land behind them? Appeal can be made to these courts; moreover, decisions of labor boards may be enforced by the courts.

Now, the second Affirmative speaker, I believe it was, is going to incorporate the unions under his policy of a national closed shop. This means that if he favors the C. I. O.—and the Affirmative apparently do favor the C. I. O.—it is this union, together with the A. F. of L. and perhaps one or two other unions, which will be incorporated. If this were done today, the policy of a national union would be as remote as the man in the moon. The unions would have so many law suits on their hands that they would be financially ruined in thirty days. Further, the unions do not want to be incorporated.

We of the Negative have proved to you that the closed shop is not necessary; however, to further prove this assertion, let me bring you an unbiased report made by the *Commentator* of April, 1937. These are the facts: "Buick workers average \$147.00 per month (during 1936)." Is the work too hard? Are salaries too low? "There are 500 men in the plant over 60 years of age." Moreover, "out of 17,000 people on the Buick payrolls, over 10,000 are under 40 years, and 7,000 are over 40; a reasonable proportion." Permit me to quote

from Herbert Hoover's book, *A Challenge to Liberty*. Mr. Hoover says:

In the Garden of Liberty there are many weeds growing, but is it not better to fight the weeds than to give up the whole garden?

So it is, my friends, with the industrial system.

We have proved to you that the closed shop stands for restriction of membership in the unions, for the retardation of production by fixing the amount of a day's work, for utter disregard of the law, for inefficient production, and for the exploitation of labor to further its own power through the unions, for the granting of great powers to the unions without corresponding responsibilities, for the reduction of skilled laborers to the level of the unskilled.

In closing, let me prove to you that labor itself does not want this national closed shop. In the *Fortune* Quarterly Survey, Number 10, issued October, 1937, this question was asked: "Do you agree or partly agree with, or disagree with the charge that the C. I. O., headed by John L. Lewis, is forcing workers to join or lose their jobs?" The answer is in the total figures of the minor salaried workers. Fifty-two and four-tenths per cent agreed or partly agreed to that statement. In other words, the policy of the national closed shop certainly has no place in the field of American industry.

Second Affirmative Rebuttal, Nicholas Titus
Denison University

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Our worthy opponents have accused us, stating that the policy of the closed shop will bring about an overwhelming amount of power in the hands of the worker. On the contrary, what the workers are seeking is not a preponderance of power, but an equality of power—an equality which they have not been able to obtain thus far, and an equality which only the closed shop can bring about.

In this regard, I should like to quote from Edward F. McGrady, Assistant Secretary of Labor, in a speech over the National Broadcasting Company on March 29, 1937. Mr. McGrady said:

If labor is given the right to bargain through representatives of its own choosing on wages, hours, and working conditions, it will have to assume responsibility of discipline among its members, sacredness of contract, efficiency of production, and elimination of waste, out of which is bound to develop an intelligent and cooperative spirit. I have been reassured over and over again by the leaders of the American Trade Union Movement that if given an opportunity they are ready to assume these obligations in full.

Quite naturally, we wouldn't expect labor to "cut its own throat." We wouldn't expect labor to do anything which would be harmful to the majority, for it *is* the majority.

There is an old maxim which says: "What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander." In other words, if it is fair for the employers to cooperate and combine

by forming huge corporations, it ought to be fair for the working men to cooperate for their mutual advancement and protection. In this regard, I wish to quote from a Labor Sunday Message, issued by the Executive Committee of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America: "Experience has shown that since industry is often organized on a national or even wider basis, labor unions of corresponding scope are needed if workers are to be adequately represented in truly democratic relations, and if industry-wide standards are to be maintained."

Our opponents have pointed to legislation as a way out of our problem. However, we think of the failure of the N. R. A., the apparent failure of the N. L. R. B., as well as the general dislike of our American people for too much control by the Federal Government, and we cannot help feeling that the Negative plan is all too ridiculous.

Our opponents have pointed out that employers are spending a great deal of money and effort to help their employees. At the same time, they are fighting off the unions, tooth and nail. Recently before the La Follette Investigating Committee of the Senate, sworn testimony revealed that some employers invested millions of dollars in creating industrial spy systems within and outside the plants to prevent their employees from joining unions of their own choosing. Leo Huberman, in his little book, *The Labor Spy Racket*, points out that this sum amounts to about \$80,000,000 a year. It is evident that employers feel that they are going to lose so much power and such a large slice of future

profits that they are willing to spend this large amount of money for spy systems in order to keep out unions and the closed shop.

For these reasons, we believe that the closed shop should be adopted throughout American industry.

Third Negative Rebuttal, Robert Hillibish
Denison University

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I should like to take the few minutes allotted to me to show you wherein the Affirmative team has failed to maintain its case.

I think that the first point on which they have failed is the first point Mr. Gordon discussed, the *need* for the closed shop. Mr. Gordon went to great lengths telling you of certain undesirable conditions which have existed in this country. We recognize fully that these conditions exist; however, the fact which we want you to keep in mind is that these evils are being remedied. In the *Pathfinder*, for February 26, 1938, there appears an article entitled, "NLRB—The Labor Board Gathers New Strength," and on page twenty, we read of the accomplishments of the National Labor Relations Board during the 27 months of its existence. We read this:

Despite the arguments that revolve around it, however, the National Labor Relations Board seems stronger now than at any time since its creation. One reason for this is its solid record of achievement. Last week, the latest figures available on the subject told an eloquent story: Up to January 1, 1938, in the 27 months since it began to func-

tion, spending little more than \$3,000,000, the Board had handled 11,179 cases involving close to 3,000,000 workers. Covering action on charges of unfair labor practices and elections of union representatives for collective bargaining, the total of 11,179 was accounted for in part as follows:

- (1) Of the 11,179 cases, 7,760 were closed, leaving 3,419 cases pending at the beginning of 1938.
- (2) Of the 7,760 closed, 4,440 cases involving over 1,000,000 workers were closed by agreement of both parties; 1,162 cases were dismissed by the Board; 1,751 were withdrawn; and 407 were disposed of in other ways.
- (3) In 1,256 strike cases, 957 were settled and 165,278 workers were restored to their jobs, after strikes and lock-outs. In addition, 489 threatened strikes, involving 125,000 workers, were averted.
- (4) Other cases included 948 elections to determine bargaining agencies for employees and reinstatement of 8,000 workers who had been fired for union activity.

Also remember, the government has conciliation and mediation boards working in the field of labor problems. What we want you to understand is this: the government, through peaceful and strictly voluntary means is meeting the problem in industrial relations today. We do not need, nor do the people want, such a drastic change as the closed shop.

In addition, we have listed for you the evils of the closed shop which are bound to result from the adoption of such a policy as that advocated by the Affirmative. The Affirmative ask us to attack their plan; my answer is that their plan is so indefinite that it defies understanding, let alone being definite enough to attack.

Collective bargaining, the thing for which the Affirmative are looking exists today; moreover, there is no attempt at coercion, a thing vital to any form of closed shop.

The Affirmative have failed to show you that the closed shop would not result in the closed-union closed shop, that the closed shop would not result in restricted out-put, that there would not be a labor monopoly, that violence and blood-shed would not result; nor have they shown you how their plan would work.

We of the Negative have shown you that the labor problems are being met today. We have shown you the evils of closed shop. We have shown better methods of solution *which have not been attacked*. It is for these reasons that we say, No, the closed shop must not be adopted throughout American industry. We must maintain the open and democratic means given us by the open shop.

Third Affirmative Rebuttal, Richard Cosway

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I believe that I am safe in saying that we have only one point to settle at this time. Both sides in this discussion have, as Mr. Hillibish has told you, recognized that we are in search of a plan. The point which we must settle is, "What plan shall we use?" The Negative have mentioned such means as legislation will offer; we of the Affirmative desire the closed shop.

The Negative have mentioned the National Labor Relations Board and voluntary arbitration as one form

of solution. I should like to point out that this body has already shown its ability to cope with the problem. May I quote from the proceedings of the recent convention of the American Federation of Labor, page 486:

The National Labor Relations Board has, together with and through a number of its Regional Boards, repeatedly denied employees the right of designating the bargaining unit, and have thereby denied employees the right of selecting representatives of their own choosing with full freedom.

The National Labor Relations Board through its regional representatives has attempted to destroy the validity of contracts entered into between legitimate labor organizations and their employers, contracts which were in full conformity with public laws, including the National Labor Relations Act, in some instances with full knowledge of the facts involved, and in others without any apparent effort to ascertain the facts.

The C. I. O. and other labor organizations are in agreement with the A. F. of L. on this one point: they do not favor the National Labor Relations Board.

Then, Mr. Leo Huberman, whom we have quoted before, says, in the last chapter of his book:

Employees should do immediately what the law gives them a right to do—organize. They should join trade unions. It is all to the good that the Wagner Act is on the statute books; that Wisconsin and Indiana have laws requiring the registration of operatives. . . . Yet that is not enough. . . . The only way for workers to advance their own interests is by building up and strengthening their own organization—the trade-union.

What better plan is there for strengthening trade-unions than a plan which will make every worker a member

of one union or another? "In union there is strength." You can see, I believe, that the closed shop is essential to give labor unions the strength they must have.

We have no ardent desire to set up a monopoly. We shall set up our closed shop with this rule: the unions operating under the closed shop must remain open unions, nominally and actually. This will settle the question raised by some of the Negative speakers.

We have shown you that labor does not want the plan offered by the Negative. May I point out to you that in one month, June, 1937, according to government figures, 85,161 persons struck for the closed shop? More laborers struck for the closed shop, as I have said before, than for any other purpose. We maintain, therefore, that the workers do want the closed shop.

The Negative attempt to make us believe that liberty will be destroyed. If they mean the liberty to work for starvation wages, the liberty to work under unhealthful conditions, the liberty to work for slave-driving and organized employers, then, we agree, liberty will be destroyed. If, on the other hand, they mean the liberty to improve their conditions of labor and their positions in society, then, we maintain that liberty which has never existed will be created.

In summary, then, we may say that both sides have attempted to solve the problem. The Negative have presented legislation *which is now failing* as the solution. We of the Affirmative have answered their questions concerning the closed shop, and we have pointed out that the evils the Negative mention will not exist under the closed shop. We, therefore, maintain that

the closed shop should be adopted throughout American industry.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: CLOSED SHOP

(Compiled by Richard Cosway)

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

- Adamic, Louis—*Dynamite, the Story of Class Violence in America*, 2nd edition. The Viking Press. 1934.
- Adams, Thomas S. and Sumner, Helen L.—*Labor Problems*. The Macmillan Company. 1905.
- Analysis of Strikes in June, 1937*. The United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1937.
- Andrews, John Bertram—*Labor Problems and Labor Legislation*. New York, American Association for Labor Legislation. 1932.
- Blum, Solomon—*Labor Economics*. Henry Holt and Company. 1925.
- Brooks, Robert—*When Labor Organizes*. Yale University Press. 1937.
- Bye, Raymond T. and Hewett, William W.—*Applied Economics*. F. S. Crofts and Company. 1935.
- Caldwell, Erksine—*Some American People*. R. M. McBride and Company. 1935.
- Calkins, Clinch—*Spy Overhead*. Harcourt Brace and Company. 1937.
- Carlton, Frank Tracy—*Organized Labor in American History*. D. Appleton and Co. 1920.
- Catlin, Warren B.—*The Labor Problem in the United States and Great Britain*. Harpers. 1926.
- Commons, John Rogers—*Trade Unionism and Labor Problems*. Ginn and Company. 1905. 2nd edition, 1921.
- Commons, John Rogers, and others—*History of Labor in the United States*. The Macmillan Company. 1926-1935.
- Douglas, Paul Howard—*Real Wages in the United States, 1890-1926*. Houghton Mifflin Company. 1930.
- Eighth Day's Proceedings*, Washington, D. C. American Federation of Labor. 1937.
- Estey, James Arthur—*The Labor Problem*, 1st edition, McGraw Hill Book Co. 1928.

- Fairchild, Fred R., Furniss, Edgar S., and Buck, Norman S.—*Elementary Economics*, esp. Vol. II, Yale University Press. 1937.
- Feldman, Herman—*Racial Factors in American Industry*. Harpers. 1931.
- Fifty Years of Service*, American Federation of Labor. Washington, D. C. 1931.
- Fitch, John Andrews—*The Causes of Industrial Unrest*. Harpers. 1924.
- Furniss, Edgar S.—*Labor Problems*. Houghton Mifflin Company. 1925.
- Gemmill, Paul F.—*Present-Day Labor Relations*. J. Wiley and Sons. 1929.
- Great, George Graham—*An Introduction to the Study of Organized Labor in America*. The Macmillan Company. 1916.
- Green, William—*The Right to Work*. The American Federation of Labor, Washington, D. C. 1931.
- Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1936*; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, Washington, D. C. 1936.
- Huberman, Leo—*The Labor Spy Racket*. Modern Age Books, Inc. 1937.
- Labor Sunday Message*—Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, Dept. of the Church and Social Service. 1937.
- Laidler, Harry W., ed.—*New Tactics in Social Conflict*. The Vanguard Press. 1926.
- Leeds, Morris Evans—*Wages: A Means of Testing Their Adequacy*. University of Pennsylvania Press. 1931.
- Lorwin, Lewis W.—*Labor Relations Boards*. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C. 1935.
- Mason, Alpheus Thomas—*Organized Labor and the Law*. Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina. 1925.
- Merritt, Walter G.—*Open Shop and Industrial Liberty*. The League for Industrial Rights, New York. 1922.
- Minton, Bruce and Stuart, John—*Men Who Lead Labor*. Modern Age Books, Inc. 1937.
- O'Neal, James—*The Workers in American History*, 4th ed. The Rand School of Social Science, New York. 1921.
- Onward March of the Open Shop*—The National Association of Manufacturers, New York. 1929.
- Orth, Samuel Peter—*The Armies of Labor*. Yale University Press. 1921.

- Perkins, Frances—*People at Work*. The John Day Company. 1934.
- Reed, Louis S.—*The Labor Philosophy of Samuel Gompers*. Columbia University Press. 1930.
- Senturia, Joseph A.—*Strikes*. University of Chicago Press. 1935.
- Stark, Louis—*Labor and the New Deal*. Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D. C. 1936.
- Stein, Emanuel and Raushenbush, Carl—*Labor and the New Deal*. F. S. Crofts and Co. 1934.
- Sullivan, Edward Dean—*This Labor Union Racket*. Hillman-Curl, Inc. 1936.
- Sutherland, R. L. and Woodward, J. L.—*Introductory Sociology*. J. B. Lippincott Company. 1937.
- Thomas, Norman—*Human Exploitation in the United States*. Frederick A. Stokes Co. 1934.
- Titus, H. H.—*Ethics for Today*. American Book Company. 1936.
- Wages and Hours of Labor*. No. 616. United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, Washington, D. C. 1936.
- Walling, William E.—*American Labor and American Democracy*. Harper's. 1926.
- Williams, Whiting—*What's on the Worker's Mind?* C. Scribner's Sons. 1920.
- Wolman, Leo—*The Growth of American Trade Unions*. National Bureau of Economic Research, New York. 1924.
- Wood, Clement—*Don't Tread on Me*. Vanguard Press. 1928.
- Wood, Louis A.—*Union-Management Cooperation on the Rail Strikes*. Yale University Press. 1931.
- Yellow Dog Contracts*—American Federation of Labor, Washington, D. C. 1930.
- Yoder, Dale—*Labor Economics and Labor Problems*. McGraw Hill Book Co. 1933.
- You and Industry Series*—New York, National Association of Manufacturers. 1936.

SIGNED MAGAZINE ARTICLES

- Adamic, Louis—"The Truth About the C.I.O." *Forum*, November, 1937.
- Adams, Mildred—"The Human Price of a Bargain." *The Delineator*, March, 1933, pp. 34 ff.
- Amidon, Buelah—"Due Process," *Survey Graphic*, July, 1936.

- Barr, P.—“Is Labor Learning Democracy?” *Christian Century*, 54: 1261-3. (Oct. 13, 1937.)
- Bliven, B.—“Sitting Down in Flint.” *New Republic*, January 27, 1937.
- Bortz, N. M.—“Collective Bargaining on Rails.” *Review of Reviews*, 96:47. (July, 1937.)
- Cameron, W. J.—“Why Laws Don’t Work.” *Vital Speeches*, 4:214-15. (February, 1938.)
- Carnegie, A.—“Employer’s View of the Labor Question.” *Forum*, 95:131-3. (March, 1936.)
- Douglas, P. H.—“American Labor Relations Act,” bibliog. *American Economic Review*, 24:735-61. (December, 1937.)
- Frey, A. H.—“What’s Behind the Strikes?” *Harper’s*, 176:168-78. (January, 1938.)
- Garrett, G.—“Labor Weapon.” *Saturday Evening Post*, 210:10-11. (July 17, 1937.)
- Girdler, T. M.—“Way to Industrial Peace; Four Pillars of Security.” *Vital Speeches*, 4:264-7. (February 15, 1938.)
- Goldmark, Josephine—“The New Menace in Industry.” *Scribner’s Magazine*, March, 1933.
- Green, William—“Does the United States Want a Labor Dictator?” *Reader’s Digest*, 31:104-7. (December, 1937.)
- Harris, H.—“Labor in America.” *Current History*, 46:40-8, (Sept. 1937), ff. (Cont’d.)
- Hartley, F. A.—“Can Industrial Peace Be Attained?” *Vital Speeches*, 3:543-4. (June 15, 1937.)
- Houser, J. D.—“Blind Spot in Labor Relations.” *Nation’s Business*, 25:26-8. (Sept., 1937.)
- Huberman, Leo—“Those ‘Regulated’ British Unions.” *The Nation*, 146:206. (Feb. 19, 1938.)
- McGrady, Edward F.—“What Does Labor Want?” *Vital Speeches*, Vol. III, No. 13, p. 399. (April 15, 1937.)
- Murkland, H. B.—“Labor at the Crossroads.” *Christian Century*, 53:264-6. (Feb. 12, 1936.)
- Pegler, W.—“Labor Parasites, Union Racketeers.” *Review of Reviews*, 96:41. (July, 1937.)
- Perkins, Frances—“The Cost of a Five-Dollar Dress.” *Survey Graphic*, February, 1933.
- Senturia, J. J.—“Types of Employer-Employee Dealing.” *Monthly Labor Review*, 41:1441-66. (Dec., 1935.)

- Slichter, S. H.—"Collective Bargaining at Work." *Atlantic*, 161:20-7. (January, 1938.)
- Spahr, Walter E.—"America Looks at Labor Today, with a Changed Opinion." *Vital Speeches*, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 663. (Aug. 15, 1937.)
- Taft, C. P.—"Thinking vs. Swearing in Labor Relations." *Vital Speeches*, 3:766-8. (Oct. 1, 1937.)
- Ward, R. W.—"Should Unions Be Incorporated?" *Nation*, 144:398-9. (April 10, 1937.)
- Williams, W.—"What D'you Mean, Check-off?" *Nation's Business*, 25:39-40. (November, 1937.) "What the Workers Want." *Scribners Magazine*, 103:41-4. (February, 1938.)
- Wolman, Leo—"Issues in American Industrial Relations." *Political Science Quarterly*, 52:161-73. (June, 1937.)

UNSIGNED MAGAZINE ARTICLES

- Business Week.—October 30, 1937, p. 28-9, *American Labor Unions, How They Stand Today*; June 26, 1937, p. 64, *Business Can Expect This*; April 25, 1936, *How Some Firms Avert Strikes*; August 7, 1937, p. 51-7, *Industrial Relations*; October 16, 1937, pp. 17-18, *Labor Talks Peace, Wages War*; March 19, 1938, pp. 17-18, *Push Government Out of Labor*.
- Christian Century.—34:239-41, February 24, 1937. *After the Motors Strike*.
- Colliers.—100:82, September 11, 1937. *Mr. Lewis' Baby; Political Power and Organized Labor*.
- Fortune.—16:104:11, November, 1937. *Industrial War; with Survey of Employer Opinion*.
- Literary Digest.—124:3-4, July 3, 1937. *Brickbat Words in Labor War*.
- Nation.—145:5, July 3, 1937. *Law and Order; Battle Between the C.I.O. and Little Steel*.
- New Republic.—August 4, 1937, p. 349. *Editorial*.
- New York Times.—November 17, 1937, p. 13. *Holds Church Aids Labor*; October 13, 1937, *Three More B. M. T. Unions Win Wage Increases*.
- The Pathfinder.—February 26, 1938, p. 3. *The NLRB—The Labor Board Gathers New Strength*.
- Scholastic.—32:2, March 5, 1938. *Growing Pains of Labor*.

EVER-NORMAL GRANARY PLAN

A Radio Discussion, Station WIBW

IOWA STATE COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE vs.
KANSAS STATE COLLEGE NEGATIVE

The following debate is one of the annual discussions broadcast over the radio as a service by these two state colleges to the farmers in their constituency. For a long time the practice of discussing annually, somewhere in a vast forensic program, subjects of direct interest to the farmers has been an important project with the debaters of the state colleges. Usually two speakers participate on each side and there is an Affirmative rejoinder, making five speeches in all. This form is necessitated by the time limits of radio programs.

The present debate was held over station WIBW at Topeka, Kansas, in March, on the following statement: Resolved, that the ever-normal granary plan would benefit the American farmer.

The speeches were contributed to *Intercollegiate Debates* by Professor Harrison B. Summers, Director of Debate at the Kansas State College, with the active assistance of Professors Forrest L. Whan and W. Justus Wilkinson of the Speech Department of Iowa State College.

EVER-NORMAL GRANARY PLAN

First Affirmative, D. Gale Johnson
Iowa State College

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Mr. Harlow and I are very glad to have the opportunity of discussing the subject of the Ever-Normal Granary over station WIBW, and for an audience of Kansas farmers. As our announcer has told you, the subject of our discussion is whether the Ever-Normal Granary Plan would benefit the American farmer.

At the outset, we want to say that the plan is not a cure-all or a panacea—far from it. Many of the problems with which agriculture is faced today would continue to exist. Nor do we want to leave the impression that there would be no difficulties involved in administering such a gigantic undertaking. We are advocating the plan because it has a few definite advantages that will outweigh the costs involved and the difficulties encountered.

Coming as we do from Iowa, the heart of the corn belt, Mr. Harlow and I would like your permission to discuss the plan as it affects corn. We realize that our knowledge would not permit us to do justice to the problems of the wheat grower, but we do feel from our limited knowledge of the subject that the plan would work equally for wheat as for corn.

Let us turn now to the basic purpose of the Ever-

Normal Granary. This purpose can be stated very simply, taking the gamble out of farming. You who are farmers know that you are always affected adversely by instability. Your crops, your income, your prices are all uncertain, fluctuating, and highly unpredictable. Because of this fundamental characteristic of all agricultural pursuits, the statement that farming is a gamble has become universally accepted.

No farmer in this audience can tell you in the spring how much he will harvest in the fall. From a forty-acre field of corn, you may get 2,000 bushels, or you are just as likely to harvest only 1,000 bushels. The wheat growers are beset with the same problem, perhaps even to a greater degree, because the weather is so much more uncertain in the wheat belt than in the corn belt. The yield of wheat is almost equally likely to be twenty bushels, ten bushels, or no bushels to the acre, depending upon weather, insect pests, diseases, and many other factors beyond the farmer's control.

But as you who are farmers know, you are beset with uncertainties other than the variable yield of your corn or wheat. Prices fluctuate to a greater extent than crop yields. What farmer has not experienced a drop in price of sixty cents or more a bushel between planting and harvesting time?

Uncertainties in agriculture are the result of two different sets of fluctuations—changes in the supply and changes in the demand for farm products. Farmers can do little to control the demand for their products, but to a remarkable degree, the problem of changes in supply is within the control of the nation's farmers.

Taking corn as an example, we find the primary reason for fluctuation in supply is the weather. Just as Mark Twain remarked, "Everybody talks about the weather, but no one does anything about it." The Ever-Normal Granary Plan hardly suggests controlling the weather. But the plan does provide for storing the surplus in years in which production is above average and making these surpluses available in poor crop years. In this way, prices of farm products would have a relative stability never before realizable or possible.

Let us take a specific example. In 1923 there was a large corn crop. The average yield of corn was over 28 bushels an acre. In 1924 there was a small corn crop because of unfavorable weather. The yield was less than 23 bushels. Because of the small corn crop, the price rose from 83 cents to \$1.06 a bushel. But the next year, the weather was again favorable and the yield was again 28 bushels per acre. In 1925, the price per bushel was 35 cents less than in 1924, and the larger crop of that year had a total value smaller by a half billion dollars than the smaller crop of 1924. You farmers realize only too well what the effects of such fluctuations in the value of your farm output has on your profits.

Had it been possible to carry over the surplus of 1923 into 1924, several benefits would have arisen. First of all, the price would have been higher in 1923 because all of the corn would not have been sold. Secondly, the price would have been lower in 1924 because the surplus from 1923 would have been available.

Some of you who are not farmers may well wonder

why a lower price in 1924 and higher price in 1923 would have been advantageous, though corn belt farmers could easily tell you, since they have learned the answer from the school of experience. Because of the low price of corn in 1923, hog production became relatively profitable and production increased. But it takes time to increase hog production. The real increase in production was not shown until late 1924. At that time, instead of having cheap 1923 corn to feed, the farmers were forced to use high priced 1924 corn and as a result, plus an increase in hogs, suffered heavy losses on their hogs. Had the price of corn not been so low in 1923, hog production would not have been increased, and if the corn surplus had been made available in 1924, corn price would not have risen so high, and the hogs could have been produced profitably.

Agriculture is predominantly an enterprise of high fixed cost. Taxes must be paid, good years or bad. Interest and principal payments must be met. Rent is a fixed payment set in advance. Because of this, the enormous fluctuations that we have witnessed in agricultural income in the past have resulted in hardship, distress, suffering, loss of farm and home. To replace this uncertainty in farm income by a high degree of stability through providing an average supply of feed and grains for consumption each year is the purpose of the Ever-Normal Granary Plan.

First Negative, Robert E. Summers
Kansas State College

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I was certainly surprised to hear Mr. Johnson offer to take the gamble out of farming. According to him, all you have to do is put the Ever-Normal Granary Program into operation and presto! farming is safe, secure, and profitable. But regardless of what Mr. Johnson says, you know and I know that the problem isn't that simple. An ever-normal granary system wouldn't help the farmer at all; on the contrary, it would either break the government, or break the farmer.

Now let's look at this ever-normal granary idea for a moment. First, it provides for a system of crop loans which, in effect, are the same as a government-guaranteed price. Through these loans, the government plans to take the surplus off the market and hold it for future crop shortages.

But just what will be the effect of such a price guarantee? Just this—every farmer will break his neck to increase his production on those price-guaranteed products. If he raises other products, he takes a chance on the price; but he's sure either of a good price, or of a government loan, on corn, wheat, or cotton. And so he'd raise more wheat, more corn, and more cotton. Farmer Jones would read in his newspaper that Congress is providing for loans to support the price; and say, "Well, I guess I won't plant that south forty in barley, after all. There may be a low price on barley next summer. But the government's guaranteeing me a

good price on wheat; so I'll put that forty into wheat."

We know that's what Farmer Jones would say, because he's done the same thing before. During the World War, the government wanted more wheat; so it guaranteed a high price for wheat; and immediately, every farmer in the Middle West turned to wheat-raising. Production jumped from 636 million bushels in 1917, to 967 million in 1920. The price guarantee booted production over 50 per cent.

Our experience with cotton, the last few years, proves the same thing, that a guaranteed price means increased production, and a bigger surplus. When cotton prices went so low a few years ago, the government came along and told the cotton planter, "Here, Mr. Farmer. We'll lend you nine cents a pound on your cotton, if you'll take some of your land out of cultivation. That will send prices up, and keep them there." And what happened? In spite of the land the government took out of cultivation, the farmers of the South turned out a bumper crop, and we have a surplus of 5 million bales that we can't get rid of. Guarantee the price, and you get increased production, and a bigger surplus. That'll happen with corn, with cotton, with wheat, or with any crop you try.

Well, if the effect is to boost production, what happens then? You have an oversupply, and the price goes down. Farmer Smith and Farmer Jones can borrow far more than the market price, from the government, so they go ahead and borrow, and the government's left holding the bag with a lot of unsaleable corn or wheat or cotton on its hands.

And the final result—well, take the experience of Brazil a few years ago. The Brazilian government tried to stabilize the price of coffee; it bought up the surplus coffee, and took it off the market. But then, it couldn't get rid of the surplus, so finally Brazil had to send shipload after shipload of coffee out to be dumped into the ocean. We had the same experience here in the United States with President Hoover's Federal Farm Board. The government guaranteed the price; to maintain the price, it bought up the surplus. And in the end, the government lost half a billion dollars, because it couldn't get rid of that surplus. So the effect of all price-fixing efforts is increased production, a bigger surplus, and finally, a loss of millions of dollars by the government.

But Mr. Johnson says that it's going to be different, this time. We're not going to get any big surpluses; we're going to limit production. But let's see how that would work.

First of all, how much must production be cut? Well, if we boost the price abroad, the price at home will be higher than the price abroad. So to avoid a disastrous surplus, we'll have to cut production till it simply equals our home demand.

Take wheat, for example. Our home consumption of wheat is only about 600 million bushels. But wheat production, prior to the recent drouths at least, averaged 850 million bushels. If we cut production to the 600 million bushel figure, it means that 30 per cent of all our wheat land must be taken out of cultivation. The situation's even worse with cotton. Our average

home consumption is about 8 million bales, but last year we produced 18 million bales. To cut cotton production down to a home consumption level, we'll have to cut cotton acreage by more than 50 per cent. In fact, next year, with a carry over greater than a full year's needs, the government would have to cut cotton acreage 100 per cent.

Let me make this very clear. That land taken out of cultivation will have to lie idle. If it's turned to the production of alfalfa, or oats, or any other crop, it will cause an oversupply of those crops, and knock the bottom out of prices. Then the system of control would have to be broadened to include those other crops. So the only solution would be to have the land lie idle.

Now, consider the effect on the American farmer. Back before the Triple-A, when the farmer produced all the wheat or corn or cotton he could, he got good prices. Farmer Jones sold his wheat for an average of \$1.35 a bushel. With the Ever-Normal Granary Plan, Farmer Jones is guaranteed 90 cents a bushel, but he can only produce 70 per cent as much wheat. That'll cut his total income down to far less than he's receiving now. In fact, most wheat and cotton farmers would starve to death.

Well, that's the situation. Either we don't cut production greatly and get surpluses which will break the government, or we do cut production and break the farmer. Take your choice. Accept the Ever-Normal Granary, or look for a solution to the farm problem, one that works.

Second Affirmative, Leroy Harlow
Iowa State College

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Mr. Summers makes the agricultural problem seem extremely simple. He tells you the Ever-Normal Granary Plan will either increase production or it will decrease it. If production is increased the government will go bankrupt; if production is decreased the farmer will starve. I assure you that our agricultural leaders do not believe that we face the terrible alternatives which Mr. Summers pictures. Let us examine his arguments and see where a careless reading of the plan has led him into error.

He first argued that the plan would bankrupt the government because a guaranteed price has always meant an increase in production. He told you of the experiences of Brazil, of the Federal Farm Board, and of this country in time of war. But he forgot to tell you that in none of these instances was *any* attempt made to decrease production. So these examples prove nothing. Mr. Summers ignores basic features of the present plan. He ignores the benefit payments which the government makes to farmers for cutting production, the methods to be used in allocating loans, and the penalties which may be applied for producing more than the plan calls for.

In order to understand better why we need not fear that many farmers will refuse to cooperate, let us compare the case of a Kansas corn farmer who joins and one who does not. Suppose that Mr. Smith joins the plan this year. He is immediately paid 10 cents a

bushel on the average annual yield for his allotted number of acres. In return he agrees to cut his acreage less than 10 per cent. Harvest time arrives and one of two things happens. Either the price is above 75 per cent of parity—63 cents a bushel or more at present parity price—or it would be below that figure, depending upon the yield. If it was over 63 cents, Mr. Smith would sell his corn. If under that figure, the government would offer him a loan of 60 cents a bushel to hold his corn for higher prices. In other words, by joining the plan, Mr. Smith is actually guaranteed a price of at least 60 cents a bushel on all the corn he raises on his reduced acreage, and has been given a benefit of one-sixth more to make up for cutting his acreage less than 10 per cent.

Now supposing his neighbor, Mr. Zitts, does not join the plan, plants all of his acres, and even an extra "south forty" as Mr. Summers suggests. Naturally, he does not get the 10 cents a bushel benefit payment. But that isn't all. Harvest time comes. If the price is above 63 cents a bushel he sells his corn at an advantage, true! But if the price is below that amount he can only get a corn loan on his *excess* production, and of 36 cents per bushel instead of 60 cents. He must sell the rest at the market price, no matter how low. But still that may not be all. If the price is low and market quotas are put in force by a two-thirds vote of the corn farmers, he will not be allowed to sell more than his quota, anyway, without paying a penalty of 50 cents a bushel. In short, Mr. Zitts, by refusing to join, has truly gambled. He has given up a benefit payment equal to one-sixth of his crop at a 60 cent price

level; he is able to get only a 36-cent corn loan on but a small part of his crop; and he is running the risk of being penalized 50 cents a bushel on all his increased production.

How many non-signers do you believe there will be when all this is made perfectly clear? Mightly few, if any! The benefits from joining are great; the possible penalties for not joining are huge. Hence, student Summer's first fear is groundless. Production will not increase because of non-signers. His error was in ignoring the incentives and penalties embodied in the present plan.

But realizing that his first argument was unsound, Mr. Summers changed his ground and argued that the plan would work so well that it would starve the farmer to death. In proof he claimed that the wheat acreage must be cut 30 per cent, and that we can raise no cotton at all. He ignores the fact that the allocation has already been made and that no such drastic reduction has occurred. In Iowa, corn has been cut between 5 and 10 per cent, down to the acreage planted in 1934 and 1935. Wheat acreage has been cut 23 per cent and potato acreage has been cut only 7 per cent. The cotton reduction has not yet been announced, but the surplus does not need to be exhausted in a single year. So the actual reductions belie Mr. Summers' claims. His error was in believing that we would have to cut to equal the home demand alone; but he ignored the plan, which bases its figures on both home consumption *and* exports. So the drastic crop reductions he pictures will not materialize.

Finally, Mr. Summers argues that the farmer once

sold wheat for \$1.25 per bushel while the government guarantees only 90 cents per bushel on the reduced acreage. But he did not tell you the whole truth. In only one year between 1920 and 1937 has the *average* wheat price on the farm been as high as \$1.25 per bushel, according to Department of Agriculture statistics. And most years it has gone below the 90-cent figures. If the price again goes to \$1.25, well and good. I leave it to you wheat farmers. Isn't a 90-cent guarantee on 77 per cent of your last year's acreage, plus a 12 cent benefit payment per bushel, better than no guarantee and no benefit payment, plus the added possibility of a 96 cent-per-bushel penalty for over-production? Will you starve on \$1.02 wheat planted on 77 per cent of your acres?

Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Summers argued that we shall either bankrupt the government or starve the farmer. But I believe I have shown you that the benefits and penalties of the plan make a continued over-production impossible; while the guaranteed price, plus the benefit payments, will provide a profitable minimum price.

Second Negative, James L. Gould
Kansas State College

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Mr. Harlow has presented a very smooth and plausible argument. But let's just check a few of his statements and see how accurate they really are.

First, Mr. Harlow told us that in the instances Mr. Summers cited no attempts were made to decrease

production. Yet Brazil forbade the planting of additional coffee trees; the Farm Board tried to get farmers to cut acreage and as for the Triple-A you'll all remember you were paid to kill off your little pigs, and not to raise corn, wheat, or cotton. And in every single case, the higher artificial price resulted in a boosted production; and increased surplus and the government got stuck.

Next, Mr. Harlow objected to our argument that if the government forces a cut in production big enough to get rid of the surplus, the farmers are going to take it on the chin. But very wisely, he dodged that argument and tried to show that with the production cut in operation, the farmer who doesn't sign up is worse off than the one who does. That's beside the point—the important fact is that, if we cut production enough to get rid of our surplus, the farmer will have a smaller income than he has had in the past. And Mr. Harlow hasn't tried to deny that very obvious fact.

Next, Mr. Harlow tried to show that with the Ever-Normal Granary Plan, the farmer won't have to cut production very much. In corn, he says, production will only be cut from 5 to 10 per cent. In wheat, just a mere 23 per cent; and of course, the cut in cotton has not yet been announced. And fortunate it is for Mr. Harlow, that it hasn't. Especially with a surplus cotton carry over equal to a whole year's production.

But let's get at the facts and see how much these cuts will have to be. Mr. Harlow says we won't have to cut to the basis of domestic consumption, because we will always have our exports. We will, if the domestic price

remains as low as the world price. But the whole idea of the plan is to cut production enough to give us here at home artificially high prices. If the price of wheat or cotton is to be higher after a cut of 23 per cent in wheat acreage, or 40 to 50 per cent in cotton, then why cut production at all? So if the plan worked, the price here in the United States for these products would have to be higher than the price on the world market. And if it is, we certainly can't export. Do you think the exporter is going to pay \$1.00 a bushel for wheat here in the United States only to sell it in Liverpool for 70 cents? By no means. If the plan works, prices go higher at home than they are abroad; the result is, our exports stop. And so if the plan works, we've got to cut our acreage enough to see that there's no surplus to export—and that's 5 to 10 per cent for corn, 30 to 35 per cent for wheat, and 50 per cent or more for cotton.

Mr. Harlow has tried to dodge the big weakness in the plan. If we don't cut production to the level of our own domestic needs, we're going to have a big surplus which will be dumped on the government. In other words, we break the government. On the other hand, we can cut production to the level of the American demand, so we won't have a surplus; but the necessary cut will have to be so great that it will break the farmer. Those are the alternatives if we accept Mr. Harlow's plan.

Now our belief is that the best thing for the farmer is to adopt a plan that won't require cutting production. We believe in letting the farmer raise all he can, and then enable him to sell it at a good price. In other

words, let him produce a surplus, and then export it.

Prior to 1929, that's just what the farmer did. He had a large foreign demand and he sold his products at a good price. But Mr. Harlow tells us that only one year since 1920 has the average price of wheat been \$1.25. Well, Mr. Harlow must be daydreaming. In 1920 the average price paid for wheat was \$2.34; in 1921—\$1.50; in 1925—\$1.62; and in 1926—\$1.58; now there you have four years in which the average price of wheat, according to the United States Department of Agriculture, exceeds \$1.50. And the average price paid for wheat here in the United States from 1920 to 1930 was \$1.30 a bushel. Certainly Mr. Harlow will have to admit \$1.30 was a good price. And we had equally good prices for cotton and corn.

In 1929, Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley tariff, which boosted rates sky-high, on nearly everything we imported. The result was, that within two years after the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, our imports had fallen from 4½ billion to about 2 billion dollars.

But Mr. Harlow may say, how does it affect you farmers. Well, in just this way. If England can't send goods to us, then she can't build up any credits to pay for the wheat, corn, and cotton she would like to buy from us. The result, our exports of wheat, corn, and cotton take a nose dive. And that's exactly what happened after the Smoot-Hawley tariff law went into effect. Our wheat exports dropped from 151 million bushels a year to 80 million bushels in 1930, to 32 million bushels by 1932. Cotton exports dropped from 11½ million bales a year to 6½ million bales. Nat-

urally the result was that a lot of the wheat and corn and cotton the farmers raised couldn't be sold, and so we had a surplus. And naturally, prices went down and down and down.

Now, there are two possible ways to get rid of this surplus. First, we can cut production, raise only enough goods for the home market, not try to export at all. That method will get rid of the surplus, if we cut the production enough and raise the price. But it means that the farmer must let from 30 to 40 per cent of his land lie idle, bringing him no income at all. That's the Ever-Normal Granary Plan.

The other way seems more intelligent to me. If high tariffs, by keeping foreigners from buying our corn and wheat or cotton, *caused* the surplus, the reasonable way to get rid of the surplus is to cut the tariffs. Let foreign nations sell their goods to us, and in return receive credits with which to buy our products. Then we can get rid of our surplus corn and wheat or cotton by selling it abroad, and with the surplus exported, the prices can return to the levels of 1927 and 1928. But this way, the farmer won't have to cut his production—instead of raising only 60 or 70 per cent of the amount of wheat or cotton his land will produce, he can raise 100 per cent—and get just as high a price per bushel or per bale for that whole 100 per cent as he could for the 60 or 70 per cent allowed him under the Ever-Normal Granary Plan.

So, ladies and gentlemen, I think you will agree that the Ever-Normal Granary Plan is not the best method of solving the farmers' problems.

Affirmative Rejoinder, D. Gale Johnson
Iowa State College

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Let us briefly review this debate, point by point, as it has been presented here this afternoon, and then decide whether or not we should have the Ever-Normal Granary Plan.

In the first speech I presented the Ever-Normal Granary as an orderly marketing plan, a plan that will take much of the gamble out of farming by providing an even supply of farm commodities year in and year out. Because of the fixed nature of farm expenses, a stable farm income is an extremely desirable objective. It is very interesting to note that not once in the entire debate has the Negative attacked the underlying feature, orderly marketing, of the Ever-Normal Granary Plan. Such gross negligence to consider it must mean that they admit that the plan is not vulnerable to attack on that point.

Because Mr. Summers could not attack the basic feature of the plan—orderly marketing—he attempted to present a superficial dilemma for our consideration. He maintained that the crop loans would act as a governmental guarantee price for the crops, causing a great expansion of production. This would occur unless you limited production which would “break” the farmer.

First of all, the size of the crop loan will not be set until most of the crops are harvested. However, if the market price is such that it might encourage production, the production control will be inaugurated to keep the

new crop, plus the carryover, within the limits of normal needs.

The gentlemen from Kansas have the mistaken impression that control means restriction of supply to the needs of the domestic market. They labor under the false assumption that to raise the price by restricting production, the domestic price must be above the world price. How do they explain the fact that in 1933 a wheat crop 65 per cent as large as the 1932 crop had a total value 35 per cent greater? Yet exports were as large in 1933 as in 1932. A small corn crop invariably brings more than a large one, despite the fact that much of it is indirectly exported through pork. No attempt was made by the gentlemen from Kansas to explain this phenomena of agricultural prices.

The Negative have made much of past attempts to control production. The Brazilian coffee control and the Farm Board were cited. But in neither case was a real effort made to limit production. Finally, the gentlemen considered the Triple-A. The results of the Triple-A, according to them, was that production was boosted, an increased surplus resulted, the government got stuck, and the farmer was not benefited. Was this actually the case? You know that it was not, but for the edification of the Negative let us review the results of the Triple-A. The Federal Government was able to dispose of all of the surpluses on which it lent money, without loss. Net farm incomes trebled from 1932 to 1936, and in 1936 net farm income was only slightly below that of the prosperous year of 1929.

The Negative is going to solve the problem by reduc-

ing the tariffs. When? How? What tariffs? What is going to happen to the farmer in the meantime? These questions they made no attempt to answer. Neither did they show that an orderly system of marketing as provided by the Ever-Normal Granary Plan would not be advantageous if we had all of the foreign market back again.

Since the plan takes much of the gamble out of farming by providing for orderly marketing and the control of supply to meet the effective demand, we feel that it will be beneficial to the American farmer.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: EVER-NORMAL GRANARY PLAN

MAGAZINE REFERENCES

- Agriculture Situation.—21:9, Mar., 1937. *Definition of the Ever-Normal Granary*. H. A. Wallace.
- American Cattle Producer.—18:15, Feb., 1937. Editorial: *Ever-Normal Granary*.
- American Economic Review.—26: sup. 129, Mar., 1936. *Trade Agreements Program and American Agriculture*. L. R. Edminster.
- Business Week—p. 31, Mar. 5, 1938. *Chains Give More Aid to Farmers*. p. 26, Apr. 9, 1938. *Independents Rush Farm Drives in Moving Surpluses*. p. 49, Apr. 16, 1938. *Chains and Auction Men Mix It*.
- Christian Century.—53:290, Feb. 19, 1936. *America's Real Farm Issue*. A. E. Holt. 55:301, Mar. 9, 1938. *Farm Seeks a Market*. D. Stevenson. 55:334, Mar. 16, 1938. *Farmer Is Betrayed*. D. Stevenson. 55:365, Mar. 23, 1938. *Farmer Is Enchained*. D. Stevenson. 55:399, Mar. 30, 1938. *More Food For Less Money*. D. Stevenson.
- Collier's Weekly.—101:9, Jan. 1, 1938. *Devil in de Cotton*. O. P. White.
- Country Life.—72:33, Sept., 1937. *Farms in the Black*. W. N. Ely, Jr.

- Fortnightly.—147:(n.s.):481, Apr., 1937. *Future of Marketing Boards*. L. F. Easterbrook.
- Fortune.—17:84, Jan., 1938. Survey: *Guaranteed Farm Prices*.
- Forum.—97:294, May, 1937. *Hope for the Farmer*. R. H. Peters.
- Journal of Political Economy.—45:394, June, 1937. *Orderly Marketing in Agriculture*. S. Herman.
- New Republic.—89:133, Dec. 2, 1936. *Next Four Years in Agriculture*. H. A. Wallace.
- News Week.—8:11, Oct. 31, 1936. *Farmers Collect Benefits Under Revamped Crop Control*.
- Quarterly Journal of Economics.—51:1, Nov., 1936. *Controlled Distribution of a Crop Among Independent Markets*.
- Review of Reviews.—92:41, Nov., 1935. *Predicament of Agriculture*. D. D. Casement. 95:34, Mar., 1937. *Control of Crops or Prices*. W. I. Drummond.
- Rural America.—15:9, May, 1937. *Definition of Ever-Normal Granary*. H. A. Wallace.
- Saturday Evening Post.—209:14, May 8, 1937. *That Ever-Normal Granary*. J. E. Boyle. 208:12, Nov. 2, 1935. *Managed Agriculture*. G. Garrett. 208:22, Feb. 22, 1936. *Economic Equality*. 208:16, Nov. 16, 1935. *Plowing Up Freedom*. G. Garrett. 208:16, Aug. 22, 1936. *Political Curse on the Farm Problem*. G. Garrett.
- Survey.—73:348, Nov., 1937. *Farmers on Relief*. I. Lorge.
- Survey Graphic.—25:669, Dec., 1936. *Market for Farm People*. H. Hill.
- Vital Speeches.—3:23, Oct. 15, 1936. *Sold Down the River*. Alf. M. Landon. 2:158, Dec. 16, 1935. *Fair Deal for the Farmer*. Address by F. D. Roosevelt before the American Farm Bureau, Chicago, Dec. 10, 1935. 1:279, Jan. 28, 1935. *Farm Problem, the Export Trade and Our General Industrial Equilibrium*. B. M. Anderson, Jr. 2:27, Oct. 7, 1935. Speech on Farm Problems at Fremont, Nebraska, Sept. 28, 1935. F. D. Roosevelt. 2:506, May 18, 1936. *Next Move in American Agriculture*. F. W. Sargent, H. A. Wallace. 1:146; Dec. 3, 1934. *Farm Situation*. H. A. Wallace. 2:352, Mar. 9, 1936. *National Agricultural Program*. W. McMillan.
- Wallace F.—62:53, July 17, 1937. *Farm Bill Faces Stiff Fight*.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Topic Index of Debate Subjects Appearing in the Various Volumes of "Intercollegiate Debates"

- Abandonment of Policy of Military Preparedness,
Vol. 12.
- Accident Insurance, *Vol. 4.*
- Advertising, Modern, *Vol. 10.*
- Agricultural Adjustment Act, *Vol. 15.* (See also Cotton Control Program, *Vol. 17.*)
- Alliance with Great Britain, *Vol. 19.*
- Anglo-American Boycott on Japanese Goods, *Vol. 19.*
- American Legion Should Be Condemned, *Vol. 14.*
- Armed Intervention for Collection of Debts, *Vols. 1, 9.*
- Arms and Munitions, Prevention of International Shipment, *Vol. 16.*
- Nationalization of, *Vol. 17.*
- Asset Currency, *Vol. 1.*
- Athletics, Amateurism and Professionalism in, *Vol. 12.*
- Balancing the Federal Budget, *Vol. 18.*
- Banks, Government Control of, *Vol. 14.*
- Bank Notes Secured by Commercial Paper, *Vol. 1.*
(See also Asset Currency.)
- Bonus (See American Legion.)
- British vs. American System of Broadcasting, *Vol. 15.*
- Cabinet System of Government, *Vols. 1, 3, 10.*
- Cabinet Officers in Congress, *Vol. 4.*
- Cancellation of War Debts, *Vols. 13, 14.*

Capitalism vs. Socialism.

 Capitalism Is Unsound, *Vol. 13.*

 Social Control of Production and Exchange, *Vol. 7.*

 Limitation of Wealth, *Vols. 14, 16.*

Central Banks, *Vols. 1, 3.* (See Banks, Gov't Control of.)

Centralization of Power in Federal Government, *Vols. 9, 13.* (See also Control of Industry, Banks, Gov't Control of.)

Chain Store, *Vol. 11.*

Child Labor, *Vol. 8.*

C.I.O., The Policies of the, *Vol. 18.*

City Manager Plan of Municipal Government, *Vol. 7.*

Closed and Open Shop, *Vols. 1, 3.*

Coal Mines, Government Ownership of, *Vol. 1.*

Co-education, *Vol. 10.*

Collective Bargaining by Non-Company Unions, *Vol. 16.*

Collective Bargaining in Mass-Production Industries, *Vol. 19.*

Commission Form of Municipal Government, *Vols. 1, 3.*

Compulsory Automobile Insurance, *Vol. 15.*

Compulsory Military Service, *Vol. 6.* (See also Swiss Military System, *Vol. 7.*)

Compulsory Reserve Officers Training Corps, *Vol. 17.*

Conservation of Natural Resources, *Vol. 2.*

Consumers' Co-operatives, *Vol. 18.*

Control of Industry, *Vol. 13.*

Cotton Control Program, *Vol. 17.*

Courts and Reform in Legal Procedure.

 Abolition of Insanity Plea in Criminal Cases, *Vol. 10.*

 Abolition of Jury System, *Vol. 10.*

Courts and Reform in Legal Procedure—(*Continued*)Judges, Appointment vs. Election, *Vol. 1.*Judges, Recall of, *Vol. 2.*Judicial Decisions, Recall of, *Vol. 4.*Three-fourths Jury Decision, *Vol. 3.*Crop Insurance, *Vol. 18.*Cuba, Annexation of, *Vol. 1.*Declaration of War by Popular Vote, *Vol. 8.*Democracy vs. Dictatorship, *Vol. 15.*Dictatorship, Presidential, *Vols. 14, 15.*Direct Primary, *Vol. 3.*Disarmament, International, *Vol. 11.* (See Abandonment of Policy of Military Preparedness.)

Divorce

Divorce Is a Social Asset, *Vol. 13.*Uniform Marriage and Divorce Laws, *Vol. 8.*

Education

Amateurism vs. Professionalism in Athletics, *Vol. 12.*Co-education, *Vol. 10.*Federal Aid to Education, *Vol. 16.*Federal Department of Education, *Vol. 9.*Educational Qualification for Suffrage, *Vol. 1.*Election of Senators by Popular Vote, *Vol. 1.*Emergence of Women from the Home, *Vol. 12.*

Farm Relief

Agricultural Adjustment Act, *Vol. 15.*Ever-Normal Granary Plan, *Vol. 19.*McNary-Haugen Bill (Two debates), *Vol. 9.*Fixing Prices of Staple Agricultural Products, *Vol. 13.*Federal Aid to Education, *Vol. 16.*

Federal Charter for Interstate Commerce Corporations,
Vols. 1, 4.

Federal Control of Banks, *Vol. 14.*

Federal Control of the Express Business, *Vol. 5.*

Federal Control of Railroads, *Vol. 1.*

Federal Department of Education, *Vol. 9.*

Foreign Affairs

Governmental Principles of Mussolini, *Vols. 9, 11.*

Japanese Policy in Manchuria, *Vol. 14.*

Foreign Loans and Investments

Armed Intervention for Collection of, *Vols. 1, 9.*

Foreign Relations

Alliance with Great Britain, *Vol. 19.*

Anglo-American Boycott on Japanese Goods, *Vol. 19.*

Building United States Navy to Treaty Strength,
Vol. 15.

Cancellation of War Debts, *Vols. 13, 14.*

League of Nations, *Vols. 8, 10.*

Monroe Doctrine, *Vol. 5.*

Open Door Policy in China, *Vol. 7.*

Prevention of International Shipment of Arms and
Munitions, *Vol. 16.*

Neutrality, Freedom of Action, and Alliances, *Vol.*
19.

Neutrality Policy of the United States, *Vol. 19.*

Recognition of Soviet Russia, *Vol. 8.*

Free Trade. (See also Tariff.)

In Raw Materials, *Vol. 2.*

International Free Trade, *Vol. 12.*

Protective Tariff, Abandonment of, *Vols. 1, 2.*

- Government, Change in Form of
Cabinet Form of Government, *Vols. 1, 3, 10.*
Centralization of Power in Federal Government,
Vols. 9, 13.
Educational Qualification for Suffrage, *Vol. 1.*
Election of Senators by Popular Vote, *Vol. 1.*
Personal Liberty, Restriction of by Government,
Vol. 9.
Power of Supreme Court to Declare Laws Unconsti-
tutional, *Vol. 8.*
Reorganization of the Federal Executive, *Vol. 19.*
Six Year Term for President, *Vol. 5.*
- Government Ownership
Of All Means of Production, *Vol. 17.*
Of Coal Mines, *Vol. 1.*
Of Commercial Banking, *Vol. 18.*
Of Electric Utilities, *Vols. 17, 18.*
Of Hydro-Electric Power, *Vols. 10, 11.*
Of Merchant Marine, *Vol. 6.*
Of Public Utilities, *Vol. 16.*
Of Telegraph and Telephone, *Vol. 6.*
Of Railroads, *Vols. 4, 6, 7.*
- Government Policies
Annexation of Cuba, *Vol. 1.*
Conservation of Natural Resources, *Vol. 2.*
Federal Aid to Education, *Vol. 16.*
Independence of the Philippines, *Vol. 5.*
Ship Subsidy, *Vols. 1, 6.*
Spending to Combat Depression, *Vol. 17.*
Hitlerism, Advantages of, *Vol. 15.*

Hydro-Electric Power, Government Ownership and Control of, *Vols. 10, 11.*

Hours of Labor, 40-hour week, *Vol. 11.*

Immigration

 Japanese Immigration Law, *Vol. 8.*

 Literacy Test, *Vol. 5.*

 Restriction of, *Vol. 1.*

Income Tax, *Vols. 1, 2, 14, 16.* (See Limitation of Wealth.)

Incorporation, Federal, *Vols. 1, 4.* (See Federal Incorporation of Railroads, *Vol. 1.*)

Increase in Army and Navy, *Vol. 7.* (Navy alone, *Vols. 1, 15.*)

Independence of Philippines, *Vol. 5.*

Industry, Control of, *Vol. 13.*

Inheritance Tax, *Vols. 1, 14, 16.*

Initiative and Referendum, *Vols. 1, 2.*

Injunction in Labor Disputes, *Vols. 1, 5.*

Insanity Plea in Criminal Cases, Abolishment of, *Vol. 10.*

Installment Buying, *Vol. 11.*

International Free Trade, *Vol. 12.*

Interstate Commerce.

 Advertising, Modern, *Vol. 10.*

 Chain Store, *Vol. 11.*

 Control of Industry, *Vol. 13.*

 Federal Charter for Interstate Commerce Corporations, *Vols. 1, 4.*

 Federal Control of Express Business, *Vol. 5.*

 Federal Control of Railroads, *Vol. 1.*

 Federal Control of Banks, *Vol. 14.*

Interstate Commerce—(*Continued*)

Government Ownership of Public Utilities, *Vol. 16.*

Government Ownership of Railroads, *Vol. 4.*

Installment Buying, *Vol. 11.*

Reduction of Wages Retards Business Recovery,
Vol. 13.

Regulation vs. Dissolution of Trusts, *Vol. 4.*

Japanese Immigration, *Vol. 8.*

Japanese Policy in Asia, *Vol. 17.*

Japanese Policy in Manchuria, *Vol. 14.*

Judges, Appointment vs. Election of, *Vol. 1.*

Judges, Recall of, *Vol. 2.*

Judicial Decisions, Recall of, *Vol. 4.*

Judicial Review of Legislation, Limitation of, *Vol. 17.*

Jury System, Abolition of, *Vol. 10.*

Labor and Capital

Benefits of Labor Unions, *Vol. 1.*

Child Labor, *Vol. 8.*

Closed and Open Shop, *Vols. 1, 3.*

Collective Bargaining by Non-Company Unions,
Vol. 16.

Collective Bargaining in Mass-Production Industries,
Vol. 19.

Exemption of Labor Unions from Anti-trust Laws,
Vol. 7.

Forty-Hour Week, *Vol. 11.*

Injunction in Labor Disputes, *Vols. 1, 5.*

Minimum Wage, *Vols. 3, 6, 18.*

Provisions of the N.R.A., *Vol. 15.*

Reduction of Wages, *Vol. 13.*

Union Closed Shop, *Vol. 19.*

Labor Unions, Benefits of, *Vol. 1.*

Exemption of from Anti-trust Laws, *Vol. 7.*

Larger Navy in the Pacific, *Vol. 19.*

League of Nations, *Vols. 8, 10.*

League Sanctions, United States Support for, *Vol. 17.*

Light Wines and Beer, *Vol. 9.*

Liquor Control, *Vols. 8, 9, 12.*

Limitation of Incomes and Inheritances, *Vol. 16.*

Limitation of Wealth, *Vol. 14.*

Limiting Judicial Review of Legislation, *Vol. 17.*

Literacy Test for Immigrants, *Vol. 5.*

McNary-Haugen Bill, *Vol. 9.*

Medicine, Socialized, *Vols. 12, 16.*

Merchant Marine, Government Ownership of, *Vol. 6.*

Merits of New Deal, *Vol. 16.*

Military Problems and War

Abandonment of Military Preparedness, *Vol. 12.*

Compulsory Military Service, *Vol. 6.*

Compulsory R.O.T.C., *Vol. 17.*

Swiss System of Compulsory Military Service, *Vol. 7.*

Declaration of War by Popular Vote, *Vols. 8, 19.*

Increase in Army and Navy, *Vols. 1, 7.*

International Disarmament, *Vol. 11.*

Prevention of International Shipment of Arms and
Munitions, *Vol. 16.*

Referendum on Declaration of War, *Vol. 19.*

Minimum Wages and Maximum Hours, *Vol. 18.*

Money and Banking

Asset Currency, *Vol. 1.*

Banks, Government Control of, *Vol. 14.*

Bank Notes Secured by Commercial Paper, *Vol. 1.*

Money and Banking—(*Continued*)Central Bank, *Vols. 1, 3.*Control of Industry (Credit Control), *Vol. 13.*Guarantee of Bank Deposits, *Vols. 1, 15.*Postal Savings Banks, *Vol. 1.*Stabilization of the Dollar, *Vol. 15.*Monroe Doctrine, *Vol. 5.*

Municipal Government

Commission Form, *Vols. 1, 3.*City Manager Plan, *Vol. 7.*Mussolini, Governmental Principles of, *Vols. 9, 11.*Nationalization of Arms and Munitions, *Vol. 17.*N.R.A., Labor Provisions of, *Vol. 15.*

Navy

Building United States Navy to Treaty Strength,
*Vol. 15.*Larger Navy in the Pacific, *Vol. 19.*Neutrality, Freedom of Action, and Alliances, *Vol. 19.*Neutrality Policy of the United States, *Vol. 19.*New Deal, Merits of, *Vol. 16.*Old Age Insurance or Pension, *Vols. 4, 13, 16.*Ontario Plan of Liquor Control, *Vol. 12.*Open Door Policy in China, *Vol. 7.*Open vs. Closed Shop, *Vols. 1, 3.*Personal Liberty, Restriction by Government, *Vol. 9.*Postal Savings Banks, *Vol. 1.*Power of Supreme Court, *Vol. 8.*

Power of Government. (See Centralization of Power.)

Prohibition, *Vols. 8, 9, 12.*Protective Tariff, *Vols. 1, 2.* (See also Free Trade.)Radio Broadcasting, *Vols. 14, 15.*

Railroads

Government Ownership of, *Vols. 4, 6, 7.*

Federal Control of, *Vol. 1.*

Raw Materials, Free Trade in, *Vol. 2.*

Recognition of Russia, *Vol. 8.*

Reduction of Wages Retards Business Recovery, *Vol. 13.*

Referendum on Declaration of War, *Vol. 19.*

Reorganization of Federal Executive, *Vol. 19.*

Regulation vs. Dissolution of Trusts, *Vol. 4.* (See also Federal Control.)

Repeal of the Iowa General Sales Tax, *Vol. 17.*

Restriction of Immigration, *Vols. 1, 5, 8.* (See Immigration.)

St. Lawrence Waterway, *Vol. 18.*

Sales Tax Repeal of, *Vol. 17.*

Ship Subsidy, *Vol. 6.*

Short Ballot, *Vol. 2.*

Single Tax, *Vol. 6.*

Six Year Term for President, *Vol. 5.*

Social Insurance

Accident, *Vol. 4.*

Automobile, *Vol. 15.*

Old Age, *Vols. 4, 13, 16.*

Unemployment, *Vols. 11, 12, 13.*

Socialistic Control of Production and Exchange, *Vol. 7.*

Socialism, *Vol. 14.*

Socialized Medicine, *Vols. 12, 16.*

Soldier Bonus, *Vol. 14.* (See American Legion.)

Stabilization of the Dollar, *Vol. 15.*

State Government, Reform and Change in

Abolition of Insanity Plea in Criminal Cases, *Vol. 10.*

Abolition of Jury System, *Vol. 10.*

Appointment vs. Election of Judges, *Vol. 1.*

Compulsory Automobile Insurance, *Vol. 15.*

Direct Primary, *Vol. 3.*

Initiative and Referendum, *Vol. 3.*

Recall of Judges, *Vol. 2.*

Recall of Judicial Decisions, *Vol. 4.*

Short Ballot, *Vol. 2.*

State Medical Aid, *Vols. 12, 16.*

Three-fourths Jury Decision, *Vol. 3.*

Unicameral Legislature, *Vols. 5, 16.*

State Medical Aid, *Vols. 12, 16.*

Supreme Court Reorganization, *Vol. 18.*

Swiss System of Compulsory Military Service, *Vol. 7.*

Tariff (See Free Trade, also Protection), *Vols. 1, 2, 12.*

Taxation

Income Tax, *Vols. 1, 2.*

Inheritance Tax, *Vol. 1.*

Intangible Property Tax, *Vol. 14.*

Limitation of Wealth by Income and Inheritance
Taxes, *Vols. 14, 16.*

On Rental Value of Land, *Vol. 2.*

Sales Tax, *Vol. 17.*

Single Tax, *Vol. 6.*

Telegraph and Telephone, Government Ownership of,
Vol. 6.

Three-fourths Jury Decision, *Vol. 3.*

Townsend Plan for Old Age Pension, *Vol. 16.*

Trusts, *Vol. 4.* (See also Control of Industry, *Vol. 13.*)

Unemployment Insurance, *Vols. 11, 12, 13.*

Unicameral Legislature, *Vols. 5, 16.*

Uniform Marriage and Divorce Laws, *Vol. 8.*

Union Closed Shop, *Vol. 19.*

United States Support for League Sanctions, *Vol. 17.*

Wages

 Minimum Wages, *Vols. 3, 6, 18.*

 Reduction of Wages, *Vol. 13.*

Working Week of Forty Hours, *Vol. 11.*

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY



118 325

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY